PBJyCETON,  N.   J. ^ 

Young,  John,  1805-1881. 
The  province  of  reason 


UNIFORM     WITH    THIS    VOLUME. 

THE   CHRIST  OF  HISTORY: 

AN  ARGUMENT  GROUNDED  ON  THE  PACTS 
OF   HIS    LIFE   ON   EARTH. 

By    JOHN    YOUNG    LL.D 

Price  TS  cents. 


"  It  is  an  argument  in  favor  of  the  Di\inity  of  Christ,  founded  on  the  facts 
of  his  earthly  life.  It  takes  the  lowest  ground  with  the  skeptic — excluding  all 
miracles,  and  simply  claiming  the  authenticity  of  those  recorded  facts  which 
are  free  from  question  and  all  appearance  ofexaggeration  or  delusion.  From 
these  admitted  facts,  he  constructs  an  arguuient  to  prove  that  Christ  could  not 
have  been  merely  human,  but  must  hav^'been  divine.  "What  we  admire  in 
the  argument  is  the  candor  and  fairness  with  which  it  is  conducted.  The 
evangelic  narratives  are  subjected  to  a  rigid  induction ;  nothing  is  relied  on 
that  is  not  unquestionable,  and  no  conclusion  drawn  but  such  as  is  irresistible 
to  every  honest,  logical  mind.  We  have  never  seen  this  branch  of  Christian 
evidence  so  luminously  and  fairly  treated.  The  writer  is  a  severe  and  accu- 
rate thinker,  and  is  evidently  intent,  throughout  his  whole  argument,  only 
upon  obtaining  the  truth.  For  skeptical  minds  it  must  prove  a  most  powerful 
and  impressive  work ;  while  to  all  minds  it  will  bring  the  great  features  of  the 
Eedeemer's  life  and  character  with  so  mj^h. freshness  and  force,  that  a  deep 
impression  can  hardly  be  escaped.  We  reaard  it  as  an  extraordinarily  able  and 
profitable  volume." — EvangeliHt.  ^ 


ROBERT  CiiRTER-'&  BROTHERS, 


THE 


PROVINCE  OF  REASON: 


A    CRITICISM     OP 


THE    BAMPTON    LECTURE 


ON 


^'THE  LIMITS  OF  RELIGIOUS  THOUGHT. 


» 


B  T 


JOHN  YOUNG,  LL.D.,  Edin., 

ATTTHOR      OF      "THE      CHRIST      OP      HI3TOR  T,"     B  T  O , 


NEW    YORK: 
ROBERT    CARTER    &    BROTHERS, 

No.   530    BEOADWAY. 
1860. 


T  O 


M.   P.  FOE  THE   UNIVERSITY   OF   OXFORD,    AND   FIRST   VICE-CHANCELLOR   01* 
THE   tTNIVERSITT   OF   EDINBURGH, 


THIS       -V  O  IL,  TJ  IMi  JSl , 

WHICH    ATTEMPTS   TO    EXAMINE   THE   PHILOSOPHIES 

OF    OXFORD    AND    EDINBURGH, 

AND   TO    TEST   THEIR   LEGIITMATE    RESULTS, 


IS  RESPECTFULLY  DEDICATED, 


BY    HIS    OBEDIENT    HUMBLE  SERVANT. 

JOHN  YOUNG. 
London,  Uh  April,  1860. 


PREFACE. 


There  are  some  things  so  true  and  so  great, 
as  to  be  independent  of  tlie  obscurity  or  the 
fame  of  those  who  assert  or  deny  them.  The 
humblest  individual,  gras2)ing  them  with  his 
poor  hand,  possesses  an  advantage  in  their  un- 
aided grandeur  and  force,  which  no  superior 
abilities,  acquirements,  and  culture  can  com- 
mand. 

To  me,  if  the  principles  of  the  Bampton 
Lecture  on  the  Limits  of  Beligious  Thought 
be  conceded,  the  chief  attribute  of  humanity, 
as  constituted  by  the  Great  Father,  is  laid  in 
the  dust,  the  sacred  Scrij^tures  are  an  elabor- 
ate and  meaningless  pretence,  the  possibility  of 
worship  and  of  trust  in  the  Supreme  is  de- 
stroyed, and,  above  all,  the  authority  of  con- 
science, and  the  immutable  foundations  of 
morality  are  undermined.  These,  I  think,  are 
reasons  sufficiently  jtowerful  for  attempting, 
even  with   inadequate  means,  to   counteract  the 


vill  PREFACE. 

influence  of  a  work  which  has  found  a  much 
wider  acceptance  than  metaphysical  writings, 
generally,  meet  w^ith   in   this   country. 

An  independent,  exhaustive,  and  formal  dis- 
cussion is  not  to  he  looked  for  here,  of  the 
great  suhject  which  is  placed  as  the  title  of 
this  volume.  But  I  am  altogether  at  fault, 
if  hy  the  criticisms  and  arguments  wdiich  fol- 
low, the  rightful  Province  of  Keason  be  not 
made   out,   with   some   distinctness. 


CONTENTS. 


SECTIOX  FIRST. 

INTRODUCTORY 


CHAPTER    I. 

EEACTION. 

PAGE 

Its  inherent  Yice — History  of  Speculation — Oscillation  from 
Extreme  to  Extreme — Impartial  Investigations — Extreme 
Views  of  Brampton  Lecture — Possible  Medium 17 


CHAPTER    II. 

RATIONALISM. 

Fairly  and  Unfairly  Defined — Right  Reason  harmonious  with 
all  Truth — Desire  to  find  Harmony — Based  in  our  Nature — 
Law  of  our  Intelligence — Lower  Reason,  the  Understand- 
ing— Higher  Reason — Evil  Name,  Rationalism — Partly 
Merited 23 


CHAPTER    III. 

GERMAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  RATIONALISM. 

Kant — ^Hamilton's  Relation  to  him — Kantian  System — Two 
Chief  Evils — Fichte — His  Relation  to  Kant — Idealism — Re- 
lation to  Spinoza — Pantheism,  Fatalism — Deep  Influence  on 
Germany — Schelling — Personally,  no  Pantheist — InteUec- 
lectual    Intuition — Mysticism — Hegel,    the    Philosopher — 


CONTENTS. 

PAGE 

"The  Absolute"=l8t,  Being;  2d,  Xon-being;  3d,  The  Be- 
coming="  The  Idea" — Basis,  mere  assumption — Carried 
into  Sphere  of  Religion — German  Rationalism — Where  ? 
A  Rationalism,  Rererent,  "Wise 30 


SECTION  SECOXD. 
COXCERXIXG   APPLICATIOXS   OF  LOGIC. 


CHAPTER     I. 

PRELIillNARY   CRITICISMS. 

Method  of  Bampton  Lecture — Laid  down,  but  Abandoned — 
Over-Confidence — Difficulties  of  Investigation — Virtually 
Hamilton's  Arguments  —  "  Infinite  "  distinguished  from 
"Absolute" — Groundless — Two,  essentially  the  same 59 

CHAPTER    II. 

"the  infinite,"  "the  absolute,"  etc. 

Infinity  of  Attributes — Contradiction — All,  Actual  and  Possi- 
ble in  Absolute— " The  One,"  "The  All"— Shifting  and 
Substitution  of  Terms — Contradictory  Reasoning — Illustra- 
tions— Potential  and  Actual — Confusion — Materialistic  Ten- 
dency      68 

CHAPTER    III. 

CAUSATION,    etc. 

Hamilton's  very  Argument — Here,  no  Force — Hamilton's  Idea 
of  Cause — Of  "Absolute" — Lecturer's,  opposite — Hamilton's 
formally  Abandoned  —  Here,  Adopted — Grave,  Logical 
Blunder — Contradictory  Reasonings — Unsupported  Asser- 
tion —  Idea  of  Creation  — Incomprehensible  —  Commence- 
ment of  Finite  Phenomena,  not — And  not  Contradictory. . .     82 


CONTENTS.  XI 

CHAPTER     IV. 

IXCONCEIV ABILITY    OF    "THE   INFINITE." 

PAGE 

Admit  Fact,  Refuse  Arguments — Nature  of  Consciousness — 
Equivocal  "  Limitation" — Infinite,  Finite — Distinction  Just 
and  Real  —  Confusion  —  Inconsequent  Reasonings — Con- 
sciousness of  Infinite  Contradictory  ? — Virtual  Skepticism — 
Natural  Theism  Impossible? — Not  Consistent  with  Facts — 
Impeachment  of  the  Almighty 95 

CHAPTER    V. 

MISCELLANEOUS     REASONINGS. 

"Infinite,"  "Absolute,"  held  Equivalent  to  God — Conclusions 
as  to  these  applied  to  this — Investigation  of  Principles  held 
wrong — Can  never  reach  Principles — Content  with  Regula- 
tions— Truth  and  Falsehood — Properties  of  our  Concep- 
tions— Hume  and  Berkeley — "  Mind  Cramped  by  own 
Laws,"  etc. — Unmitigated  Skepticism — Inconsistency  of 
Reasoning — Suicidal 108 


SECTION  THIRD. 


CONCERNING   A   PHILOSOPHY   OF   "THE   UN- 
CONDITIONED "  ETC. 


CHAPTER    I. 

RELATION   OF   THE   SCOTTISH   AND   OXONIAN   PHILOSOPHIES. 

Hamilton  and  Mr.  Maurice — Scottish  System — Chief  Fault — 
Excellences — Entire  Separation  from  Bampton  Lecture — 
"The  Unconditioned,"  etc. — Assumptions  of  Rationalism — 
Cousin — Realism  of  Hamilton — Wrote  in  Interest  of  Phi- 
losophy, and  of  Logic — Lecturer,  of  Theology — Hamilton's 
Conclusions,  and  his,  opposite 12"? 


XU  CONTENTS, 

CHAPTER     II. 

MEANING   OF   "THE  UNCONDITIONED,"  ETC. 

FAGS 

No  Unconditioned,  no  Absolute — Never,  to  Created  Spirit — 
"Infinite,"  Incomprehensible — 0/,  concerning  In&nite — No 
Idea,  then  Nothing —  Word  Infinite,  Understood — How  ? — 
Infinite,  not  Wliole  Sphere  of  Divine — Eternal — This  In- 
finity proper — All  possible  Attributes — Power,  Knowl- 
edge— He,  who  Infinite,  not  all  Inconceivable — Human 
Spirit  and  Highest— Human  Personality  and  Divine — 
Human  Intelligence  and  Divine — Moral  Attributes  and 
Divine — Man,  true  Microcosm 146 


SECTIOJ(  FOURTH. 
CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 


CHAPTER     I. 

NECESSARY   CONDITIONS. 

Must  believe  G-od  is — That  Intelligent — Free  Intelligence- 
Truthful,  Benignant — Independently,  these  Conclusions — 
If  not,  no  Revelation  to  Man 113 


CHAPTER     II. 

EVIDENCES     OF    REVELATION. 

External  Evidence — TVhat? — Impossible  to  Multitudes — In 
Fulness,  to  any — Book,  Divine  in  Origin — Contents  un- 
known— Faith  to  seek — Internal  Evidence — What  ? — Self- 
attestation — Its  Power 183 


CONTENTS.  xm 

CHAPTER    III. 

REVELATION  AND  GOD. 

PAGE 

Is  Grod  Revealed  ? — As  He  is,  as  is  not  ? — Presented,  repre- 
sented ? — Representation — Revelation — True  or  False  ? — 
Types,  Images — Their  Meaning  and  Use — Fearful,  if  Very 
God,  not  Revealed. 200 


SECTION  FIFTH. 
CONCERNING  MORALITY  AND  MORAL  SENSE. 


CHAPTER    I. 

THE  RELATIVE  AND  THE  REAL. 

Relation  to  Faculties  of  Knower — Phenomena — Also  Nou- 
mena — Ground  to  believe  this — Consciousness  not  falla- 
cious— Knowing  Faculty  not  fallacious — Minds  generically 
same — Limited,  not  therefore  unreal 225 

CHAPTER    II. 

MODIFICATIONS   OP   MORALITY 

Kant — Practical  and  Pure  Reason — Logically  wrong,  morally 
right — Thought-Forms — Time,  Space,  Personality — No  new 
Limitations — Moral  Ideas  not  modified  by  Laws  of  Thought 
— Mind  reflects  truly — ^Not  cramped  by  its  own  Forms. ...  236 

CHAPTER    III. 

IMMUTABLE  RIGHT   AND   WRONG. 

Incapable  of  judging  of  Divine  ? — Infinite  Morality  ? — Abso- 
lute Morality  ?  —  Contradictory  —  Bolingbroke  —  Practical 
Rules — Eternal  Principles — No  Modification — Varied  Ap- 
plications— Conscience — Supreme  Authority 248 


Xiv  CONTENTS. 

SECTION  SIXTH. 
CONCERNING  REASON  AND  FAITH. 


PAGB 

Faith,  as  Act  of  Understanding — Knowledge,  Basis,  and  Meas- 
ure of — Its  Distinctions  —  Consciousness  —  Intuitions  of 
Sense — Of  Reason — Sphere  of  Responsibility — Character 
of  Faith — Determined  by  its  Grounds — Fact  of  Conscious- 
ness, enough — Its  own  Ground — Mere  Act  of  Faith,  noth- 
ing— Primary  Beliefs— Mansel's  Statements — Hamilton's — 
Ground  of  Faith — Always  understanding,  Higher  Reason, 
or  both — Revelation — God  trustworthy — Understanding, 
Reason,  and  Conscience  proclaim — Harmony  of  these  pow- 
ers— No  Discord  —  Spirit  of  Fault  —  Piercing  Eye — The 
Perfect  Light 2*73 


SECTION   FIRST. 


INTRODUCTORY. 


Chapter 

I. — Reaction. 
II. — Rationalism. 
III. — Geeman  Philosophical  Rationalism. 


PROVINCE    OF    REASON. 


CHAPTER    I. 

REACTION. 


Its  inherent  Vice — History  of  Speculaton — Oscillation  from  Ex- 
treme to  Extreme — Impartial  Investigation — Extreme  Views 
of  Bampton  Lecture — Possible  Medium. 

The  old  truism  renews  itself,  with  each  age,  in 
each  struggle  of  opinions,  bearing  not  partially  on 
one  side  of  a  debated  question,  but  honestly  and 
equally  on  both.  "  Reaction  rarely  can  be  tem- 
perately wise  or  even  simply  just/'  The  vice  is 
inherent,  ineradicable.  The  excess  which  provokes 
reaction,  by  a  law  as  constant  as  any  power  in 
material  nature,  never  fails  to  beget  its  counter- 
part, in  a  compensating  excess,  in  the  opposite 
direction.  In  the  moment  of  keen,  perhaps  pas- 
sionate debate,  truth  is  never,  only  and  altogether^ 
with  either  of  two  antagonist  sections,  but  partly 
with  both,  and  often  in  marvellously  equal  propor- 
tion. A  silent  verity  lies  underneath  every  position, 
which  has  the  force  to  attract  around  it  resolute 


18  INTRODUCTORY. 

and  honest  adherents.  There  is,  also,  always  lurk- 
ing error  in  the  selectest  combination,  let  the  party 
symhol  embody  ever  so  large  an  amount  of  truth. 
In  the  middle  space  between  opposite  extremes, 
verging  now  in  the  direction  of  the  one,  and  again 
in  the  direction  of  the  other,  will  be  found  that, 
which  is  far  above  all  parties — the  imperishable, 
the  immutable,  the  divine. 

The  history  of  speculation  reveals  an  incessant 
action  and  reaction  of  the  mind  of  the  ages,  on  the 
highest  subjects  of  human  thought.  Instead  of 
normal  and  j^rogressive  intellectual  efforts,  spring- 
ing from  mthin,  from  a  wdsely-balanced  organism, 
obedient  to  its  governing  laws,  men  have  been  pro- 
voked or  betrayed  into  opinions,  have  been  hurried 
by  prejudices,  have  been  blindly  enamored  of  some 
peculiar  theory,  perhaps  their  own,  have  been  in- 
flamed by  a  passion  for  victory,  instead  of  a  love 
for  truth,  and  have  acted  in  a  spirit  of  partizanship 
and  of  rivalry ;  or  they  have  obeyed  the  secret  force 
of  mental  idiosvncracies,  the  existence  of  which  in 
themselves  they  did  not  suspect.  The  result  has 
been,  successive  oscillations,  from  extreme  to  ex- 
treme, always  both  right  and  both  wrong,  though 
in  unequal  degrees.  The  periods  of  dispassionate, 
catholic  and  steadily  advancin2;  invcstio:ation  have 
been  often  remote  from  one  another,  nidelv  broken 
up  by  exaggerations  and  extravagances  in  one  direc- 
tion, which  again  have  given  birth  to  exaggerations 


REACTION.  19 

and  extravagances,  as  great  or  greater  in  the  oppo- 
site direction. 

In  this  country,  and  at  this  moment,  we  seem 
to  be  in  the  presence  of  a  strong  reaction,  as  well 
in  the  department  of  mental  philosophy,  as  in  a 
higher  and  more  sacred  sphere  still.  Opposite 
schools  are  in  collision  ;  no  one,  as  yet,  being  ac- 
knoAvledged  to  have  made  good  a  j)ermanent,  ex- 
clusive occupation  of  the  vantage  ground.  Such  a 
state  of  things  may  have  its  unquestionable  bene- 
fits, but  there  is  also  no  small  peril  to  the  interests 
of  the  highest  truth,  which  may  be  sacrificed  to 
unfounded  prejudices,  or  to  the  violence  of  un- 
worthy passions.  Perhaps  only  one  thing  is  quite 
certain,  neither  extreme  of  the  opposing  sections 
will  be  wholly  right,  neither  will  be  wholly  wrong. 
To  discover  that,  in  each,  which  is  true,  is  the  brave 
and  great  work  imposed  on  us  by  our  age,  and  it 
demands  an  impartial,  searching,  fearless,  candid, 
broad  spirit  of  investigation. 

No  injustice  is  done  to  the  celebrated  work  of 
which  we  are  about  to  venture  a  criticism,  in  saying 
that  it  is  the  birth  of  a  reaction,  and  is  formally 
designed  to  crush  what  is  deemed  an  excessive  and 
dangerous  rationalism.  The  lecturer  states  as  much 
in  plain  terms,  and  perhaps  his  deservedly  admired 
production  bears  upon  it,  sufficiently  strongly 
marked,  the  peculiar  taint  of  a  reactionary  efi'ort. 
It  is  extreme — and  here,  without  reasoning  at  all, 


20  INTRODUCTORY. 

I  may  be  allowed  to  cluster  together  in  as  few  sen- 
tences as  possible  the  first  strong  impressions  pro- 
duced on  my  own  mind,  which  may  also  have  been 
awakened  in  other  minds,  by  this  book.  "It  is 
extreme.  It  goes  too  far,  to  be  quite  within  the 
law  of  equity  and  wisdom.  It  is  too  exterminating, 
too  mercilessly  destructive  to  be  wholly  merited. 
The  efiect  also  is  utterly  depressing  and  prostrat- 
ing. Limited  as  human  powers  confessedly  are, 
we  shudder  at  abject  intellectual  denudation.  It 
is  one  thing  to  admire  heartily  the  extended  and 
varied  learning  of  an  accomplished  writer,  the 
vigorous,  sometimes  eloquent  periods  that  flow 
from  his  joractised  pen,  his  dialectic  power,  his 
logical  subtilty,  facility  and  courage,  and  to  bow 
unfeignedly  to  the  purity  of  his  motives  ;  but  it  is 
quite  another  thing  to  consent  to  the  justice  of  his 
conclusions.  No.  The  impression  abides  and  deep- 
ens— it  is  too  much  :  it  can  not  be  true  ;  these 
principles  are  not  in  harmony  with  the  deep  con- 
victions lodged  in  our  nature,  or  with  our  most 
cherished  hopes.  Man  must  be  able  to  know  more 
of  the  Great  Being  than  this  writer  will  allow,  must 
be  able  to  reach  some  essentially  true  thoughts, 
respecting  him.  Nor  is  it  doubtful,  as  he  asserts 
it  is,  whether  what  constitutes  virtue,  moral  excel- 
lence on  earth  among  men,  does  also  constitute 
virtue,  moral  excellence,  among  all  orders  of  ra- 
tional creatures.      Conscience  is  not  a  temporary 


REACTION.  21 

guide  for  this  world  only,  is  not  the  proclaimer  of 
arbitrary  distinctions  and  of  mere  human  modifica- 
tions of  morality,  but  a  divine  voice  in  the  soul, 
announcing  what  is  eternally,  immutably,  univer- 
sally right — right  in  itself,  right  for  men,  right  for 
all  rational  beings,  and  light  for  ever  and  ever  ! 

''  Here  is  a  high  and  extended  argument — an 
elaborate  book  !  On  what  ?  The  Infinite,  the 
Unconditioned,  the  Absolute.  This  author  boldly 
goes  into  the  region  of  inconceivable,  a  prioi^i 
truths,  the  region  of  pure  abstraction,  the  region 
of  mere  subjective  logic.  But  the  principle  which 
he  seeks  to  establish,  is  that  the  human  mind  is 
incapable  of  reasoning  respecting  the  Infinite,  in- 
caj^able  of  conceiving  the  Infinite  at  all.  Either 
his  course  is  legitimate,  and  then  his  principle  is 
demolished  ;  or  his  course  is  illegitimate  and  nug- 
atory, and  then  his  principle  is  yet  undefended, 
unestablished.  In  any  case,  the  false  impression 
is  created  that  human  reason  must  be  an  irrecon- 
cilable foe  to  Christians  and  to  <i;)hristianity  for 
nothing,  it  seems,  will  content  them  but  to  forbid 
imperatively  every  efi'ort  of  reason  to  approach 
and  adore  the  Great  Being.  And  then,  the  evil 
is  a  grave  and  terrible  one,  that  j^hilosophy  and 
religion  alike  are  left  surrounded  with  insoluble 
contradictions  and  impenetrable  uncertainties.  Is 
not  the  inference  inevitable,  that  in  this  case,  it  is 
the  part  of  wisdom  to  have  as  little  as  possible  to 


22  INTRODUCTORY. 

do  with  either  ?  So  far  as  this  book  is  concerned, 
many  will  fairly  judge,  that  men  have  two  and 
only  two  things  before  them.  Either,  they  must 
blindly  accept  as  divine  a  revolution,  whose  exter- 
nal evidences — and  with  these  the  author  main- 
tains, and  these  only,  reason  has  anything  to  do — 
it  is  literally  impossible  for  myriads  of  them  to 
examine,  flattering  themselves  that  this  is  faith  ; 
or  they  must  hopelessly  suiTender  to  a  universal 
scepticism,  calling  this  the  light  of  reason." 

Such,  I  believe,  will  be  the  first  involuntary  im- 
pressions of  at  least  one  class  of  minds,  after  the 
perusal  of  these  Lectures.  The  question  is,  Can 
our  first  impressions  bear  second  thoughts  ?  Have 
they  solid  ground  to  rest  upon  ?  This  remarkable 
book,  professedly  a  defence  of  Kevelation  and  a 
determination  of  the  legitimate  province  of  human 
reason,  which  has  been  welcomed  cordially  by  a 
large  ]3ortion  of  the  public — dare  we  venture  to 
suspect  that  it  may,  after  all,  be  unsound  in  its 
fundamental  principles,  injurious  to  our  most  sa- 
cred interests,  and  dishonoring  to  one  of  the  no- 
blest endowments  with  which  man  has  been  gifted 
by  his  Maker.     Let  us  examine  and  judge. 


CHAPTER   II. 


RATIONALISM. 


Fairly  and  unfairly  defined — Right  Reason  harmonious  with  all 
Trutli — Desire  to  find  Harmony — Based  in  our  Nature — Law  of 
our  Intelligence — Lower  Reason,  Understanding — Higher  Rea- 
son— Evil  Xame,  Rationalism — Partly  merited. 

Among  the  minor,  but  decisive  proofs  of  the 
reactionary  character,  which  pervades  the  work 
before  us,  we  mark  the  language,  and  especially 
the  tone  in  which  rationalism  so  called,  is  de- 
scribed. The  word,  not  without  just  occasion,  has 
come  to  be  of  bad  odor  ;  but  in  its  etymological 
sense,  it  is  a  faultless  and  excellent  word.  The 
idea  which  it  conveys  is  in  entire  harmony  with 
the  nature  of  rational  beings,  is  indeed  the  proper 
and  necessary  demand  of  that  nature. 

Rationalism,  rightly  so  called,  is  not  a  sectional, 
but  a  universal  faith.  He  who  accepts  cordially  a 
doctrine  laid  down  in  what  he  holds  to  be  the 
Book  of  Inspiration,  does  not  hesitate  to  ask,  and 
expects  to  find,  and  does  actually  find,  in  most 
cases,  that,  besides  its  external  authoritative  sanc- 
tion, it  is  commended  to  his  mind  as  true  in  itself, 
and  in  harmony  with  other  truths,  and  with  those 


24  INTRODUCTORY. 

general  principles  of  belief,  which  belong  to  the 
constitution  of  our  rational  nature.     Without  ex- 
ceptiouj  all  who  are  capable  of  any  mental  effort, 
are  conscious  of  a  profound  desire  to  discover  a 
consistency  between  the  dictates  of  their  intelli- 
gence, and  the  articles  of  their  faith,  be  that  faith 
what  it  may.     Very  many  things  they  may  be  un- 
able perfectly  to  harmonize,  and  are  satisfied  to 
leave  unsolved.     But  the  effort  in  other  directions 
is  continued,  notwithstanding.     The  desire  is  not 
extinguished.     It   is  hrepressible.     It  belongs   to 
our  nature,  to  search  and  strive  after  inward  har- 
mony,  after   the  reconciliation   of   things,   which 
must  be  really  one,  whether  we  be  able  to  discover 
their  unity  or  not.     So  universal,  so  irrepressible, 
is  this  tendency,  that  it  can  only  be  looked  upon 
as  a  law  of  our  intelligence.     And  how  vain  to 
force  back  the  rushing  spirit  of  investigation,  which 
obeys  a  power  as  mighty  as  that  which  governs 
the  ocean  in  its  ebb  and  flow  !     How  vain  to  deter 
men  from  that  to  which  the  structure  of  their  minds 
prompts  them  !     How  worse  than  vain,  to  stigma- 
tize as  crime  an  act  of  obedience  to  a  constitu- 
tional principle  ! 

The  fact  is,  that  the  desire  to  reconcile  our  rea- 
son (using  the  word  in  its  current  popular  sense, 
as  synonymous  with  general  human  intelligence,) 
and  our  creed,  be  that  creed  what  it  may,  Jewish, 
Christian,    Mohammedan,    or   Pagan,  rests   on   a 


RATIONALISM.  25 

foundation  as  deep  as  any  which  our  nature  knows. 
Let  it  be  ovanted  on  the  one  hand  that  there  is  an 
outward  -syritten  revelation.  But  it  is  as  surely 
believed,  on  the  other  hand,  that  there  is,  also,  an 
inward  unwritten  revelation  in  our  intelligent  na- 
ture. Both  have  the  same  origin — they  must  be 
perfectly  harmonious.  The  voice  of  truth  from 
without  must  be  essentially  at  one  with  the  voice 
of  truth  from  within.  That  is  the  secret  convic- 
tion of  every  mind,  and  it  is  indestructible.  If 
consciousness — as  Sir  William  Hamilton,  and  we 
presume  Mr.  Manseil,  holds — be  a  revelation  of  the 
facts  of  our  inward  being,  it  admits  of  no  doubt 
at  all,  that  not  the  least  authoritive  portion  of  the 
revelation  must  be  that  w^hich  embodies  the  data 
of  our  higher  reason.  Our  native  cognitions,  be 
they  many  or  few,  the  necessary  truths  lying  in 
the  depths  of  our  minds,  our  rational,  and  most  of 
all  our  moral  intuitions,  are  to  us  the  voice  of  the 
Being  who  created  us.  And  nothing  can  be  more 
certain  than  that  He  cannot  contradict  himself. 
The  outward,  written  revelation  may  contain  trea- 
sures unknown  to  the  inward  revelation,  and  un- 
utterably more  precious.  But  so  far  as  they  go 
the  two  must  he  in  perfect,  absolute  harmony, 
whether  we  be  able  to  make  it  out,  or  not. 

Even  our  lower  reason — reason  in  the  common 
meaning  of  the  word,  the  fair  and  sound  conclusions  , 
of  the  understanding  proper,  the  comparing  and 


26  INTRODUCTORY. 

judging  faculty — must  be  essentially  at  one  with  all 
truth.  Imperfect  and  fallible  as  the  humnn  under- 
standing is,  it  is  the  highest,  it  is  the  only  instru- 
ment of  judging,  which  our  Maker  has  granted  to 
us.  Within  its  own  sphere,  wisely  and  rightly  em- 
ployed, it  must  be  trustworthy  ;  at  all  events,  we 
have  nothing  else,  as  rational  beings,  by  which  to 
compare,  discriminate  and  affirm,  or  deny,  in  any 
case.  But  be  the  confidence  which  we  repose  in 
our  mere  understanding  ever  so  limited,  we  are 
compelled  to  put  unlimited  trust  in  our  higher 
reason,  in  the  primitive  data  of  our  rational  and 
moral  nature.  These  must  be  altogether  divine. 
The  mysterious  intuitions  that  result  from  no  ex- 
perience of  ours,  but  come  forth  from  that  locus 
principioruniy  to  whose  contents  we  have  contrib- 
uted nothino-  and  can  never  contribute  anvthino;, 
are  a  true  and  proper  revelation  from  our  Creator, 
and  can  only  be  in  perfect  harmony  with  every 
other  communication  from  the  same  great  source. 
We  may  mistake  the  inward  message,  as  we  may 
mistake  the  outward.  There  may  be  interpolations 
and  various  readings  in  the  one,  as  there  are  also 
in  the  other.  And  different  commentators  and 
critics,  American,  Asiatic,  African,  European,  Ger- 
man, French,  British,  according  to  their  mental 
structure  or  their  training,  or  their  taste,  may  be 
prompted  and  may  find  it  possible,  to  bring  out 
different  meanings  from  the  one,  as  they  have  also 


RATIONALISM.  27 

from  the  other.     But  the  essential  harmony  of  the 
two  is  indubitable. 

This  is  the  foundation,  the  deep  ground  of  that 
tendency,  which  is  strictly  universal,  though  often 
unavowed,  perhaps,  even,  often  unperceived.  And 
shall  ifc  be  denounced  as  wicked  ?  Is  the  desire  an 
impious  one,  to  perceive  the  essential  harmony  be- 
tween the  nature  with  which  our  Creator  has  en- 
dowed us  and  what  claims  to  be  His  written  reve- 
lation ?  Is  the  mental  effort  to  search  till  we 
discover,  and  as  far  as  it  is  possible  for  us  to 
discover  this  harmony,  of  such  a  nature,  that  a 
philosopher  must  frown  upon  it  and  forbid  it 
peremptorily  ?  On  the  contrary,  is  it  not  in 
every  way  becoming,  and  right,  and  imperative, 
forced  on  us  by  a  clamorous  want  within,  and  de- 
manded, as  a  sacred  duty,  springing  out  of  venera- 
tion of  the  Great  Being  ? 

It  is  not  denied  that  there  are  evils,  possible  and 
real  evils,  connected  with  the  free  exercise  of  the 
understanding  within  the  domain  of  religion.  In- 
stead of  humility,  and  reverence,  and  faith,  a  hard- 
ened, j)resumptuous,  impious  spirit  shall  create 
most  revolting  confusion  between  the  respective 
claims  of  man  and  his  Creator.  But  every  good 
thing  on  this  earth  must  be  accepted,  if  accepted 
at  all,  with  grievous  deductions.  Liberty  always 
and  everywhere,  is  in  danger  of  degenerating  into 
licentiousness,  yet  with  all  its  chances  of  abuse  it 


28  INTRODUCTORY. 

may  not  be  exchanged,  one  instant,  for  the  Upas 
shade  of  despotism.  Truth  in  like  manner  may 
be  pushed  to  extreme,  and  may  pass  into  extrava- 
gance and  absurdity,  but  it  must  be  left  perfectly 
free  nevertheless,  exposed  to  all  manner  of  perver- 
sions, and  is  only  endangered  by  pretended  safe- 
guards, material  or  spiritual.  And  that  desire, 
deeply  based  in  our  nature,  the  desire  not  to  bring 
the  dictates  of  our  intelligence  to  revelation  or 
revelation  to  them,  for  either  would  be  dishonest, 
but  to  make  out,  ever  in  greater  extent,  the  real 
and  perfect  harmony  between  the  two  ;  this  desire 
is  not  to  be  crushed,  to  whatever  possible  evils  it 
may  give  rise.  It  cannot  be  crushed.  Desire  or 
do  what  we  may,  it  will  not  be  crushed  ;  and  the 
attempt  to  crush  it  is  ignoble  as  it  is  futile.  Vir- 
tually, it  is  the  old  struggle  revived,  ever  in  vain, 
between  might  and  right,  between  authority  and 
intelligence,  between  blind  superstition  and  enlight- 
ened faith.  What  the  faggot  and  the  fire  of  other 
times  failed  to  accomplish  is  not  likely  to  be  ac- 
complished by  a  ponderous  and  rigorous  dialectic,  a 
hard,  cold,  and  passionless  logic.  Divine  Kevela- 
tion  and  right  reason  have  one  source  ;  it  is  a 
very  sacred  thing  to  strive  to  see,  it  would  be 
very  wrong  not  to  strive  to  see  that  they  utter  one 
voice. 

But  Rationalism,  so  called,  has  a  general  evil 
reputation.     Deservedly  it  has  an  evil  reputation, 


RATIONALISM.  29 

owing  to  misapplications  and  abuses  sanctioned 
by  some  of  its  nominal  disciples,  perhaps  amongst 
uSj  certainly,  in  other  quarters.  The  power  of  the 
understanding  has  been  exaggerated  and  a  much 
wider  province  has  been  claimed  for  the  human 
faculties,  than  belongs  to  them  rightfully.  The 
most  sacred  authority  has  been  invaded  and  the 
proper  liberty  of  scientific  criticism  has  passed,  in 
some  instances,  to  licentiousness.  This  is  the  ex- 
treme on  one  side,  and  it  is  worthy  of  just  condem- 
nation. But  it  is  not  just  to  represent,  as  the 
Bampton  lecturer  has  done,  the  extreme  as  the 
thing  itself — the  extreme,  too,  in  its  very  worst 
form,  a  form  unknown  to  this  country,  limited,  at 
all  events,  to  a  few  solitary  individuals  who  reject 
Chistianity  altogether,  and  are,  certainly,  not  wor- 
thy of  prominent  consideration,  or  entitled  to  the 
rank  of  leaders  of  public  opinion. 


CHAPTER   III. 

GEEMAN  PHILOSOPHICAL  EATIONALISM. 

Kant— Hamilton's  Relation  to  him— Kantian  System— Two  Chief 
Evils — Fichte — His  Relation  to  Kant — Ideahsm — Relation  to 
Spiaoza — Pantheism,  Fatalism — Deep  Influence  on  Germany — 
Schelling — Personally,  no  Pantheist — Intellectual  Intuition — 
Mysticism— Hegel,  the  Philosopher — "  The  Absolute"=  1st. 
Being;  2d.  Non-Being;  3d.  the  Becoming="  The  Idea— Basis, 
mere  Assumption — Carried  into  Sphere  of  Religion — German 
Rationahsm — Where  ? — A  Rationalism,  Reverent,  Wise. 

GrERMANY  IS  the  imagined  birtli-j)lace  and  home 
of  rationalism  proper,  which,  as  currently  under- 
stood, simply  means  the  wildest  infidelity.  The 
philosophy  and  theology  of  that  country  are  asso- 
ciated in  the  minds  of  many  with  all  that  is  law- 
less, absurd,  and  impious.  And  certainly,  in  no 
other  region,  shall  we  find  any  thing  answering  to 
the  modes  of  thought  which  are  exposed  in  the 
Bampton  Lecture.  Those  who  are  unacquainted 
with  Gi-ermany  can  scarcely  be  capable  of  doing 
justice,  either  to  the  errors  which  the  lecturer 
assails,  or  to  his  method  of  combatting  them. 
There  was  needed  for  most  of  his  readers,  I  appre- 
hend, in  order  to  intelligent  appreciation,  some 
account — ^if  touching  only  the  leading,  uppermost 


GERMAN    PHILOSOPHICAL    RATIONALISM.         31 

points — of  the  speculations  of  Kant,  Fichte,  Schel- 
ling,  and  Hegel,  to  whom  chiefly  allusion  is  made. 
I  find  myself  obliged,  for  my  own  sake,  and  that 
my  future  statements  and  reasonings  may  be  un- 
derstood, to  attempt  something  of  this  kind,  though 
it  can  only  be  very  imperfect  and  very  general. 
The  difficulty  is  unusually  great,  of  putting  into 
small  compass,  an  account  at  all  intelligible  and 
satisfactory. 

My  statement  can  have  little  value  save  that,  as 
the  mode  in  which  a  common  mind  has  striven  to 
bring  a  hard  subject  within  its  conception,  it  may 
be  the  more  easily  apprehensible  by  ordinary  men. 

Emanuel  Kant  is  esteemed  the  arch-heretic  of 
Germany,  the  father  of  a  rationalism,  which  for 
more  than  half  a  century  flooded  the  Continent, 
almost  unchecked,  and  well-nigh  swept  away  the 
most  sacred  mental  heritage  of  the  nation.  Were 
this  true,  or  anything  like  truth,  that  grave  and 
2;ood  man  must  have  thorouo;hly  misunderstood 
his  own  office  and  actual  w^ork.  His  conscious  and 
determined  aim  was  directly  the  reverse.  At  a 
time  when  the  idealism  of  Hume  had  found  dis- 
ciples all  over  Europe,  and  when  the  materialism 
and  atheism  of  Voltaire,  D'Holbach,  and  the  En- 
cyclopaedists had  infected  Germany  to  its  very  core, 
and  were  spreading  fast  and  far,  Kant  stood  for- 
ward a  philosophic,  I  might  say,  a  religious  re- 
former.    He,  at  least,  honestly  intended  to  build 


32  INTRODUCTORY. 

up  an  impregnable  defence  for  philosophy  and  for 
religion  against  the  worst  assaults  of  scepticism. 
If  the  actual  effect  was  widely  different  from  the 
original  intention — if,  as  has  been  said  with  some 
bitterness,  but  also  with  a  little  truth,  he  has  only 
laid  a  more  thoroughly  logical  basis  for  infidelity — 
at  least  his  sincerity  is  unquestionable.  And  his 
philosophy,  now  better  understood  and  more  fairly 
applied,  forms  a  grand  landmark  in  the  progress  of 
European  enlightenment.  Many  who  vehemently 
cry  out  against  the  transcendental  nonsense  of 
Kant,  the  same  persons  who  eagerly  take  refuge  in 
the  system  of  Sir  William  Hamilton,  as  the  bul- 
wark of  religion,  are  little  aware  of  the  actual  rela- 
tion which  these  two  philosophical  chiefs  bear  to 
one  another. 

There  are  seveml  and  very  important  points  of 
difference  between  the  Scottish  and  the  Kantian 
philosophies.  But,  passing  over  the  terminology, 
which,  in  the  one  case,  is  simple,  and  in  the  other, 
is  barbarous  and  nearly  unintelligible,  none  wdia 
are  acquainted  with  both,  and  without  prejudice 
against  either,  will  dispute  that  the  philosophy  of 
Sir  William  Hamilton  is  virtually  and  essentially 
the  philosophy  of  Kant.  The  points  of  resemblance 
are  leading  and  striking.  Consciousness,  the  au- 
thoritative witness  of  all  mental  phenomena,  is  the 
basis  of  both.  The  two  mental  forms  of  time  and 
space,  which  mold  the  acts  of  consciousness,  are 


GERMAN   PHILOSOPHICAL   RATIONALISM.         33 

common  to  both.  So  also  are  the  fact  of  pure  a 
priori  truths  made  known  by  consciousness,  and 
the  two  principles  of  universality  and  necessity  by 
which  such  truths  are  tested.  So  also  is  the  grand, 
general  disti'ibution  of  all  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness into  those  of  knowledge,  and  feeling,  and 
conation,  or  desire  and  will.  And  on  wdiat  may 
be  called  Sir  William  Hamilton's  great  principle, 
of  a  philosophy  of  the  conditioned  being  alone  pos- 
sible, has  anything  more  explicit  been  uttered  than 
these  words  of  Kant  ?  "  This  refusal  of  our  reason 
to  afford  a  satisfactory  ausw^er  to  speculative  ques- 
tions, extending  beyond  this  life,  is  a  hint  from  it, 
to  divert  our  self-cognition  from  fruitless  transcend- 
ant  specidation  to  fruitful  practical  use  ;  w^iich, 
although  it  is  always  directed  only  to  objects  of 
experience,  still  takes  up  its  principle  at  a  higher 
point,  and  thus  determines  its  procedure,  as  if  our 
destiny  extended  infinitely  far  beyond  experience, 
and  consequently  out  beyond  this  life."'-'' 

But  notwithstanding  the  close  relation  of  the 
two  philosophies,  it  is  not  difficult  to  account  for 
the  aversion — to  use  no  harsher  term — with  w^hich 
Kant  has  been  and  is  regarded  among  us,  and  for 
the  actual,  evil  results  to  which  his  system  gave 
occasion  in  his  own  country.  That  all  our  knowl- 
edge can  be  only  relative,  not  absolute,  that  it  is 
of  phenomena  only  and  not  of  things  in  se,  is  not 

*  Kritik  derreiner  Vernun/t,  Seite  421.     Frankfort,  1791. 

2* 


34  INTRODUCTORY. 

peculiar  to  him,  but  is  equally  maintained  by  Sir 
William  Hamilton.  The  chief  vulnerable  points 
in  the  Kantian  system,  the  sources  of  that  fatal 
direction  which  it  gave  to  speculation,  appear  to 
me  to  be  the  two  following  : 

I.  The  false  valuation  of  the  subjective  and  the 
objective  resj)ectively.  The  non-ego ^  with  Kant,  is 
next  to  nothing  ;  the  ego  is  all  but  everything. 
The  reality  of  the  non-ego  is  not  denied.  He  finds 
it  in  consciousness.  He  finds  it  also  a  pure  under- 
standing-cognition, under  the  category  of  substance. 
But  it  is  reduced  to  the  smallest  possible  minimum. 
There  is  an  unknown  substratum  of  phenomena  ; 
but  the  phenomena,  excepting  this  inherence  in  an 
unknown  substratum,  are  wholly  dependent  on  the 
ego,  a  result  arising  from  the  laws  of  our  sensibility 
and  the  forms  of  the  understanding.  The  non-ego 
is  all  but  phenomenal,  far  more  subjective  than  ob- 
jective. Even  the  ego  itself  is,  in  a  wide  sense, 
phenomenal ;  that  is  to  say,  the  ego  of  conscious- 
ness is  only  the  manifested,  the  phenomenized  ego. 
The  I,  thinking,  feeling,  or  willing,  is  a  phenome- 
non of  consciousness.  But  there  is  something  else, 
and  far  more,  which  never  comes  up  as  phenome- 
non. The  real  ego  is  behind,  underneath — an  un- 
known substratum,  substance.  It  is  impossible 
not  to  see  the  tendency  of  this  to  lead  either  to 
scepticism,  on  the  one  hand,  or  to  pure  subjective 


GERMAN   PHILOSOPHICAL    RATIONALISM.         35 

idealism,  on  the  other — a  tendency  which  was  too 
speedily  developed  in  both  directions. 

II.  A  more  fatal  portion  still  of  the  Kantian 
system  is  that,  wherein  what  are  held  to  be  the 
necessary  contradictions  of  the  pure  reason,  are  set 
forth.  This  is  the  portion,  it  must  be  noted,  which 
in  its  spirit,  and,  to  some  extent,  in  its  very  form, 
has  been  reproduced  in  the  Bampton  Lecture  ;  to 
be  followed,  there  is  reason  to  fear,  unless  some 
sufficient  corrective  and  repellant  be  forthcoming, 
by  not  less  lamentable  consequences.  The  doctrine 
of  creation,  that  of  identity  and  immortality,  that 
of  liberty  and  necessity,  and  that  of  the  neces- 
sary existence  of  the  Deity,  are  those  wherein 
Kant  concludes,  there  exists  for  the  pure  reason 
inevitable  contradiction.  The  sphere  to  which  these 
doctrines  belong,  according  to  Kant,  is  that  of  the 
unconditioned,  and  it  is  this  sphere,  from  which  it 
is  the  great  purpose  of  the  Bampton  lecturer  to 
show,  there  can  arise  nothing  but  contradiction  to 
the  human  mind.  Only  in  ignorance  can  it  be 
imagined,  that  while  Kant  propounds  antinomies  in 
one  region,  the  English  philosopher  discovers  them 
in  another.  The  sphere  is  the  same  to  both,  and, 
virtually,  the  work  of  both  is  the  same.  But  there 
is  this  marked  difference  :  Kant,  applying  a  severe 
logic  to  the  criticism  of  the  pure  reason,  having 
discovered  what  he  deemed  natural  and  necessary 
contradictions,  was  obliged  in  stern  honesty  to  ex- 


36  INTRODUCTORY. 

pose  them.  But  he  labors,  though  unsuccessfully, 
to  show  how  they  arise,  so  as  to  save,  as  far  as  may 
be,  the  authority  of  reason.  The  English  philo- 
sopher seems  to  go  to  his  work  with  good  will, 
and  with  the  distinct  aim,  not  to  make  the  best  of 
what  may  be  confessedly  bad,  but  to  make  the  bad 
worse,  and  still  worse,  if  possible.  He  seems  to 
exhibit  satisfaction,  not  sorrow,  in  humbling  and 
maiming  human  reason,  and  fixing  on  it  the  charge 
of  weakness  and  error.  Be  this  as  it  may,  at  least 
Kant  knew  full  well  the  inherent  tendency  of  that 
portion  of  his  system  to  which  we  have  referred. 
"  Reason,''  he  says  ^'  is  hereby  led  into  the  tempta- 
tion, either  of  abandoning  itself  to  a  sceptical  hope- 
lessness, or  of  assuming  a  dogmatical  pride,  and 
cariying  its  head  stiffly  as  to  certain  assertions, 
without  granting  a  hearing  or  justice  to  the  argu- 
ments for  the  contrary.  Both  ways  are  the  death 
of  a  sound  philosophy,  although  the  first  (scepti- 
cism) may  be  called  the  euthanasia  of  pure  reason.''* 

Fichte  was  at  first  the  disciple,  and  always  the 
reverent  and  loving  admirer,  of  the  Konigsberg 
sage.  But  his  genius  was  too  real  and  too  kingly 
to  be  controlled.  Unhappily  imbibing  the  latent 
eiTors  of  the  Kantian  system,  he  developed  with 
fatal  success  the  sj)ecial  evil  which  inhered  in 
them. 

I.  On    the   one  hand,  the  exaggeration  of  the 

*  Kritik,  s.  434. 


GERMAN    PHILOSOPHICAL    RATIONALISM.         37 

subjective,  carried  so  high  by  Kant,  was  carried 
still  higher  by  Fichte.  If  the  ego  were  really  of 
such  moment  as  the  master  had  shown  it  was,  it 
must  be  of  yet  greater  moment  still,  the  disciple 
argued.  The  non-ego,  reduced  to  the  smallest 
possible  minimum  by  the  one,  was  reduced  to  nil 
by  the  other.  The  ego  and  its  manifestations  in- 
cluded everything.  Knowledge  can  only  be  of  the 
acts  of  consciousness  ;  consciousness  cannot  trans- 
cend itself  What  is  within,  it  can  bear  witness 
to,  w^hat  is  without,  if  there  be  existence  without, 
we  can  never  know.  Our  inward  sensations, 
thoughts,  acts,  and  changes  of  whatever  kind, 
belong  to  the  sphere  of  our  knowdedge  ;  nothing 
else  does.  External  phenomena  are  wholly  the 
creation  of  the  ego,  wholly  the  result  of  subjective 
changes  and  laws.  An  external  substratum  or  sub- 
stans,  even  if  such  a  thing  existed,  we  have  no 
possible  means  of  reaching.  We  can  know  only 
what  is  within  the  ego,  its  modes  and  its  acts. 
Still  further,  as  Kant  had  shown  that  the  ego 
of  consciousness  was  only  phenomenal,  and  that 
the  real  ego  "  in  se"  was  unrevealed,  Fichte  ex- 
tended the  principle  yet  farther.  With  him  the 
ego  became  not  so  much  individual  in  this  or  that 
person,  as  absolute  and  universal  in  humanity. 
And  how  near  this  was  to  a  pure,  subjective 
pantheism,  it  is  not  hard  to  perceive. 

May  we  here  venture  a  humble,  yet  sincere  word 


38  INTRODUCTORY. 

on  behalf  of  the  man,  one  of  the  brightest  and 
noblest  sons  of  the  German  fatherland,  without 
faltering  in  condemnation  of  the  system  ?  Pre- 
sently, I  shall  have  occasion  to  produce  the  words 
of  Schelling,  when  he  vehemently  resisted  the 
charge  of  pantheism  which  was  brought  against 
him,  with  gi'eater  force  of  evidence,  than  against 
any  of  his  philosophical  comperes.  But  as  vehem- 
ently and  as  sincerely  did  Fichte  resent  the  same 
charge,  and  that  of  atheism  also,  of  which  he  was 
accused.  I  do  not  profess  to  explain  how  it  was  ; 
I  do  not  understand  it.  But  it  seems,  as  if  the 
personal  faith  of  none  of  the  German  philosophers 
could  be  righteously  measured,  by  the  sytems  which 
they  founded.  These  systems,  without  exception, 
starting  from  a  mere  assumption,  w^ere  severely 
w^rought  out  by  them,  on  the  principles  of  what 
they  deemed  the  soundest  logic,  were  held  by  them 
as  sacred,  hard-gotten  possessions,  and  in  the  re- 
gion of  abstract  thought,  ruled  over  them  with  ab- 
solute sway.  But  it  would  seem  that  all  the  while 
their  real,  personal  life,  their  moral  convictions, 
and  their  religious  faith,  were  quite  apart,  as  if  in 
a  totally  different  sphere.  In  my  humble  judg- 
ment, the  metaphysical  speculations  of  Fichte, 
beginning  with  a  mere  ijetitio  principii,  are  as 
baseless  and  as  wild  as  they  are  calculated  to  be 
deeply  injurious  and  dishonoring  to  the  Great 
Being.     But  the  religious  and  moral  region  of  his 


GERMAN    PHILOSOPHICAL    RATIONALISM.         39 

soul,  in  some  unaccountable  way,  must  have  been 
preserved  notwithstanding.  Scarcely  anything  loft- 
ier, purer,  more  touching,  and  more  inspiring  in 
moral  sentiment,  is  to  be  found  anywhere,  than 
Fichte  has  indited.  The  lustre  which  encircles  his 
memory,  to  my  mind,  is  more  spiritual,  more  genial, 
more  human,  than  that  which  gathers  around  al- 
most any  other  of  the  great  names  of  Germany. 
His  life  was  a  noble  one.  His  death  approached 
the  heroic  ;  and  his  character  was  one  of  rare  ele- 
vation and  purity.  Enough  of  this.  There  was  a 
second  direction,  in  which  the  latent  evil  of  the 
Kantian  system  was  developed  by  Fichte. 

II.  The  weakness  and  untrustworthiness  of  pure 
reason,  as  shown  by  Kant,  created  an  intense  recoil 
in  the  mind  of  one  who,  though  a  skilled  logician, 
had  more  of  sentiment,  and  soul,  and  daring  genius 
in  his  constitution,  than  of  the  dialectic  spirit.  He 
rushed  to  the  opposite  extreme.  The  authority  of 
reason  must  be  paramount.  He  would  accept  no 
other  guide.  But  this  issue  again  was  powerfully 
helped  from  another  and  very  different  quarter 
than  the  Kantian  philosophy.  The  short,  suffer- 
ing, self-denying  course  of  Benedict  Spinoza  had 
been  extensively  productive,  too  productive,  for  its 
effects  were  in  a  fearfully  evil  direction.  Perhaps 
no  single  man,  not  excepting  even  Leibnitz  himself, 
ever  exerted  so  deep  an  influence  on  all  the  leading 
souls  of  Germany  as  did  the  persecuted  Jew.   Leib- 


40  INTRODUCTORY. 

nitz  may  have  touclied  the  national  mind  at  many 
more  points,  but  his  influence  in  the  one  direction 
in  which  Spinoza  especially  wrought,  was  nothing 
like  so  profound  or  enduring.  It  has  seemed  to 
me  that  the  wild,  reckless,  almost  insane  spirit,  so 
constantly  flashing  out  both  in  the  philosophy  and 
the  theology  of  Germany,  is  to  be  ascribed,  in  very 
great  part,  to  the  sway  which  the  writings  of  Spi- 
noza had  secured.  And  Fichte's  was  a  soul  to  be 
struck  more  than  most  by  their  unflinching  bold- 
ness and  their  tremendous  sweep.  Having,  besides, 
altogether  renounced  the  reality  of  the  objective,  it 
became  a  necessity  for  him  to  maintain  so  much 
the  more  determinedly,  the  reality  and  validity  of 
the  subjective.  If  the  conclusions  of  reason  were 
hopelessly  contradictory,  as  Kant's  antinomies 
seemed  to  show,  there  was  nothing  for  him  ever- 
more to  trust  to.  But,  in  Spinoza,  he  found  at 
once  a  high  assertion  and  a  noble  testimony  to  the 
supremacy  of  reason.  Here  was  a  mighty  efi'ort 
of  the  subjective  faculty,  a  system  professedly 
founded  on,  and  entirely  wrought  out  by,  pure 
reason.  He  took  his  own  course,  he  did  not  accept 
the  details,  but  he  was  hereby  fortified  and  se- 
cured in  the  principle. 

There  is  wonderful  fascination  in  the  system  of 
Spinoza  as  a  piece  of  mere  abstraction,  a  pure 
creation  of  the  intellect.  It  is  simple,  clear,  appa- 
rently exhaustive  and  unanswerable.    Suhstans  and 


GERMAN   PHILOSOPHICAL    RATIONALISM.         41 

modes,  subject  and  attributes,  apparently  mivst  in- 
clude all  being.  Can  there  be  any  higher  generali- 
zation than  this  ?  Except  for  the  one  omission  of 
the  idea  of  causality,  fatal  to  the  metaphysical,  but 
still  more  to  the  moral  side  of  the  sj)eculation,  the 
answer  must  have  been.  No  ;  there  can  be  no 
higher  generahzation.  But  this  fundamental  omis- 
sion produces,  on  the  one  hand,  a  pure  objective 
Pantheism ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  a  universal 
and  terrific  fatalism. 

Did  not  the  mind  of  Germany  recoil  at  once, 
and  for  ever,  from  such  a  system  ?  Formally, 
it  did  ;  that  is  to  say,  Spinoza  found  few  professed 
disciples.  But  his  influence  was  deep  and  far  ex- 
tended, notwithstanding.  A  tone  was  given  to 
speculation,  and  a  cast  of  thought  was  inspired 
and  diffused,  which  live  to  this  dav.  The  intellec- 
tual  vigor  and  daring  of  the  man,  his  wonderful 
logical  faculty,  his  lofty  generalization,  and  his 
profound  j^ower  of  abstraction,  were  captivating. 
But,  above  all,  his  memory  was  loved,  for  his 
sufferings,  his  moral  integrity  and  intrepidity, 
and,  if  the  testimony  of  Schleiermacher  is  to  be 
accepted,  for  his  piety.  Unaccountably,  the  Ber- 
lin theologian  deliberately  honors  him  as  ''  the 
holy,  though  rejected  Spinoza."  And  many  of 
the  philosophers  and  theologians  of  Germany 
shared,  perhajDS  to  this  day  share,  his  enthusiasm. 
These  are  the  words  in  which  Schleiermacher  ex- 


42  INTRODUCTORY. 

alts  him  :  ^'  the  high  world-spirit  penetrated  him, 
the  illimitable  was  his  beginning  and  his  end,  the 
universe  his  only  and  eternal  love.  In  holy  inno- 
cence and  deep  humility,  he  saw  himself  mirrored 
in  the  eternal  world  :  and  perceived,  at  the  same 
time,  how  he,  likewise,  was  the  world's  mirror. 
Full  of  religion  was  he,  and  full  of  the  Holy 
Ghost  ;  and,  therefore,  stands  he  alone  and  unap- 
proachable, a  master  in  his  art,  but  lifted  high 
above  profane  association,  without  disciples,  and 
without  citizenship."'*' 

The  influence  of  Spinoza  on  the  tone,  if  not  the 
substance  of  Fichte's  sjDeculations,  is  most  mani- 
fest. On  those  of  Hegel,  we  shall  find  it  is  yet 
more  manifest  still.  But  it  is  most  of  all  palpable 
and  pervading  in  the  philosophy  of  Schelling.  That 
is  virtually  and  truly,  though  not  formally,  Spino- 
zism,  another  name  for  Pantheism  ;  and  hence,  the 
charge  was  broadly  preferred  against  Schelling,  and 
with  the  very  strongest  apjmrent  ground.  How 
indignantly  and  utterly  he  cast  it  from  him,  these 
words  of  his  will  show  :  ^'  Grod  is  that  which  is  in 
itself,  and  only  from  itself  can  be  conceived  ;  but 
the  finite  is  necessarily  in  another,  and  only  from 
this  can  be  conceived.  Clearly,  in  consequence  of 
this  distinction,  things  are  sejmrated  from  God  ; 
not  merely,  as  might  appear  from  the  doctrine  of 
modifications  superficially  considered,  in  degree  and 

*  Werke,  1st  Band,  s.  100.     Berlin,  1843. 


GERMAN    PHILOSOPHICAL    RATIONALISM.         43 

through  their  limitations,  but  toto  genere.  What- 
ever their  relation  to  God  may  be,  they  are  abso- 
lutely divided  from  Him  by  this,  that  they  can 
exist  only  in  and  through  another  (namely  Him), 
so  that  the  conception  of  them  is  a  dependent  one, 
which,  without  the  concejotion  of  God,  would  be  in 
no  way  possible.  He,  on  the  contrary,  is  alone  the 
self-sufficient,  original,  self-affirming  Existence,  and 
everything  else  can  be  essentially  related  to  Him, 
only  as  affirmed  by  Him,  and  dependent  on  Him. 
Only  on  this  hypothesis  are  the  attributes  of  things 
(their  eternity,  for  example)  valid.  God  is  eternal 
in  his  own  nature  ;  things  are  eternal  only  depend- 
ently  on  Him,  and  as  consequences  of  his  existence. 
Just  owing  to  this  difference,  all  individual  things 
taken  together  cannot,  as  is  often  asserted,  consti- 
tute God.  By  no  kind  of  combination  can  that, 
which  in  its  own  nature  is  derived,  pass  into  that 
which  in  its  own  nature  is  underived.''* 

Can  w^ords  be  more  clear,  more  exact,  more 
strong,  than  these  ?  The  man  who  uttered  them, 
surely,  could  be  no  real  pantheist  in  his  soul ;  but 
he  certainly  was  in  his  philosophical  system.  It  is 
a  striking  instance  of  what  I  have  ventured  to  sup- 
pose, though  I  am  altogether  unable  to  explain  it, 
the  entire  separation,  as  if  into  two  totally  different 
and  widely  apart  regions — the  entire  separation,  in 

*  Schriften,  1st  Band,  a.  404.     Landschut,  1809. 


44  INTRODUCTORY. 

the  German  metaphysicians,  of  the  speculative  in- 
tellect from  the  moral  convictions  and  life. 

The  absolute  assumed  by  Schelling — (always  the 
outset  is  pure  assumption) — is  virtually  the  uni- 
versal suhstans  of  Spinoza,  and  the  ego  and  non- 
ego  of  Schelling  are  virtually  the  two  modes  of 
Substance,  thought  and  extension,  as  evolved  by 
Spinoza.  But,  further,  Schelling  seeks  to  show 
that  the  ego  and  non-ego^  though  separate,  are  also 
one ;  that  subject  and  object,  though  apart,  are 
also  identical.  There  are  two  poles  of  Being,  like 
the  negative  and  positive  extremes  of  the  magnet, 
the  center  being  the  indifference-point,  in  which  the 
two  meet  and  are  one.  The  Absolute  is  an  infinite 
subject-object,  evolving  itself  in  two  forms,  as  mind 
and  as  matter.  There  is  a  process  of  evolution, 
from  the  Absolute,  into  intelligence  on  the  one 
hand,  and  into  external  nature  on  the  other  hand. 
There  is  also  a  process  of  resumption  in  which 
mind  and  matter  are  restored  to  identity  in  the 
Absolute,  are  absorbed  in  the  essential  unity  of  the 
Great  Whole. 

It  is  curious  and  startling  to  find,  that  the 
knowledge,  by  us,  of  the  Absolute  is  also  reached 
through  a  process  of  absorption  and  identification. 
The  organ  of  this  highest  knowledge,  which  is  pos- 
sessed only  by  a  gifted  few  of  the  human  race, 
Schelling  calls  intellectual  intuition.  The  soul  in 
its  upward  stretch  towards  the  Absolute,  rises  be- 


GERMAN    PHILOSOPHICAL    RATIONALISM.         45 

jond  the  sphere  of  consciousness,  passes  away  as 
out  of  itself,  loses  itself  for  the  time,  in  identity 
with  pure  Being,  in  absorption  into  pure  Being. 
Thus  identified  and  absorbed,  and  only  thus,  it 
comes  to  know  the  Absolute. 

From  what  absurdity  and  what  contradictions 
this  intellectual-intuition  theory  is  obviously  inse- 
23arable,  need  not  here  be  shown.  But  it  is  impos- 
sible not  to  connect  it  at  once  with  Jacob  Boehme, 
with  Tauler,  with  Eckart,  and  with  the  whole 
mystic  school  from  the  earliest  period.  Schelling 
is  no  more  the  metaphysician,  but  the  undisguised 
mystic,  whatever  that  may  involve.  There  was 
needed  a  mind  far  more  philosophic  and  more  sys- 
tematic than  his,  if  anything  enduring  were  to 
come  out  from  the  materials  which  he  had  alien- 
ated from  their  true  sphere. 

Hegel  is  pre-eminently  the  philosopher  of  Ger- 
many— always  excepting  Kant,  who  in  his  origin- 
ality, in  the  depth  and  sweep  of  his  views,  and  in 
his  logical  facility  and  power,  is  unsurpassed. 
Hegel  had  less  of  poetry  and  of  spiritual  insight 
than  Schelling,  and  far  less  of  genius  and  of  soul 
than  Fichte,  but  he  had  more  of  the  legislative  and 
methodizing  faculty  than  either,  had  more  entire 
mastery  of  logic,  was  more  inured  to  extended  ab- 
straction, and  altogether  was  gifted  with  a  more 
subtle,  more  comprehensive  and  more  indomitable 
intellect. 


46  INTRODUCTOKY. 

The  Absolute  is  the  starting-point  of  the  Hege- 
lian philosophy.  In  the  farthest,  utmost  regress 
of  though tj  we  reach  the  Absolute,  a  bare  idea,  a 
pure  abstraction,  the  purest  and  most  abstract  of 
all  abstractions,  a  something  infinite,  unconditioned 
— for  with  Hegel,  the  Absolute,  the  Infinite,  the 
Unconditioned  are  the  same  and  applied  to  one 
idea — the  ultima  tliule  of  thought,  the  last,  dim, 
naked  point  in  the  backward  stretch  of  the  reason. 
Beyond  this  we  cannot  pass,  but  this  we  reach, 
and  with  this,  therefore,  j)hilosoj)hy  must  begin 
"  das  absolute,"  the  boundless,  aloof  from  all  lim- 
itation, relation,  condition  or  dependence,  nothing 
substantial,  actual,  as  we  speak,  far  less  material, 
I  had  almost  said  physical,  but  only  pure,  mere 
idea,  which  to  him  was  alone  entity."  The  Abso- 
lute" was  the  unbeginning,  eternal  Idea,  and  phe- 
nomena were  the  decomposition  and  reconstruction, 
the  egress  and  regress  of  the  Idea.  The  analysis 
of  the  Absolute,  therefore,  would  be  a  true  re- 
thinking of  the  stupendous,  aboriginal,  abysmal 
thought  :  it  would  be  the  key  of  the  universe,  for 
the  universe  is  only  the  evolution  of  the  Idea. 
The  higher  we  can  ascend  in  the  analytic  move- 
ment, the  nearer  we  must  come  to  very  reality. 
Hence  the  process  of  thought,  as  thought,  of  all 
thought,  must  reveal  the  true  unfolding  of  the 
"  Absolute  Idea."  A  thought  as  such,  is  never  a 
unity.      Something    is   distinguished   from    some 


GERMAN   PHILOSOPHICAL   RATIONALISM,         47 

other   thing,  and  the  two  combined  and  unified 
form  the  thought. 

What  then  are  the  elements  into  which  the  Ab- 
solute Idea  may  be  resolved  ?  What  is  the  result 
of  this  last  and  highest  analysis  ?  I.  Das  Absolute 
ist  das  Seyn.  The  boundless,  the  unconditioned, 
the  absolute  is,  first  of  all,  Being.  It  is — but  that 
is  all — it  is  mere,  bare  Being.  '^  Es  ist  dies,  die 
(im  Gredanken)  schlechthin  anfangliche,  abstract- 
este,  und  diirftigste,"'^'-' — "  the  barest,  nakedest, 
most  impoverished  idea,  possible  to  be  formed" — 
mere  Being,  mere  existing,  wide,  boundless,  undis- 
tinguished, undetermined  by  anything,  in  any  way 
— no  attributes,  no  consciousness.  II.  Das  Abso- 
lute ist  das  Nichts — is  nothinsr,  non-beino;.  "  Das 
reine  Seyn,''  says  Hegel,  "  ist  nun  die  reine  Ab- 
straction, damit  das  absolut-negative,  welches, 
gleichfalls  unmittelbar  genommen,  das  Nichts  ist. 
Es  folgte  hieraus,  die  zweite  Definition  des  Abso- 
luten,  dasz  es  das  Nichts  ist/'f  "  Pure  being  is 
pure  abstraction,  and  consequently  the  absolute- 
negative,  which  in  like  manner,  directly  taken,  is 
nothing.  There  follows  from  this  the  second  defi- 
nition of  the  Absolute,  that  it  '  is  nothing,' — non- 
being.''  I  must  yet  again  employ  Hegel's  own 
words — ^'  Nur  in-und  um-dieser  Unbestimmtheit- 
willen,  ist  es  Nichts  ;  ein  unsagbares,  sein  Unter- 

*  Encydopddie  Die  Lehre  vom  Seyn,  s.  99.    Heidelberg  1827. 
f  Seite  100. 


48  INTRODUCTORY. 

sobied  von  dem  Nichts  ist  eine  blosse  Meinung." 
— "  Only  through  and  on  account  of  this  undefin- 
edness  (unconditionedness)  is  Being=:non-being — 
a  thing  incapable  of  being  expressed,  its  difference 
from  non-being  is  a  bare  notion."  Being,  in  the 
sense  intended  by  Hegel,  mere  being,  without  at- 
tributes and  without  consciousness,  is  absolutely 
unconditioned,  has  nothing  to  mark  it,  to  define 
it,  to  make  it  a  thing.  And  non-being,  in  like 
manner,  is  absolutely  unconditioned,  has  nothing, 
and  can  have  nothing,  to  mark  or  define  it  ;  for  it 
is  nothing.  Here,  therefore,  in  this  resj^ect,  das 
Seyn  ist  das  Nichts,  Being  is  non-Being. 

Beinof  and  non-beinjr  are  the  same,  amount  to 
the  same.  Both  are  alike  absolutely  uncon- 
ditioned, and  both,  on  the  same  ground,  are  alike 
included,  and  nothing  else  is  included,  in  the  Ab- 
solute. These,  then,  are  the  two  elements,  which 
enter  alike  into  the  Absolute  Idea,  and  are  con- 
tradistinguished. In  the  seeming  unity  of  eYery 
idea,  there  needs  a  '^  widerspruch,''  some  one  thing 
to  be  set  against  another,  a  positive  and  a  nega- 
tive :  and  only  through  their  union  is  the  forma- 
tion  of  a  distinct  idea  possible.  Das  Seyn,  mere 
unconscious  being,  would  for  ever  have  remained 
unconscious:=non-being.  There  was  needed,  ein 
Anders-seyn — other  being.  Only  by  meeting  some- 
thing else,  could  das  Seyn,  distinguish  itself,  be- 
come conscious  of  itself    But  the  original,  Anders- 


GERMAN   PHILOSOPHICAL    RATIONALISM.         49 

seyn,  must  be  ^^  das  Nichts/' — non-being ;  nothing 
else  was  possible  according  to  the  conception.  And 
hence  this,  namely,  non-being,  was  the  medium 
through  which,  alone,  self-distinction  and  self-con- 
sciousness were  reached  by  the  Seyn.  So  that  the 
formula  was  logically  true.  "  Das  Nichts  ist  das 
Seyn," — non-being  is  being;  it  became  as  being  to 
the  Seyn,  it  was  the  Anders-seyn — other  being,  an 
actual  thing.  Alone,  they  were  each  as  nothing,  but 
together  they  groio  to  something  ;  they  result  in 
^^  das  werden," — the  becoming  :  there  is  an  evolu- 
tion from  them  into  consciousness  ;  there  is  the 
formation  of  a  distinct  idea,  a  passing  into  reality. 
Thus  we  have  the  Absolute  Idea  resolved  into  its 
elements,  ''  das  Seyn,  das  Nichts  (das  Anders- 
seyn),  das  Werden."  This  is  the  Eternal,  Unbe- 
ginning  process.  The  universe  is  no  other  than 
this  evolution  of  "  The  Idea,"  an  everlasting  be- 
coming, a  ceaseless  growing  up  into  reality,  that  is, 
ideal  reality  ;  for  with  Hegel  there  is  no  other. 
Ideas  are  things,  and  there  are  no  real  things,  but 
ideas ! 

Only  a  mere  fragment  of  the  Hegelian  Schema, 
have  I  attempted  to  open.  Let  it  suffice.  The 
fatal,  mortal  vice  is  palpable  as  sunlight.  The 
basis  of  the  speculation  is  pure,  mere  assumption. 
There  never  was,  never  could  be,  such  an  absolute 
as  is  su2}posed,  or  such  an  evolution  of  unconscious 

into  conscious  being,   save   in    the   brain   of  the 

3 


50  INTIIODUCTOUY. 

dreamer.  But  we  are  coin])('lled  to  admin;  tlie 
man^  however  we  judge  of  the  systein.  IHh  pro- 
digious Hubtlety,  and  his  giant  grasp  of  the  severest 
al)straetions  ereate  unniix(Ml  amazement.  And 
Tnany  grand,  pun;,  nohle  thoughts  has  he  left  be- 
hind, wliich  must  live,  and  kindle  life,  wherever 
they  are  received.  But  it  is  almost  past  belief,  that 
a  sane  and  honest  mind  should  have  surrendcii'ed 
itself  to  such  utter  and  jjorfect  wildness  of  si)e(;ula- 
tion  as  we  have  exposed  ;  and  still  more  j)ast  be- 
lief that  multitudes  of  sane  and  honest  men  should 
have  caught  the  infection,  and  with  almost  the  en- 
thusiasm of  l)iety,  have  carried  the  madness  of 
logic  to  a  more  outrageous  height  still,  liut  it  is 
true. 

No  complaint  could  be  made  against  the  Bamp- 
ton  lecturer,  for  any  strong  and  severe  language  he 
may  have  used,  had  it  a])]jlied  ordy  to  the  wild  ex- 
tremes of  (lerman  speculation  ;  especially  since,  in 
Hegel's  own  Vhllosopliy  of  ilvJiijion^  and  in  the 
writings  of  Feuerbach,  Bauer,  Strauss,  and  many 
besides,  it  has  been  shown  to  what  ruinous  lengths 
it  may  be  carried,  when  brought  to  bear  on  the 
most  sacred  of  all  subjects.  But  the  lecturer, 
throughout  his  celebrated  volume,  and,  as  it  aj)- 
pears  to  me,  without  guard  or  reserve,  has  identi- 
fied this  country,  its  2)hilos()phers  and  theologians, 
not  only  witli  (;r(!rman  sjM'culation,  but  with  its 
very  extreme  and  worst  forms.     The  following  qu  j- 


GERMAN    PIIILOSOI'UICAL   RATIONALISM.         51 

tations,  a  few  out  of  many,  I  may  be  allowed  to  put 
forward  in  evidence  of  this  : 

"  The  rationalist  .  .  .  assigns  to  some  su- 
perior tribunal  the  right  of  determining  what  (in 
revelation)  is  essential  to  religion  and  what  is  not ; 
he  claims  the  privilege  of  accepting  or  rejecting  any 
given  revelation,  wholly  or  in  part,  acc(jrding  as  it 
does  or  does  not  satisfy  the  conditions  of  some 
higher-criterion,  to  be  supplied  by  tiie  hunjan  con- 
sciousness." (pp.  4,  .0.)  Kationalisni  proceeds — 
"  by  paring  down  supposed  excrescences.  Com- 
mencing with  a  preconceived  theory  of  the  puiposc 
of  a  revelation,  and  of  the  form  which  it  ouglit  to 
assume,  it  proceeds  to  remove  or  reduce  all  that 
will  not  harmonize  with  this  leading  idea."  (p.  G.) 
"  Kationalisni  tends  to  destroy  revealed  reUgion 
altogether,  by  obliterating  the  whole  distinction 
between  the  human  and  the  divine.  If  it  retain 
any  portion  of  revealed  truth,  as  such,  it  does  so, 
not  in  consequence,  but  in  defiance,  of  its  funda- 
mental principle."  (p.  IG.)  "The  fundamental 
position  of  rationalism  is,  tliat  man  by  his  own  r<;a- 
son  can  attain  to  a  right  conception  of  God."  (p. 
37.)  In  a  way  certainly  not  characterized  by  dig- 
nity, rationalists  are  thus  addressed  :  "  FooJs,  to 
dream  that  man  can  escape  from  himself,  tliat  hu- 
man reason  can  draw  aught  but  a  human  jjortiait 
of  God  !  They  do  but  substitute  a  marred  and 
mutilated   humanity  for  one  exalted  and  entire, 


52  INTRODUCTORY. 

they  add  nothing  to  their  conception  of  God  as  he 
is,  but  only  take  away  a  part  of  their  conception 
of  man  ;  .  .  .  and  what  is  the  caput  mortuum 
which  remains,  but  only  the  sterner  features  of  hu- 
manity, exhibited  in  repulsive  nakedness."  (p.  18.) 
"  Our  rational  j)hilosopher  strips  off  from  humanity 
just  so  much  as  suits  his  purpose,  and  ^  the  residue 
thereof  he  maketh  a  god,' — less  pious  in  his  idola- 
try than  the  carver  of  the  graven  image,  in  that  he 
does  not  fall  down  unto  it  and  pray  unto  it,  but  is 
content  to  stand  afar  off  and  reason  concerning  \i" 
(p.  19.)  ''  Surely  downright  idolatry  is  better  than 
this  rational  worship  of  a  fragment  of  humanity. 
.  .  .  Unmixed  idolatry  is  more  religious  than 
this.  .  .  .  Undisguised  atheism  is  more  logi- 
cal." (p.  20.) 

As  descriptive  of  rationalism,  Mr.  Mansell  pro- 
duces the  following  quotations  from  the  darkest 
portions  of  Hegel's  logic,  nearly  unintelligible,  one 
may  surmise,  to  English  readers  : — ''  The  logical 
conception  is  the  absolute  divine  conception  itself, 
and  the  logical  process  is  the  immediate  exhibition 
of  God's  self-determination  to  Being."  (p.  30.) 
''  Eeligion  is  the  divine  spirit's  knowledge  of  hini- 
self,  through  the  mediation  of  the  finite  sj^irit." 
(p.  31.)  "  The  kingdom  of  philosophy  is  truth,  ab- 
solute and  unveiled.  It  contains  in  itself  the  ex- 
hibition of  God  as  he  is  in  his  eternal  essence,  be- 
fore the  creation  of  a  finite  world."  (p.  31.) 


GERMAN   PHILOSOPHICAL   RATIONALISM.         53 

In  connection  with  these,  are  quotations  less 
dark,  but  not  less  revolting,  from  Strauss,  from 
Fichte,  from  Schelling,  from  Feuerbach,  from  Mar- 
heincke,  and  from  August  Comte.  After  a  refer- 
ence to  the  philosophical  Christ  of  Hegel  and  the 
mythical  Christ  of  Strauss,  the  lecturer  cries  out 
with  passionate  indignation  :  "These  be  thy  gods, 
0  philosophy  !  these  be  the  metai^hysics  of  salva- 
tion !"  (p.  161.) 

I  venture  to  think  that  one  and  all  of  these  pas- 
sages, and  especially  the  whole  taken  together,  are 
not  called  for  either  in  spirit  or  in  direct  expres- 
sion. I  venture  to  think  that  they  are  net  true 
and  not  just,  that  scarcely  a  single  one  of  them  is 
true  or  just,  as  applied  to  any  philosophical  or 
theological  school  in  this  country,  or  even  almost 
to  any  solitary  individuals.  As  for  Fichte,  Schel- 
ling, Feuerbach,  and  Strauss,  they  belong  very 
much  to  the  past,  even  in  Germany.  It  cannot  be 
denied  that  the  spirit  which  they,  and  especially 
the  first  and  brightest  of  them,  Fichte,  awoke  and 
diffused,  still  breathes  in  many  a  page  of  modern 
German  literature.  But  it  deserves  remark  that 
no  one  of  them  has  founded  a  school  called  after 
his  name,  or  can  number  of  actual  disciples  be- 
yond a  few  scattered  units.  Strauss  has  formally 
receded  from  his  earlier  course,  without  abjuring 
it,  and  has  entered  on  the  field  of  sober  historical 
science,  far  away  from  the  mythic  region.     Hegel 


54  INTRODUCTORY. 

alone  can  be  said  to  survive  as  the  founder  of  a 
system,  and  he  is  the  parent  of  several  separate 
schools.  In  the  thirty  years  that  have  passed  since 
his  death,  they  have  arisen,  each  differing,  on  some 
points,  from  the  master,  but  all  standing  by  his 
method  and  deeply  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  his 
philosophy.  But  where  in  this  country  shall  we 
look  for  the  faintest  image  of  the  Hegelian  ration- 
alism .?  It  does  not  exist.  Since  the  days  of 
Locke,  if  we  except  the  school  of  English  Platon- 
ists,  and  the  irregular  and  incomplete  efforts  of  Mr. 
Coleridge,  it  must  be  confessed  with  sorrow,  that 
the  philosophy  of  England  has  been  only  descend- 
ental.  Our  transcendentalism  is  the  merest  nom- 
inis  umhra.  We  have,  it  is  true,  as  we  always 
have  had,  and  certainly  not  in  greater  number  or 
of  more  formidable  character,  now  than  in  other 
times,  individual  writers,  avowedly  opposed  to 
divine  revelation  on  various  grounds.  It  is  true, 
also,  that  translations  of  Strauss'  Life  of  Jesus 
are  circulated  to  some  noticable  extent,  and  that 
■the  atheism  of  Comte  has  been  epitomised  and  put 
into  an  English  dress.  Nor  is  it  denied,  that  here 
'^^  "^  and  there  may  be  found  stray  sentiments  and  an 
occasional  cast  and  method  of  thought  which  can 
be  distinctly  traced  to  a  Hegelian  source.  But 
among  our  philosophical  writers,  and  especially 
among  our  theologians,  of  whatever  class,  in  this 
country — and  it  is  theologians  especially  that  are 


GERMAN   PHILOSOPHICAL   RATIONALISM.         55 

foriiially  addressed  in  the  Bamjiton  Lecture — where 
is  there  anything  answering,  or  even  in  the  most 
distant  way  approaching  to  that  rationalism  which, 
in  such  dark  lines,  is  marked  off  in  the  passages 
which  have  been  quoted  ?  There  is  not  any  such 
thing. 

It  is  scarcely  just  or  worthy  of  philosophy  or  of 
religion,  to  exhibit  a  picture  which  finds  its  coun- 
terpart only  in  the  growth  of  a  foreign  country,  as 
if  it  truly  represented  some  rationalistic  school  in 
this  country.  By  all  means,  if  there  be  individ- 
uals, clerical  or  lay,  who  have  seemed  to  attach 
higher  authority  to  human  reason  than  is  meet, 
and  to  treat  great  and  sacred  questions  in  too  free 
and  rash  a  sj^irit,  let  their  sentiments  be  met  on 
their  own  proper  ground  and  exposed  and  corrected. 
But  it  is  a  very  different  procedure — one  essentially 
faulty — to  identify  a  number  of  persons  not  for- 
merly indicted,  but  perfectly  well  known,  with  a 
system  which,  as  a  whole,  they  would  utterly  re- 
pudiate, to  identify  them  with  the  veiy  worst  de- 
tails of  that  system.  The  effect  of  this — I  do  not 
believe  the  conscious  design,  but  the  actual  effect 
of  this — must  be  to  create  against  earnest  and  able 
and  upright  men  a  prejudice,  of  which  they  are 
wholly  undeserving. 

There  is  a  rationalism — it  must  be  held  all  the 
more  firmly,  because  the  too  indiscriminate  and 
too  strong  language  of  the  Bampton  Lecture  would 


5f)  INTRODUCTORY. 

blind  us  to  the  fact  ;  there  is  a  rationalism,  not 
German — if  so  invidious  and  offensive  a  use  of  an 
honored  national  name  may  be  pardoned — not  Ger- 
man and  not  infidel,  and  not  presumptuous,  and 
not  godless — a  rationalism  reverent,  humble,  pious, 
which,  unless  we  be  false  to  the  constitution  of  our 
minds,  false  to  what  is  higher  than  our  minds, 
eternal  truth,  and  false  to  the  Great  Being,  the 
Father  of  our  minds  and  the  Fountain  of  truth, 
we  dare  not,  must  not,  never  must  forego. 


SECTION    SECOND. 


CONCEML\G   APPLICATlOxNS    OF    LOGIC. 


CHAPTER 

I. — Prelimixary  Criticisms. 
II. — "  The  Ixfinite,"  "  The  Absolute,"  etc. 
III. — Causatiox,  etc. 

lY. IXCOXCEIYABILITY    OP    ".ThE    IxFIXITE." 

V. — Miscellaneous  Reasoxixgs. 


CHAPTER    I. 

PRELIMINAEY  CEITICISMS. 

Method  of  Bampton  Lecture — Laid  down,  Abandoned — Over- 
confidence — Difficulties  of  Investigation — •Virtuallj,  Hamilton's 
Arguments — -"Infinite"  distinguished  from  "Absolute"  — 
Groundless — Essentially  same. 

The  method  of  discussion,  proposed  in  the 
Bampton  Lecture,  has  all  the  advantage  of  being 
faultlessly  logical.  It  is  perfectly  fair  to  say,  as 
the  writer  does,  that  "  the  primary  and  proper 
object  of  criticism  is  not  religion,  natural  or  re- 
vealed, but  the  human  mind  in  its  relation  to  reli- 
gion." (p.  24.)  It  is  added,  "  rightly  or  wrongly, 
men  will  think  of  these  things  (the  truths  of  reli- 
gion), and  a  knowledge  of  the  laws  under  which 
they  think,  is  the  only  security  for  their  thinking 
soundly.''  (p.  32.)  "  A  philosophy  of  religion,"  he 
says  with  great  distinctness,  "  may  be  attempted 
from  two  opposite  points  of  view — either  as  a  phi- 
losophy of  the  object  of  religion,  that  is  to  say,  as 
a  scientific  exposition  of  the  nature  of  God,  or  as 
a  philosophy  of  the  subject  of  religion,  that  is  to 
say,  as  a  scientific  inquiry  into  the  constitution  of 
the  human  mind,  so  far  as  it  receives  and  deals 


60  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

with  religious  ideas",  (p.  34.)  Of  the  second 
method,  which  the  lecturer  is  to  adopt,  it  is  said, 
"  its  primary  concern  is  with  the  operations  and 
laws  of  the  human  mind,  and  its  special  purpose  is 
to  ascertain  the  nature,  the  origin,  and  the  limits 
of  the  religious  element  in  man."  (p.  35.)  Before 
dealing  w^ith  the  object  of  religion,  God,  ''  we  need 
a  preliminary  examination  of  the  conditions  of 
human  thought."  (p.  37.)  In  this  way,  we  reach 
"  the  limits  of  our  own  powers  and  the  consequent 
distinction  between  w^hat  w^e  may  and  what  we 
may  not  seek  to  comprehend."  (p.  36.)  "We 
must  begin  with  that  wliich  is  within  us,  not  with 
that  which  is  above  us,  with  the  philosophy  of 
man,  not  w^ith  that  of  God."  (p.  65.) 

Such  is  the  order  of  discussion.  But,  curiously 
enough,  it  is  not  sooner  announced  than  aban- 
doned.  Instead  of  commencing  with  an  examina- 
tion of  the  human  mind,  in  order  to  ascertain  the 
conditions  and  limits  of  human  thought,  the  lec- 
turer turns  aside  to  expose  the  contradictions  and 
confusions  of  German  rationalism.  For  the  time, 
he  follow^s  a  method  exactly  the  opposite  of  that 
on  which  he  had  determined,  the  method  which 
begins  not  with  the  subject  of  theology,  man,  but 
with  the  object  of  theology,  God.  The  temptation 
must  have  been  powerful,  which  thus  hurried  him 
in  the  face  of  the  order  which  he  himself  had  im- 
posed on  the  discussion,  that  he  might  reduce  to 


PRELIMINARY   CRITICISMS.  61 

absurdity  the  attempts  of  German  rationalists,  to 
philosophize  respecting  the  Infinite.  "  We  can 
not/'  says  he,  "  legitimately  approach  the  object 
of  theology,  God,  until  a  previous  inquiiy  has  de- 
termined for  us  the  limits  of  our  powers  of  thought, 
and  what  we  may,  and  what  we  may  not  seek  to 
comprehend/'  But  straightway,  we  are  led  down 
to  the  deepest  of  the  reasonings,  about  the  most 
incomprehensible  aspects  of  that  which  the  lecturer 
pronounces  to  be  all  incomprehensible  together. 
Without  attaching  immoderate  importance  to  this 
violation  of  order,  it  is  nevertheless  very  significant 
in  a  professed  and  disciplined  logician. 

The  opening  sentence,  with  which  the  lecturer 
introduces  the  strictly  argumentative  part  of  his 
work,  deserves  a  little  notice  from  us  here.  "  There 
are  three  teruis,  fayniliar  as  household  ivords  in 
the  vocabulary  of  philosophy,  which  must  be  taken 
into  account  in  every  system  of  metaphysical  the- 
ology. To  conceive  the  Deity  as  he  is,  we  must 
conceive  Him  as  first  cause,  as  absolute  and  as  infi- 
nite." (p.  44.)  The  sj^irit  of  this  announcement, 
it  seems  to  me,  is  not  assuring  ;  not  assuring  espe- 
cially, to  those  who  feel  that  the  discussion  about 
to  be  entered  upon  touches  a  question  of  life  and 
death  to  them,  touches  the  one,  most  momentous 
point  in  the  whole  range  of  philosophy  and  the- 
ology. Withal  I  question  whether  it  be  actually 
true  that  these  three  terms  are  familiar  as  house- 


62  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

hold  words,  in  the  vocabulary  of  philosophy.  On 
the  contrary,  are  they  not  among  its  highest  and 
rarest  symbols,  and  do  they  not  belong  to  a  pro- 
found, even  inaccessible  region  ?  At  all  events, 
they  certainly  are  meant  to  embody  ideas  which 
the  lecturer  holds  to  be  altogether  inconceivable. 
Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel  in  Germany,  and 
Jouffroy  and  Cousin  in  France,  have  freely  made 
use  of  the  terms  in  question.  But  with  the  excep- 
tion of  Coleridge,  they  were  all  but  entirely  foreign 
to  this  country,  till  the  appearance  of  Sir  William 
Hamilton's  celebrated  review  of  Cousin's  Flii- 
losopliy  of  the  Infinite,  now  thirty  years  ago.  Even 
now,  it  seems  scarcely  becoming  in  any  writer  to 
boast  of  a  household  familiarity  with  words,  which, 
though  they  have  come  into  more  general  use,  have 
not  ceased  to  represent  the  highest  and  hardest 
abstractions  of  metaphysics. 

It  is  no  fault  of  the  lecturer,  but  it  is  of  some 
importance  to  bear  in  mind,  that  the  argument 
which  is  forthwith  constructed,  in  the  second  and 
third  discourses,  the  portion  of  the  work  which  is 
devoted  to  continuous  reasoning,  the  other  por- 
tions being  more  popular  than  argumentative,  is 
substantially  and  virtually  that  of  Hamilton's  cele- 
brated review.  It  is  altered  in  some,  even  essen- 
tial, respects,  and  it  is  greatly  extended  in  parts, 
and  many  special  additional  details  are  intro- 
duced, but  all  the  strongest  points  are  contained, 


PRELIMINARY   CRITICISMS.  63 

either  expressly  or  implicity,  in  the  earlier  criti- 
cism. 

One  other  thing  must  not  be  omitted  in  these 
preliminary  notices  ;  the  lecturer  accepts,  without 
a  word  of  yindicatioUj  the  distinction  between  the 
Infinite  and  the  Absolute,  which  can  rest  only  on 
the  authority  of  Hamilton.  Neither  Kant,  nor 
Fichte,  nor  Schelling,  nor  Hegel  mark  any  notice- 
able difference  in  the  meaning  of  these  words.  Ety- 
mologically  they  amount  to  much  the  same  thing, 
and  at  least  by  the  German  metaphysicians  they 
are  used  indifferently.  Hamilton  takes  a  course 
peculiar  to  himself,  and  constitutes  the  Uncondi- 
tioned a  genus,  of  which  the  Infinite  and  the  Ab- 
solute are  the  species.  Perhaps  the  exigencies  of 
his  system,  and  especially  his  favorite  theory  of 
causality,  needed  this  distinction.  At  all  events, 
for  himself  he  selects  the  pair  of  contraries — an 
absolute  whole,  and  an  absolute  part,  a  whole  all 
inclusive,  such  that  it  cannot  be  conceived  as  part 
of  a  larger  whole,  a  part  so  small  that  it  cannot  be 
conceived  as  a  whole,  capable  of  being  again  divided 
into  parts — and  gives  to  them  the  name  of  the 
Absolute,  completed,  finished,  perfect,  whole,  tJie 
unconditionally  limited.  What  is  meant  by  the 
whole  and  the  part,  thus  described,  may  be  intelli- 
gible. But  I  am  not  ashamed  to  confess  that,  when 
this  is  called  the  imconditionally  limited,  I  do  not 
understand  the  words  nor  do  I  believe  that  they 


64  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIO. 

are  capable  of  being  understood  by  any  person.  To 
me,  tliey  are  not  sense,  as  little  so,  as  would  be  the 
expression,  solidly  liquid,  or  coldly  hot.  Uncondi- 
tionally limited  !  The  first  term  is  directly  con- 
tradictory of  the  second.  At  all  events,  it  was  not 
justifiable,  even  in  Sir  William  Hamilton,  that  a 
formula,  at  least  apparently  contradictory,  should 
be  noted  by  him  as  the  Absolute  ;  that  is  to  say, 
should  usurp  for  its  own  use  a  term  already  occu- 
]Died,  quite  in  a  different  sense — namely,  as  synony- 
mous with  the  Infinite.  But  yet  less  justifiable  is 
it  in  the  Bampton  lecturer  to  take  up  the  supposed 
distinction  between  the  Infinite  and  the  Absolute, 
as  if  it  were  universally  admitted,  especially  since, 
as  we  shall  presently  find,  he  had  not  even  Hamil- 
ton's ground  for  making  any  distinction  at  all. 
And  he  does  all  this,  with  Mr.  Calderwood's  very 
noticeable  book,  to  which  he  expressly  refers,  before 
him,  containing,  as  it  does,  an  ingenious  and  robust 
exposure  of  Hamilton's  use  of  the  terms  in  ques- 
tion.''' The  lecturer,  it  seems  to  me,  was  scarcely 
entitled  in  these  circumstances  to  pass  on  in  simple 
silence  :  and  until  the  opposing  reasonings  be  set 
aside — and  I  believe  they  cannot  be  set  aside — we 
must  regard  the  unconditionally  Ujiiited,  that  is, 
the  Absolute,  as  distinguished  from  the  Infinite, 
as  a  palpable  blunder. 

*  Tlie  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite,  by  Henry  Calderwood — a  very 
rare  example  of  early  power  and  promise,  which  would  have  dono 
honor  to  a.  ripe  and  practised  metaphysician. 


PRELIMINAEY   CRITICISMS.  65 

But  the  extraordinary  fact  is,  that  while  the 
lecturer  resolves  to  distinguish  the  Infinite  from 
the  Absolute,  he  does  not  use  the  latter  term  in 
Hamilton's  sense  at  all,  though  this  1^  the  only 
sense,  which  makes  it,  however,  strangely  and  con- 
tradictorily, distinguishable  from  the  Infinite.  In 
a  note  on  his  second  lecture,  he  tells  us,  "  the  other 
sense  in  which  the  Absolute  is  contradictory  of  the 
Infinite,  is  irrelevant  to  the  present  argument/' 
(p.  301.)  But  Hamilton  says,  "in  this  accepta- 
tion,''— he  means,  as  contradictory  of  the  Infinite 
— "for  myself,  I  exclusively  use  it," — the  term 
Absolute  (p.  13.)  The  meaning  which  the  lecturer 
attaches  to  the  Absolute  is  the  very  one  which  it 
never  bears  in  Hamilton's  use  of  the  word  ;  namely, 
"  aloof  from  relation,  comparison,  limitation,  con- 
dition, dependence,"  etc.,  and  it  is  thus,  says  Ham- 
ilton, tantamount  .to  rh  dnoXvrov  of  the  lower 
Greeks.  In  this  meaning,"  he  adds,  i.  e.,  the  mean- 
ing selected  by  the  Bampton  lecturer — "  the  Ab- 
solute is  not  opposed  to  the  Infinite."*  It  is  not 
indeed,  it  is  not  even  distinguishable  from  it.  For 
how  better  could  we  define  the  Infinite,  than  in  the 
very  words  here  employed  to  define  the  absolute, 
"  aloof  from  relation,  comparison,  limitation,  con- 
dition, dependence,"  etc.  Absolute,  i.  e.,  absolved, 
loosed,  freed  from — what  ?  connections,  relations, 
boundaries,  limits,  without  limits,  infinite.     The 

*  Discussions,  p.  13. 


66  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

two  words  are  virtually  identical,  and  only  an 
imagined  imperious  necessity,  which  in  this  case  is 
certainly  not  shown,  can  account  for  the  abortive 
attempt  to  distinguish  between  them.  It  is  possi- 
ble to  detect  the  merest  shade  of  difference,  when 
the  lecturer  says,  "  by  the  Absolute  is  meant  that 
which  exists  in,  and  by  itself,  having  no  necessary 
relation  to  any  other  being.  By  the  Infinite  is 
meant  that  which  is  free  from  all  possible  limita- 
tion, that  than  which  a  greater  is  inconceivable.^' 
(p.  45.)  But  we  can  perceive  in  a  moment  that 
the  definitions  might  be  reversed  with  perfect  just- 
ice. Quite  as  truly  it  might  be  asserted  that  the 
Infinite,  like  the  Absolute,  is  that  which  exists  in, 
and  by  itself,  and  which  can  have  no  necessary  rela- 
tion to  any  other  being.  On  the  other  hand,  quite 
as  truly,  so  far  as  yet  aj)23ears,  it  might  be  asserted 
that  the  Absolute,  like  the  Infinite,  is  that,  than 
w^hich  a  greater  is  inconceivable,  and  which  is  free 
from  all  possible  limitation.  "Aloof  from  limita- 
tion,'' etc.,  is  Sir  William  Hamilton's  very  j^lirase. 
The  Absolute,  at  all  events  in  the  lecturer's  sense 
of  the  word,  and  the  Infinite,  are  identical,  and  yet 
he  distinguishes  them,  as  if  they  were  perfectly 
different,  and  as  if  the  difference  were  universally 
understood  and  admitted.  Hamilton  had  a  reason 
in  the  exigencies  of  his  system  for  distinguishing 
between  the  two  terms,  and  he  constructed  a  de- 
fence of  the  distinction,  however  insufficient,  and 


PRELIMINARY   CRITICISMS.  67 

even  contradictory.  The  lecturer  does  not  give  any 
reason,  and  does  not  make  any  defence.  I  am  un- 
able to  conjecture  why  he  employed  two  hard,  un- 
couth, and,  as  he  believes,  unintelligible  words, 
when  one  might  have  sufficed  ;  why,  especially,  he 
imposed  two  separate  definitions  which  were  both 
distinctly  contained  in  either  of  the  two  terms. 
But  I  am  obliged  to  own  that  in  the  circumstances 
an  anticipative  distrust  of  his  accuracy,  and  of  the 
soundness  of  his  reasoning  is  created  in  my  mind. 


CHAPTEK   II. 

THE  INFINITE,  THE  ABSOLUTE,  ETC. 

Infinity  of  Attributes — Contradiction — All  actual  and  possible  in 
"  Absolute"— "  The  One"— "  The  All"— Shifting  and  Substitu- 
tion of  Terms — Contradictory  Reasonings — Illustrations — ^Poten- 
tial and  Actual — Confusion — Materialistic  Tendency. 

Up  to  a  certain  pointy  there  can  be  little  differ- 
ence one  would  imagine  ;  there  is  in  fact,  little  dif- 
ference, amongst  moderate  men,  of  however  oppo- 
site schools,  as  to  the  at  least  apparent  contradic- 
tions in  which  reason  is  involved,  when  it  attempts 
to  construct  a  ]yhilosopliy  of  the  Infinite  or  Abso- 
lute. Most  would  agree — do  in  fact  agree — though 
this  is  very  far  from  the  imj^ression  suggested  in 
the  Bampton  Lecture — that  there  is  so  much  of  in- 
scrutable mystery  in  the  region  of  the  Divine,  so 
much  that  is  necessarily  incomj^rehensible,  that 
anything  approaching  to  a  system,  a  fully  compre- 
hended and  explained  philosophy,  with  the  ground 
princiijles  on  which  it  rests,  is  never  to  be  reached. 
The  grand  error — but  not  of  extreme  rationalists, 
at  least,  not  of  them  only — of  theologians,  is,  that 
they  have  philosophized  too  much,  and  not  well  ; 
that  they  do  philosophize,  philosoj^hize  falsely,  and 


THE   INFINITE,    THE    ABSOLUTE,    ETC.  69 

profess  to  give  forth  a  round  whole  of  religious 
truth,  a  coropleted  scheme  which  leaves  compara- 
tively little  unexplained.     It  cannot  be.     Hints  to- 
wards such  an  issue,   more  or  less  inspiring  and 
precious,  may  be  possible  ;    occasional  gleams  in 
one  direction  and  another,  openings  into  the  deep 
unknown,  the  recovery  here  of  one  patch  of  sur- 
face hitherto  dark,  and  there  of  another,  and  bring- 
ing them  within  the  range  of  the  light,  may  be 
possible.     But  anything  approaching  to  a  complete 
philosophy  of  the  Infinite,  or  a  philosophy  of  re- 
ligious truth,  natural  or  revealed,  few  will  hesitate 
to  pronounce  a  mere  imposibility.     But  many  who 
would  readily  make   this  admission,  shrink  back 
from  such  conclusions  as   those  of  the  Bampton 
lecturer,  and  especially  from  his  (as  I  judge)  not 
satisfactory  method  of  supporting  them. 

The  second  lecture  in  the  series  which  is  before 
us,  is  distinguished  by  high  and  hard  abstractions, 
and  by  uncouth  words,  with  the  use  of  which  few 
could  boast  a  household  familiarity.  Our  first 
business  must  be  to  pierce,  as  far  as  we  are  able, 
through  the  encrusting  terms  and  forms,  and  to 
reach  a  meaning  apprehensible  by  the  common  un- 
derstanding. Scientific  formula  are  unavoidable 
in  marking  scientific  distinctions.  But  we  deal 
here  with  spiritual  truth  ;  and  whatever  value  there 
may  be  in  the  use  of  abstract  terms,  they  are 
never,  if  they  be  really  worth  anything,  incapable 


70  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS    OF   LOGIC. 

of  being  translated,  it  may  be  circuitously  and 
cumbrously,  into  the  ordinary  language  of  thought. 
If  they  are  untranslatable,  it  is  because  there  is 
nothing  to  translate. 

I  have  only  further  to  submit,  that  with  "  the 
Absolute''  of  Schelling  or  Hegel,  with  the  Uncon- 
ditioned, the  Absolute,  the  Infinite  of  German,  or 
French  philosophy  I  am  not  here  to  deal  at  all  ; 
but  only  with  these  terms,  as  defined,  explained, 
and  reasoned  upon  in  the  Bampton  Lecture  ;  and 
any  argument  of  mine  must  be  held  to  be  valid, 
so  long  as  it  is  soundly  based  only  on  these  defini- 
tions, explanations,  and  reasoning. 

The  lecturer's  first  distinct  position,  as  I  gather, 
amounts  to  this,  that  the  Infinite  must  be  en- 
dowed with  infinite  attributes,  and  that  their  num- 
ber must  be  infinite.  Passing  by  the  contradiction 
involved  in  the  idea  of  an  infinite  number,  it  must 
be  borne  in  mind  that  we  have  nothing  to  do  with 
the  relevancy,  as  respects  the  general  argument,  of 
this  or  of  any  of  the  other  positions  maintained. 
Taking  them  as  they  stand,  I  am  only  concerned 
to  show,  by  one  or  two  examples,  the  inexact  na- 
ture of  the  reasoning.  "  The  Infinite,"  I  quote 
from  lecture  second,  "  cannot  be  regarded  as  con- 
sisting of  a  limited  number  of  attributes,  each  un- 
limited in  its  kind.  It  cannot  be  conceived,  for 
example,  after  the  analogy  of  a  line  infinite  in 
length  but  not  in  breadth,  or  of  a  surface  infinite 


THE   INFINITE,    THE   ABSOLUTE,    ETC.  71 

in  two  dimensions  of  space  but  bounded  in  the 
third,  or  of  an  intelligent  being  possessing  some 
one  or  more  modes  of  consciousness  in  an  infinite 
degree,  but  devoid  of  others."  (p.  45.)  The  con- 
clusion is, — or  if  not,  what  is  it  ? — that  the  In- 
finite must  possess  infinite  attributes  and  an  in- 
finite number  of  them.  What  then,  one  might 
ask  7  The  use  to  be  made  of  such  a  conclusion, 
supposing  it  reached,  and  its  precise  effect  on  the 
general  argument,  it  would  be  hard  indeed  to 
determine. 

We  shall  meet  with  other  examples  of  the  evil 
and  danger  of  such  illustrations,  borrowed  from 
material  nature,  as  occur  in  the  passage  just 
quoted,  by  which  the  highest  spiritual  truth  is 
entangled  and  darkened.  Here,  however,  even  the 
illustration  might  have  served  to  correct  the  state- 
ment, and  ought  to  have  suggested  that  what 
might  seem  limitation  in  the  number  of  attributes 
may  be  only  a  mere  necessary  fact,  an  addition  be- 
ing simjDly  impossible,  in  the  nature  of  things. 
Suppose  a  body  infinite  not  in  two  dimensions 
only,  but  in  all  three  alike  ;  it  could  then  be  infi- 
nite in  no  other,  for  no  other  is  possible.  Length, 
breadth,  and  thickness  comprise  the  dimensions 
possible  to  extended  body.  Any  other,  according 
to  our  modes  of  judging,  is  impossible  in  the  na- 
ture of  things. 

It  must  be  noticed  emphatically,  that  there  is  a 


72  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

vast  distinction,  which  is  thoroughly  overlooked  by 
the  lecturer  not  in  this  place  merely,  but  through- 
out the  entire  discussion,  and  the  overlooking:  of 
wliich  necessarily  creates  confused  and  fallacious 
reasoning.  It  is  the  distinction,  between  a  supposed 
quantitative  Infinite,  and  the  qualitative  Infinite. 
Let  the  notion  be  attempted,  however  vain,  of 
^^The  Infinite  Whole" — a  quantity,  an  amount, 
including  everything,  to  which  nothing  by  possi- 
bility can  be  added,  and  from  which  nothing  by 
possibility  be  subtracted.  This  Infinite — if  a  fic- 
tion so  baseless  may  be  suffered  to  keep  itself,  for 
a  moment,  before  our  imagination — is  strictly  one, 
and  there  can  be  nothing  besides.  This  is  the  Infi- 
nite (if  you  will),  and  there  can  be  nothing  but 
this  Infinite.  It  can  admit  of  no  parts.  Partition 
is  at  once  destructive  of  the  conception,  or  rather 
the  fiction.  Distinct,  separate  personality  is  im- 
possible ;  distinct,  separate  qualities  or  attributes 
are  impossible.  But  the  qualitative  Infinite  in- 
volves no  such  necessary  results.  An  Infinite,  as 
to  duration,  does  not  render  a  finite,  as  to  dura- 
tion— which  is  another  and  separate  thing — impos- 
sible to  our  thought.  Without  contradiction,  the 
two  may  co-exist.  So  also  distinct  and  separate 
personality  is  not  here  swallowed  up  and  lost,  as 
in  the  One  Infinite.  An  Infinite  Being — quite 
remote  from  the  notion  of  a  quantity,  an  amount, 
to  which  nothing  can  be  added  without  destroying 


THE   INFINITE,    THE   ABSOLUTE,    ETC.  73 

it — does  not  render  the  existence  of  a  finite  being 
or  of  finite  beings  impossible  to  our  thought. 
Witliout  contradiction,  they  may  co-exist.  Even 
beyond  this,  an  Infinite  attribute  does  not  render 
another  distinct  and  different  Infinite  attribute,  or 
many  distinct  and  different  Infinite  attributes,  im- 
possible to  our  thoughts. 

The  fancied,  quantitative  Infinite  is  One,  and 
there  can  be  nothing  besides.  All  parts,  all  per- 
sonalities, all  separate  qualities  are  necessarily 
merged  and  lost  in  it.  But  with  the  notion  of 
the  qualitative  Infinite,  there  may  co-exist,  with- 
out contradiction,  as  many  Infinites  as  there  are  at- 
tributes. Knowledge  and  Power  belong  to  spheres 
which  interfere  not  in  any  possible  way,  the  one 
with  the  other.  They  cannot  come  into  collision. 
Without  contradiction,  Power  may  be  unlimited 
and  Knowledge  may  also  be  unlimited.  Veracity, 
Rectitude,  Love,  and  a  thousand  Infinites  besides, 
co-existing  at  the  same  time,  are  not  impossible  to 
our  thouf^ht. 

To  come  more  closely  to  the  point  from  which 
we  started,  the  difference  is  hardly  to  be  estimated, 
when  we  pass  from  quantity  to  quaKty,  from  gross 
amount  to  attributes.  Thus,  it  is  no  limitation  of 
Unlimited  Power  that  it  is  not  Knowledge,  and 
no  limitation  of  Unlimited  Knowledge  that  it  is 
not  Power.  It  is  not  in  the  nature  of  things,  that 
these  qualities  should  be  interpenetrable  or  con- 


74  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS    OF   LOGIC. 

vertible^  and  that  the  separate  independent  exist- 
ence of  the  one  should  be  incompatible  with  that 
of  the  other.  In  like  manner,  in  a  lower  sphere, 
the  sphere  of  the  finite,  it  is  no  limitation  to 
mind,  that  it  cannot  walk,  and  no  limitation  to 
truth  or  love,  that  you  cannot  measure  them  by  a 
scale  of  inches.  These  things  are  simply  impossi- 
ble. If  then  we  say  that  the  Infinite,  as  defined, 
is  necessarily  endowed  wdth  all  possible  attributes 
— this  is  the  very  utmost  which  the  definition  al- 
low^s  to  be  said.  That  all  possible  attributes  make 
up,  and  must  make  up  an  infinity  ;  this,  true  or 
false,  is  at  all  events  not  shown.  Take  the  writ- 
er's own  illustration  of  "  an  intelligent  being  pos- 
sessing certain  modes  of  consciousness  in  an  infi- 
nite degi'ee,"  and  say  that  in  place  of  certain 
modes  the  being  possesses  all  the  modes  of  con- 
sciousness possible  to  an  intelligence  ;  can  it  be 
maintained,  besides,  that  these  amount,  and  must 
amount  to  infinity  ?  No  man  is  entitled  to  ad- 
vance such  a  position.  Jt  is  utterly  incapable  of 
proof.  On  the  contrary,  it  is  clear,  if  we  suppose, 
as  the  lecturer  himself  supposes,  a  purely  spiritual 
nature,  there  is  at  least  one  class  of  attributes, 
those  included  in  extension,  which  could  have  no 
possible  application  to  it.  We  come  to  this  :  the 
attributes  of  a  pure  intelligence,  each  infinite  in 
kind,  nevertheless  could  include — and  this,  with- 
out the  slightest  limitation  of  the  Being — only  so 


THE   INFINITE^    THE  ABSOLUTE,   ETC.  75 

much  as  was  possible,  in  the  nature  of  things  :  and 
whether  this  might  or  might  not  amount  to  in- 
finity is  a  point  unsettled. 

Again  :  it  is  maintained  that  the  Absolute  must 
include  in  itself  all  being  and  all  modes  of  being, 
actual  and  possible,  not  even  excepting  evil.  There 
are  two  distinct  applications  of  which  these  terms, 
the  Infinite,  the  Absolute,  are,  or  at  least  in  this 
work  are  held  to  be,  susceptible  : — 1st,  to  the  one 
Absolute  Being,  God  (the  words  are  not  mine  ;  I 
shall  by  and  by  try  to  show  that  they  are  false  and 
contradictory).  2d,  to  the  Whole,  the  all-inclusive 
Whole,  without  distinction  of  Divine  or  human, 
Infinite  or  finite,  the  All,  the  to  ndv  of  the  early 
Greeks. 

It  is  perplexing  that  the  lecturer  takes  advantage 
of  both  of  these  senses,  and  passes  them  inexplica- 
bly from  one  hand  to  the  other,  of  course  unde- 
signedly, but  never  keeps  fixedly  to  either.  You 
have  references  that  can  apply  only  to  ^'  The  One," 
and  again,  others  that  can  apply  only  to  '^  The 
All ;"  but  you  have  no  security  that  the  same  ap- 
plication shall  be  retained  in  two  successive  illus- 
trations. He  turns  from  the  one  to  the  other  with- 
out notice. 

In  the  case  immediately  before  us  it  is  manifestly 
intended  to  convey  that  "  The  One,"  the  Infinite, 
living  Being,  must  include  all  existence,  not  even 
excepting  evil.     But  it  is  overlooked  that  an  an- 


76  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

tagonist  lias  still  the  alternative  of  ^^  The  All/'  the 
all-inclusive  Whole.  This  he  might  argue  is  the 
Absolute,  and  this  contains  in  itself  all  actual 
modes  of  being  and  all  possibility  of  being.  But 
what  then  ?  what  is  gained  by  the  admission,  the 
admission  of  a  fact  which  nobody  denies,  however 
they  may  deal  with  it  ?  "What  is  gained  by  it  ? 
Nothing ;  at  least  by  the  lecturer,  in  the  present 
stage  of  his  reasoning,  literally  nothing. 

But  it  is  argued  farther,  not  only  that  the  Infi- 
nite or  Absolute  must  contain  in  itself  all  actual 
being,  but  that  all  actual  being  must  contain  the 
realization  of  every  possible  mode  of  being.  "  The 
entire  distinction,"  he  says,  "  between  the  possible 
and  the  actual  can  have  no  existence  as  regards  the 
absolutely  Infinite,  for  an  unrealized  possibility  is 
necessarily  a  relation  and  a  limit."  (p.  46.)  The 
Infinite,  as  here  conceived  and  represented,  has 
reached  its  last  development — has  had  its  utmost 
possibility  actualized,  and  has  become  one  vast, 
boundless  monotony,  over  which  no  breath  of 
change  can  ever  pass ;  a  gross,  gorged,  dead  com- 
plement of  being,  to  which  movement  of  any  sort, 
even  from  within,  is  for  ever  denied.  This  surely 
is  limitation,  iron  necessity,  for  ever  bounding  and 
crushing  all  existence,  not  only  not  involved  in  the 
idea  of  the  Infinite,  or  rather,  of  an  infinite,  but 
opposed  to  it :  this  is,  if  any  thing  can  be,  the  un- 
conditionally limited^  entirely  contradictory  of  the 


THE    INFINITE,    THE   ABSOLUTE,    ETC.  77 

Infinite,  which  sense,  however,  the  lecturer  has 
formally  abjured.  But  here  it  is.  The  rationalist 
is  justified  in  pronouncing  all  this  a  flat  denial  of 
the  patent  facts  of  nature.  The  Great  Whole,  he 
could  maintain,  is  the  residence  of  forces  that  are 
ceaselessly  in  action  ;  of  laws  that  ceaselessly  reign 
in  the  harmony  and  order  of  the  universe.  A  pause 
in  the  action  of  these  forces,  in  the  reign  of  these 
laws,  would  be  a  limit  to  ''  The  AlF'  in  the  most 
direct,  possible  form.  Endless  development  and 
production  resulting  from  power  in  harmony  with 
law — in  other  words,  the  never-ceasinoj  conversion 
of  the  possible  into  the  actual — this,  he  might  as- 
sert, constitutes  the  true  and  grand  idea  of  the  In- 
finite, The  All. 

But,  as  has  akeady  been  noticed,  the  intended 
reference,  in  the  passage  we  are  examining,  must 
certainly  be  not  to  ''  The  Whole,"  the  rb  nav,  though 
it  is  perfectly  legitimate  for  an  antagonist  to  resort 
to  this  alternative,  but  to  The  One  ;  for  in  con- 
firmation or  illustration  of  what  had  been  ad- 
vanced, a  sentiment  is  introduced  which  can  apply 
only  to  the  One.  '^  The  scholastic  saying,  ^  Deus 
est  actus  lourus,'  ridiculed  as  it  has  been  by  modern 
critics,  is,  in  truth,  but  the  expression  in  technical 
language  of  the  almost  unanimous  voice  of  philoso- 
phy, both  in  earlier  and  later  times.''  (p.  47.)  The 
saying  in  question,  like  many  other  aphoristic  sym- 
bols of  the  schoolmen,  contains  a  profound  truth. 


78  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

From  all  sides  it  cannot  be  accepted,  but  on  some 
sides  it  is  both  true  and  grand.  God  is  nobly  con- 
ceived as  everywhere,  and  ever,  in  act,  a  ceaseless, 
infinite  energy.  The  duration  of  God  the  school- 
men represented  as  the  "" punctum  starts,''  in  which 
there  could  be  no  past,  no  future,  no  succession — 
an  everlasting  now.  His  nature,  in  certain  essen- 
tial aspects,  they  described  when  they  said,  ^'  Deus 
est  actus  purus" — God  is  pure,  mere,  simple  act ; 
the  one  all-pervading,  living  power  of  the  universe ; 
unlabored,  spontaneous,  untiring,  eternal,  universal 
energy.  But  what  has  this  to  do  with  the  neces- 
sity, which  the  lecturer  seeks  to  make  out,  that  all 
possible  modes  of  being  must  also  be  actual,  exist- 
ing modes  of  being  ?  Nothing.  So  far  from  it, 
the  adduced  confirmation  or  illustration  is  the 
clearest  possible  refutation  of  his  position.  The 
idea  of  ceaseless  action  suggests  that  of  ceaseless 
production,  not  the  completed  actualization  of  all 
possibilities,  but  never-ending  conversion — an  irre- 
pressible, inner  life,  coming  forth  in  ever  new  de- 
velopments. 

Meanwhile,  it  is  certain  that  the  lecturer,  in  the 
statement  wliich  he  would  confirm  or  illustrate  by 
the  quotation  from  Thomas  Aquinas,  had  in  his 
mind,  not  the  All,  but  the  One,  the  Infinite  Being. 
In  so  many  words,  this  is  distinctly  conveyed  sub- 
sequently :  "A  mental  attribute,  to  be  conceived 
as  infinite,  must  be  in  actual  exercise  on  every  pos- 


THE   INFINITE,    THE    ABSOLUTE,    ETC.  79 

sible  object ;  otherwise,  it  is  potential  only  with 
regard  to  those  on  which  it  is  not  exercised  ;  and 
an  unrealized  potentiality  is  a  limitation/'  (p.  51.) 
Were  a  mental  attribute  simply  brute  force,  these 
'  statements  would  be,  at  least,  partially  admissible. 
Brute  force,  left  to  itself,  is  not  only  necessarily 
in  action,  but  necessarily  in  its  utmost  possible 
action,  and  on  all  objects  on  which  it  can  bear.  A 
steam  power,  whatever  be  its  amount,  goes  forth 
to  the  limit  of  that  amount,  and  on  all  objects  be- 
longing to  its  sphere,  and  within  that  sphere.  In- 
troduce the  additional  idea  of  mind,  of  reason,  of 
w^ill,  of  choice,  and  you  have  no  longer  an  irresisti- 
ble, brut«  necessity  of  action,  but  power  com- 
manded and  regulated  by  its  possessor,  now  let 
forth,  or  again  held  back.  Is  that  a  limit  which 
substitutes  choice  for  necessity  .^  Is  that  a  limit 
which  elevates  and  extends  power,  and  glorifies  its 
possessor  .?  But  what  can  be  meant  when  it  is  as- 
serted, "if  a  mental  attribute  be  not  in  actual  ex- 
ercise on  every  possible  object,  it  is  potential  only 
with  regard  to  those  on  -which  it  is  not  exercised.'* 
This  may  not  be,  but  it  looks  wonderfully  like  a 
contradiction.  The  only  intelligible  meaning  wdiich 
it  can  have  is  this,  where  an  attribute  has  been  ac- 
tually exercised  to  its  utmost  limit,  it  is  no  longer 
potential,  it  is  expended,  exhausted.  But  where 
it  has  not  been  'put  forth,  yet  might  be,  it  is  still 
potential,  it  waits  to  he  exercised.     A  potentiality 


80  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

realized  is  done  with  ;  there  is  an  end  of  it.  That, 
surely,  is  a  limit.  But  if  so,  what  shall  we  say  of 
its  opposite  ?  Is  it  also  a  limit  ?  "  An  unrealized 
potentiality  is  a  limit/'  says  the  lecturer.  But 
power  which  is  truly  infinite,  must  he  for  ever  un-  • 
realizable  in  its  utmost  extent,  and  just  because  it 
is  infinite.  Let  the  manifestations  of  it  he  ever  so 
overwhelming,  there  must  be  a  reserve  of  jDoten- 
tiality  within  and  beyond,  which  can  never  be  ex- 
hausted. If  power  in  the  Infinite  is  not  put  forth 
in  eveiy  possible  mode,  so  as  to  convert  all  possi- 
bility into  actuality— in  other  words,  if  there  is 
such  a  thing  with  the  Great  Being  as  unrealized 
potentiality  ;  this,  so  far  from  imposing  a  limit  on 
his  nature,  so  far  from  making  it  finite,  is  the  very 
thing  which  we  mean  to  convey  when  we  say  it  is 
infinite. 

Mr.  Mansell  proceeds — "hence,"  and  yet,  for 
one,  I  am  quite  unable  to  discover  anything  like  a 
necessary,  or  even  probable  sequence — *•  hence, 
every  infinite  mode  of  consciousness  must  be  re- 
garded as  extending  over  the  field  of  every  other, 
and  their  common  action  involves  perpetual  anta- 
gonism.'" (p.  51.)  If  we  suppose  a  literal  field, 
completely  filled  up  by  different  bodies  of  solid, 
material  actors,  who  have,  at  the  same  time,  in  the 
same  space,  different  and  conflicting  sets  of  opera- 
tions to  carry  forward,  Mr.  ManselFs  difficulty 
would  be  realized.     But  spiritual  powers  do  not 


THE    INFINITE,    THE   ABSOLUTE,    ETC.  81 

occupy  space,  do  not  fill  up  space,  so  as  to  impede 
and  obstruct  action.  Kectitude,  and  wisdom,  and 
love,  and  truth,  have  perfectly  different  spheres  be- 
longing to  them,  though  in  the  same  mind,  and 
cannot,  by  any  ]3ossibility,  come  into  material  col- 
lision with  one  another.  These  perfections  may 
be  misused,  either  by  not  being  sufficiently  in  ex- 
ercise, or  by  being  put  forth  wrongly.  But  spirit- 
ual attributes,  extending  over  each  other's  fields, 
so  as  to  imjDcde  each  other's  action,  what  can  it 
mean  ?  I  am  unable  to  tell.  It  seems  gross  in 
idea,  and  not  consistent  with  a  belief  in  the  essen- 
tial distinction  between  matter  and  mind.  But 
very  noticeable  is  it,  that  this  unhappy  statement 
is  scarcely  sooner  made,  than  the  lecturer  escapes 
from  it — and  to  what  ?  to  human  sin,  moral  free- 
dom, and  the  mysteries  of  providence,  matters  spe- 
cially theological,  even  scriptural,  far  away  from 
the  high  abstractions  amidst  which  we  have  been 
soaring.  Into  this  devious  region  we  must  not  at 
present  venture. 


CHAPTER    III. 

CAUSATION,  ETC. 

Hamilton's  very  argument — Here,  no  Force — Hamilton's  Idea  of 
Cause — Of  Absolute — Lecturer's,  opposite — Hamilton's  formally 
Abandoned — Here  Adopted — Grave,  logical  Blunder — Contra- 
dictory Reasonings — Unsupported  Assertion — Idea  of  Creation — 
Incomprehensible — Commencement,  not — And  not  Contradictory. 

The  lecturer  maintains  (pp.  47-53)  that  the  idea 
of  cause  is  contradictory  of  the  idea  either  of  The 
Infinite  or  "  The  Absolute." 

Dealing  as  he  professes  to  do  with  the  modern 
forms  of  rationalism,  he  might  have  been  expected 
to  notice  that  causation  is  entirely  abandoned  in 
certain  quarters,  and  that  in  its  place  we  have  the 
forces  and  laws  of  the  universe,  and  resulting  from 
them  an  eternal,  infinite  series  of  developments.  It 
might  have  been  a  well-timed  and  valuable  service, 
had  he  set  himself  to  expose  this  subtle  and  spread- 
ing form  of  infidelity.  Far  better  this,  than  to 
expend  time  and  power  in  laboriously  and  learn- 
edly plucking  to  pieces  what  I  humbly  conceive  no 
party  or  school  here  is  found  to  uphold  !  Far  bet- 
ter this,  than,  as  I  have  striven  to  show  and  hope 
still  farther  to  show,  to  argue  inconclusively  against 


CAUSATION,    ETC.  83 

a  system  which  has  next  to  no  standing  in  this 
country,  and  is  never  in  the  least  likely,  judging  by 
present  appearances,  to  have  a  standing  amongst 
us. 

That  there  are  profound  mysteries  surrounding 
the  idea  of  creation,  of  creation  in  time,  for  that  is 
the  point,  in  the  common  form,  in  which  it  is  put, 
and  more,  that  the  notion  of  the  Infinite  beginning 
to  cause  and  giving  being  to  a  finite  universe,  is 
incapable  of  being  grasped  by  the  human  mind,  is 
most  fully  admitted.  But,  I  must  deny  that  the 
lecturer  has  touched  the  real  difficulty.  He  has 
shown  that  the  whole  subject  may  be  involved  in 
the  thickest  darkness,  and  he  has  multiplied  the 
contradictions  and  confusions  to  which,  by^  one 
method  of  reasoning,  it  may  lead  ;  but  I  must  deny 
that  even  the  extremest  rationalists  are  without 
the  means  of  replying  successfully,  at  least,  to 
much  that  he  has  advanced.  Some  of  his  reason- 
ings, in  my  humble  judgment,  are  very  far  from 
being  conclusive. 

"  A  cause,"  he  says,  "  cannot  as  such,  be  abso- 
lute ;  the  absolute  cannot,  as  such,  be  a  cause." 
(p.  47  )  Is  one  allowed  to  ask  why  ?  The  thing 
is  far  from  being  self-evident.  I  maintain  that  his 
distinctly  laid  dowai  definition  of  the  Absolute  con- 
tains nothing,  at  least  palpably,  inconsistent  with 
the  idea  of  cause.  '^  That  which  exists  in  and  by 
itself,  and  has  no  necessary  relation  to  any  other 


84  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

being" — for  so  the  Absolute  is  defined — may,  re- 
taining all  its  self-sufficiency  and  absoluteness, 
have  a  voluntary,  a  self-imposed  relation  to  other 
being.  At  least  I  am  unable  to  perceive  how  this 
can  be  denied.  It  is  freely  granted,  that  very  new 
and  totally  different  ground  is  broken  open,  when 
it  is  added  to  the  w^ords  already  quoted  :  "  on  the 
other  hand,  the  conception  of  the  absolute  implies 
a  possible  existence  out  of  all  relation."  I  simply 
call  special  attention  to  this  short  clause — it  will 
be  examined  presently. 

Meantime,  the  argument  founded  on  it  is,  in  so 
many  words,  Sir  William  Hamilton's,  perhaps  the 
very  strongest  which  even  he  was  able  to  produce. 
But  I  apprehend  that  its  strength  is  his  alone,  and 
cannot  serve  his  disciple  in  the  slightest  degree. 
1st.  Hamilton  was  contending  against  Cousin's 
theory,  not  of  the  Absolute,  as  cause,  but  of  an 
absolute  cause,  a  necessary,  eternal  cause,  a  cause 
which  must  pass  into  act.  The  precise  words  of 
Cousin  are  these — "  The  distinguishing  character- 
istic (of  God)  being  an  absolute  creative  force, 
which  cannot  but  pass  into  activity,  it  follows  not 
that  the  creation  is  possible,  but  that  it  is  neces- 
sary." The  cause  in  Hamilton's  reasoning  is  not 
the  cause  in  Mr.  Mansel's  reasoning,  but  totally 
different ;  and  the  argument,  w^hich  is  appropriate 
and  powerful,  if  not  invincible  as  applied  to  the 
one,  loses  all  its  point  and  force  as  applied  to  the 


CAUSATION,    ETC.  85 

other.  2d.  The  Absolute  to  which  Hamilton  refers 
is  not  the  Absolute  to  which  Mr.  Mansell  refers, 
but  totally  cliiferent,  indeed  diametrically  opposite. 
'"  As  contradictory  of  the  Infinite/'  and  in  no  other 
acceptation,  Sir  WilHam  Hamilton  declares  he  in- 
variably uses  the  term  Absolute.  But  this  sense 
the  lecturer  finds  "irrelevant  to  his  argument," 
and  he  has  avowedly  and  formally  adopted  quite 
another ;  a  sense  in  which  the  word  "  is  not  opposed 
to  the  Infinite,''  in  w^hich  I  have  tried  to  show  it  is 
not  even  distinguishable  from  the  Infinite,  but  is 
virtually  and  essentially  the  same.  Bearing  this  in 
mind,  how  shall  we  interpret  that  short  clause  to 
which,  a  few  moments  ago,  special  attention  was 
called  ?  How  shall  we  understand  the  words,  "  the 
conception  of  the  Absolute  implies  a  possible  exist- 
ence out  of  all  relation  ?"  No  ;  "the  Absolute,"  as 
deliberately  and  formally  defined  by  the  lecturer, 
implies  no  such  thing,  and  he  is  guilty  of  uncom- 
mon carelessness  in  asserting  that  it  does.  The  pal- 
pable logical  blunder  is  so  great  and  so  serious  in  its 
consequences  that  it  is  scarcely  pardonable.  "  The 
Absolute,"  in  Sir  WilHam  Hamilton's  sense,  does 
imply  "  a  possible  existence  out  of  all  relation  ;" 
but  the  lecturer  distinctly  abandons  this  sense,  and 
as  distinctly  accepts  another  definition,  which  is 
purposely  antagonistic  to  that  of  Hamilton.  In- 
deed, as  has  been  already  noticed,  Mr.  Calderwood 
makes  out  the  terms,  Infinite  and  Absolute,  to  be 


86  CONCERNING    APPLICATIONS    OF   LOGIC. 

virtually  synonymous,  though,  by  a  nice  phrase- 
ology, it  be  possible  to  exhibit  a  slight  shade  of 
difference  in  their  signification.  '^  By  the  Abso- 
lute,'' says  Mr.  Mansell,  following  Calderwood, 
"  is  meant  that  which  exists  in  and  by  itself,  hav- 
ing no  necessary  relation  to  any  other  being."  (p. 
45.)  But,  in  the  place  of  this,  we  find  here  the 
important  substitution,  "  the  conception  of  the 
Absolute  implies  a  possible  existence  out  of  all 
relation."  It  is  glaringly  in  the  face  of  his  own 
definition!  '^  Out  of  all  relation  T'  No,  by  no 
means  ;  for  the  Absolute,  as  defined,  is  that  which 
has  not  no  relation,  but  no  necessary  relation  ; 
and  even  more  than  this,  no  necessary  relation  to 
any  other  being.  Two  things  are  manifestly  im- 
plied— 1st.  That  external  relation,  and  not  inter- 
nal, is  contradictory  of  the  Absolute,  as  he  under- 
stands it.  2d.  That  even  external  relation  is 
contradictory,  only  if  it  be  supposed  to  be  also 
necessary  ;  necessary,  that  is,  to  the  very  idea  of 
the  being  of  the  Absolute,  so  that  it  could  not  be 
conceived  apart  from  it.  Relation  within  itself  is 
admissible  ;  relation  to  other  being  is  admissible, 
provided  always  it  be  not  necessary,  not  essential. 
Temporary,  incidental  relation,  voluntary  self-im- 
posed relation  to  other  being  is  not  contradictory 
of  the  Absolute.  And  yet  we  read,  '^  the  concep- 
tion of  the  Absolute  implies  a  j^ossible  existence 
out  of  all  relation."     It  is  not  necessary  to  insist 


CAUSATION,    ETC.  87 

further  on  tliis  grave  mistake  ;  but  the  lecturer 
must  pardon  his  readers,  if,  after  this,  they  greatly 
distrust  his  logical  accuracy  and  precision. 

The  act  of  causation,  it  is  further  argued,  must 
be  voluntary  ;  volition  is  possible  only  in  a  con- 
scious being,  and  consciousness  supposes  relation, 
at  all  events,  between  subject  and  object,  the  being 
choosing  and  the  choice  formed.  With  unneces- 
sary amplification,  it  is  said,  "  there  must  be  a 
conscious  subject  and  an  object  of  which  he  is  con- 
scious. The  subject  is  a  subject  to  the  object,  and 
the  object  is  an  object  to  the  subject,  and  neither 
can  exist  by  itself  as  the  Absolute.''  (p.  48.)  But 
why  not  ?  I  am  entitled  to  suppose  by  the  Abso- 
lute what  Mr.  Mansell  designates  The  Absolute 
God,  and  so  much  the  more,  indeed  necessarily, 
because  the  argument  respects  the  act  of  causation. 
An  ^ct  supposes  an  actor.  Now  the  relation  be- 
tween the  Divine  Mind  and  its  conscious  thought 
is  purely  internal,  and  internal  relation  was  implied 
in  the  definition  with  which  the  argument  set  out. 
Are  we  again  to  find  a  logician  not  supplementing, 
but  subverting  his  own  definition  and  arguing 
against  it  ?  We  are.  The  lecturer  does  this,  but 
without  the  least  intimation  that  he  is  changing 
his  ground.  "The  alternative  (^.  e.,  of  internal 
relation),  he  says,  is,  in  ultimate  analysis,«no  less 
self-destructive  than  the  other.  For  the  object  of 
consciousness,  whether  a  mode  of   the  subject's 


88  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

existence  or  not,  is  either  created  in  and  by  the  act 
of  consciousness,  or  it  has  an  existence  independent 
of  it.  In  the  former  case,  the  object  depends  on 
the  subject,  and  the  subject  alone  is  the  true  Abso- 
lute." (p.  49.)  Of  course  it  is,  an  antagonist  might 
reply,  and  stop  him  just  at  this  point ;  the  subject 
is  the  true  Absolute — and  what  then  ?  We  need 
not  go  further.  The  other  alternative  proposed, 
or  any  possible  alternative  besides,  is  not  required. 
This  is  enough.  Of  course  the  conscious  subject 
is  the  Absolute,  if  there  be  an  absolute,  and  his 
conscious  choice  is  a  mode  of  his  existence.  Sub- 
stance and  mode  are  not  contradictory,  but  essen- 
tial the  one  to  the  other.  And  yet  this  is  all,  by 
which  the  lecturer  seeks  to  subvert  his  own  defini- 
tion, and  feels  himself  entitled  to  assert,  "  Not 
only  is  the  Absolute,  as  conceived,  incapable  of  a 
necessary  relation  to  anything  else,  but  it  is  ^also 
incapable  of  containing,  by  the  constitution  of  its 
own  nature,  an  essential  relation  within  itself 
Stop,  an  antagonist  might  say ;  prove  it ;  the  con- 
trary is  distinctly  conceded  in  your  own  defini- 
tions— "  as  a  whole,  for  instance,  composed  of 
parts,  or  as  a  substance,  consisting  of  attributes, 
or  as  a  conscious  subject  in  antithesis  to  an  object.'' 
(p.  49.)  I  can  only  offer  a  dkect  negative  to  this 
affirmal^on.  It  is  not  only  not  proved,  I  hold  it 
to  be  not  true,  to  be  the  very  contrary  of  the  truth — 
always  taking  the  lecturer's  own  formal  definition 


CAUSATION,    ETC.  89 

of  the  Absolute  as  the  legitimate  one.  Being 
without  attributes  is  a  contradiction,  an  absurdity; 
and  no  relation  can  be  more  indubitable,  direct  and 
close,  than  that  between  being  and  its  attributes. 
It  is  essential,  it  is  inevitable.  It  does  not  limit, 
it  constitutes  being.  Consciousness  in  like  manner 
is  the  condition  of  intelligence.  Self-conscious  in- 
telligence is  alone  intelligence.  I  know  that  I 
know,  else  I  do  not  know  at  all.  Intelligence 
without  self-consciousness  is  a  nonentity,  a  purely 
baseless  idea. 

The  lecturer  returns  to  the  notion  of  Cause  and 
its  incompatibility  with  that  of  either  the  Infinite, 
or  the  Absolute.  Much  is  made  of  the  familiar 
common-places,  about  creation  involving  a  change 
to  the  Creator,  either  from  worse  to  better,  or  from 
better  to  worse,  from  a  lower  to  a  higher,  or  from 
a  higher  to  a  lower  mode  of  being,  or  from  one 
state  to  another,  the  change  being  purely  indiffer- 
ent. On  all  which,  for  my  part,  I  do  not  feel 
called  upon  to  say  one  w^ord — ^inasmuch  as  the 
same  things  advanced  by  infidels  of  different 
schools,  have  been  met,  so  far  as  they  can  be  met, 
many  times  over.  This  newer  scepticism — for  such 
essentially  I  hold  it  to  be,  of  course  without  the 
remotest  suspicion  of  the  lecturer's  personal  faith 
— contains  only  the  old  poison  not  even  changed 
in  form.  But  how,  it  is  asked,  can  the  Absolute 
give  origin  to  the  relative^  the  Infinite  to  finite  ? 


90  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

We  cannot  tell,  an  extreme  rationalist  shall  reply, 
and  as  little  can  you  tell,  and  yet  you  believe  it. 
It  is  incomprehensible  to  us,  as  it  is  to  you,  and 
not  more.  The  alternative  is  before  us — either 
matter  is  eternal  or  the  one  Infinite  Intelligence 
caused  the  universe  of  matter  and  mind.  We 
cannot  comprehend  this,  and  you  cannot  com- 
prehend it.  We  cannot  interpret  either  the  fact 
or  the  mode  or  the  time  of  creation,  and  you 
cannot  interpret  these.  But  jve  believe  in  the 
creation,  and  you  having  no  other  evidence  than 
is  open  to  us,  believe  in  it.  Believing  in  it,  we 
defy  any  one  to  prove  that  it  is  contradictory. 
To  the  power  of  the  Infinite  Being,  we  like  you, 
can  affix  no  limits.  New  developments  of  that 
power  are  ever  to  be  expected.  They  can  neither 
create  nor  exhibit  change  in  Him,  but  are  only 
fresh  forms  of  expressing  what  He  is,  what  He  im- 
mutably, eternally  is. 

"  But  how,"  asks  the  lecturer,  "  can  the  relative 
be  conceived,  as  coming  into  being  .?  If  it  is  a 
distinct  reality  from  the  Absolute,  it  must  be  con- 
ceived as  passing  from  non-existence  into  exist- 
ence." "  To  think  of  an  object  in  the  act  of  be- 
coming, in  the  progress  from  not  being  into  being, 
is  to  think  that  which  in  the  very  thought  annihi- 
lates itself."  (p.  53.)  It  is  enough  to  reply,  that 
there  can  be  no  such  progress,  and  it  is  not  ima- 
gined that  there  can  be,  as  the  lecturer  describes, 


CAUSATION,    ETC.  91 


'7 


no  such,  act  of  becoming,  no  such  passing  from 
non-existence  into  existence,  no  such  coming  into 
being.  What  is  really  supposed  or  imagined  is 
this  :  One  instant,  the  Infinite  Being  is  alone;  be- 
sides Him,  there  is  absolutely  nothing.  The  next 
instant,  something  else  is,  the  creation  is.  It  is, 
that  is  all  we  can  say.  It  has  not  come,  as  from 
one  place  to  another.  It  is.  It  has  not  passed, 
as  from  one  state  to  another.  It  was  not.  It  is. 
It  has  not  become  anything,  having  been  something 
else  before.  It  simply  is.  It  has  not  made  pro- 
gress by  a  single  step.  It  never  was  anything, 
anywhere.  It  is.  That  is  all  we  can  say.  How 
it  is,  or  why,  or  why  not  earlier,  or  later,  we  can- 
not comprehend  or  explain.  The  lecturer  asserts, 
but  he  has  failed  to  prove,  does  not  even  attempt 
to  prove,  "  the  impossibility  of  conceiving  the  co- 
existence of  the  Infinite  and  the  finite."'  On  the 
contrary,  it  is  the  Being  of  a  God,  of  an  Infinite, 
which  make  the  patent,  admitted  fact  of  the  exist- 
ence of  the  finite — at  least  to  many  minds — either 
intelligible  or  credible. 

Just  as  little  can  we  acknowledge  "  the  cognate 
impossibility  of  which  he  speaks,  of  conceiving  a 
first  commencement  of  phenomena  or  the  absolute 
giving  birth  to  the  relative."  (p.  54.)  We  have 
here  the  one  fatal  error  in  Sir  William  Hamilton's 
system,  as  some  of  its  devoutest  disciples  confess 
with  sorrow,  the  true  origin  of  whatever  else  is  ob- 


92  CONCERNING  APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

jectionable  in  it.  With  sometliing  like  infatua- 
tion that  great  man,  betrayed  by  fondness  for  his 
own  theory  of  causation,  clung  to  the  idea  of  ''  the 
impossibility  of  conceiving  an  absolute  commence- 
ment or  an  absolute  termination."  The  question 
of  the  conceivability  of  the  idea  of  the  Infinite  is 
here  quite  apart,  the  question  of  the  comprehensi- 
bility  of  the  fact  or  the  mode  of  creation  is  also 
quite  apart.  All  that  is  at  issue,  is  simj)ly  this  : 
When  the  statement  is  made,  "  this  instant  God  is 
alone,  besides  Him  there  is  absolutely  nothing,  the 
next  instant  something  else  is,  creation  is,''  does 
consciousness  declare  or  does  it  not  declare  this  ab- 
solute commencement  of  the  finite  to  be  incon- 
ceiveable,  because  contradictory  .^  Mr.  Mansell, 
following  Hamilton,  maintains  that  it  does.  Many 
even  of  Hamilton's  disciples,  amongst  whom  I 
humbly  claim  to  number  myself,  maintain  that  it 
does  not.  Authority,  of  course,  goes  for  nothing 
in  such  a  case.  Calmly,  profoundly,  continuously 
meditating,  divesting  ourselves,  in  all  honesty,  of 
every  prejudice  and  every  prepossession,  each  must 
determine  this  question  for  himself.  No  authority, 
however  justly  venerated,  can  be  suffered  to  sug- 
gest or  supply  what  can  have  no  value,  unless  it 
be  the  clear  testimony  of  our  own  minds.  For  my 
part,  I  am  as  thoroughly  satisfied  as  I  can  be  of 
anything,  that  I  can  and  do  think,  represent  to 
myself,  in  thought,   this  first  commencement  of 


CAUSATION,    ETC.  93 

relative  phenomena,  and  without  the  slightest 
sense  of  contradiction.  The  power  which  caused 
it  is  incomprehensible.  The  mode  in  which  this 
power  operated  is  also  incomprehensible.  But  the 
effect  of  creative  power,  in  the  absolute  com- 
raencement  of  new  existence,  I  can  and  do  think, 
I  can  and  do  represent  it  to  my  mind,  without  the 
slightest  sense  of  contradiction.  The  idea  of  cre- 
ation— and  this,  be  it  noted,  is  a  much  wider 
thing,  and  even  perfectly  different  from  the  crea- 
tion, the  actual  new  existence,  first  beginning  to 
be — is  not  contradictory.  It  has  never  been  shown 
— we  maintain  it  cannot  be  shown — to  be  contra- 
dictory. The  lecturer  asserts  that  it  is, .but  he  has 
not  proved  his  assertion. 

Those  who  have  concurred  in  the  principles 
which  I  have  sought  to  establish,  in  opposition  to 
his  reasoning,  will  agree  with  me,  that  it  is  not 
here  only  he  has  failed,  but  also  in  several  of  the 
conclusions  which  he  sums  up,  towards  the  close  of 
his  second  lecture.  To  one  and  another  of  these 
conclusions,  be  they  true  or  false  in  themselves,  I 
have  to  offer,  so  far  as  his  arguments  are  concerned, 
a  direct  negative,  on  the  ground  of  evidence  abeady 
advanced.  "The  conception,"  says  the  lecturer, 
professing  to  sum  up  his  reasonings  thus  far,  but 
in  reality  not  doing  so,  "  of  the  Absolute  and  the 
Infinite,  from  whatever  side  we  view  it,  appears 
encompassed  with  contradictions.     There  is  a  con- 


94  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

tradiction  in  supposing  such  an  object  to  exist, 
whether  alone  or  in  conjunction  with  others,  and 
there  is  a  contradiction  in  supposing  it  not  to  exist. 
There  is  a  contradiction  in  conceiving  it  as  one, 
and  there  is  a  contradiction  in  conceiving  it  as 
many.  There  is  a  contradiction  in  conceiving  it  as 
personal,  and  there  is  a  contradiction  in  conceiving 
it  as  impersonal.  It  cannot,  without  contradiction, 
be  represented  as  active,  nor,  without  equal  contra- 
diction, be  represented  as  inactive.  It  cannot  be 
conceived  as  the  sum  of  all  existence,  nor  yet  can 
it  be  conceived  as  a  part  only  of  that  sum."  (p.  59.) 
This  peroration  is  unusually  imposing,  and  is 
very  admirably  put.  But  it  appears  to  me  to  have 
one  fundamental  and  fatal  fault,  as  we  may  dis- 
cover, I  humbly  conceive,  on  casting  our  thoughts 
back  on  the  course  of  the  argumentation.  It  puts 
forward,  in  strong  relief,  propositions  strikingly 
antithetical  and  telling  in  their  sequence,  but  it 
does  not  contain  the  actual  findings,  and  only  the 
actual  findings  which  appear  in  the  body  of  the 
lecture  itself  By  no  means  ;  and  hence  it  is  desti- 
tute of  all  value,  save  that  of  very  fine  writing,  out 
of  place.  Against  several  clauses  of  this  eloquent 
and  ingenious  summary,  I  have  tried  to  make  good 
my  right  to  put — "  not  proven."  True  or  false,  at 
least  "  not  proven." 


CHAPTER    lY. 

INCONCEIVABILITY    OF  INFINITE, 

Admit  Facts,  refuse  Arguments  —  Nature  of  Consciousness  — 
Equivocal  Limitation — Infinite,  Finite — Distinction,  just  and 
real — Confusion — Inconsequent  Reasonings — Consciousness  of 
Infinite  Contradictory  ? — Virtual  Scepticism — Natural  Theism 
Impossible  ? — This  Inconsistent  with  Facts— ^Impeachment  of 
the  Almighty. 

Happily,  it  will  not  be  necessary  much  longer  to 
employ  the  kind  of  reasoning  to  which  it  has  hith- 
erto been  unavoidable  to  have  recourse.  There  are 
very  vital,  home-coming  questions  awaiting  discus- 
sion, and  it  is  a  trial  of  patience  and  spirit  to  be 
detained  from  these  by  what,  did  it  not  lie  in  the 
way  of  something  far  higher,  one  might  be  provoked 
to  regard  as  mere  logical  sleight-of-hand.  I  must 
also  own  to  a  feeling  of  pain,  that  in  a  case  where 
the  Great  Being,  and  the  spirit  of  man,  and  the 
destiny  of  the  universe  were  concerned,  it  should 
have  been  necessary  to  resort  to  the  coldest  and 
hardest  forms  of  logic,  the  most  impalpable  of 
metaphysical  abstractions,  and  the  veriest  subtleties 
and  illusions  of  dialectics.  The  sense  of  duty  must 
have  been  overwhelmingly  imperative,  to  compel 
an  earnest  and  true  soul  to  endure  the  substitution 


96  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

of  shadow  for  substance,  of  verbal  mechanism  for 
living  energy,  and  of  mere  dialectic  for  stern  reality. 
There  are  high  and  noble  uses  of  metaphysics,  I 
believe  ;  there  is  an  absolute  necessity  for  the  rigid 
philosophical  treatment  of  subjects  which  belong  to 
the  true  sphere  of  philosophy.  But  we  must  not 
forget  that  extensive  acquaintance  with  the  history 
and  the  materials  of  speculation,  perfect  facility  in 
the  use  of  logical  forms,  and  familiarity,  even  house- 
hold familiarity,  with  the  nomenclature  of  abstrac- 
tion are  not  identical  either  with  a  true  philosophic 
spirit  or  with  sound  reasoning,  or  with  the  main- 
tenance of  great  and  just  principles.  I  have  already 
tried  to  show,  and  I  am  about  to  produce  still  far- 
ther proofs,  that  the  Bamj)ton  Lecture,  justly  cele- 
brated on  many  accounts,  is  not  a  safe  guide,  either 
in  philosophy  or  in  theology,  is  not  accurate  in  its 
reasonings,  and  not  philosophical  in  its  conclusions 
and  its  spirit. 

Only  very  briefly  will  it  now  be  necessary  to  do 
this  ;  and  so  much  the  more,  as  in  the  special  point, 
which  is  laboriously  argued  in  the  third  lecture,  I 
shall  have,  by  and  by,  to  express  at  least  a  quali- 
fied concurrence.  But  even  where  the  conclusion 
may  be  limitedly  true,  I  wish  to  show  that  the  ar- 
gumentation is,  to  some  extent,  vicious  and  invalid. 

The  point  to  be  made  out  in  the  third  lecture  is, 
that  the  Infinite  is  inconceivable  by  the  human 
mind,  and  the  proof  is  derived  from  the  nature  of 


IXCONCEIY ABILITY    OF   INFINITE.  97 

human  consciousness.  ^^  ith  the  issue,  its  actual 
truth  or  falsehood,  I  am  not  now  concerned.  But 
the  proof  is,  in  my  humble  judgment,  unsatisfac- 
tory in  many  respects,  and  is  acx^ompanied  with 
statements  not  only  not  supported,  but  untenable. 
^^  To  be  conscious,  we  must  be  conscious  of  some- 
thing, and  that  something  can  only  be  known  as 
that  which  it  is,  by  being  distinguished  from  that 
which  it  is  not.  But  distinction  is  necessarily  limi- 
tation/' (p.  70.)  Why  so  ?  Do  I  limit  some- 
tiling^  when  I  say  it  is  not  nothing  ?  In  the  sense 
of  distinguishing,  defining,  determining^  I  do  limit  ; 
but  in  the  sense  of  circumscribing,  narrowing,  mak- 
ing less  or  other  than  it  is,  I  do  not  necessarily 
limit.  All  knowledge  is  essentially  discrimination, 
distinction,  the  separation  and  differentiation  of 
things.  Do  I  necessarily  impose  a  limit — except 
in  an  equivocal  sense — on  everything,  hy  simply 
knoioing  it  ?  If  this  were  true,  it  must  apply 
much  beyond  the  human  consciousness,  it  must 
reach  to  the  divine.  The  Infinite  God  is  a  con- 
scious being.  Consciousness  is  the  condition  of 
all  knowledge,  exist  w^here  it  may.  ^'  I  know  that 
I  know,  else  I  do  not  know  at  all,"  is  true  univer- 
sally, without  any  possible  exception.  Divine,  like 
human  consciousness,  implies  distinction  of  one 
thing  from  another — differentiation — for  that  is 
equivalent  to  knowledge.  But  beyond  this,  and 
perhaps  still    more   clearly   decisive,    the   Infinite 


98  CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

Being  is  self-conscious,  knows  himself ;  and  does 
He,  must  He,  by  this  knowledge  limit  his  own  na- 
ture ?  Even  from  this  alone,  we  are  entitled  to 
assert,  with  confidence,  that  to  discriminate,  to 
distinguish,  to  know,  to  be  conscious,  is  not  neces- 
sarily equivalent  to  limitation,  except  in  an  equivo- 
cal sense. 

Again  :  "  the  infinite  cannot  be  distinguished, 
as  such,  from  the  finite,  by  the  absence  of  any 
quality  which  the  finite  possesses,  for  such  absence 
would  be  a  limitation.  Nor  yet  can  it  be  distin- 
guished by  the  presence  of  an  attribute  which  the 
finite  has  not  ;  for,  as  no  finite  part  can  be  a  con- 
stituent of  an  infinite  whole,  this  differential  char- 
acteristic must  itself  be  infinite,  and  must,  at  the 
same  time,  have  nothing  in  common  with  the 
finite."  (pp.  70,  71.)  I  understand  by  the  Infinite, 
and  have  a  right  to  understand,  the  one  living  God. 
The  lecturer  himself,  again  and  again,  so  under- 
stands it ;  and  he  cannot  be  sufiered,  because  it 
may  be  necessary  for  his  special  purpose,  to  enforce 
— the  rationalist  may  legitimately  refuse  him  the 
right  of  enforcing — in  this  instance,  another  sense, 
and  of  taking  refuge  in  the  Infinite,  the  All — a 
mere  ideal  abstraction.  He  admits,  as  his  own 
personal  belief,  and  those  with  whom  he  is  con- 
tending, are  entitled  to  keep  him  to  the  admission 
of  One  Infinite  Being,  the  Creator  of  the  finite 
universe.     It  is  a  patent  fact  that  we  can,  and  do, 


INCONCEIVABILITY   OF   INFINITE.  99 

distinguish  this  Infinite  Being  from  finite  beings. 
Whether  we  be  able  fully  to  conceive  and  compre- 
hend the  Infinite  is  not  the  question.  But,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  thus  far,  at  least,  we  can,  and  do 
go  ;  every  intelligent  man  does  distinguish  the  In- 
finite Being  from  finite  beings  and  things,  and  in 
the  very  way  which  is  j)i'onounced  in  this  passage 
to  be  impossible.  What  is  more,  we  are  perfectly 
certain  that  the  distinction  so  made  is  thoroughly 
well-founded  and  real.  We  distinguish  the  In- 
finite, I.  by  the  absence  of  a  quality  which  the 
finite  possesses — finity,  limitation.  But  in  sober 
earnest,  the  lecturer  asserts,  that  thus  discrimina- 
ting, difierentiating  the  Infinite,  hy  the  absence  of 
limitation^  we  do  limit  Him.  II.  by  the  presence 
of  an  attribute  which  the  finite  has  not — infinitv, 
non-limitation.  But,  it  is  said,  the  difierential 
characteristic  must  itself  be  infinite,  and  so  can 
have  nothing  in  common  with  the  finite.  Of 
course,  so.  It  does  not  need  to  have  anything  in 
common  ;  just  because,  in  this  point,  the  two  have 
nothing  in  common,  the  distinction  between  them 
is  complete. 

Among  other  inconsequent  passages,  as  I  deem 
them,  the  following  may  be  selected — "  a  thing,  an 
object,  an  attribute,  a  person,  or  any  other  term, 
signifying  one  out  of  many  possible  objects  of  con- 
sciousness, is,  by  that  very  relation,  necessarily  de- 
clared to   be  finite"  (is   the  one   Infinite   Being, 


100        CONCERNING    APPLICATIONS    OF   LOGIC. 

because  there  is  a  finite  creation,  and  distinsruished 
from  it,  necessarily  declared  to  be  finite  ?  does  the 
writer  deliberately  mean  so  ?)  '^  An  infinite  thing, 
or  object,  or  attribute,  or  person,  is,  therefore,  in 
the  same  moment  declared  to  be  both  finite  and 
infinite/'  (p.  90.)  Were  there  only  the  Infinite, 
in  the  pure  pantheistic  sense,  the  Quantitative  In- 
finite, if  we  so  speak,  the  One  Whole,  the  to  ndv 
(a  very  difierent  thing  from  the  Qualitative  Infi- 
nite), and  nothing  but  the  Infinite  ;  all  j^henomena, 
and  all  finity,  being  mere  illusion,  the  passage  we 
have  quoted  might  stand.  But  rationalists,  in 
common  with  the  lecturer,  are  not  restricted  from 
supposing  One  Infinite  Being,  and,  besides  Him, 
finite  beings  and  things.  The  co-existence  of  the 
One  and  the  many  they  do  not  profess  to  explain, 
nor  does  he,  but  it  is  a  fact,  and  they  accept  the 
fact,  as  he  also  does  ;  the  natural  reason  accepts 
it  ;  and  they  defy  him,  or  any  one,  to  prove  that 
it  is  contradictory.  Inexplicable  they  will  allow  it 
to  be,  but  not  contradictorv — at  all  events,  ac- 
cepted  on  both  sides.  Now  will  the  lecturer  main- 
tain that,  when  it  is  asserted  that,  besides  limited 
beings  and  things  there  is  one  Being  who  is  not 
limited,  '^  who  is  free  from  all  possible  (that  is,  as 
I  understand,  necessary)  limitation,  and  than 
whom  a  greater  is  inconceivable '' — for  such  is  his 
own  definition — this  is  limiting  that  Being  ?  The 
thing  is  surely  preposterous.     Will  he,  aside  from 


INCONCEIVABILITY   OF   INFINITE.  101 

the  Schellingian  and  Hegelian  abstractions,  with 
which  we  have  nothing  to  do,  maintain  that  by 
predicating  attributes  of  that  Being,  in  other  words, 
by  conceiving  Him  to  be  being,  and  not  nothing — 
for,  being  without  attributes  is  a  contradiction — 
we  limit  Him  ?  The  fact  is,  that  in  these  lec- 
tures not  only  is  One  Infinite  Being  admitted,  but 
it  is  distinctly  argued  that  his  attributes,  like  his 
nature,  must  be  infinite.  Let  us  then  take  forth 
a  single  attribute — power  !  What  do  I  limit, 
when  I  say  that  this  power  is  unlimited  ;  or,  if 
you  will,  infinite  ?  True,  power  is  not  everything, 
it  is  '^  the  All,"  it  is  not  the  Infinite.  And  if  the 
lecturer  is  only  showing  the  impossibility  of  the 
Infinite,  the  '^  rb  ndv/'  with  whom  is  he  contend- 
ing, for  where  is  the  rationalist,  in  this  country, 
who  maintains  it  ?  And,  surely,  a  logician  will 
not  imagine  that  he  has  gained  a  victory  over  those 
wdio  stand  by  his  side  and  are  glad  to  see  him, 
contending  against  a  position  to  which  they  are  as 
thoroughly  opposed  as  he  can  be.  Human  reason 
finds  no  contradiction,  though  it  does  find  profound 
mystery  in  the  unlimited  power,  unlimited  wisdom, 
unlimited  spiritual  excellence  of  the  Being  whose 
nature  is  all  unlimited. 

The  same  Schellingian,  Hegelian,  or  Spinozistic 
Infinite,  is  assailed  in  another  passage.  ''  The  In- 
finite, if  it  is  to  be  conceived  at  all,  must  be  con- 
ceived as  potentially  everything,  and  actually  no- 


102         CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

thing  ;  for,  if  there  is  anything  in  general  which  it 
cannot  become,  it  is  thereby  limited  ;  and  if  there 
is  anything  in  particular  which  it  actually  is,  it  is 
thereby  excluded  from  being  any  other  thing.  But, 
again,  it  must  also  be  conceived  as  actually  every- 
thing, and  potentially  nothing  ;  for  an  unrealized 
potentiality  is  a  limitation/'  (p.  71.)  All  this  is 
literally  assailing  nothing.  The  Infinite,  in  this 
sense,  the  to  irdv^  the  universal  substans,  who 
adopts  the  idea  ?  And  yet  even  here,  the  veriest 
pantheist,  I  am  presumptuous  enough  to  think, 
might  silence  the  Bampton  lecturer  on  his  own 
ground,  and  might  say.  Yes,  the  Infinite  is  poten- 
tially everything,  and  actually  everything.  There 
is  no  unrealized  2:)0tentiality.  Everything  possible 
is  ;  and  there  is  nothing  which  the  Infinite  cannot 
become,  for  no  actual  thing  more  is  possible.  And 
what  then  ?  the  jDantheist  might  ask. 

It  is  v^earisome,  lowering,  and  almost  corrupt- 
ing, this  mere  vaporing  of  words  and  forms  of 
attack  and  of  fence,  which  means  nothing  and 
can  end  in  nothing,  save  that  it  must  have  a  mis- 
chievous moral  efiect,  alike  on  the  writer  and  his 
readers. 

I  shall  only  notice,  further,  the  form  in  which 
the  lecturer  puts  the  conclusion,  when  he  thinks  he 
has  established  '^  a  consciousness  of  the  Infinite,  as 
such,  thus  necessarily  involves  a  self-contradiction.'* 
(p.  71.)     And  yet  a  consciousness  of  the  Infinite 


INCONCEIVABILITY   OF    INFINITE.  103 

God,  a  consciousness  that  the  Infinite  God  exists, 
is  vehemently  maintained  by  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton, and  is  again  and  again  admitted  in  the  Bamp- 
ton  Lecture.  The  incongruity  is  owing  entirely  to 
that  illogical  and  (in  effect)  immoral  shifting  and 
shuffling  of  the  Infinite  and  an  Infinite,  to  which  I 
have  before  had  to  refer.  Here,  "  a  consciousness 
of  the  Infinite  is  self-contradictory."  But  the  writer 
can,  when  necessary,  find  Infinity  in  one  living 
Being.  ^'^  We  are  compelled,"  he  says,  "  by  the 
constitution  of  our  minds,  to  believe  in  the  exist- 
ence of  an  Infinite  and  Absolute  Beins; — a  belief 
which  appears  forced  on  us,  as  the  complement  of 
our  consciousness  of  the  relative  and  the  finite. 
But  the  instant  we  attempt  to  analyze  the  ideas 
thus  suggested  to  us,  in  the  hope  of  attaining  to 
an  intelligible  conception  of  them,  we  are,  on  every 
side,  involved  in  inextricable  confusion  and  contra- 
diction." (p.  QS.)  No,  we  are  not,  it  might  be  re- 
plied ;  it  is  not  true  ;  unless,  indeed,  instead  of 
keeping  by  the  idea  of  One  Infinite  God,  Ave  shift 
it,  ever  and  a2;ain,  and  substitute  for  it.  the  Infinite 
— a  mere  abstraction,  a  perfectly  wild  and  unmean- 
ing abstraction,  against  which  it  is  utterly  worth- 
less labor  for  this  accomplished  v/riter  to  argue  ; 
for  where  is  it  held,  where  is  anything  approaching 
it  held .?  "  So  long  as  human  consciousness,'' — 
these  also  are  the  words  of  the  Bampton  Lecture  ; 
with  what  consistency  they  are  introduced  any  one 


104         CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS    OF   LOGIC. 

may  judge — "  contains  the  idea  of  a  God" — and 
He  is  the  Infinite — '"and  the  instincts  of  worship, 
so  long  mental  philosophy  will  walk  on  common 
ground  with  religious  belief/'  (p.  32.) 

I  think  I  may  appeal  to  every  reader  of  the 
work,  whether,  not  the  tendency,  but  one  great 
and  avowed  purpose  of  it  be  not  to  separate  mental 
philosophy  from  religious  faith,  to  show  that  they 
are  irreconcileable,  and  that  faith  has  no  security, 
save  in  a  universal  protest  against  the  authority  of 
the  understandinoj.  Ao;ain,  ''  It  is  bv  consciousness 
alone,  that  we  know  that  God"  (and  He  is  the 
Only  Infinite)  "  exists,  or  that  we  are  able  to  offer 
Him  any  service.''  (p.  86.)  And  yet  the  same 
writer  maintains  "  that  a  consciousness  of  the  In- 
finite (who  is  God)  is  self-contradictory,"  and, 
therefore,  I  should  presume  to  argue,  impossible. 

Minute  criticism  of  these  two  Lectures  need  not 
be  pursued  further.  Looking  back,  especially  to 
the  second,  and  to  the  long  array  of  contradictories,, 
which  is  there  slowly  and  formally  drawn  out,  it  is 
hardly  possible  to  avoid  thinking  that,  throughout, 
there  is,  at  least,  seeming  satisfaction,  in  darkening 
and  blasting  what  many  regard  as  the  natural  be- 
liefs and  hopes  of  men.  The  irrepressible  feeling  in 
my  mind — of  course  without  for  an  instant  im- 
peaching the  personal  convictions  of  the  writer,  and 
referring  solely  to  the  reasonings  and  conclusions 
of  his  book — is,  that  I  have  been  dealing;  with  a 


INCONCEIVABILITY   OF   INFINITE.  105 

virtual  scepticism  ;  with  a  scepticism,  moreover, 
which  seems  to  gloat  over  its  own  blindness,  and 
impotence,  and  degradation,  and  almost  to  exult  in 
putting  out  its  own  eyes,  and  covering  itself  with 
shame  and  rags  ! 

Theism,  on  the  mere  ground  of  our  rational 
nature,  and  in  the  absence  of  written  revelation,  is 
imjDOSsible  !  That  is  the  conclusion  which  the  Lec- 
turer announces.  The  co-existence  of  the  Infinite 
and  the  finite  involves  endless  contradictions. 
Either  we  must  abandon  the  finite  and  hold  bv  the 
Infinite,  adopting  the  scheme  of  Pantheism,  or  we 
must  abandon  the  Infinite  and  hold  by  the  finite, 
adoptiug  the  scheme  of  Atheism.  But  both  alter- 
natives alike  land  us  in  contradictions  as  great  or 
greater  than  those  from  which  we  seek  to  escape. 
Theism,  Pantheism,  Atheism  are  impossible,  nearly 
equally  impossible  !  Man  cannot  even  read  the 
alphabet  out  of  which  a  rational  Theism  must  be 
framed.  Paragraphs,  sentences  of  profound  mean- 
ing, are  impossible  !  Even  single  words,  the  sym- 
bols of  living  ideas,  precious  as  suggestive  of  undy- 
ing truth,  are  impossible.  Man  is  ignorant  of  the 
very  letters  of  the  alphabet,  cannot  join  them  to- 
gether, cannot  pronounce  them,  and  cannot  form 
even  a  solitarv  term. 

It  is  a  terrible  conclusion,  if  it  be  true.  But  is 
it  true  ?  Is  it  true  that  in  the  absence  of  written 
revelation,  natural  Theism  is  impossible  ?     Is  it 

5* 


106        CONCERNING    APPLICATIONS   OF    LOGIC. 

consistent  with  facts  ?  Is  there  no  Theist,  has 
there  never  been  a  natural  Theist,  save  among  Jews 
or  Christians  ?  What  of  Mohammedans  ?  Has 
no  single  soul,  over  all  the  ages,  and  in  all  the  pa- 
gan world,  amidst  many  darknesses,  and  inconsis- 
tences, and  false  beliefs,  yet  adhering  to  it, — has 
no  single  soul  ever  struggled  up  through  the  crowd 
of  inferior  divinities,  to  the  idea  and  the  faith  of 
one  Supreme  Being  ?  Has  there  been  no  Pytha- 
goras, no  Xenophanes,  no  Parmenides,  no  Socrates, 
no  Plato,  no  Zeno,  noEpictetus  ?  Andhave  there 
been  no  obscure  and  unprivileged  souls,  of  whose 
ruder  faith  these  higher  spirits  may  suggest  the  ex- 
istence ? 

When  we  return — as  on  the  lecturer's  principles 
we  should  be  compelled  to  return — a  decisive  nega- 
tive to  these  questions,  it  must  surely  be  forgotten 
that  for  thousands  of  years  from  the  creation,  man- 
kind did  not  receive  the  boon  of  a  written  revela- 
tion, as  we  understand  it ;  that  with  the  exception 
of  one  small  tribe  of  men,  all  the  nations  of  the 
world  were  destitute  of  this  boon  till  the  coming 
of  Christ  ;  that  in  the  1800  years  that  have  elapsed 
since,  only  the  few,  compared  with  the  vast  masses 
of  the  earth's  population,  have  seen  the  light  of  the 
Christian  Scriptures  ;  that  at  this  moment,  four- 
fifths  of  our  race  are  in  the  midst  of  pagan  or  other 
darkness  ;  that  under  shelter  of  the  name  Chris- 
tian, there  are  untold  myriads  who  know  nothing 


INCONCEIVABILITY    OF    INFINITE.  107 

of  these  Scriptures — myriads  who  are  even  opposed 
to  them.  In  consequence  of  their  birth  and  educa- 
tion, over  which  they  have  had  no  control,  owing  to 
prejudiced  and  false  notions  which  have  been  poured 
into  them,  not  sought  by  them,  they  are  ignorant 
of  the  New  Testament  and  opposed  to  it.  Is  there 
no  God  to  them  ?  have  they  absolutely  no  means 
through  the  powers  and  tendencies  of  their  own 
minds  of  reaching  even  to  faith  in  God  ?  Is  there 
no  God  to  all  the  outlying  millions  of  our  race  ? 
For  6,000  years  or  more,  over  all  the  world,  has 
there  never  been  a  Supreme  Being  in  the  thought, 
in  the  heart  of  man,  save  among  the  few  who  have 
received  a  written  revelation  ? 

I  hope  I  am  profoundly  thankful  for  the  light  of 
Christian  truth,  and  do  fervently  long  for  its  diffu- 
sion over  the  whole  world.  But  among  the  teach- 
ings of  the  New  and  of  the  Old  Testament  I  regard 
this  as  not  the  least  divine,  that  the  Great  Father 
since  the  beginning  of  the  world  has  been  veiy  near 
to  the  minds  He  has  made,  though  they  were 
neither  Jews  nor  Christians  ;  has  ever  had  a  wit- 
ness for  Himself  within  them  ;  and,  above  all,  has 
never  ceased,  by  his  Spirit,  to  strive  with  their 
evil,  in  order  to  subdue  and  cast  it  out,  that  they 
might  be  restored  to  Him,  and  might  know  and 
trust  Him  for  ever. 


CHAPTEK    V. 

MISCELLANEOUS  REASONINGS. 

"Infinite,"  "  Absolute,"  held  equivalent  to  God — Conclusions  as 
to  these  applied  to  this — Investigation  of  Principles  declared 
wrong — Cannot  reach  Principles — Content  with  Regulations — 
Truth  and  Falsehood — Properties  of  our  Conceptions — Hume 
and  Berkeley — "  Mind  cramped  by  own  Laws  " — Unmitigated 
Scepticism — Inconsistency  of  Reasoning — Suicidal. 

In  the  first  of  tlie  Banipton  Lectures  a  singular 
quotation  from  Clemens  Alexandrinus  is  intro- 
duced with,  at  least  qualified  approbation.  "It 
has  been  actually  said/'  writes  the  lecturer,  "  that 
even  if  philosophy  is  useless,  it  is  still  useful  as  the 
means  of  proving  its  own  uselessness/'  Wherein 
the  acuteness  of  this  saying  lies  it  might  be  diffi- 
cult to  discover ;  but  certainly  the  Greek  father 
who  uttered  it  must  have  lost  all  Ms  faith  in  phi- 
losophy before  he  could  think  of  exalting  it  to  the 
honor  of  proving  its  own  uselessness.  And  the 
modern  lecturer,  who  appreciates  the  sharpness  of 
the  Alexandrian  salt,  can  hardly  himself  be  a  very 
serious  or  determined  believer.  This  little  sen- 
tence at  the  outset  is  startling — almost  suspicious. 
What  is  to  be  expected  from  one  who,  about  to 
discuss,  on  the  ground  of  philosophy,  a  high,  and 


MISCELLANEOUS   REASONINGS.  109 

sacred,  and  most  momentous  subject,  betrays  that 
he  has  little  or  no  confidence  in  the  instrument  he 
is  to  employ  ?  Nor  has  there  been  anything  to 
quiet  this  early  suspicion,  so  far  as  we  have  yet 
gone.  Kather  otherwise.  Had  the  lecturer  under- 
taken to  show,  he  could  have  adopted  no  more 
effectual  method  than  he  has  done  of  showing  the 
utter  uselessness  and  mischievousness  of  philoso- 
phy. The  never-varying  tendency  of  his  work,  I 
humbly  conceive,  is  to  destroy  all  respect  for  phi- 
losophy and  for  the  efforts  of  human  intelligence. 
So  many  things,  it  has  been  j)roved  or  attempted 
to  be  proved,  philoso23hy  cannot  do,  the  human 
mind  cannot  do,  that  one  is  fain  to  inquire  at  this 
stage,  is  there  anything  which  they  can  do  ? 
Where  is  this  process  of  nullifying  and  annihi- 
lating to  stop  ?  Limits  of  religious  thought ! 
Doubtless,  religious  thought  has  its  limits,  and  it 
must  be  important  to  discover  them.  But  it  must 
also  have  its  sphere  ;  and  where  is  this  ?  Here  we 
have  all  limits  together,  on  this  side,  on  that  side 
— nothing  but  limits  everywhere.  Difficulty  is 
added  to  difficulty ;  the  circumscribing  cord  is 
drawn  tighter  and  tighter,  narrower  and  narrower, 
until  literally  no  atom  of  free  space  is  left. 

One  who  has  been  well  nigh  overwhelmed  by 
the  contradictions  and  confusions  that  are  here  so 
laboriously  piled  up,  and  who  at  first  sees  no  es- 
cape from  them,  may  be  imagined  to  stop  the  lee- 


110         CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

turer  and  to  ask  tremblingly,  before  yielding  him- 
self without  reserve — ''  But  what  more  ?  where  is 
this  to  end,  or  has  it  an  end  ?  You  tell  me  the 
Infinite  is  inconceivable,  and  that  a  consciousness 
of  it  is  self-contradictory,  and  that  the  human, 
mind  can  do  nothing  towards  solving  the  problem 
of  the  universe — cannot  w^ork  out  for  itself  even  a 
single  first  principle — but  what  then  ?  Whither 
is  this  j)hilosophical  nihilism  to  conduct  me  ? 
What  more  am  I  to  be  required  to  abandon  ?  I 
v;ould  see  the  end  ?" 

These  questions  are  fair,  and  the  answer  which 
they  must  receive  is  unmistakeable.  The  lecturer 
goes  so  far,  and  is  so  ingenuous,  so  explicit,  that 
doubt  is  impossible.  Hitherto  the  argument  has 
been  restricted  to  tJie  Infinite  or  x\bsolute,  whether 
One  living  Being,  or  a  vast  indefinite  whole,  or 
both,  is  not  determined,  but,  in  any  case,  an  idea 
wdiich  it  is  possible  to  reach  (if  at  all)  only  by 
the  highest  effort  of  abstraction.  Throughout  the 
later  lectures,  however,  the  abstraction  is  dis- 
missed, and  by  the  Infinite  or  Absolute,  the  Di- 
vine Being  is  unmistakeably  intended  ;  and  what 
had  been  proved,  or  supposed  to  be  proved,  in  re- 
ference to  the  philosophical  abstraction,  is  applied 
to  the  only  true  God.  The  lecturer  began  with 
the  position,  that  it  is  impossible  to  know  the  Li- 
jinite;  he  ends  with  the  position,  that  it  is  impos- 
sible to  know  God — a  somewhat  different  thing, 


MISCELLANEOUS    REASONINGS.  Ill 

one  might  judge,  and  therefore  a  questionable  con- 
clusion, unless  he  has  clearly  shown  that  the  Infi- 
nite or  Absolute  are  convertible  with  God,  and 
this  he  certainly  has  not  done  or  professed  to  do. 
Meantime,  it  is  again  and  again  broadly  asserted, 
that  man  does  not  and  cannot  know  Grod;  at  all 
events,  does  not  and  cannot  know  that  he  knows 
God.  The  utmost,  even  with  the  aid  of  revela- 
tion, that  we  can  reach  is,  ^^  such  a  knowledge  as  is 
best  adaj^ted  to  our  wants  and  training.  But  how 
far  that  represents  God  as  He  is,  (I  understand 
this  to  mean,  how  far  it  represents  the  true,  the 
real  God)  we  know  not,  and  have  no  need  to 
know."  (p.  146.)  It  is  explicitly  declared,  that 
^Hhe  Infinite  (he  means  God,  and  can  mean 
nothing  else) — God — is  not  an  object  of  human 
thought  at  all."  (p.  218.)  It  is  not  yet  the  time, 
for  showing  all  that  must  grow  out  of  this  conclu- 
sion, but  it  ought  to  be  distinctly  understood  that 
on  the  principles  of  the  Bampton  Lecture  it  is  not 
God,  not  very  God,  not  the  true  God,  but  some- 
thing essentially  difierent  from  Him,  and  how  far 
difierent  we  cannot  ascertain,  that  we  can  ever 
know  ;  not  God,  not  very  God,  not  the  true  God, 
but  something  essentially  difierent  from  Him,  that 
we  can  ever  worship. 

Be  it  so — and  what  then  ?  It  comes  to  this,  at 
least,  that  only  in  some  sphere,  lower  than  the 
Divine — if  at  all — there  can  be  scope  for  the  efforts 


112       CONCERNING    APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

of  the  human  mind.  But  even  this  hope  is  vain. 
The  lectm'er  distinctly  aims  to  make  out  that, 
within  the  entire  range  of  speculative  thought, 
there  is  nothing  for  us — at  all  events  ultimately — 
but  contradiction,  confusion,  and  darkness.  He 
states  that  the  very  first  law  of  all  thought  and  of 
all  consciousness,  the  very  first  principle  of  action 
and  feeling,  and  the  very  perception  of  our  senses 
create  for  us  only  inscrutable  mysteries.  The  un- 
derstanding can  do  nothing,  but  blindly  accept  the 
conditions  with  which  it  is  environed,  or  else  stum- 
ble at  the  very  first  step  into  insoluble  contradic- 
tions. Moral  liberty,  personality,  individuality, 
and  the  commerce  between  mind  and  matter,  stare 
us  in  the  face,  w^hen  we  look  out  on  the  region  of 
speculative  thought,  and  vainly  demand  from  us 
an  interpretation.  It  cannot  be  given.  The  mere 
facts  (of  liberty,  personality,  etc.),  the  lecturer 
admits,  are  not  inconceivable  and  not  contradic- 
tory. So  far  from  this,  "  they  embody,"  he  says, 
"  the  veiy  laws  of  conception  itself,  and  are  expe- 
rienced every  moment  as  true."  (p.  140.)  But  we 
must  not  speculate  on  them — it  is  impossible  to 
gain  the  least  satisfaction  res]^)ecting  them — all  in- 
quiry is  not  only  useless,  but  wrong  in  its  very 
principle.  On  every  subject  and  on  every  side,  the 
lecturer  seems  to  be  able  only  to  heap  up  difficul- 
ties. The  very  things  which  are  universally  ac- 
cepted and  understood,  he  is  at  pains  to  show,  are 


MISCELLANEOUS   REASONINGS.  113 

connected  with  others  which  are  not  understood  at 
all,  which  cannot  even  be  discovered.  Any  inquiry 
into  these  higher  facts  is  peremptorily  forbidden, 
as  lying  beyond  the  legitimate  sphere  of  thought. 
At  all  events,  "  to  such  inquiry/'  he  pronounces, 
"  no  satisfactory  answer  can  be  given."  (p.  141.) 
But  surely,  we  may  at  the  least  try  to  advance,  if 
but  a  step ;  we  may  patiently  speculate,  and 
pierce,  and  wait  for  light  ?  No.  At  this  jDoint, 
without  an  effort  to  inquire,  he  would  have  us 
rest  I  But  why  ?  For  a  reason  which  is  even 
more  startling  than  the  statement,  for  which  it  is 
supposed  to  account.  "  The  highest  principles  of 
thought  and  action  to  which  we  can  attain,"  he 
says,  "  are  regulative,  not  speculative  ;  they  do 
not  serve  to  satisfy  the  reason,  but  to  guide  the 
conduct."  (p.  141.)  The  counter-assertion  is 
enough  ;  the  highest  principles  do  satisfy  the  rea- 
son, and  they  then  best  guide  the  conduct,  when 
they  have  first  satisfied  the  reason. 

I  cannot  and  will  not  argue  such  a  point  as  this. 
But  I  may  be  suffered  to  ask,  is  this  philosophy  ? 
— is  this  the  spirit  of  philosophy  ? — has  this  been 
inspired  by  the  writings  of  Sir  William  Hamilton  ? 
With  a  deeper  feeling  than  I  care  to  clothe  in 
words,  I  answer — no,  it  has  not ;  it  is  as  wide  as 
the  poles  asunder,  from  either  the  tone  or  the  let- 
ter of  the  teaching  of  that  great  man.  And  I  hope 
to  furnish  abundant  proof  of  this,  ere  long.     No  : 


114       CONCERNING    APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

the  natural  and  true  association  of  such  ideas  as 
those  just  referred  to  is  not  with  a  high  philoso- 
phy, hut  with  a  darkening  scepticism.  Hence  it  is 
no  wonder  to  me,  that  the  lecturer  should  find  in 
Hume — who,  though  perhaps  personally  not  a 
sceptic,  made  it  the  business  of  his  life  to  show 
that  all  philosophy  and  all  speculative  inquiry  ter- 
minated only  in  scepticism — I  do  not  wonder  that 
the  English  logician  should  find,  in  the  Scottish 
sceptic,  a  statement,  which  in  its  letter  and  in  its 
aim,  he  can  accept  and  commend.  "  No  priestly 
dogmas,"  says  Hume — I  quote  from  the  Bampton 
Lecture,  p.  138 — '^  ever  shocked  common  sense 
more  than  the  infinite  divisibility  of  extension, 
vvith  its  consequences.  He  should  have  added, 
that  the  antagonist  assumption  of  a  finite  divisibil- 
ity is  equally  incomprehensible.''  Be  it  borne  in 
mind,  that  the  substance  of  this  statement  is  not  the 
question,  resjDecting  which  men  of  the  most  oppo- 
site sentiments  may  concur  ;  I  refer  to  the  sym- 
pathy of  spirit  between  the  sceptic  and  the  logician, 
at  all  events,  to  the  oneness  of  tendency  and  effect 
in  their  labors,  to  shock  common  sense,  to  put 
down  reason,  and  to  beget  scepticism. 

Notwithstanding  this,  we  are  hardly  prepared 
for  the  assertion,  in  its  stern  dogmatic  force,  that 
''  truth  itself  is  nothing  more  than  a  relation. 
Truth  and  falsehood  are  not  properties  of  things 
in  themselves,  but  of  our  conceptions     .... 


MISCELLANEOUS    REASONINGS.  115 

trutli,  in  relation  to  no  intelligence^  is  a  contradic- 
tion in  terms."  (p.  149.)  It  is  quite  admitted  that 
om'  conceptions  of  things  may  be  true  or  false  ; 
truth  and  ftilsehood  are  qualities  of  our  concep- 
tions. But  are  they  only  qualities  of  our  concep- 
tions ?  that  is  the  question.  A  statement,  a  rep- 
resentation, a  fact  so-called,  a  principle,  may  be 
true  or  false  in  itself  Our  idea  of  it  is  one  thing, 
but  its  own  actual,  j)ositive  truth  or  falsehood  is 
quite  another  thing.  I  am  not  ignorant  how  such 
positions  as  the  lecturer's  may  be  defended,  in 
■what  logical  forms  they  may  be  put  and  held  to 
be  invincible.  But  I  know  also  that  they  are  the 
very  foundation  of  the  idealism  of  Berkeley,  of 
which,  the  idealism  of  Hume  was  the  necessary 
and  native  consequence,  and  I  hold  them  to  be  as 
ruinous  as  they  are  unsound. 

Perhaps  it  ought  not  to  be  matter  of  surprise 
that  the  writer,  who  has  evidently  lost  faith  in  the 
human  mind,  and  certainly  aims  to  destroy  its 
authority,  and  can  be  satisfied  with  nothing  short 
of  its  utter  humiliation,  should  also  be  doubtful 
respecting  truth  itself,  should  question  its  indepen- 
dent reality,  and  should  reduce  it  to  a  mere  modi- 
fication of  the  conscious  subject,  a  mere  quality  of 
our  conceptions.  Happily,  there  is  an  untaught 
dialectic,  in  this  case,  a  native,  instinctive  logic 
which  is  more  than  a  match  for  all  the  subtlety  of 
the  schools.    The  common  sense,  I  mean  communis 


116        CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

sensuSy  in  the  old,  high  signification,  the  common 
reason  of  men  rebels  against  this  idealistic  theory, 
and  will  have  none  of  it.  There  is  such  a  thing  as 
truth  ;  there  are  such  things  as  truths,  independent 
realities,  apart  from  our  conceptions  altogether,  be 
they  right  or  wrong.  Immortality,  responsibility, 
are  real  properties  of  beings,  not  mere  subjective 
affections.  Wisdom,  rectitude,  purity,  benevolence, 
are  real  properties  of  beings  in  themselves,  indepen- 
dent,- immutable  entities  attaching  to  substance, 
and  not  essentially  affected  by  any  conceptions  that 
may  be  formed  in  any  mind  concerning  them. 
These  conceptions  may  be  true,  and  tbey  may  be 
false,  they  may  vary  endlessly  ;  but  truth  and 
truths  are  immutably,  eternally  the  same. 

In  connection  with  the  principles  that  have  now 
been  instanced,  the  Bampton  lecturer  seems  to  nar- 
row the  compass,  and  to  enfeeble  the  intellectual 
power  of  man,  to  an  extent,  and  with  an  undis- 
guisedness,  which  are  somewhat  confounding.  He 
seems  desirous  of  encompassing  this  part  of  our 
nature  with  difficulties  which  it  cannot  remove, 
and  with  darkness  which  it  cannot  penetrate,  and 
of  showing  that  it  has,  and  can  have  no  other  in- 
heritance than  this.  "  Such  problems'' — he  means 
problems  insoluble — "  arise  inevitably,  whenever 
we  attempt  to  pass  from  the  sensible  to  the  intelli- 
gible world,  from  the  sphere  of  action  to  that  of 
thought,  from  that  which  appears  to  us,  to  that 


MISCELLANEOUS    REASONINGS.  117 

which  is,  in  itself."  (p.  135.)  Where  then,  any  one 
may  now  ask,  is  the  sphere  of  human  intelligence  ? 
We  can  only  answer,  nowhere  ;  for  the  intelligible 
world,  the  world  of  thought,  the  world  of  reality, 
in  distinction  from  that  of  j^henomena,  is  shut 
against  us.  Where  is  the  sphere  of  human  intelli- 
gence, as  an  essential  part  of  our  mental  constitu- 
tion ?  nowhere.  It  has  no  sphere,  unless  we  accept 
from  the  lecturer  the  world  of  sense,  of  action,  and 
of  outward  phenomena,  the  same  over  which  the 
bodily  senses  and  the  animal  instincts,  and  the 
mere  calculating,  prudential  faculty,  preside.  It 
is  impossible  that  anything  can  be  more  unquali- 
fied, undisguised,  and  free,  than  the  language  in 
Avhich  our  destiny  is  pronounced.  ^'  In  religion,  in 
morals,  in  our  daily  business,  in  the  care  of  our 
lives,  in  the  exercise  of  our  senses,  the  rules  which 
guide  our  practice  cannot  be  reduced  to  principles 
which  satisfy  our  reason."  (p.  135.) 

Emphatically  and  utterly  I  protest  against  this 
view  of  human  experience.  It  is  not  consistent 
with  fact.  It  is  wholly  at  variance  with  fact. 
Were  it  meant,  that  we  cannot  reach  principles, 
which  leave  no  unanswered  question  behind,  this 
would  be  quite  admissible,  and  since  the  range  of 
truth  is  unlimited,  this  must  also  apply  to  intel- 
lects higher  far  than  the  human.  Even  they  can- 
not advance  to  the  utmost  boundary  of  truth  and 
of  knowledge,  beyond  which  no  question  can  arise. 


118       CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

But  apply  where  it  may,  this  is  not  what  is  stated, 
but  something  essentially  different.  And  if  what 
is  stated  be  really  meant,  that  we  cannot  reach 
principles,  which,  whatever  questions  they  leave 
behind,  are  nevertheless  satisfactory  to  the  reason, 
I  answer,  this  is  contradictoiy  to  all  fact.  The 
distinction  is  acknowledged  every  day,  and  is  patent 
to  all,  between  those  who  merely  follow  practical 
rules,  and  those  w^ho  search  into  the  principles  on 
which  the  rules  are  based.  The  one  form  the  class 
of  prudent,  correct,  successful  persons.  The  latter 
are  distinctively  called  wise.  In  religion  and 
morals,  the  mere  servants  of  custom  and  of  pre- 
cepts are,  at  the  best,  decent,  harmless,  innocent. 
They,  on  the  other  hand,  who  inquire,  and  inves- 
tigate, and  search  for  the  grounds  of  religious  be- 
lief, and  of  moral  law,  until  they  are  able  to  satisfy 
their  rational  and  then-  moral  nature,  only  they  are 
really  virtuous  and  pious.  In  the  actual  experience 
of  life,  persons  in  whom  the  trust  of  their  fellow- 
creatures  is  reposed  are  such  as  are  believed  to  have 
thought  for  themselves,  and  made  their  deliberate 
election  of  principles,  and  come  to  a  fixed  purpose 
to  stand  by  them,  at  all  hazards.  For  the  indivi- 
dual self,  there  is  no  inward  rest,  and  no  real 
strength  to  suffer  or  to  do,  save  from  deep,  satisfy- 
ing, immovable  convictions.  "  Men  of  princij^le" 
— in  distinction  from  mere  practice — is  not  a  flour- 
ish of  words,  a  poor  deception  which  we  put  upon 


MISCELLANEOUS   REASONINGS.  119 

ourselves,  in  order  to  conceal  an  unwelcome  fact 
There  is  a  reality  answering  to  it  !  There  is  such 
a  thing  as  examiDing,  discovering,  and  laying 
hold  of  deep  and  sure  principles,  which  in  their 
measure,  satisfy  the  reason,  and  are  felt  to  be  inde- 
structible. 

Were  the  representations,  from  the  Bampton 
Lecture,  which  have  been  produced,  true,  then  for 
once,  we  might  altogether  agi'ee  with  the  lecturer 
in  the  method  by  which  he  accounts  for  them. 
They  would  verily  suggest — he  distinctly  says,  and 
believes  they  do  suggest,  and  he  puts  it  as  the  ac- 
tual fact  of  the  whole  case — "  they  suggest,  as 
their  obvious  explanation,  the  hypothesis  of  a  mind 
cramped  by  its  own  laws,  and  bewildered  by  the 
contemplation  of  its  own  forms.''  (p.  142.)  These 
are  his  very  actual  words,  and  to  me,  this  conclu- 
sion— of  course,  referring  solely  to  the  book,  and 
not  questioning  for  a  moment,  the  actual  personal 
convictions  of  the  writer — seems  the  climax  of  an 
unmitigated  scepticism  !  In  my  humble  judg- 
ment, it  is  blasphemy  against  human  reason  ! 
blasphemy  against  the  Being  who  formed  the 
mind  of  man  !  Aye  !  its  Father  !  God  is  the 
Creator  of  all  things,  but  he  is  the  Father  of 
minds,  only  of  minds,  hut  of  minds.  And  what 
of  his  child — the  mind  of  man  ?  Here  is  the  an- 
swer of  the  lecturer, ''  a  cramped,  bewildered  thing, 
cramped  by  its  own  laws,  bewildered  in  its  own 


120        CONCERNING   APPLICATIONS   OF   LOGIC. 

forms  !"  It  can  avail  liim  nothing,  to  take  refuge 
in  the  doctrine  of  the  fall,  or  of  original  sin.  He 
blasphemes  the  very  primitive  constitution  of  the 
mind,  the  original  laws,  the  essential  thought- 
forms,  established  by  The  Maker,  and  he  declares 
that  they  can  terminate — are  designed  to  termin- 
atCy  save  within  the  sphere  of  the  senses — though 
even  here,  one  cannot  forget  that  he  has  said  that 
the  very  perception  of  our  senses  creates  for  us  in- 
soluble mysteries — in  nothing  but  contradiction, 
confusion,  and  darkness.  One  of  the  grossest  para- 
doxes of  Germany  has  been  outdone  here  in  Eng- 
land. For  what  end  were  eyes  given  ?  To  limit 
vision,  was  the  reply  of  the  German  sage,.  But 
here, — for  what  end  was  mind  given  ?  to  limit 
knowledge,  to  prevent  us  from  knowing,  to  cramp 
and  bewilder  the  being  endowed  with  it. 

In  the  presence  of  such,  or  anything  approach- 
ing such  an  announcement,  I  think  of  ingenuous, 
open,  youthful  souls  !  By  all  means  let  them  be 
warned  against  the  danger  of  presumptuous  and 
rash  philosophizing.  But  can  we  not  also  quicken 
and  kindle  them  ?  Can  we  not  touch  their  spirit- 
ual nature,  w^ith  a  wise  and  gentle  hand,  so  as  to 
awaken  a  tremulous  response  ?  They  need  to 
have  the  upward  path  of  inquiry  opened  to  them, 
hopefully,  to  be  invited  and  stimulated  to  the 
search  after  truth  !  Can  we  do  nothing  to  kindle 
the  glow  of  generous  enthusiasm  in  their  breasts — 


MISCELLANEOUS   KEASONIXGS.  121 

the  fire  of  an  inextinguishable  love  of  truth  ?  It 
is  not  nohle,  in  a  professed  philosopher  to  frown  on 
the  spirit  of  inquiry,  and  to  check  and  chill  the  effort 
of  speculative  thought.  It  is  not  noble,  to  humble 
and  degrade  the  human  mind,  to  exhibit  its  power- 
iessness,  and  to  convict  it  of  doing  always  and 
only  mischief.  But  in  these  Divinity  lecture  ser- 
mons, whatever  be  the  subject,  the  heavy  blow 
comes  down  on  man's  intellectual  powers.  What- 
ever be  the  illustration,  the  lesson  never  varies — 
how  worthless,  fallacious,  and  injurious  are  all 
speculative  efforts  !  It  is  poor  and  pitiable  work, 
so  to  represent  truth  on  the  one  hand,  and  the 
mind  of  man  on  the  other,  as  to  leave  no  refuge 
for  a  generous  and  high  pulsing  soul,  absolutely 
no  refuge,  but  scepticism  or  despair. 

I  only  add,  on  this  section  of  the  subject,  that 
there  is  a  glaring  inconsistency  between  the  lec- 
turer's views  of  the  human  mind  in  general,  and 
his  ow^n  particular  use  of  the  instrument,  when  as- 
sailing rationalism.  Beginning,  from  the  outset, 
with  the  position  that  the  Infinite  or  Absolute  is 
wholly  and  only  inconceivable,  is  not,  in  fact,  an 
object  of  human  thought  at  all,  he  nevertheless 
reasons  on  the  subject  with  confidence,  and  with 
an  apparent  total  absence  of  effort.  We  are  com- 
pelled to  think,  that  at  least  lie  knows  thoroughly 
well.     It  is  no  diflficultv,  no  labor  to  him.     Like 

an  accomplished   chess-player,    he   is   so   familiar 

6 


122        CONCERNING    APPLICATIONS   Of   LOGIC. 

with  the  pieces  caDcl  places,  that  he  could  make  the 
moves  blindfoldj  and  check  at  every  turn.  The 
subject  is  not  above  him,  but  he  is  manifestly 
above  it,  and  can  handle  it  with  perfect  ease.  The 
most  impalpable  distinctions  he  can  pursue,  the 
darkest  processes  of  abstraction  he  can  penetrate, 
and  all  the  windings  and  ramifications  of  the 
highest  ideas  he  can  trace  out.  In  this  respect,  the 
Bampton  lecturer  must  not  be  confounded  with 
Sir  William  Hamilton.  Cousin, — after  Helgel, 
and  striving  to  bring  the  German  schema  some- 
what within  the  range  of  the  common  understand- 
ing, and  to  make  it,  instead  of  a  pure  ideal  fig- 
ment, at  least  a  little  more  consistent  with  the 
reality  of  things — had  put  forth,  in  brilliant  capti- 
vating form,  his  Philosophy  of  the  Infinite.  This 
was  a  legitimate  object  of  criticism.  Hamilton 
simply  criticizes  it,  takes  the  reasonings  and  posi- 
tions as  given,  brings  them  to  the  test  of  what  he 
deems  established  principles,  and  concludes  that  the 
Infinite  does  not  come  within  the  legitimate  sphere 
of  philosophy,  and  is  incogitable  by  the  human 
mind.  The  Bampton  lecturer,  on  the  other  hand, 
argues  independently,  constructs  and  spreads  out 
his  own  processes  of  reasoning,  as  on  a  subject 
with  which  he  was  familiar,  asserts  confidently, 
and  concludes  decisively.  Nevertheless,  after  all, 
he  confesses,  "  I  know  actually  nothing  about  the 
Infinite  or  Absolute,  I  can  attach  no  idea  to  the 


MISCELLANEOUS    REASONINGS.  123 

words,  they  are  perfectly,  wholly,  only  inconceiva- 
ble by  my  mind." 

It  is  hardly  a  question,  whether  this  does  not 
vitiate  the  entire  argumentation,  to  the  very  core, 
and  from  beginning  to  end.  An  impartial  umpire 
might  surely  say,  you  reason  as  if  you  thoroughly 
understood  your  subject ;  and  yet  you  assure  me 
that  you  do  not,  that  you  cannot  even  conceive  the 
ideas  which  you  put  into  words.  Which  am  I  to 
believe,  your  course  of  reasoning,  which  is  one  thing, 
or  your  assurance,  which  is  quite  another  thing  ? 
If  you  do  not  know,  and  cannot  even  conceive  this 
Infinite  or  Absolute  of  which  you  speak,  am  I  to 
think  that  you  are  nevertheless  able  to  reason  ac- 
curately concerning  it ;  and  am  I  to  trust  your 
reasonings,  and  to  accept  your  conclusions  ?  The 
reductio  ad  ahsurdum  is  a  perfectly  legitimate 
method,  and  quite  satisfactory  when  fitly  em- 
ployed. But  who  ever  heard  of  reducing  to  ab- 
surdity, a  thing  of  which  he  was  utterly  ignorant, 
of  which  he  could  not  even  form  the  least  concej)- 
tion  ?  Are  we  not  obliged  to  think  that  there 
must  be  some  egregious  fallacy,  utterly  fatal  to  the 
entire  reasoning  of  this  book  on  "  the  Limits  of 
Beligious  Thought  ?" 


SECTION    THIRD. 

CONCERNING   A   PHILOSOPHY    OF  "THE 
UNCONDITIONED,"  ETC. 


Chapter 

I. — Relation   of   the   Scottish    axd   Oxonian 

Philosophies. 
II. — Meaning  of  "The  Unconditioned."  etc. 


CHAPTER    I. 

PwELATION   OF  THE  SCOTTISH   AND  OXONIAN   PHILOSOPHIES. 

Hamilton  and  Mr.  Maurice — Scottish  System — Chief  Fault — Ex- 
cellences— Entire  Separation  from  Bampton  Lecture — "  The 
Unconditioned,"  etc. — Assumptions  of  Rationalism — Cousin — 
Realism  of  Hamilton — Wrote  in  Interest  of  Philosophy,  and  of 
Logic — Lecturer  of  Theology — Hamilton's  Conclusions  and  his 
opposite. 

This,  perhaps,  is  the  fitting  place  for  attempting, 
presumptuous  though  it  must  seem,  a  brief  vindi- 
cation of  the  illustrious  Scottish  philosopher,  with 
whom,  and  whose  philosophy,  the  Bampton  Lec- 
ture and  its  respected  author,  have  been  completely 
identified.  First  of  all,  for  a  moment  or  two,  I 
may  notice  what,  though  in  my  humble  judgment 
it  be  an  entire  mistake,  is,  I  am  sure,  the  farthest 
thing  possible  from  a  misrepresentation,  on  the 
part  of  Mr.  Maurice,  whose  fervent,  eloquent,  and 
noble  protest  against  the  recently  promulgated 
views  of  revelation,  must  deepen  the  already  pro- 
found respect  and  love  with  which  he  is  regarded. 
"  Sir  William  Hamilton,"  says  Mr.  Maurice,  "  a 
loi^ician  in  the  most  thorou2:h  and  exclusive  sense, 
was  too  consistent,  and  too  honest,  not  to  avow  his 


128       PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

abhoiTcnce  of  mathematics."  (p.  156.) -^  "A  brave 
man  doubtless,  reckless  of  popularity,  ready  to 
overthrow  the  discoveries  of  the  generations  past, 
or  the  prospects  of  generations  to  come,  rather  than 
sacrifice  his  consistency.  One  cannot  but  honor 
him  for  his  sincere,  cordial,  unconditioned  hatred 
of  that  which  had  no  meaning  for  him."  (p.  156.) 
No  meaning  for  him !  I  am  not  aware  of  the 
ground  on  which  this  idea  of  Hamilton's  utter 
ignorance  is  based.  It  seems  to  need  something 
like  proof,  and  proof,  I  am  convinced,  would  not 
be  easy  to  find.  But  for  his  cordial  and  uncondi- 
tioned hatred  of  mathematics,  I  must  look  upon 
this,  as  an  entire  mistake.  He  does  indeed  say 
that  the  study  of  mathematics  is  not  improving,  in 
the  sense  and  in  the  degree  in  which  its  admirers 
maintain  that  it  is.  But  he  admits  that  as  a 
mental  discipline,  in  which  view,  and  in  which 
view  alone,  he  speaks  of  it,  "it  is  beneficial  in  the 
correction  of  a  certain  vice,  and  in  the  formation 
of  a  certain  virtue.  The  vice  is  the  habit  of  mental 
distraction ;  the  virtue  is  the  habit  of  continued 
attention."  (p.  304.)t  He,  at  the  same  time,  quotes 
with  approval  the  words  of  no  mean  authority^ 
who  asserts  that  the  chief  benefit  of  the  study  lay 
"  in  strengthening  the  power  of  steady  and  conca- 
tenated thought."  (p.  305.)  Hamilton  does  say, 
that  the  study  is  capable  of  leading  to  credulity  on 

*  ""What  is  Revelatiou,'"  etc.  \  '•' DiscussioiiSj"  etc. 


SCOTTISH   AND   OXONIAN   PHILOSOPHIES.      129 

the  one  hand,  and  to  scepticism  on  the  other  hand. 
But  the  name  which  awakens  so  much  reverence, 
Bacon,  he  brings  forward  as  countenancing  the 
same  idea. 

It  ouo;ht  not  to  be  for^jotten,  that  Sir  W.  Ham- 
ilton  explains  himself  and  his  purpose,  when  he 
says,  "  we  are  far  from  meaning  to  disparage  the 
mathematical  genius,  which  invents  new  methods 
and  formulas  or  new  and  felicitous  appUcations  of 
the  old."  (p.  285.)  '^  Our  objections  and  those  of 
our  authorities  are  directed  against  the  excessive 
study  of  the  mathematical  sciences  in  general."  (p. 
321.)  The  case  was  simply  this,  as  stated  by  him- 
self— ''  the  university  of  Cambridge,  unless  it  can 
demonstrate  that  mathematical  study  is  the  one 
be^f,  if  not  the  exclusive,  mean  of  a  general  evolu- 
tion of  our  faculties,  must  be  held  to  have  estab- 
lished and  maintained  a  scheme  of  discipline,  more 
partial  and  inadequate  than  any  other,  which  the 
history  of  education  records/'  (p.  259.)  "  Some 
intelligent  mathematicians,"  he  adds,  "  admit  all 
that  has  been  urged  against  their  science  as  a  prin- 
cipal discipline  of  the  mind,  and  only  contend, 
that  it  ought  not  to  be  extruded  from  all  place  in 
a  scheme  of  liberal  education.  With  these  we  have 
no  controversy."  (p.  261)  "  The  question,"  he  says, 
"  does  not  regard  the  value  of  mathematical  science, 
considered  in  itself,  or  in  its  objective  results,  but 

the  utility  of  mathematical  study,  that  is,  in  its 

6* 


130       PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

subjective  effect,  as  an  exercise  of  the  mind.  The 
expediency  is  not  disputed  of  leaving  mathematics, 
as  a  co-ordinate,  to  find  their  level,  among  the 
other  branches  of  academical  instruction.  It  is 
only  contended,  that  they  ought  not  to  be  made 
the  principal,  far  less  the  exclusive  object  of  acade- 
mical encouragement."  (p.  260.) 

On  the  whole,  perhaps  it  may  be  allowed,  that 
this  was,  and  still  is,  an  open  question,  on  which 
men  may  take  the  side  taken  by  Hamilton,  with- 
out either  entire  ignorance  or  cordial  hatred  of  ma- 
thematical science,  or  its  professors. 

Whether  I  be  right  or  wrong,  in  imagining  any 
connection  between  this  mistake  and  the  supposed 
identification  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton  with  Mr.  Man- 
sell,  so  comj)lete  has  the  identification  been,  that 
in  many  quarters  what  praise  or  blame  has  been 
measured  out  to  the  one,  has  been  supposed  to  be 
equally  deserved  by  the  other.  In  some  cases,  a 
prepossession  in  favor  of  the  Scottish  philosopher, 
in  others  a  strong  prejudice  against  him  has  been 
created  ;  both,  I  hope  to  show,  alike  unmerited. 
It  is  not  forgotten  by  me,  how  much  is  justly  due 
to  the  accomplished  and  learned  author  of  the 
Bampton  Lecture.  I  have  not  the  power  to  injure 
his  high  reputation — I  hope  also,  it  is  the  farthest 
thing  possible  from  my  desire.  Nevertheless,  it  will 
be  maintained  that  he  has  misconstrued,  and  has 
totally  misapplied  and  perverted  Hamilton's  doc- 


SCOTTISH    AND    OXONIAN    PHILOSOPHIES.       131 

trines.  Altogether,  the  design  is  to  show,  that  the 
fundamental  principles  of  the  Bampton  Lecture  are 
very  far  aj^art  indeed,  from  the  j)rinciples,  but  espe- 
cially from  the  genius  and  the  spirit  of  the  modern 
Scottish  philosophy. 

Sir  W.  Hamilton  needs  no  eulogium  from  any 
one.  His  labors  and  his  writings  are  his  monu- 
ments. He  belongs  to  Europe,  and  Europe,  for 
ages  to  come,  ^vill  cherish  his  memory  and  his  work 
as  among  her  rarest  treasures.  Praise,  from  such 
as  I  am,  would  be  simply  presumptuous,  with 
whatever  genuine  reverence  and  admiration  I  may 
look  upon  him.  But,  it  would  be  folly  to  claim  for 
Hamilton's,  or  any  other  philosophical  system, 
either  faultlessness  or  perfection.  One  flagrant 
error  in  it  has  often  been  singled  out,  it  may  be 
called,  the  one  flagrant  error,  which  more  or  less 
taints  the  whole.  It  is  the  theory  of  causation,  to 
which  its  author  clung  with  intense,  passionate 
fondness  to  the  last,  the  impossibility  of  conceiving 
an  absolute  commencement  (or  an  absolute  termi- 
nation) of  finite  phenomena.  But  in  spite  of  this 
great  vice,  the  excellences  of  the  system  are  many 
and  grand. 

1st.  The  doctrine  of  external  perception  ;  simple, 
jirofound,  exhaustive,  affording  an  impregnable 
philosophical  basis  for  natural  realism.  2d.  The 
doctrine  of  consciousness.  Kant  had  first  com- 
pletely revealed  and  interpreted  this  authoritative 


132         PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

basis  of  philosophical  induction.  Cousin,  also,  had 
penetrated  into  its  "arcana/'  with  his  subtle  genius, 
and  had  irradiated  them  with  the  warm  light  of  his 
fervid  imagination.  But  to  Hamilton  we  are  in- 
debted for  the  full  analysis  of  the  facts  of  conscious- 
ness, and  for  the  rigid  and  logical  exposition  of  its 
laws.  3d.  The  analysis  and  synthesis  of  the  men- 
tal powers  ;  exact,  complete,  comprehensive  ;  are 
a  lasting  monument  to  Hamilton's  fame.  Even 
the  mere  nomenclature  is  an  inheritance  ;  beautiful, 
suggestive,  severely  fitting.  I.  The  acquisitive 
faculty — perception  external  and  internal.  II.  The 
conservative  faculty,  memory  proper.  III.  The  re- 
productive faculty,  recollection  proper,  under  the 
laws  of  association.  IV.  The  representative  fac- 
ulty, imagination.  V.  The  elaborate  faculty,  the 
understanding.  VI.  The  regulative  or  legislative 
faculty,  reason. 

I  have  said  nothing  of  Hamilton's  achievements 
in  the  sphere  of  logic,  though  competent  judges  de- 
clare them  to  constitute  his  highest  triumph.  But 
my  information  is  too  limited  to  authorize  me  to 
speak,  and  perhaps  my  power  of  appreciation  is  yet 
more  limited  still. 

In  comparing  the  modern  English,  and  the  mod- 
ern Scottish  philosophies,  there  is  one  feature  of  re- 
semblance which  it  is  impossible  to  deny.  It  is,  liere, 
acknowledged  with  great  sorrow.  The  relativity 
of  all  our  knowledge  is  maintained  by  Hamilton. 


SCOTTISH   AND   OXONIAN   PHILOSOPHIES         133 

Entire  and  universal  relativity  is  maintained,  in 
the  face,  as  we  shall  by-and-by  strive  to  show,  of 
considerations  founded  on  experience,  which  go  at 
least  to  modify  the  position.  "  Our  whole  knowl- 
edge of  mind  and  matter  is  only  relative,  of  exist- 
ence absolutely  and  in  itself  we  know  nothing." 
(Lee.  i.  138.)  '^  All  we  know,  is  known  only  un- 
der the  special  condition  of  our  faculties.''  (Lee.  i. 
140.)  "  However  infinite  and  various  may  be  the 
universe  and  its  contents,  these  are  known  to  us, 
not  as  they  exist,  but  as  our  mind  is  capable  of 
knowing  them.  Quicquid  recipitur,  recipitur  ad 
modum  recipientis."  (Lee.  i.  61.)  ^^  God  only 
exists  for  us,  as  we  have  faculties  of  apprehending 
his  existence."  (Lee.  i.  63.)  Even  so — thus  far, 
the  two  appear  to  be  in  harmony.  Perhaps  it  may 
come  out  eventually,  that  the  harmony  is  more  ap- 
parent than  real,  special  rather  than  general.  But 
to  the  points  of  contrast : — 

I.  The  unvarying  tone  of  the  Bampton  Lecture, 
we  have  seen,  is  repressive,  humiliating  and  con- 
demnatory of  the  efforts  of  the  speculative  under- 
standing. But  it  is  a  fact,  which  hundreds  at  this 
moment  would  be  eager  to  attest,  that  the  living 
teaching  of  Hamilton  w^as  stimulative  and  quick- 
ening in  the  highest  possible  degree.  If  anything 
be  certain  it  is  this,  that  he  inspired  his  students 
with  an  enthusiasm  for  speculative  inquiry,  a  pas- 
sion for  investigation.    And  in  this  respect  his  writ- 


134         PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

ings  are  at  one  with  liis  oral  instructions.  "  Spec- 
ulation/' he  says,  ^^  is  not  a  negation  of  thought 
but  the  highest  energy  of  the  intellect."  (Lect.  i. 
114.)  The  Bampton  Lecture  constantly  exalts 
faithj  in  opposition  to  intelligence.  Hamilton  en- 
dorses the  sentiment,  that  doubt  is  the  first  step  to 
philosophy,  and  that  the  sceptical,  searching,  spec- 
ulative spirit  is  indispensable  in  its  disciples. 
Philosophy  is  the  art  of  doubting  well.  (Lect.  i. 
90-93.)  Again,  supposing  materialism  to  gain  the 
ascendancy,  he  says,  ^*  Philosophy  would  then  be 
subverted  in  the  subversion  of  its  three  gi'eat  ob- 
jects, God,  free-will  and  immortality" — the  very 
three,  from  w^hich  especially  and  peremptorily,  the 
Bampton  Lecture  would  for  ever  shut  us  out ; 
"  true  wisdom,"  he  adds,  "  would  then  consist,  not 
in  speculation,  but  in  repressing  thought,  during 
our  brief  transit  from  nothingness  to  nothingness." 
(Lect.  i.  37.)  We  know  where  the  repression  of 
thought  and  the  prohibition  of  speculation  are  de- 
manded, with  abundant  plainness. 

XL  The  entire  separation  of  philosophy  from 
theology,  inasmuch  as  the  latter  belongs  to  the 
region  of  faith,  is  distinctive  of  the  Bampton  Lec- 
ture. Let  us  hear  Hamilton's  idea  of  philosophy, 
"  It  comprehends  all  the  sublimest  objects  of  our 
theoretical  and  moral  interest :  every  (natural) 
conclusion  concerning  God,  the  soul,  the  present 
wo"rth  and  future  destiny  of  man  is  exclusively  de- 


SCOTTISH    AND    OXONIAN    PHILOSOPHY.        135 

ducted  from  the  philosophy  of  mind."  (Lect.  i. 
13.)  ''  Mind  rises  to  its  highest  dignity,  when 
viewed  as  the  ohject,  through  which  and  through 
which  alone  our  unassisted  reason  can  ascend  to 
the  knowledge  of  God."  (Lect.  i.  35.)  Need  I  say, 
where  we  are  taught  that  reason  never  can  ascend 
to  this  knowledge  ?  Again,  ^^  the  importance  of 
mental  ^^hilosphy  to  theology  has  not  become  su- 
perfluous in  Christianity.  Anterior  to  revelation, 
religion  rises  out  of  psychology  as  a  result,  subse- 
quently to  revelation,  it  supposes  a  genuine  phi- 
losophy of  mind,  as  the  condition  of  its  truth." 
(Lect.  i.  42.)  Again,  after  arguing  on  philosophi- 
cal gi'ounds  for  the  priority  of  free  intelligence  in 
the  universe,  he  adds,  ^^  such  is  the  manifest  de- 
pendence of  our  theology  on  our  psychology,  in 
reference  to  the  Jirst  condition  of  a  Deity — the  ab- 
solute priority  of  free  intelligence.  But  this  is,  per- 
haps, even  more  conspicuous,  in  relation  to  the 
second,  that  the  universe  is  governed  not  merely 
by  physical,  but  by  moral  laws,  for  God  is  only 
God,  insomuch  as  he  is  the  moral  governor  of  a 
moral  world."  (Lect.  i.  32.)  '^  Thus  it  is  shown," 
he  says,  "  that  theology  is  wholly  dependent  on 
psychology,  for  with  the  proof  of  the  moral  nature 
of  man,  stands  or  falls  the  proof  of  the  existence 
of  a  Deity."  (Lect.  i.  33.)  If  these  passages  fail 
to  mark  a  severance  wide  and  fundamental   I  con- 


136       PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

fess  myself  unable  to  understand  what  like  and  un- 
like mean. 

III,  The  last  quotation  suggests  a  characteris- 
tic of  the  Bampton  Lecture,  namely,  the  ethical 
principles  maintained  in  it,  which  will  fall  to  be 
examined  at  length  in  its  proper  place,  and  has 
not  yet  come  before  us.  Here,  it  is  taken  forth 
only  for  a  moment,  and  for  the  one  purpose  of  con- 
trast. No  more  unambiguous  illustration  of  the 
contrast,  perhaps,  will  be  found,  than  is  furnished 
by  the  perfectly  opposite  views  taken  of  a  passage  in 
Kant's  Kritik  of  the  Practical  Reason.^  It  is  that 
well-known,  magnificent  passage,  beginning  some- 
what thus: — "  Two  things,  alike  incomprehensible, 
lie  clear  before  me,  the  starry  heaven  above  and 
the  moral  law  within ;''  there  follows  a  glorious 
and  noble  exposition  of  essential  and  immutable 
morality  and  of  conscience  as  the  revelation  of  it. 
Hamilton  quotes  it  at  length,  with  enthusiastic 
admh'ation  as  well  of  the  soundness  of  the  doctrine 
as  of  the  stern  sublimity  of  the  expression.  The 
Bampton  lecturer  simply  ignores  such  a  revelation 
of  morality,  and  such  authority  in  conscience.  Is 
there  no  difierence  between  the  two  ? 

IV.  Were  everything  else  set  aside,  or  satisfac- 
torily exjDlained,  there  remains  one  grand  funda- 
mental doctrine,  which  places  the  two  distin- 
guished men,  of  whom  we  speak,  immeasurably  far 

*  Kritik  der  Pradischer  Vernunft,  s.  238.     Riga,  1788. 


SCOTTISH    AND    OXONIAN    PHILOSOPHY.        137 

apart  from  one  another.  It  is  the  doctrine  of  the 
higher  reason  in  man.  Without  the  least  hesita- 
tion, so  far  as  concerns  the  work,  on  The  Limits  of 
Religious  Thought,  it  can  he  asserted,  that  its  au- 
thor beheves  in  no  intellectual  endowment,  above 
the  faculty  of  judgment,  the  understanding  proper, 
the  comparing  and  reasoning  power.  There  may 
be  occasional  sentiments  and  phrases,  that  seem  as 
if  they  pointed  elsewhere,  but  throughout  the  dis- 
tinct evidence  is  unvarying,  abundant  and  decisive, 
that  the  highest  of  the  mental  powers  is  the  mere 
understanding.  But  Hamilton  places  last  and 
highest  in  his  synthesis  of  intellectual  endow- 
ments, reason,  the  lociis  princijoiorum,  the  place 
of  native  intuitions,  of  necessary,  universal  truths. 
He  calls  this,  "  the  power  which  the  mind  has  of 
being  the  native  source  of  certain  a  priori  cogni- 
tions.'' It  is  the  regulative  faculty,  but  not  in  the 
feeble  sense  of  the  Bampton  Lecture,  where  regu- 
lative is  used  as  equivalent  to  promling  rules  for 
practice  and  life.  It  is  regulative,  in  the  sense  of 
regnant,  legislative,  insomuch  as  it  gives  forth 
laws  of  thought,  creates  mental  forms,  arising  out 
of  its  own  proper  nature,  according  to  which, 
knowledge  and  thought  are  moulded.  It  is  not 
reasoning,  and  has  nothing  to  do  with  reasoning, 
which,  on  the  contrary,  belongs  wholly  to  the  un- 
derstanding, the  lower  reason.  This  reason  does 
not  reason,  never  can  reason.     Its  only  office  is  to 


138        PHILOSOPHY   OF    THE   UNCONDITIONED. 

see  what  is  written  within,  and  to  announce  ac- 
cordingly. It  is  the  true  m-tel-Iectio7i,  though  a 
lower  faculty  commonly  usurps  this  name.  "  The 
human  mind,"  says  Leibnitz,  "  is  not  only  capable 
of  knowing  universal,  necessary  truths,  but  of  dis- 
covering them  in  itself.  There  is  a  disposition,  an 
aptitude,  a  pre-formation,  which  determines  our 
mind  to  elicit  these  truths,  and  causes  that  they 
can  be  elicited."  So  wrote  the  great  Grerman  ; 
and  Hamilton,  after  reciting  his  words,  adds,  ^^  I 
have  quoted  these  passages  for  their  own  great  im- 
portance, as  the  first  full  and  explict  announce- 
ment, and  certainly  not  the  least  able  illustrations 
of  one  of  the  most  momentous  principles  in  philo- 
sopliif — (Lect.  ii.  p.  359.)  This  principle,  how- 
ever, is  entirely  ignored  in  the  Bampton  Lecture. 
It  is  not  possible  to  exaggerate  the  extent  and  the 
depth,  the  entirenss  and  absoluteness  of  the  dif- 
ference, arising  out  of  the  reception  or  rejection  of 
the  doctrine  of  the  higher  reason,  as  the  organ  of 
a  priori  truths. 

I  have  done  with  the  contrast ;  and  can  now, 
only  in  a  single  sentence,  cluster  together  the  points 
which  have  been  selected.  1st,  in  a  spirit  repres- 
sive of  speculation  and  of  philosophical  inquiry, 
and  one  stimulative  and  quickening  in  the  highest 
degree  ;  2nd,  in  totally  opposite  views  of  the  pro- 
per objects  of  philosophy  and  of  the  relation  of 
philosophy  to  theology  ;  3rd,  in  no  less  opposite 


SCOTTISH    AND    OXONIAN    PHILOSOPHIES.       139 

views  of  conscience  and  of  immutable  morality  ; 
and  4th,  in  a  mere  discursive  understanding  on  the 
one  hand  and  a  higher  reason  on  the  other  hand, 
the  author  of  the  Bampton  Lecture  is  thoroughly 
and  essentially  separated  from  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton. I  am  prepared  to  maintain,  that  wherever 
the  philosophy  of  the  able  work,  on  the  Limits  of 
Religious  Thought,  may  find  its  source,  it  is  not 
and  cannot  be,  in  the  system  of  Hamilton,  the 
fundamental  principles  of  which  are  utterly  irre- 
concilable with  its  structure,  its  conclusions,  and 
its  entire  tendency  and  spirit. 

But  the  doctrine  of  "  the  Unconditioned,  the 
Absolute,  the  Infinite"'  remains,  and  here,  at  all 
events,  it  may  be  conceived,  it  will  be  impossible 
to  deny  that  the  conclusions  of  these  two  distin- 
guished men  are  entirely  identical.  I  am  very  far, 
indeed,  from  being  satisfied  that  this  is  at  all  the 
case. 

We  must  look  back  to  the  account  which  was 
given  in  an  earlier  part  of  this  criticism  of  Ger- 
man philosophical  speculation  ;  of  that  account 
the  use  is,  now,  to  be  made,  for  which,  chiefly,  it 
was  introduced.  Be  it  then  remembered,  that 
Fichte,  Schelling,  and  Hegel  were  not  only  meta- 
physicians and  philosophers,  but  the  acknowledged 
and  admired  leaders  of  metaphysical  philosophy. 
Hegel,  especially,  was  a  profound  logician  and  the 
master  mind  of  his  age.     Nevertheless,  we  have 


140       PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   UNCONDITIONED. 

seen,  that  the  course  of  his  speculation  was,  in 
many  respects,  consistent  only  with  a  thorough 
logical  monomania.  The  same  was  nearly  equally 
true  of  the  others.  Yery  frequently,  the  logical 
processes  which  they  constructed  might  be  rigidly 
sound.  But  one  and  all  began  in  pure  assumj)tion, 
and  throughout,  necessitated,  now  and  again,  re- 
course to  assumption.  The  Absolute  of  Schelling 
and  Hegel  and  the  absolute-e^o  of  Fichte,  at  all 
events,  the  absolute  of  the  two  former  was  not  only 
a  mere  petitio  principii,  but  a  mere  abstraction. 
Being,  Absolute  being,  in  the  naked,  impoverished, 
most  abstract  sense  of  Hegel,  was  only  the  wildest 
figment  of  the  logical  intellect,  and  had  no  possible 
reality  answering  to  it.  And  w^e  have  seen,  in 
part,  what  conclusions,  revolting  to  common  sense, 
were  built  up  out  of  this  figment.  Nevertheless, 
the  mere  dialectic  freak  of  a  pow^erful  but,  in  this 
respect,  uncontrolled  understanding,  was  the  theory 
of  the  universe,  the  one  philosophy,  at  last  dis- 
covered, the  science  of  sciences.  And  it  was  hailed 
as  such,  over  Germany,  by  the  ablest  and  best 
men. 

It  was  impossible  that  a  man  so  intensely  realis- 
tic as  Hamilton,  a  believer  in  a  real,  external  uni- 
verse, a  real  individual  soul  of  man,  and  a  real 
Grod — all,  with  him,  first  principles  of  philosophy, 
immediate  data  of  consciousness — could  do  any- 
thing but  vehemently  protest  against  this  mania 


SCOTTISH    AND    OXOXIAX    PHILOSOPHIES.       141 

which,  withal,  had  so  much  to  captivate  and  allure 
a  certain  order  of  minds.  Besides,  himself  as  pro- 
found and .  accomplished  a  logician  as  Hegel,  how 
could  he  but  indignantly  spurn  mere  assumption 
and  be  shocked  by  daring,  outrageous,  even  impious 
and,  withal,  baseless  syllogisms  ?  The  German 
school  of  which  we  speak  must  by  no  means  be 
confounded  ^vith  the  early  sages  of  Greece  and  of 
Egypt.  There  is  a  profound  and  warm  sympathy, 
which  it  is  hardly  possible  to  repress,  when  we  lis- 
ten to  the  wild  rhapsodists  of  Elea,  crying,  as  they 
did,  amidst  darkness  and  perplexity ;  or  when  we 
gaze  on  the  ecstacies  of  Plotinus.  Jamblichus,  and 
Proclus  :  for  they  were  men  possessed  and  ab- 
sorbed, surrendered  disinterestedly,  unreservedly, 
and  wholly  to  what  thev  passionately  beHeved  in. 
But  we  come  in  contact  with  quite  another  phase 
of  experience,  in  the  German  school.  I  am  far 
from  denying  the  attribute  of  earnestness  to  Hegel, 
yet  farther  still  from  denying  it  to  Schelling,  and 
farthest  of  all  from  denvino:  it  to  Fichte.  But 
with  Hegel,  at  all  events,  earnestness  was  a  quality 
far  more  of  the  head  than  of  the  heart — it  was  in- 
tellectual, much  more  than  either  spiritual  or 
moral.  He  had  enthusiasm,  an  absorbing  and 
overmastering  enthusiasm,  but  it  was  the  enthu- 
siasm, not  of  religion,  not  even  of  philosophy,  but 
almost  purely  of  logic.  He  had  a  passion  for 
subtletv,  for  svstem,   and.   whetted  bv  success,  it 


142       PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

became  a  passion  for  victory,  for  scholastic  supre- 
macy. It  seems  to  me  impossible  to  resist  the 
conclusion,  that  Hegel  became,  as  it  was  quite  na- 
tural he  should,  a  bewitched  and  intoxicated  lover 
of  his  own  system — the  system,  as  he  and  his  dis- 
ciples currently  called  it.  All  other  realities  were 
little  to  him  in  comparison  with  the  system,  the 
method.  He  souglit  to  make  them  consistent  with 
it,  but  he  cared  far  more  for  it  than  for  them.  In- 
vincible logic,  all-conquering  syllogism,  were  every- 
thing to  him.  That  a  whole  nation,  nearly,  so  far 
as  its  educated  men  were  concerned,  had  caught 
this  frenzy,  had  taken  up,  as  the  grandest  reality, 
what  rested  on  a  mere  assumption  and  worse,  a 
mere  abstraction,  an  idea,  nothing  real,  not  even 
possible,  not  even  cogitable,  was  enough  to  vex  and 
rouse  a  nature  more  phlegmatic  than  Hamilton's. 
But  when,  besides,  it  was  attempted  by  Cousin  to 
introduce  the  system  to  Europe,  through  a  French 
medium,  to  modify,  and  soften,  and  rationalize  it, 
suiTounded  with  all  the  brilliance  of  a  noble  ima- 
gination and  all  the  corruscations  of  a  highly-cul- 
tivated genius,  he  could  be  silent  no  longer. 

But — and  attention  is  specially  called  to  this 
fact — he  A\Tote  in  the  interest  of  philosophy.  In 
the  first  instance,  he  Avrote  chiefly,  if  not  solely,  in 
the  interest  of  philosophy,  in  the  interest  of  the 
science  of  logic,  whose  legitimate  sphere,  he  judged, 
had  been  wantonly  abandoned.     Logical  formulae 


SCOTTISH    AJJD    OXONIAN    PHILOSOPHEKS.      143 

and  logical  processes  had  been  applied  to  certain 
abstractions — ^^  The  Unconditionedj  the  Absolute, 
the  Infinite/'  For  philosoj)hy's  sake,  he  sought  to 
demonstrate  that  a  system  of  the  universe,  on  such 
a  basis,  was  impossible  and  absurd.  For  logic's 
sake,  he  sought  to  demonstrate  that  these  wild  ab- 
stractions were  not  amenable  to  logical  laws,  w^ere 
not  compressible  within  logical  forms,  and  were 
totally  incognizable  and  incogitable. 

The  Bampton  Lecture,  quite  on  the  other  hand, 
is  nominally,  formally,  altogether  a  theological 
treatise.  It  is  written  in  the  interest  of  Christian- 
ity, and  consists  of  ''  Divinity  Lecture  Sermons," 
according  to  the  wording  of  the  original  founda- 
tion. Its  title  is,  The  Limits  of  Beligious  Tliought 
Examined.  The  lecturer  had  nothing  to  do  with 
philosophy,  except  indirectly  ;  nothing  to  do  with 
the  rationalism  of  Hegel ;  nothing  to  do  with  these 
abstractions — The  Unconditioned,  the  Absolute, 
the  Infinite — unless  they  were  to  be  held  synony- 
mous with  the  name  of  God,  which  neither  Hegel, 
Cousin,  nor  Hamilton  profess  to  maintain.  The 
distinction  is  fundamental.  Hamilton,  in  the  first 
instance,  at  least,  was  discussing  a  question  of  pure 
metaphysics  and  of  logic. 

The  lecturer  was  determining  a  religious  doc- 
trine. But  there  is  a  second  distinction.  It  is 
not  denied  that  Hamilton  applied  his  philo- 
sophical  conclusions   to   the  more   sacred   sphere 


144       PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

of  theolog}'',  but  such  applications  were  partial 
and  comparatively  few.  He  holds  and  asserts,  in 
the  strongest  terms,  that  the  Unconditioned,  the 
Infinite,  the  Absolute — these  abstractions  —  are 
wholly  and  only  inconceivable.  But  he  never 
asserts,  in  the  same  way,  that  Grod  is  wholly  in- 
conceivable. I  think  we  shall  find  that  he  asserts 
something  veiy  different,  and  totally  opposite.  As 
Infinite,  he  holds  that  God,  in  his  infinity,  is  in- 
conceivable, cannot  be  taken  into  thought.  But 
this  is  all.  Here  are  his  very  words  :  ''The  Divin- 
ity in  a  certain  sense  is  revealed  ;"  could  he  have 
said  the  Infinite  is,  in  a  certain  sense,  revealed  ? 
No  :  the  Infinite,  that  ideal  abstraction,  that  Pan- 
theistic substance,  is  wholly  inconceivable  ;  but 
with  him  the  Infinite  was  not  equivalent  to  Grod, 
but  very  much  otherwise,  for  he  says — "  The  Di- 
vinity is,  in  a  certain  sense,  revealed  ;  in  a  certain 
sense,  is  concealed.  He  is  at  once  known  and  un- 
known."    Who  can  desire  more  than  this  ? 

But  the  Bampton  lecturer  does  not  only  not 
say  this,  but  he  says  the  very  opposite.  All  the 
findings  of  Hamilton  and  his  own,  in  reference  to 
the  Unconditioned,  Absolute,  or  Infinite,  he  ap- 
plies, without  reserve  or  qualification,  to  the  living 
God,  as  if  they  were  the  same.  God,  the  true 
God,  according  to  him,  is  wholly  and  only  incon- 
ceivable by  the  human  mind,  "  is  not  an  object  of 
human  thought  at  all."     Something  is  conceived  ; 


SCOTTISH   AND   OXONIAN   PHILOSOPHERS.      145 

but  it  is  not  God,  not  God  as  He  is,  not  very  God  ; 
something  is  known,  but  it  is  not  God.  God,  very 
God,  is  only  and  wholly  unconceived  and  unknown. 
There  are  separate  terms,  occasional  phrases,  in  the 
BamjDton  Lecture  which  seem  to  point  to  more 
than  this.  But  taking,  with  the  utmost  stretch 
of  candor,  its  deliberate  reasonings,  its  express  and 
repeated  language,  and  its  unvarying  tendency  and 
spirit,  I  think  no  impartial  reader  will  deny  that 
this  is  what  it  maintains. 

1 


CHAPTER    II. 

MEANING  OF  THE  UNCONDITIONED,  ETC. 

"  No  Unconditioned,"  "  No  Absolute" — Never,  to  created  Spirit — 
"  Infinite"  Incomprehensible — Of^  concerning,  "  Infinite" — No 
Idea,  then  Nothing — Word  Infinite  understood — How  ?- — Infi- 
nite not  whole  Sphere  of  Divine — Eternal — This  Infinity  proper — 
All  possible  Attributes — Power,  Knowledge — He,  who  Infinite, 
not  All-incomprehensible — Human  Spirit  and  Highest — Human 
Personality  and  Divine — Human  IntelUgence  and  Divine — floral 
Attributes  and  Divine — Man,  true  Microcosm. 

These  disastrous  terms,  the  Unconditioned,  tlie 
Absolute,  the  Infinite  !  How  have  they  been  im- 
ported into  theology,  or  even  into  philosophy  ? 
Above  all,  what  authority  is  there  for  making 
them  convertible  with  the  sacred  word,  Grod,  the 
name  of  the  Only  Living  One,  whom  we  have 
been  taught  to  call  our  Father,  surely,  not  all  un- 
known ? 

Hamilton  will  tell  us  that  '^  from  Xenophanes 
to  Liebnitz,  the  infinite,  the  absolute,  the  uncon- 
ditioned, formed  the  highest  jDrinciple  of  specula- 
tion." This  sentence,  separated  as  it  sometimes 
has  been  by  those  who  have  quoted  it,  from  what 
immediately  follows,  not  only  may  lose  part  of  its 
meaning,  but  may  convey  a  totally  different  sense 


MEANING   OF   THE   UNCONDITIONED.  147 

from  what  is  intended.  Hamilton  adds,  "but 
from  the  dawn  of  philosophy  in  the  school  of  Elea, 
until  the  rise  of  the  Kantian  philosophy,  no  seri- 
ous attempt  was  made  to  investigate  the  nature 
and  origin  of  the  notion  (or  notions)  as  a  psycho- 
logical phenomenon."  {Discussions,  p.  18.)  A  cer- 
tain ultimate  point  in  speculation  had  been  early 
reached,  been  thereafter  assumed  and  pondered, 
but  never  deliberately  and  philosophically  investi- 
gated, either  during  the  Platonic,  or  the  Alexan- 
drian, or  the  scholastic  periods,  till  the  time  of 
Kant  and  his  iDimediate  followers.  Alexandrian 
philosophy,  plunged  in  the  mysteries  of  the 
"  Logos,"  and  rapt  in  ecstatic  visions — the  vision 
of  pure  being,  a  widely  different  thing  from  calm, 
patient  investigation,  had  all  but  entirely  passed 
this  by.  The  marvellous  dialectic  subtlety  of  the 
schoolmen,  save  in  a  single  instance  or  two,  in  the 
period  of  its  highest  excitement  and  energy,  amidst 
the  war  of  universal s,  and  of  sensible  and  intelligi- 
ble species,  dared  not  throw  its  weblike  entangle- 
ment around  their  ultimate  idea,  dared  not  touch 
it.  The  silence  and  inaction  of  a  thousand  years 
are  significant.  Better,  some  will  say,  they  had 
never  been  broken  by  the  might  and  the  mastery 
of  Hegelianism.  No,  by  no  means.  This  highest 
principle,  assumed  so  long,  but  never  psychologi- 
cally examined,  lying  dim  and  vague  in  the  depths 
of  certain  philosophic  minds,  as  a  terrible  secret 


148         PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

which  they  must  not  question — this,  philosophized 
and  systematized,  may  reveal  itself,  as  it  never 
could  have  done,  otherwise.  Let  us  search  to  see. 
Thought,  it  is  said,  in  its  farthest  regress,  its 
utmost  effort  to  ascend  to  the  ultimate,  the  hijrh- 
est,  reaches  a  limit  which  it  cannot  transcend — 
ahsoluteness,  unconditionedness.  There  must  be 
something  primitive,  original,  antecedent  to  all 
else,  independent  of  all  else.  Be  what  it  may,  it 
must  be  absolute,  unconditioned,  infinite.  Specu- 
lation asserts  this,  as  its  first  principle,  ponders  it, 
goes  forth  after  it,  did  so  thousands  of  years  ago. 
In  the  depths  of  eternity  past,  before  the  existence 
of  a  finite  universe,  there  must  have  been  absolute- 
ness, unconditionedness,  infinity,  something  abso- 
lute, unconditioned,  infinite.  That  is  the  conclu- 
sion, or  rather,  the  postulate.  And  it  may  here 
be  allowed,  that  it  is  not  unlawful  to  sufier 
thought  to  wander  back,  even  though  it  can  only 
weary  itself  in  spasmodic  efforts  to  transcend  the 
limits  of  creation,  and  to  conceive  the  Uncreated, 
alone,  in  immensity.  Nor  may  this  be  wholly  un- 
connected with  an  exalted,  a  rare  veneration.  But 
it  is  impossible  not  to  feel,  that  this  region  cannot 
belong  to  us,  save  in  a  very  exceptional  sense.  We 
may  make  the  effort  to  pass  into  it,  for  a  moment, 
but  it  can  be  but  for  a  moment.  Our  moment's 
stay  may  awaken  in  our  minds  unusual  sentiments 
of  reverence  and  awe.   We  may  meditate,  and  wait^ 


MEANING   OF    THE    UNCONDITIONED.  149 

and  gaze,  and  be  stronger  and  better  for  the  effort 
But  the  region,  certainly,  is  not  ours.  We  can 
KNOW  nothing  of  it,  however  much  we  may  con- 
jecture :  still  less,  can  we  reason  confidently  re- 
specting it.  It  is  the  place,  if  place  at  all,  not  for 
reasoning,  but  for  wonder  and  for  abandonment  to 
profound,  uncontrolled  emotion.  When,  therefore, 
it  is  reiterated  from  several  quarters,  the  Absolute, 
the  Unconditioned,  the  Infinite,  is,  must  he,  we  can 
onlv  ask,  what  do  the  words  mean  ?  Absoluteness, 
in  the  most  wide  and  abstract  sense,  Uncondition- 
edness.  Infinity — certain  qualities,  attributes — but 
attaching  to  what,  inhering  in  what  ?  that  is  the 
question — a  question  to  which  we  can  obtain  no 
answer.  Is  it  something  or  nothing,  or  both,  a 
being  or  a  thing,  living  or  dead,  mind  or  matter  .^ 
The  absolute  ;  it  is  a  mere  ideal  figment,  a  thing 
of  fancy,  a  pure  self-imposition.  There  never  was, 
or  could  be,  a  reality  answering  to  such  an  abstrac- 
tion. 

It  may  be  possible  to  imagine  the  non-existence 
of  the  finite  universe,  to  conceive  the  Great  Being, 
alone,  in  immensity  ;  possible  to  conceive  life,  then, 
intelligencCj  then,  one  living  intelligence.  But 
when  this  is  called  tlie  absolute,  that  is,  absolute- 
ness, in  the  abstract,  who  can  attach  a  sense  to  the 
word  ?  Absolute  truth  is  quite  intelligible.  We 
understand  by  it,  truth  without  mixture  ;  veiy 
truth,  and  nothing  but  truth.     And  the  Absolute 


150       PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   UNCONDITIONED. 

God  would  be  intelligible  ;  meaning,  very  God,  the 
real  God,  altogether  divine,  and  alone  divine.  But 
this  is  not  what  is  meant,  but  something  perfectly 
different.  It  is  the  absolved  God,  God  loosed  from 
all  relation,  external  and  internal,  the  uncondi- 
tioned, brought  under  no  condition  of  relation  or 
connection  of  any  kind.  One  might  answer,  even 
so — let  it  be  granted  thus  far,  at  least.  The  Great 
Being,  before  creation,  alone,  in  immensity,  must 
have  been  unconditioned,  ah  extra  ;  necessarily  so, 
for  there  was  nothing  to  condition  Him.  But  what 
is  gained  ?  This  is  only  saying,  that  He  was  alone, 
in  immensity,  saying  it  in  another  form,  without 
the  slightest  advantage.  The  statement  may  be 
true,  at  all  events  it  cannot  be  denied.  God  was 
then,  and  must  be  conceived,  as  the  unconditioned. 
But  with  that  period  and  that  state,  save  in  mere 
abstracted  contemplation,  we  have  nothing  to  do  ; 
and  it  is  impossible,  speculate  as  we  may,  that  we 
can  ever  know,  certainly  know,  anything  respect- 
ing it. 

The  era  of  creation,  whenever,  howsoever  start- 
ing forth,  the  era  of  creation,  alone,  belongs  to  us  ; 
and,  in  connection  with  this,  I  maintain  that  these 
terms — the  unconditioned,  the  absolute  (in  the 
sense  of  absolved),  not  only  have  no  meaning, 
but  are  thoroughly  and  utterly  false.  There  is  no 
being,  or  thing,  in  the  universe  to  whom,  or  which 
they  can  apply.     There  is,  there  can  be,  no  uncon- 


MEANING   OF    THE   UNCONDITIONED.  151 

ditioned  God  to  us.  The  Grod  of  consciousness  is 
not  unconditioned.  Consciousness  never  revealed, 
never  could  reveal,  an  unconditioned  God.  The 
mere  fact  of  the  existence  of  a  conscious  creature 
excludes  the  possibility  of  unconditionedness  in 
the  creator.  The  Great  Being  has  voluntarily 
conditioned  himself — that  is,  what  we  most  cer- 
tainly know — has  voluntarily  placed  himself  in  re- 
lation with  created  beings  and  thinsrs.  There  is  no 
such  thing,  evermore,  as  the  unconditioned,  the 
absolute  ;  if,  indeed,  there  ever  was  such  a  thing. 
And  how  then  shall  we  designate  a  philosophy, 
which,  of  its  own  proper  motion,  without  cause 
given,  brings  up  before  us,  and  would  perpetuate, 
these  meaningless  barbarities,  which  can  only  be- 
wilder and  darken  ?  How  shall  we  designate  the 
theology,  which,  through  these  monstrous  fictions, 
raises  an  impassable  barrier  between  the  Almighty 
and  his  creatures,  and,  by  the  same  means,  strikes 
down  the  divinest  thing  in  their  nature,  the  rea- 
son He  hath  given  them  ? 

The  Bampton  lecturer  freely  and  constantly 
uses  the  phrase  "  the  Absolute,"  as  a  name  for  the 
Deity,  and  the  Absolute  God,  God  in  his  absolute 
essence,  absolute  being.  There  is  no  absolute  God, 
or  essence,  or  being,  in  the  sense  of  absolved,  loosed 
from  relation  ;  and  if  the  word  is  employed,  ac- 
cording to  popular  usage,  to  mean  no  more  than 
true,  real,  very  God,  then  the  fault  is  not  a  small 


152        PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   UNCONDITIONED. 

one,  of  departing,  in  a  philosophical  work,  from 
the  philosophical  sense,  and  creating  ambiguity 
and  error  by  a  double  meaning.  Some,  who  are 
far  removed  from  the  lecturer's  standpoint,  be- 
cause the  terms  in  question  have  come  into  such 
prominence,  not  perceiving  how  injurious  and  how 
false  they  are,  have  adopted  them  quite  unhesitat- 
ingly, as  if  they  were  true.  The  unconditioned, 
the  absolute,  as  phrases,  occur  very  frequently, 
without  evil  design,  in  our  current  literature  and 
theology.  Perhaps,  sufficiently  valid  reasons  have 
been  produced  to  justify  the  demand,  made  in  all 
humility,  but  on  ground  which  is  deemed  unassail- 
able, that  these  barbarous,  and  most  false  words, 
be  banished  from  use  for  ever.  They  are  meaning- 
less, at  the  best ;  there  is  no  reality  corresponding 
to  them.  A  true  philosophy  disowns  them.  A 
true  theology,  still  more. 

But  ^^the  Infinite"  remains,  and,  even  in  the 
absence  of  the  two  cognate  phrases,  all  the  real 
difficulty  may  yet  abide  unmitigated  and  entire, 
compressed  into  the  remaining  term.  Some  ob- 
jection might  be  taken  to  the  form  in  which  the 
idea  is  put — the  Infinite,  that  is  Infinity,  in  the 
abstract — where  is  it  ?  what  is  it  ?  I  know  of  no 
infinity  but  one.  There  is  one  Infinite  Being. 
Where  else  is  infinity  ?  But  Grod  is  Infinite  ; 
and  the  question  rises  up,  as  inevitably  as  if  we 
had  still  to  deal  with  the  terms,  unconditioned 


MEANING   OF   THE   UNCONDITIONED.  153 

and  absolute,  is  the  Infinite  conceivabie  or  incon- 
ceivable, cognizable  or  incognizable,  by  the  human 
mind  ? 

On  this  point,  I  have  to  avow  myself  a  humble 
disciple  of  Sir  W.  Hamilton,  and  so  much  the 
more,  because  I  hold  this  to  be  perfectly  consis- 
tent ;  indeed,  alone  consistent  with  a  thorough  se- 
paration from  the  philosophy  and  the  theology  of 
the  Bampton  Lecture.  To  me,  the  reasoning  of 
Hamilton  is  altogether  invincible  and  invulnerable. 
It  amounts  to  this,  put  in  the  simplest  form — To 
think,  is  to  condition,  to  limit,  to  bring  within  the 
conditions,  the  limits  of  our  thinking  power.  That 
which  has  no  limits,  above,  below,  on  this  side  or 
on  that,  cannot  be  placed  within  limits  ;  in  other 
words,  it  cannot  be  thought.  The  Infinite  is 
strictlv  unthinkable,  because  it  is  not  limitable — 
limitable  not  in  any  exceptional  sense,  but  in 
the  true,  literal  sense  of  narrowing  and  circum- 
scribing. 

To  think  or  the  Infinite,  concerning  the  Infinite, 
to  form  ideas,  notions  respecting  it,  is  quite  possi- 
ble ;  but  to  think  it,  that  is,  to  comprehend  it  in 
thought,  is  strictly  impossible.  To  think  a  thing 
in  the  strict,  philosophical  sense,  that  is,  to  bring 
it  within  thought,  and  to  con-ceive  it,  or  com-pre- 
hend  it,  amount  virtually  to  the  same  thing.  Con- 
cipiOj  co7n-prehendo,  suggest  an  original,  literal 
identity  of  meaning.     To  conceive,  to  form  a  con- 

7* 


154       PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

ccpt  of  a  thing  exactly  answering  to  the  reality,  to 
tlirow  our  thought  around  it  and  take  it  together, 
or  again,  to  lay  hold  of  it  together,  to  close  upon 
it  with  our  grasp,  are  different  forms  of  one  sub- 
stantial meaning,  and  that,  again,  is  conveyed  by 
the  single  word,  think.  To  think  a  thing,  is  to 
grasp  it  within  our  thought.  The  Infinite  cannot 
be  grasped  within  our  thought,  nor  within  any 
limits,  for,  on  all  sides,  it  has  no  limits.  To  know 
God,  in  his  Infinity,  is  impossible ;  but  to  know,  and 
know  much  respecting  the  God,  who  is  infinite,  is 
quite  another  thing,  and  may  be  grandly  possible. 
Meantime,  I  venture  to  suggest  that  the  conclusion 
at  which  a  sober  philosophy  arrives,  is  no  other  than 
that  which  men  have  already  universally  adopted, 
who  know  nothing  of  speculation  or  of  metaphysi- 
cal controversies.  What  they  intend  to  convey,  in 
saying  that  God  is  infinite,  is,  that  they  have 
thought  and  thought  again  and  again,  but  have  ever 
found  the  reality  towering  upward,  piercing  down- 
ward, stretching  out  on  all  sides  immeasurably  be- 
yond their  loftiest,  farthest  thoughts.  Is  it  not  so  ? 
At  the  same  time,  there  are  some  exj)lanations 
to  be  put  on  this  general  conclusion,  and  some 
necessary  reservations  which  have  been  often  over- 
looked, and  have  thus  occasioned  great  inaccuracy 
and  even  injustice,  on  the  one  side  and  the  other. 
When,  for  example,  it  is  broadly  asserted  that  we 
can  have  no  idea  of,  that  is,  concerning,  the  In- 


MEANING    OF    THE    UNCONDITIONED.  155 

finite,  the  statement  is  at  variance  with  facts,  and 
with  individual  experience.  Every  one  feels  it,  at 
once.  That  concerning  which  I  have  no  idea  at  all, 
is  to  me  nothing,  in  every  sense,  nothing.  I  may, 
and  do  believe  in  that  which  I  cannot  fully  com- 
pre-hend  in  thought,  which  I  cannot  place  clearly 
within  my  thought.  But  I  must  at  least,  be  able 
to  form  some  idea,  some  notion,  as  to  what  that  is, 
which  I  cannot  fully  comprehend.  I  must  so  far 
have  an  idea  concerning  it,  that  I  can  distinguish 
it,  from  what  it  is  not.  To  believe  in  that,  respect- 
ing which  I  can  form  no  notion,  is  to  believe  in 
nothing,  it  is  not  to  believe  at  all.  The  nature 
which  compels  me  to  believe  in  the  Infinite,  must 
supply  me  somehow  with  a  substratum,  a  substance 
of  which  my  belief  can  take  hold.  Again,  when  it 
is  broadly  asserted  that  we  can  attach  no  meaning 
to  the  word  infinite,  this  statement,  also,  is  felt  to 
be  at  variance  with  fact.  We  do  attach  a  most 
distinct  meaning  to  the  word.  Every  one  does, 
else  how  comes  the  word  to  be  used.  Historically, 
it  stands  simply  thus  :  we  have  a  certain  notion  or 
notions  in  our  minds,  and,  in  order  to  express  them, 
we  select,  we  create  the  word  infinite,  without 
limits,  and  are  satisfied  that  this  word  is  a  proper 
and  fitting  medium  for  expressing  what  we  mean. 
The  word  infinite,  we  understand  perfectly  :  it 
means  without  limits  ;  but  the  thing  which  is  infi- 
nite, we  cannot  com-pre-hend,   con-ceive,   think, 


156       PHILOSOPHY   OF    THE   UNCONDITIONED, 

biing  into  thought,  and  we  simply  mean  to  say  that 
we  cannot  comprehend  it,  when  we  call  it  infinite. 
There  is  the  word  contradictory.  We  have  a  dis- 
tinct and  positive  idea  as  to  what  we  mean,  when 
we  say  that  a  thing  is  contradictory  ;  but  the  thing 
which  is  contradictory,  we  cannot  think,  cannot 
take  into  thought,  cannot  conceive.  Two  and  two 
are  nine,  it  is  a  contradiction  ;  a  piece  of  wood  is 
two  feet  long  and  fifteen  long,  at  the  same  time,  it 
is  a  contradiction  :  it  is  impossible  to  thought. 
There  is  the  word  unintelligible.  We  know  what 
it  means  ;  but  the  thing  which  is  unintelligible,  we 
cannot  think,  cannot  conceive,  cannot  comprehend. 
It  is  not  to  he  understood.  The  very  notion  we 
have  formed  and  expressed  in  the  word,  would  be 
destroyed,  if  it  were  understood. 

In  the  same  way,  we  have  quite  a  clear  notion 
resjDecting  what  is  meant  by  the  word  infinite,  with- 
out limits.  This  is  not  difficult  to  our  mind.  We 
can  reason  respecting  it  ;  we  can  apply  it,  and  can 
judge  when  it  is  rightly  ap23lied,  and  when  wrongly. 
But  that  tuhich  is  infinite,  we  cannot  con-ceive, 
and  we  mean  to  assert  its  inconceivabilitv,  w^hen 
we  say  it  is  infinite.  It  is  beyond  thought,  impos- 
sible to  thought.  Infinity,  attach  to  what  it  may, 
where  it  may,  is  beyond  thought,  impossible  to 
thought.  Rightly,  Hamilton  suggests,  that  the 
word  stands  in  human  language  as  a  symbol,  not 
of  the  power,  but  of  the  powerlessness  of  the  human 


MEANING   OF   THE   UNCONDITIONED.  157 

mind  ;  not  of  knowledge^  but  of  ignorance.  And 
yet,  is  there  not  power  as  well  as  powerlessness  ;  is 
there  not  knowledge  as  well  as  ignorance  betokened  ; 
high,  and  stupendous  knowledge.  To  know  that 
Infinity  belongs  to  the  Great  Being  ;  that  in  cer- 
tain respects  he  is  unknowable,  lifted  above  the  in- 
telligence of  his  highest  creatures  :  this  is  power, 
not  weakness,  this  affects  and  elevates  beyond  mea- 
sure our  whole  conception  of  Him.  It  is  even  this, 
"which  renders  worship  possible.  But  for  this,  there 
had  been  no  God  to  us.  A  God  all-known  and 
comprehended,  is  no  God.  That  which  I  fully 
know  and  understand  is  below,  not  above  me,  for  I 
have  mastered  it.  I  have  not  to  worship  it,  it  must 
bow  down  to  me.  That  which  towers  immeasur- 
ably above  me,  which  I  cannot  scale  and  cannot 
fathom,  before  which  I  am  as  nothing,  less  than 
nothing,  that,  that  alone,  I  fall  down  to  and  adore, 
Not  ignorance,  but  knowledge,  is  the  mother  of 
devotion.  Nevertheless,  the  sense  of  ignorance  in 
the  created  mind,  of  immeasurable  ignorance  and 
inferiority,  is  preliminary  and  essential  to  all  true 
adoration.  "  Who  can  by  searching  find  out  God, 
who  can  find  out  the  Almighty  to  perfection  ?  It 
is  as  high  as  heaven,  what  canst  thou  know  ? 
deeper  than  hades,  Avhat  canst  thou  do  ?  the  mea- 
sure thereof  is  longer  than  the  earth,  and  it  is 
broader  than  the  sea  !" 

But  how  do  we  come  to  predicate  of  any  being 


158       PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

or  thing  this  stupendous,  incomprehensible  attri- 
butCj  Infinity,  and  in  what  sense  is  it  predicable  of 
the  one  Great  Being,  and  of  Him  alone  ?  There 
are  sacred  associations  here  not  to  be  despised, 
which  do  not  surround  either  of  the  two  mere 
philosophical  terms  to  which  we  before  referred. 
This  word  is  hallowed  to  piety,  because  it  is  sup- 
posed to  be  sanctioned  by  the  Holy  Scriptures. 
For  the  sake  of  those  who  might  otherwise  fail  to 
perceive  how  thoroughly  oj)en  the  whole  question 
is,  I  shall  quote  the  only  passages  in  Holy  Scrip- 
ture in  which  the  term  translated  by  our  word  in- 
finite is  found.  They  are  four  in  number.  ^'  Ethio- 
pia and  Egypt  were  her  strength,  and  it  was  in- 
finite." "  Take  the  spoil  of  their  infinite  store." 
"  Are  not  thine  iniquities  infinite  ?"  Only  in  one 
instance  is  the  word  connected  with  the  Almighty, 
and  that  with  reference  to  one  of  His  attributes. 
^'  Great  is  the  Lord,  His  understanding  is  infinite." 
Here,  and  m  the  other  three  examples,  the  word 
simply  means,  without  number,  without  search. 
Not  once,  have  we  infinite,  in  the  modern,  philoso- 
phical and  defined  sense. 

The  Bampton  lecturer,  with  Sir  William  Hamil- 
ton, maintains  that  the  Infinite  is  given  in  con- 
sciousness, and  given  as  the  complement  of  our 
consciousness  of  the  finite.  Correlatives  imply 
one  another.  It  is  not  possible  to  think  the  one 
without,  in  the  same  mental  act,  being  necessitated 


MEANING    OF    THE    UNCONDITIONED.  159 

to  think  the  other.  Fully  admitting  the  soundness 
of  this  logical  law,  there  is,  nevertheless,  not  much 
gained  by  it  in  the  case  before  us.  Logic  and  re- 
ality are  by  no  means  necessarily  separated,  but 
they  are  by  no  means  necessarily  connected.  An 
idea  shall  suggest  its  correlate.  In  thought,  both, 
shall  be  equally  true,  yet  the  one  may  have  a  posi- 
tive reality  answering  to  it,  the  other  no  reality  at 
all.  Something  implies  its  correlate,  not  some- 
thing, nothing.  Being  implies  its  correlate,  non- 
being,  Finite  implies  its  correlate  not  finite,  infi- 
nite. The  one  is  a  reality  before  me,  the  other,  in 
two  of  the  cases  out  of  the  three,  is  no  reality  at 
all,  and  whether,  in  the  third  it  be  a  reality,  can- 
not, at  least  only  by  such  a  method  as  this,  be  as- 
certained. Indeed,  I  am  far  from  being  satisfied 
that  it  is  in  this  way  at  all,  that  we  reach  the  no- 
tion of  the  Infinite. 

That  there  is  in  the  human  soul  a  native,  intui- 
tive, original  sense  of  God,  of  a  Supreme  Being, 
is  one  thing.  But  when  Hamilton  asserts  that 
"  the  Infinite''  is  a  datum  of  consciousness — as- 
serts a  universal  conviction  that  the  Infinite  is — 
some  hesitation  is,  perhaps,  pardonable,  for  this  is 
quite  another  thing.  Two  of  the  laws  by  which 
we  test  the  data  of  consciousness  are  before  me  : — 
1st,  the  law  of  parcimony,  namely,  that  no  fact  be 
assumed,  except  it  be  simple  and  ultimate  ;  2nd, 
the  law  of  harmony,  namely,  that  nothing  but  the 


160       PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   UNTCONDITIONED. 

simple,  ultimate  fact  be  taken,  without  inference 
or  addition.  It  appears  to  me  that  both  of  these 
laws  are  violated,  when  it  is  held  that  the  Infinite 
is  given  in  consciousness.  In  the  educated,  culti- 
vated mind — the  mind  of  a  philosopher,  a  scholar 
— the  datum  may  so  gi'ow  into  this  form,  that  it 
shall  not  be  judged  susceptible  of  further  analysis. 
But  is  there  not  an  earlier,  simpler  form  of  the 
consciousness,  truly  the  ultimate  form,  to  which 
this  makes  an  unjustifiable  addition  ?  That  there 
is  a  God  is  one  of  those  a  priori  truths,  those 
primitive  cognitions,  that  lie  in  the  depths  of  our 
higher  reason,  to  which,  in  the  words  of  Leibnitz, 
there  is  a  disposition,  an  aptitude,  a  preformation, 
and  which,  though  they  may  lie  dormant,  are  ever 
capable  of  being  elicited.  There  is  a  God,  a 
Supreme,  a  highest  Being,  over  all.  But  the 
datum  is  given  in  this  grand,  undefined  form. 
That  this  Being  is  Infinite,  I  hold  to  be  a  conclu- 
sion of  the  understanding — a  conclusion  in  certain 
cases  so  direct,  immediate,  and  so  strongly  forced 
in  upon  us,  as  to  be  with  difiiculty  distinguished 
from  the  original  consciousness.  Nevertheless,  the 
two  are  perfectly  distinct,  and  can  be,  and  in  strict 
truth  ought  to  be,  kept  apart.  The  sense  of  God 
is  universal,  and  native  to  the  soul  of  man.  But 
only  this  is  universal.  The  conviction  that  the 
Supreme  must  be  infinite  is  later,  logically  and 
chronologically,  and  is  reached,  however  directly 


MEANING    OF    THE    UNCONDITIONED.  161 

and  rapidlyj  only  through  the  understanding.  But 
it  is  reached.  There  is  no  question  here  that  the 
Great  Being  is  infinite,  truly  and  properly  infinite 
is  the  Infinite  One,  the  one  only  being  of  whom 
this  attribute  is  predicable.  Yet  it  is  a  question, 
a  profound,  even  perilous  question,  one  which  de- 
mands investigation,  and  may  also  lead  to  great 
diversity  of  judgment — '^  In  what  sense  and  to 
what  extent  does  Infinity  belong  to  the  Great 
Being  ?" 

The  fallacy  which  pervades  and  vitiates  the 
Bampton  Lecture  is,  that  this  one  attribute  con- 
stitutes God,  and  since  that  which  is  Infinite  is 
inconceivable,  therefore  He  is  only  and  wholly  in- 
conceivable, unknowable.  No  proof  is  attempted, 
but  it  is  throughout  constantly  assumed  that  in  all 
respects,  and  in  every  view,  God  is  only  the  Infinite, 
and,  therefore,  the  inconceivable. 

There  is  one  sphere  in  which,  by  consent  of  all, 
this  stupendous  attribute  must  be  predicated.  The 
duration  of  the  Great  Being  is  strictly  infinite — 
unbeginning,  unending,  underived,  uncaused,  abso- 
lutely indej)endent,  unassailable,  unchangeable, 
from  everlasting  to  everlasting.  How  this  convic- 
tion is  reached,  whether  a  direct  datum  of  the 
higher  reason,  or  a  direct  and  irresistible  inference 
from  a  datum  of  the  reason,  it  is  not  here  needful 
to  inquire.  There  is  no  question  to  the  pliiloso- 
phical  theist,  any  more  than  to  the  Christian  theo- 


162         PHILOSOPHY   OF    THE   UNCONDITIONED. 

logian.  But  the  con-cep-tion,  the  com-prchension, 
to  all  is  simply  impossible.  Take  the  image  of  a 
perfect  circle — without  beginning,  without  end  ;  or 
fancy  a  '■^ punctum  stans  ;"  or  repeat  the  words 
"an  everlasting  now" — no  past,  no  future,  no  suc- 
cession, no  change,  a  perpetual  present.  But  after 
all  these,  or  any  such  helps,  we  should  count  the 
man  bereft  of  reason  who  should  profess  that  he 
could  in  the  most  distant  or  feeble  way  approach 
to  the  conception,  the  com-prehension,  of  eternal 
duration.  Here  is  Infinity  strictly  incognizable, 
incogitable,  in  the  sense  in  which  those  words  have 
been  explained.  But  it  is  believed,  and  that  sup- 
poses that  we  have  formed  some  notion  respecting 
it,  that  we  understand  the  words,  and  can  see 
clearly  enough  what  that  is  which  it  is  impossible 
for  us  to  com-pre-hend.  It  is  believed.  The  lec- 
turer holds  it  to  be  an  immediate  datum  of  con- 
sciousness. I  may  conceive  it  to  be  an  inference 
of  the  understanding  from  an  original  datum.  But 
in  either  case  it  is  believed.  That  is  the  fact.  And 
is  it  nothing.?  What  creature  on  earth,  except 
man,  is  capable  of  reaching  this  truth  at  all — is 
endowed  with  the  faculty  of  believing  it,  of  know- 
ing that  it  is  true  ?  This  is  no  badge  of  weakness, 
but  much  more  a  symbol  of  the  greatness  of  our 
nature  ;  that  we  can  and  do  believe  in  One  who  is 
unbeginning,  unending,  with  whom  is  no  succes- 
sion, no  change,  but  an  everlasting  present.     A 


MEANING   OF   THE    UNCONDITIONED.  163 

majesty,  a  grandeur,  an  awfulness,  are  thrown 
around  the  Most  High,  which  at  the  same  time 
react  on  us.  We  are  elevated,  whilst  we  are  over- 
awed. Our  worship  is  not  therefore  ignorant,  but 
only  so  much  the  more  enlightened,  because  it  is 
directed  to  One  of  whom  we  know  that  that  is  true, 
which  is  inconceivably  above  our  highest  thoughts. 
The  being  or  essence  of  the  Supreme,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  unbeginning,  unending,  strictly  eternal, 
must  be  infinite.  The  same  is  equally  true  of  the 
attributes  of  the  Supreme  nature.  As  eternal ^  they 
are,  each  and  all,  strictly  infinite.  But  explana- 
tion, elimination  is  attempted.  The  being  of  God 
is  his  proper  nature,  that  whereby  He  is  what  He 
is,  the  suhstanSj  essence  in  which  attributes  inhere. 
When  it  is  added,  this  essence  is  infinite  in  itself 
(and  not  merely  in  virtue  of  its  eternal  duration), 
I,  for  one,  am  unable  either  to  affirm  or  deny.  I 
can  attach  no  sense  whatever  to  the  words.  It  may 
be  gi'eat  ignorance,  great  obtuseness,  gi'eat  incapa- 
city. But  I  can  form  no  sort  of  notion,  what  that 
is  which  is  maintained.  It  may  be  true,  or  it  may 
be  false,  but  I  am  quite  incapable  of  understanding 
the  one  or  the  other.  Logic  would  make  short  and 
decisive  work  of  this  difficulty,  if  it  be  a  difficulty. 
The  Divine  essence,  we  should  be  told,  must  be 
either  finite  or  infinite  ;  if  it  be  not  finite,  then  it 
must  be  infinite.  Yet  this  also  admits  of  an  an- 
swer, short,  if  not  decisive.     Who  shall  determine 


164       PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE   UNCONDITIONED. 

for  US  that  these  words,  finite  and  infinite,  are  at 
all  apphcahle  in  this  case  ?  I  think  they  are  not. 
Heat  is  neither  long  nor  short.  Light  is  neither 
round  nor  square.  These  qualities  have  no  relation 
to  the  substances  named.  Were  it  asserted  that  the 
Divine  essence  is  limited,  finite,  the  ready  questions 
would  start  up,  how,  where,  in  what  sense  ?  It  is 
impossible.  There  is,  there  can  be  nothing  to  limit 
it.  This  is  the  one  essence  in  the  universe,  the  being 
of  beings,  the  primitive  nature,  the  one  fountain  of 
all  other  natures.  Whence  could  a  limit  arise  ? 
It  is  contradictor}^  — would  be  destructive. 

But,  infinite  in  itself!  I  can  attach  no  meaning 
whatever,  to  the  language.  In  my  humble  judg- 
ment, to  be  incapable  of  limit  and  to  be  infinite  are 
not  the  same,  but  totally  difierent.  When  the 
duration  of  the  Great  Being  is  declared  to  be  un- 
beginning,  unending,  there  is  certainly  a  positive 
idea  conveyed,  though  we  be  unable  to  grasp  it  in 
our  thought.  It  is  more,  much  more,  than  being 
incapable  of  being  limited,  it  is  something  positive 
and  actual  in  itself  And  it  is  this  which  I,  for 
one,  am  unable  to  attach  any  meaning  to,  in  con- 
nection with  the  Highest  essence,  the  Highest  na- 
ture. Incapable  of  being  limited  is  one  thing,  posi- 
tive Infinity,  as  in  the  case  of  duration,  is  quite 
another  thing.  Loosely,  expletively,  rhetorically, 
we  speak  of  the  Infinite  Life,  the  Infinite  Essence, 
without  harm,  possibly  even  so  as  to  awaken  rev- 


MEANING   OF   THE   UNCONDITIONED.  165 

er^nt  feeling^.  But,  beyond  tliis,  if  with  the  view 
of  exaltiDsr  the  Almio-htv,  men  have  attributed 
positive  infinity  to  his  nature,  in  itself,  they  have 
done  so,  on  their  own  authority.  Men  have  origin- 
ated this  application  of  a  sacred  word ;  a  man  may- 
question  its  propriety  and  its  truth. 

Pursuing  still  this  special  course  of  thought  it 
is  farther  maintained  that,  when  it  is  said  that  the 
Supreme  Being  is  enriched  with  all  possible  attri- 
butes to  which  not  one  in  any  direction  can  be 
added,  this  is  the  utmost  that  can  be  said.     To 
talk  of  an  infinity  of  attributes  is  to  utter  not  only 
what  has  no  meaning,  but  what  is  contradictory, 
landing  us  in  the  absurdity  of  an  infinite  number. 
And,  in  like  manner^  the  application  of  the  term 
infinite  to  the  separate  excellences  (except  in  virtue 
of  their  eternity)  of  the  Most  High,  may  be  shown 
to  be  not  only  unmeaning  but  false.     For  illustra- 
tion, I  select  two  Divine  properties,  which  seem  to 
afibrd  the  most  appreciable  example  of  what  I  seek 
to  convey — ^power  and  knowledge.     Shall  we  say, 
Infinite  power.  Infinite  knowledge  ?     With  genu- 
ine desire  to  honor  their  Maker,  men  have  uttered 
these  expressions  ;  but  they  rest  solely  on  human 
authority.     What  do  we  really  mean  when  we  so 
speak  ?     The   infinite   God,   He  who   is   strictly, 
properly  infinite,  knows  all  the  knowable  and  can 
effect   all   the  powerable.     Is  not   this  what  we 
mean,  and  all  that  we  mean  ?     But  that  all  the 


166         PHILOSOPHY    OF    THE   UNCONDITIONED. 

powerable  and  all  the  knowable  amount,  each,  to 
infinity  who  can  determine  ?  None  can.  There  is 
no  limit  to  the  power  of  the  Highest ;  all  that  be- 
longs to  the  sphere  of  power  is  His.  There  is  no 
limit  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Highest ;  all  that 
belongs  to  the  sphere  of  knowledge  is  His. 

It  comes  to  this.  The  God  revealed  in  con- 
sciousness is  the  Highest  Being,  beyond  whona 
nothing  is  possible.  The  understanding  infers 
that  his  duration  must  be  unbegiuning,  unend- 
ing, strictly  infinite;  infers  besides,  that  every  pos- 
sible attribute,  physical,  intellectual,  and  moral, 
in  the  highest  possible  degree,  must  inhere  in  his 
nature.  On  every  side,  in  relation  to  every  qua- 
lity, the  Supreme  must  tower  immeasurably  be- 
yond the  highest  conceptions  of  his  highest  crea- 
tures. The  understanding  concludes  that  he  does, 
and  adores  Him,  Him  alone,  as  Grod.  There  is  a 
sense  in  which  the  Highest  is  thus  for  ever  un- 
known and  unknowable.  But  this  conclusion  of 
the  understanding,  in  its  very  nature  and  in  the 
very  mode  in  which  it  is  reached,  involves  that 
there  is  also  a  sense,  in  which  He  is  truly  known 
and  for  ever  to  be  more  and  more  known.  Infin- 
ity is  all-incomprehensible,  but  infinity  does  not 
extend, — cannot^  in  the  nature  of  things — extend 
over  the  whole  sphere  of  the  Divine.  The  Being 
who  is  truly  infinite,  is  not  a?/-incomprehensible. 
Wherein    and    how    far    is    he    comprehensible  ? 


MEANING    OF    THE    UNCONDITIONED.  167 

That  is  the  question  to  which   we  now  address 
ourselves. 

Sir  William  Hamilton,  whom  the  Bampton  lec- 
turer professes  to  follow,  shall  here  be  our  guide, 
and  shall  show  us  the  pathway  to  this  highest 
knowledge.  "  Though  man/'  he  says,  "  be  not 
identical  with  the  Deity,  still  he  is  created  in  the 
image  of  God.  It  is,  indeed,  only  through  an 
analogy  of  the  human  with  the  Divine  nature,  that 
we  are  percipient  and  recipent  of  the  Divinity." 
{Discussions,  p.  19.)  And  in  these  memorable 
words :  "  Mind  is  the  object,  the  only  object, 
through  which  our  unassisted  reason  can  ascend  to 
the  knowledge  of  God/'  From  mind,  from  the 
spiritual  nature  within  us,  according  to  Hamilton, 
we  rise,  legitimately  rise,  to  the  spiritual  nature 
above  us  and  over  all.  Merely,  as  essence^  as  suh- 
stans,  we  are  utterly  ignorant  of  our  own  minds. 
But  the  man  would  be  unworthy  to  be  reasoned 
with,  who  should,  therefore,  deny  that  we  had  any 
real  true  knowledge  of  them.  A  mental  image  of 
spirit,  as  distinguished  from  matter,  we  certainly 
have  not,  for  to  that  all  materials  are  wanting. 
But  we  have  a  clear,  fixed  idea  of  a  spirit  dwelling 
within  us,  the  residence  of  spiritual  attributes  and 
the  source  of  spiritual  life  and  energies.  From 
our  own,  we  rise,  legitimately  rise,  to  the  uncreated, 
all-creating  Spirit,  and  can  and  do  conceive — never 
adequately,  never  with  full  comprehension,  but  in 


168       PHILOSOPHY   OF   THE   UNCONDITIONED. 

a  way  which  satisfies,  while  it  overawes  reason  and 
awakens  the  profoundest  veneration — can  and  do 
form  a  conception  of  Him  who  is  the  fountain  of 
all  spiritual  being  and  excellence.  This  is  the  first 
step  in  that  mystic  ladder,  whereby,  according  to 
Hamilton,  our  unassisted  reason  can  ascend  to  God. 
The  second  is  no  less  direct. 

From  our  own  personality  and  individuality, 
we  rise  to  the  conception  of  One  Supreme  Being. 
The  logical  enigma  of  the  One  and  the  Many,  the 
One  and  the  All,  of  which  Mr.  Mansell  makes  so 
much,  creates  little  perplexity  in  actual  experience, 
save  in  rare  instances.  I  do  not,  dare  not,  make 
light  of  it.  Too  well  I  know,  how  it  has  crushed 
and  tortured  many  an  earnest  soul,  from  the  day 
when  the  burdened  singer  of  Elea  sent  up  his  wail, 
till  now.  But  as  a  matter  of  fact,  men  have 
learned,  save  in  rare  instances,  to  argue  very 
simply,  but  very  soundly.  We  are  one,  yet  have 
many  powers.  How  our  unity  is  not  destroyed  by 
this  plurality  we  cannot  explain,  but  we  certainly 
know  the  fact  that  it  is  not  destroyed.  How  the 
I,  that  thinks,  and  feels,  and  acts,  is  not  a  bundle 
of  thoughts,  and  emotions,  and  acts,  but  separate, 
independent,  beneath  and  above  them  all,  we  can- 
not explain  ;  but  we  certainly  know  the  fact,  and 
accept  it,  and  act  m^^om  it  every  hour,  and  find  it 
perfectly  intelligible.  The  logical  dilemma  is  not, 
save  in  rare  instances,  either  an  intellectual  or  a 


MEANING    OF    THE    UNCONDITIONED.  169 

moral  difficulty.     Our  separate  unity  and  individu- 
ality, and  our  entire  identity  at  all  stages  of  our 
being,   are,  according  to  Hamilton,  and,  we  pre- 
sume, Mansell  also,  original  data  of  consciousness. 
And  the  unity  and  individuality  of  the   Great  Su- 
preme present  no  difficulties  which  have  not  been 
met  and  j^i'^'ictically  surmounted  in  the  case  of  our 
own  personality.     So  we  plant  our  foot  firmly  on 
the  second  step  of  the  ladder  which  connects  legiti- 
mately, truly  connects  the  human  with  the  Divine. 
A  third  and  a  fourth  step   are  close  at  hand. 
From   intelligence  within  we  rise  to  intelligence 
above  us  ;  from  moral  attributes  within  we  rise  to 
supreme  moral  excellence  above  us.     In  these  two 
last  respects,  the  principles  of  the  Bampton  Lec- 
ture, as  to  the  inconceivability  of  the  idea  of  God, 
are  in  directest  contradiction  to  the  ordinary  con- 
victions of  men.     We  certainly  know  what  an  in- 
telligent, what  a  moral  nature  means.     The  intelli- 
gence and  moral  perfection  of  the  Supreme  may  be 
immeasurably    beyond    our    highest    concej)tions. 
But  knowledge  and  rectitude,  and  purity,  and  love 
are  real  qualities,  independent  of  quantity.     Wis- 
dom is  wisdom,  rectitude  is  rectitude,  love  is  love, 
whatever  be  the  sphere  over  which  they  extend. 
Wisdom  on  which  no  limit  can  be  put,  I  cannot 
co7?zprehend  in  my  thought.     But  what  wisdom  is, 
I  clearly  understand,  and  am  able  to  form  a  higher 

and  still  higher  idea  of  its  extent  ;  and  if  still  far 

8 


170       PHILOSOPHY    OF   THE    UNCONDITIONED. 

above  my  highest  idea,  it  stretches  out,  it  is  all  the 
while  distinctly  in  my  thought,  though  to  its  full 
sweep  I  cannot  reach.  Infinity  is  for  ever  beyond 
the  grasp  of  my  conceptive  faculty,  but  wisdom  is 
not,  moral  attributes  are  not  ;  and  a  spiritual  na- 
ture, in  which  wisdom  and  moral  attributes  dwell, 
is  not.  Even  to  say  that  the  attributes,  intellectual 
or  moral,  are  of  an  extent  which  I  can  never  fully 
comprehend,  makes  only  a  new  and  grand  addition 
to  my  idea  of  the  nature  in  which  they  dwell ;  in- 
stead of  destroying  my  conce]3tion,  this  makes  it 
only  more  real  and  more  lofty. 

Man  is  thus  the  true  microcosm.  His  material 
frame  allies  him  with  the  visible  universe  ;  his  ra- 
tional nature  allies  him  with  the  invisible  Creator 
of  the  Universe.  It  is  not  faith,  but  scepticism, 
which  proclaims  it  impossible  for  reason  to  ascend 
to  the  conception  of  God  ;  a  scepticism,  which  is 
in  the  face  of  our  deepest  convictions  and  of  the 
facts  of  experience  ;  a  scepticism,  we  shall  find, 
which,  having  first  laid  the  chief  attribute  of  hu- 
manity in  the  dust,  proceeds  to  strip  revelation  of 
all  its  glory,  and  to  make  it  not  an  unveiling,  but 
a  concealing  of  the  Most  High — an  elaborate  and 
distressing  disappointment. 


SECTION    FOURTH. 


CONCERNING    WRITTEN    REVELATION. 


Chapter 

I. — Necessary  Conditions. 
II. — Evidences  of  Revelation. 
III. — Revelation  and  God. 


CHAPTER    I. 

NECESSARY  CONDITIONS. 

Must  believe  God  is — That  Intelligent — Free  Intelligence — Benig- 
nant, Truthful — These  Conclusions  Indispensable — If  not  reach, 
no  Revelation  to  Man. 

It  was  not  to  be  demanded  that  the  Bampton 
lecturer  should  enter  into  any  formal  proof  of  the 
divine  authority  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments. 
He  has  not  done  so.  It  was  by  no  means  necessary 
in  relation  to  his  special  subject.  We  shall  grant, 
that  supposing  a  revelation  at  all,  he  was  entitled 
to  assume  the  actual  revelation  in  the  Holy  Scri]3- 
tures.  But  what  of  the  preliminary  question  of  a 
revelation  at  all  ?  This  had  a  connection,  a  very 
close  and  startling  connection  with  his  subject.  So 
much  so,  that  at  this  moment  it  is  to  me  unac- 
countable, almost  incredible,  that  he  could  have 
overlooked  it.  Without  reasoning  at  all,  let  me 
put  the  case  as  it  may  be  su23posed  to  strike  any 
ordinary  understanding.  "  Here  is  a  revelation 
from  Grod."  ''  From  God  ?  one  asks,  who  has 
yielded  to  the  previous  reasonings  of  the  book. 
From  whom,  did  you  say  ? — God  ?  Who  is  He  ? 
where  is  He  ?  what  is  He  ?     You  have  proved  to 


174    CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

me  that  my  understanding  is  incapable  of  guiding 
me  to  know  anything  about  God,  and  that  I  can 
never,  through  my  understanding,  know  anything 
certainly  about  him.  You  have  proved  to  me,  that 
I  can  never  come  to  a  fixed  conclusion  for  myself, 
that  there  is  a  God.  You  have  proved  to  me  that, 
in  the  absence  of  written  revelation,  a  rational 
Theism  is  absolutely  impossible  ;  that  all  thought, 
and  all  speculative  reasoning  on  the  subject,  can 
only  land  me  in  insoluble  contradictions  and  ab- 
surdities. Do  not  mock  me  ;  do  not  add  insult  to 
injury.  A  revelation  from  God  ?  I  must  first  of 
all  know  that  there  is  a  God,  and  you  have  told  me 
that  this  I  cannot  know.  I  must  first  of  all  know 
something  about  God  ;  aye  much,  very  much,  about 
him  ;  much  that  is  important  and  essential,  before 
I  can  even  look  at  what  calls  itself  a  revelation  from 
Him." 

Perhaps  it  would  have  been  more  exact,  to  say 
that  the  lecturer  has,  in  effect  overlooked  the  facts 
which  I  have  expressed  in  this  imaginary  rej^ly. 
In  ivords^  he  has  acknowledged  them  ;  but  the 
words  are  few  and  loose.  The  acknowledgment  is 
made  as  if  little  or  nothing  depended  on  it,  and  as 
if  the  facts  were  of  little  or  no  importance,  and  pre- 
sented no  difficulty  in  relation  to  the  general  argu- 
ment. The  entire  passage  runs  thus  : — "  But  be- 
fore applying  this  method  to  the  j)eculiar  doctrines 
of  the  Christian  revelation,  it  will  be  desirable  to 


NECESSARY   CONDITIONS.  175 

say  a  few  words  on  the  preliminary  condition,  on 
which  our  belief  in  the  possibility  of  any  revelation 
at  all  is  dependent.  We  must  justify,  in  the  first 
instance,  the  limitations  which  have  been  assigned 
to  human  reason  in  relation  to  the  great  foundation 
of  all  religious  belief  whatsoever  ;  we  must  show 
how  far  the  same  method  warrants  the  assertion 
which  has  already  been  made  on  other  grounds, 
namely,  that  we  may  and  ought  to  believe  in  the 
existence  of  a  God,  whose  nature  we  are  unable  to 
comprehend,  that  we  are  bound  to  believe  that  God 
exists,  and  to  acknowledge  him  as  our  Sustainer 
and  our  Moral  Governor,  though  we  are  wholly 
unable  to  declare  what  he  is  in  his  absolute  es- 
sence." (pp.  170,  171.) 

In  this  quotation,  the  phrase,  Moral  Governor, 
occurs,  though  where  the  writer  finds  it,  it  is  hard 
to  see.  He  does  not  tell  us,  nor  what  sort  of  con- 
nection he  supposes  it  to  have  with  the  acceptance 
of  revelation.  The  idea  is  not  taken  up  at  all, 
either  here  or  elsewhere.  Even  the  phrase  is  not 
introduced  again.  All  that  is  in  any  way  looked  at 
by  the  lecturer,  in  the  passage  now  quoted,  is  that 
we  must  believe  that  God  exists,  though  He  be 
wholly  and  only  inconceivable  by  our  minds.  This 
belief  in  God,  which  lies  at  the  foundation  of  the- 
ology, he  then,  at  some  length,  places  by  the  side 
of  the  belief  in  causality,  which  lies  at  the  founda- 
tion of  philosophy.     Theology,  it  is  made  out,  is 


176  CONCERNING    WRITTEN    REVELATION. 

not  worse  than  philosophy.  The  one  rests  on  what 
it  cannot  conceive,  so  does  the  other.  That  is 
enough.  Were  it  at  all  of  importance,  it  might  be 
possible,  with  great  ease,  to  resist  this  parallel. 
Philosophy  asserts  that  for  every  event,  there  must 
be  cause.  But  do  we  not  distinctly  know  what  we 
mean,  by  the  word  cause  ?  We  certainly  do.  How 
the  notion  of  cause  originates,  whether  d  priori  or 
d  posteriori,  or  partly  both,  is  a  question  which 
has  long  been  agitated,  and  may  yet  be  unsettled. 
It  is  even  keenly  discussed,  whether  there  be  such 
a  thing  as  causality  at  all,  and  whether  all  pheno- 
mena may  not  be  resolved  into  mere  succession  in 
time,  or  place,  or  both.  But  what  is  meant,  when 
we  speak  of  that  which  is  properly  cause,  is  no 
question,  never  has  been  a  question.  Power  ex- 
presses the  causal  nexus,  with  abundant  distinct- 
ness and  is  perfectly  conceivable.  Why  power 
should  be  necessary,  why  for  every  event  v/e  should 
be  compelled  to  believe  a  cause  we  know  not,  and 
can  assim  no  reason.  But  that  is  all.  On  the 
theological  side,  on  the  contrary,  why  there  should 
be  a  God,  why  we  are  necessitated  to  believe  in  a 
God,  is  not  the  point  which  troubles  any  mind. 
The  lecturer  does  not  say  it  is,  but  something  per- 
fectly different.  He  maintains  that  the  very  idea 
of  God,  at  all,  we  cannot  conceive,  and  that  we 
know  and  understand  nothing  about  him  ;  except 
that  He  is.    Even  so. 


NECESSARY    CONDITIONS.  177 

But   this  is   literally  all  tliat  is  advanced,   on 
what  is  admitted  to  be  a  ''  preliminary  condition 
on  which  our  belief  in  the  possibility  of  any  reve- 
lation at  all  is  dependent/'     "  We  are  bound  to 
believe  that  God  exists/'  says  the  Lecturer.     And 
what,  then,   of  the  contradictions,   theistic,  pan- 
theistic, atheistic,  into   which  we   are   inevitably 
plunged,  so  soon  as  we  dare  to  think  ?     Are  they 
to  be  all  forgotten  ?     Must  we  not  first  of  all  get 
rid  of  them  ?     But  how  ?      Who,  luliat  shall  ex- 
tricate us  from  them  ?     Unless  from  within,  ex- 
trication is  impossible.     But  let  this  pass.    Grod  is 
given  in  consciousness,  the  lecturer  will  say.     Let 
it  be  granted.     But  through  what  power  of  our 
nature  do  we  take  hold   of  this  ultimate  fact  ? 
Consciousness   is   a   general  term,  which   applies 
equally  to  all  our  acts  of  knowledge,  all  our  feel- 
ings, and  all  our  convictions.     Somehow  or  other, 
that  which  we  distinguish  as  reason  in  man,  the 
higher  reason,  our  unassisted  reason,  must  be  able 
to  ascend  to  God,  in  spite  of  all  the  alleged  con- 
tradictions.    There  must  be  no  talk  of  building  up 
a  consciousness,  of  constructing  a  notion.     This  is 
original  and  universal,  or  it  is  not.     If  it  be  not, 
then  away  with  that  necessity  of  belief,  which  the 
lecturer  admits   and   enforces.      If  it   be,  let  us 
neither  add  to  it,  nor  take  from  it.     This  is  an 
intuition  of  our  nature — the  lecturer  admits  it, 

Hamilton  contends  for  it — a  primitive,  native,  d 

8* 


178     CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

jyrtori  cognition  ;  and  its  place  can  only  be,  the 
higher  reason. 

There  is  an  organ — it  appears — a  special  power 
in  our  mental  constitution,  through  which  we  as- 
cend to  the  highest.  From  that  inner  sanctuary 
of  our  being,  there  comes  forth  the  voice,  "  There 
is  a  God,  a  Supreme  over  all."  "We  must  be- 
lieve in  Grod/'  But  in  what  ?  something  or  noth- 
ins:  ?  To  sav  that  we  believe  in  God  and  yet  that 
we  have  no  idea  of  Him,  is  neither  more  nor  less 
than  a  dhect  contradiction. 

The  pathway  by  which  unassisted  reason  can 
ascend  upward,  I  have  already,  under  the  guid- 
ance of  Hamilton,  sought  to  describe.  From  our- 
selves, we  rise  to  the  Highest.  Infinity  it  is  im- 
possible ever  to  compass  in  thought,  but  He  who 
is  truly  Infinite,  we  can  and  do  conceive  of,  and  in 
our  measure,  know.  Every  son  of  man  in  whom  is 
the  sense  of  the  Great  Being,  has  also,  by  the  same 
token,  formed  his  idea  of  that  Being,  more  or  less 
imperfect,  but  also  more  or  less  true  and  real.  Here, 
then,  is  the  first  necessary  preliminary  condition 
of  belief  in  any  revelation.  On  some  independent 
ground,  through  some  power  of  our  nature,  we 
must  beforehand  have  reached  the  conviction  that 
there  is  a  God. 

2d.  Not  less  essential  is  the  condition,  that  we 
be  satisfied  tliat  this  God  is  endowed  with  intelli- 
gence.    A  -message  from  Him  !     Are  we  satisfied 


NECESSARY   CONDITIONS.  179 

that  He  can  instruct  us,  that  He  can  have  any- 
thing great  and  worthy  to  communicate  ?  Unless 
we  be,  it  is  impossible  for  us  even  to  admit  the 
idea  of  a  message  from  Him  at  all. 

3d.  A  Grod  under  the  law  of  universal  necessity, 
subject  to  a  force  over  which  he  has  no  control,  is 
not  one  who  could  communicate  with  his  creatures. 
He  must  be  governed  by  his  own  free  choice,  and 
have  the  power  of  adopting  measures,  arising  out 
of  the  condition  of  those  in  whom  He  is  interested, 
and  out  of  the  purposes  of  his  own  intelligence. 
Only  a  free  being  can  be  conceived  to  reveal  him- 
self 

4th.  The  conviction  is  indispensable  of  the  per- 
fect truthfulness  of  the  Supreme.  I  might  have 
added,  his  good  will ;  for  who  could  oj)en  the  mes- 
sage of  a  possibly  malignant  Deity.  But  at  least 
perfect  truthfulness  is  absolutely  essential.  The 
lurking  idea  of  falsehood,  the  faintest  suspicion  of 
decej^tion,  would  be  utterly  fatal  to  any  communi- 
cation between  the  Creator  and  his  creatures. 

Thus,  then,  it  stands.  That  reason,  which  Mr. 
Mansell  represents  as  so  feeble  and  so  false,  miLst 
have  real  power  and  of  no  inconsiderable  amount. 
If  he  cannot  trust  it,  at  least  the  G-reat  Being  puts 
confidence  in  it,  and  commits  to  it  some  high  and 
hard  questions  and  some  most  momentous  inter- 
ests. If  he  can  find  nothing  but  darkness  in  its 
path,  nothing  but  contradictions  and  absurdities 


180  CONCERNING   WRITTEN    REVELATION, 

as  its  results  and  no  destiny  for  it  for  ever,  but 
hopeless  Avandering  amidst  the  dreary  mazes  of 
Pantheism  and  Atheism,  the  Great  Being  must 
have  far  difierent  thoughts,  for  He  entrusts  it,  it 
alone,  with  the  determination  of  preliminaries,  all 
but  infinitely  important.  Somehow  or  other,  be- 
fore even  looking  into  what  professes  to  be  a  reve- 
lation, our  minds,  for  themselves,  must  have  been 
able  to  reach  the  conviction,  not  only  that  there  is 
a  God,  but  that  He  is  an  intelligent,  a  voluntary, 
a  moral — at  least  in  the  sense  of  truthful — beino;. 
We  cannot  go  to  the  revelation  for  proof  of  one  of 
these  things.  Unless  they  are  all  sure  beforehand, 
we  cannot,  as  rational  beings,  must  not,  dare  not 
open  it  at  all. 

Imagine  the  Bampton  lecturer,  requiring  only 
belief  in  a  God  of  whom  we  can  form  no  concep- 
tion, presenting  the  volume  of  revelation,  strong 
in  the  outward  tokens  of  its  origin,  to  the  ration- 
ahst  with  whom  he  has  been  reasoning.  With 
what  bitterness,  what  desolation  of  heart,  would 
he  answer  :  "  You  have  jrat  out  my  eyes,  and  do 
you  call  on  me  to  behold  the  daylight ;  you  have 
destroyed  my  organ  of  hearing,  and  do  you  tell  me 
there  are  words  of  melody  to  which  I  should  lis- 
ten. Your  external  proofs  are  excellent,  no  doubt, 
and  satisfactory  to  those  who  can  understand  them. 
But  you  have  assured  me  that  ^  my  mind  is  a  per- 
fect blank/  in  reference  to  the  essential  nature  of 


NECESSARY   CONDITIONS.  181 

God,  and  that  I  have  no  means  of  knowing,  in  any 
one  direction,  ivhat  He  truly  is.  Perhaps  he  is 
destitute  of  intelligence,  and  this  book  could  only 
lead  me  into  error  and  folly.  Perhaps  it  is  the 
work  of  an  invincible  necessity,  and  I  have  not 
even  the  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  it  is  what 
lie  wishes  to  communicate.  Perhaps  He  hates 
me,  at  all  events  has  no  regard  to  truth,  and  this 
book  may  be  a  tissue  of  malignant  untruths." 

There  is  no  answer  but  one  to  all  this — the  fun- 
damental principles  of  the  Bampton  Lecture  must 
be  unsound.  Were  they  true,  revelation  would  be 
impossible.  We  could  never  come  in  contact  with 
it.  We  should  want  the  indispensable  preliminary 
means  for  coming  into  contact  with  it.  I  deliber- 
ately maintain,  that  were  the  principles  of  the 
Bampton  Lecture  true,  not  a  single  son  of  man 
could  reach  those  conclusions,  which  are  indispen- 
sable, before  he  could  rationally  open  the  pages  of 
a  professed  revelation.  But  they  are  not  true. 
Every  enlightened  believer  in  revelation  is  a  wit- 
ness against  them.  Our  minds  are  not  perfectly 
blank,  as  the  lecturer  asserts  they  are,  in  reference 
to  the  essential  nature  of  the  Great  Being.  They 
can  and  do  reach,  they  are  constituted  to  reach  the 
conception  of  a  Supreme,  Intelligent,  Voluntary, 
Moral  Nature.  Formed  by  the  Almighty,  it  is 
not  strange  that  they  should,  it  would  be  passing 
strange  if  they  could  not.     ^'  Mind  is  the  object, 


182  CONCERNING  WRITTEN   REVELATION. 

the  only  object" — I  do  not  promise  that  this  shall 
be  the  last  time  I  shall  fortify  myself  in  this  critic- 
ism by  referring  to  these  compendious  and  memor- 
able words  of  Hamilton — "  through  which  our  un- 
assisted reason  can  ascend  to  the  knowledge  of 
God." 


OHAPTEE    II. 

EVIDENCES   OF  EEVELATION. 

Eztemal  Evidence — ^What? — Impossible  to  Multitudes — In  Full- 
ness to  Any — Book,  Divine  in  Origin — Contents  Unknown — 
Faith  to  Seek — Internal  Evidence — "What? — Self-attestation — 
Its  Power. 

There  are  obviously  two  methods,  one  or  other, 
or  both  of  whicli  might  be  adopted  in  dealing  with 
what  claims  to  be  a  message  from  heaven.  Either 
it  might  be  asked,  if  its  contents  be  such,  so  true, 
so  pure,  so  great,  so  new,  and  otherwise  unknown, 
so  consistent  with  all  that  had  before  been  reached 
respecting  the  character  of  the  Great  Being,  as  to 
show  beyond  doubt  whence  it  comes.  Or  it  might 
be  asked,  if  the  outward  tokens  and  seals  of  its 
origin  be  such,  as  not  only  to  put  down  all  sus- 
picion, but  to  create  entire  conviction.  The  Bamp- 
ton  lecturer  allows,  in  some  sense,  the  propriety  of 
both  of  these  methods,  but  he  expresses  very  clearly 
his  distrust,  almost  dislike  of  the  first,  and  his 
strong  preference  of  the  second.  "  The  reasonable 
believer  must  abstain  from  pronouncing  judgment 
on  tlie  nature  of  the  message,  until  he  has  fairly 
examined  the  credentials  of  the  messenger."  (p. 


184    CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

169.)  ''  If  there  is  sufficient  evidence  on  other 
groundSj  to  show  that  the  scripture  in  which  this 
doctrine'' — one  that  is  perplexing  and  dark — ''  is 
contained,  is  a  revelation  from  God,  the  doctrine 
itself  must  be  iinconcl{tio7ially  received,  not  as  rea- 
sonable nor  as  unreasonable,  but  as  scriptural.  If 
there  is  not  such  evidence,  the  doctrine  itself  will 
lack  its  proper  support,  but  the  reason  which  re- 
jects it  is  utterly  incompetent  to  substitute  any 
other  representation  in  its  place."  (p.  180.)  ''  We 
are  thus  compelled  to  seek  another  field  for  the 
right  use  of  reason,  in  religious  questions" — i.  e., 
than  by  examining  doctrines  and  judging  of  their 
consistency  and  truth — ''and  what  that  field  is,  it 
will  not  be  difficult  to  determine  ....  in 
other  words,  the  legitimate  object  of  a  rational 
criticism  of  revealed  religion  is  7iot  to  be  found  in 
the  contents  of  that  religion,  but  in  its  evidences." 
(p.  234.)  ''  The  crying  evil  of  the  present  day  in 
religious  controversy  is  the  neglect  or  contempt  of 
the  external  evidences  of  Christianity  :  the  first 
step  towards  the  establishment  of  a  sound  religious 
philosophy,  must  consist  in  the  restoration  of  those 
evidences  to  their  true  place  in  the  theological  sys- 
tem." (p.  238.)  ''  Wc  do  not  certainly  knoiv  the 
exact  nature  and  operation  of  the  moral  attributes 
of  God.  We  can  but  infer  and  conjecture  from 
what  we  know  of  the  moral  attributes  of  man,  and 
the  analogy  between  the  finite  and  the  infinite  can 


EVIDENCES    OF    REVELATION,  185 

never  be  so  perfect,  as  to  preclude  all  possibility  of 
error  in  the  process/'  (p.  240.)  ^'  The  evidence 
derived  from  the  internal  character  of  a  religion, 
whatever  may  be  its  value  within  its  proper  limits, 
is,  as  regards  the  divine  origin  of  the  religion, 
purely  negative.  It  may  prove  in  certain  cases 
(though  even  here  the  argument  requires  much 
caution  in  its  employment)  that  a  religion  has  not 
come  from  God,  but  it  is  in  no  case  sufficient  to 
prove  that  it  has  come  from  Him."  (p.  238.) 
"  Even  the  negative  argument,  which  concludes 
from  the  character  of  the  contents  of  a  religion, 
that  it  cannot  have  come  from  God,  however  legiti- 
mate within  its  proper  limits,  is  one  which  requires 
considerable  caution  in  the  application/'  (p.  239.) 

On  the  whole,  it  is  quite  indisputable,  that  the 
Bampton  lecturer  looks  to  the  external  evidences 
of  revelation,  as  alone  positive  and  reliable.  The 
internal  evidence  is  at  best  nesrative,  and  alwavs 
doubtful.  In  these  circumstances,  it  is  of  no  small 
importance  to  ascertain  what  are  those  external 
evidences,  on  which  almost  everytlxing,  indeed,  in 
effect  everythmg  depends,  in  order  to  a  rational 
faith,  in  divine  revelation.  We  again  quote  the 
lecturer's  own  words  : — ''  Here  then  is  the  issue 
which  the  wavering  disciple  is  bound  seriously  to 
consider.  Taking  into  account  the  various  ques- 
tions, whose  answers  on  the  one  side  and  the  other, 
form  the  sum  total  of  evidences  for  or  against  the 


186  CONCERNING   WRITTEN    REVELATION. 

claims  of  the  Christian  faith  ;  the  genuineness  and 
authenticity  of  the  documents,  the  judgment  and 
good  faith  of  the  writers  ;  the  testimony  to  the 
actual  occurrence  of  prophecies  and  miracles,  and 
their  relation  to  the  religious  teaching  with  which 
they  are  connected  ;  the  character  of  the  Teacher 
himself,   that  one  portrait,  which  in   its   perfect 
purity  and  holiness,  and  beauty,  stands  alone  and 
unajDproached  in  human  history,  or  human  fiction  ; 
those  rites  and  cermonies  of  the  elder  law,  so  sig- 
nificant as  typical  of  Christ,  so  strange  and  mean- 
ingless without  Him  ;  those  predictions  of  the  pro- 
mised Messiah,  whose  obvious  meaning  is  rendered 
still  more  manifest,  by  the  futile  ingenuity  which 
strives  to  pervert  them  ;  the  history  of  the   rise 
and  progress  of  Christianity,  and  its  comparison 
with  that  of  other  religions  :   the  ability  or  inabil- 
ity of  human  means  to  bring  about  the  results, 
which  it  actually  accomj)lished  ;  its  antagonism  to 
the  cm-rent  ideas  of  the  ao;e  and  countrv  of  its  ori- 
gin  ;  its  effects  as  a  system  on  the  moral  and  social 
condition  of  subsequent  generations  of  mankind  ; 
its  fitness  to  satisfy  the  wants,  and  console  the  suf- 
ferings of  human  nature  ;    the  character  of  those 
by  whom  it  was  first  promulgated  and  received  ; 
the  sufferings  which  attested  the  sincerity  of  their 
convictions  ;  the  comparative  trustworthiness  of 
ancient  testimony  and  modern  conjecture  ;  the  mu- 
tual contradictions  of  conflictino^  theories  of  unbe- 


EVIDENCES    OF    REVELATION.  187 

lief  and  the  inadequacy  of  all  of  them,  to  explain 
the  facts,  for  which  they  are  bound  to  account  ; — 
taking  all  these,  and  similar  questions  into  full 
consideration,  are  you  prepared  to  affirm,  as  the 
result  of  the  whole  inquiry,  that  Jesus  of  Naza- 
reth was  an  impostor,  or  an  enthusiast,  or  a  mythi- 
cal figment,  and  his  disciples  crafty  and  designing, 
or  well-meaning,  but  deluded  men  ?  For,  he  as- 
sured, that  nothing  short  of  this,  is  the  conclusion 
which  you  must  maintain,  if  you  reject  one  jot  or 
one  title  of  the  whole  doctrine  of  Christ/'  (pp. 
248-9.) 

This  is  the  course,  and  by  no  means  the  wliole 
course,  through  which  men  immersed  in  the  busi- 
ness of  daily  life,  unused  to  continuous  study,  in- 
capable of  it,  through  which  the  unlearned,  un- 
privileged, ignorant  multitudes  must  pass  before 
they  can  get  to  a  rational,  satisfactory  faith  in 
Christianity  !  Credat  Judceus  I  There  must  be 
some  grand  mistake  here  ! 

The  closing  sentence  in  the  quotation  just  made, 
does  not  much  lie  in  our  way,  but  it  is  too  singu- 
lar to  be  passed  without  notice.  Surely  this  is  not 
dignified  ;  it  sounds  like  an  argument  ad  terro- 
rem,  which  most  ingenuous  and  honorable  minds 
would  be  tempted  to  resent.  Be  assured,  nothing 
short  of  this  is  the  conclusion,  which  you  must 
maintain,  if  you  reject  one  jot  or  one  tittle  of  the 
whole  doctrine  of  Christ."     Either  the  Bible,  as  it 


]88    CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

is  received  at  this  day,  entire,  or  inevitable  scepti- 
cism. If  this  be  not  the  meaning,  what  else  can  it 
mean  ?  But  is  it  true  ?  Is  the  warning,  the  in- 
timidation, well  grounded  ?  Is  the  alternative 
actually  what  is  here  stated  to  be  ?  Some  good 
Christians  are  often  jDcrplexed  by  the  conflicting 
genealogies  in  Matthew  and  Luke,  and  especially 
because  both  alike  refer  not  to  Mary,  but  to  Jo- 
se23h.  Others  are  troubled  respecting  the  autho- 
rity of  the  Gospel,  which  bears  Matthew's  name. 
It  is  well  known,  that  Luther  rejected  the  epistle 
of  James  from  the  canon.  Many  do  not  accept 
the  epistle  to  the  Hebrews,  and  still  more  are  in 
doubt  respecting  the  Book  of  Revelation.  I  am 
not  called  upon  to  say  yea  or  nay  to  these  and 
other  such  subjects  of  dispute.  But  I  accept  the 
fact.  They  are  points  in  dispute  among  fliithful 
Christians,  and  surely  they  are  not  beyond  the 
sphere  of  legitimate  criticism.  The  Bampton  lec- 
turer has  too  summary  a  method  of  dealing  with 
them  all,  as  if  he  were  ready  to  put  in  j^ractice  a 
universal  ostracism.  "  Be  assured  there  is  no  al- 
ternative, if  you  reject  one  jot  or  one  tittle  of  the 
whole  doctrine  of  Christ."  There  is  something 
not  pleasing  in  this  sjjirit,  wiiich  more  than  once 
betravs  itself  in  the  book  on  the  limits  of  relioious 
thought.  It  would  be  wrong  to  assert  that  this 
was  the  conscious  design  of  the  author  ;  but  ever 
and  again  the  words  of  the  book  seem  framed  to 


EVIDENCES    OF    REVELATION.  189 

bewilder,   and   terrify,   and   drive   per   force   into 
faith. 

After  the  long  array  of  external  evidences  in  the 
passage  just  quoted,  it  is  added  : — "  taking  all 
these  and  similar  questions  into  full  considera- 
tion, &c/'  Ample  as  the  enumerations  had  been, 
it  is  quite  true,  that  there  are  similar  questions,  an 
almost  endless  number  of  similar  questions,  which 
demand  an  answer,  quite  as  imperatively  as  those 
that  are  speciiied,  before  a  result  satisfactory  to 
the  understanding  can  be  obtained.  I  can  jot 
down  but  a  few  headings — Ancient  Documents, 
their  age,  transmission,  purity,  authority  ;  An- 
cient History,  Egyptian,  Arabian,  Persian,  Chal- 
dean, Hebrew^,  Grrecian,  Eoman  ;  Chronology,  Gre- 
ography,  Natural  History,  Astronomy,  Geology — 
then,  Philology,  Criticism,  Principles  of  interpre- 
tation ;  Inspiration,  its  meaning,  its  evidences,  its 
degrees,  how  claimed  by  the  writers,  how  far  al- 
lowed by  antiquity  ;  the  Canon,  by  whom  deter- 
mined. When,  by  What  authority. 

The  field  is  almost  illimitable,  and  be  it  remem- 
bered, if  the  demands  of  the  understanding  are  to 
be  satisfied,  it  must  be  all  overtaken.  Not  one 
thing,  in  such  a  case,  can  rationally  be  assumed  on 
authority.  If  one  thing  may,  another  may,  all 
may  be  assumed,  and  the  whole  ground  is  shifted 
and  destroyed.  If  the  basis  of  faith  is  to  be  an  ex- 
amination of  external  evidences  a  process  of  calcu- 


190  CONCERNING   WRITTEN    REVELATION. 

lation  and  computation,  a  work  of  the  logical  un- 
derstanding, then  it  must  be  complete  and  exhaus- 
tive if  it  is  to  be  rationally  available.  A  single  de- 
cided flaw,  a  palpable  gross  blunder  in  history, 
chronology,  or  science,  in  a  quarter  which  we  had 
not  looked  into,  would  be  sufficient  to  overturn  any 
structure  we  had  previously  reared.  The  mind 
could  have  no  rest,  so  long  as  a  single  region  of 
evidence  had  not  been  thoroughly  explored. 

Far,  very  far,  am  I  from  denying  that  it  is  wise 
and  dutiful,  not  only  for  professional,  but  for  non- 
l^rofessional  ^^ersons,  to  investigate,  as  they  have 
opportunity,  one  or  other,  or  more  of  the  branches 
that  are  included  in  the  external  evidences  of  reve- 
lation. The  result  of  such  investigation,  rightly 
conducted,  will  be  to  confirm  faith,  and  to  create 
profound  wonder  at  the  minuteness,  the  nice  ad- 
justments, the  continuity  and  the  strength  of  the 
proofs.  The  result  will  be  to  awaken  the  feeling 
that  further  study,  in  other  and  new  directions, 
could  only  end  in  the  same  confirmation  of  faith, 
and  the  same  strengthening  wonder.  But  no  in- 
telligent man  could  fail  to  perceive,  that  when  only 
a  small  portion  of  a  field  almost  unlimited  had  been 
visited,  and  when  a  single  fact,  in  any  one  of  the 
unvisited  regions  of  that  field,  might  be  sufficient 
to  change  the  whole  face  of  things,  he  could  have — 
were  this  the  kind  of  basis  on  which  his  faith  must 


EVIDENCES   OF   REVELATION.  191 

rest — no  rational  peace  till  every  spot  and  corner 
had  been  thoroughly  explored. 

Far,  very  far,  am  I  from  imdervalning  the 
learned,  impartial,  indefatigable  workers  in  the 
manifold  departments  of  the  external  evidences. 
Revelation  has  everything  to  hope  for  from  them. 
The  world,  the  church  lies  under  an  amount  of  ob- 
ligation to  them,  not  easily  estimated.  The  anti- 
quarian, the  scientific,  the  hermeneutical,  especially 
the  historical,  the  philological,  and  the  critical 
branches  of  sacred  learning,  are  of  incalculable 
value,  and  have  amply  repaid  the  talent,  the  re- 
search, and  the  time  that  have  been  devoted  to 
them.  They  must  not  be  forsaken,  they  cannot  be 
spared,  and,  happily,  there  is  little  token  that  labor 
in  this  direction  is  likely  to  flag.  Far  otherwise. 
But  I  speak  to  the  nature  of  things.  If  no  single 
lifetime,  devoted  only  to  this,  could  overtake  all, 
or  nearly  all,  that  is  included  in  the  external  evi- 
dences of  revelation,  and  if  unless  all  be  overtaken,  / 
there  can  be  no  legitimate  rest  to  the  under- 
standing, in  this  species  of  proof,  is  it  conceivable, 
is  it  possible,  that  the  Most  High  should  send  a 
message  to  his  creatures,  which  could  be  satisfac- 
torily authenticated  in  no  other  way  than  this  ? 
It  is  impossible.  It  is  contrary  to  all  reason,  to  all 
probabiUty.  One  might  venture  to  affirm,  without 
exaggeration,  that  if  rational  faith  be  of  the  nature 
supposed,  there  is  not  a  rational  believer  in  revela- 


192     CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

tion,  in  existence,  at  this  moment.  There  never 
has  been  a  rational  believer  in  revelation,  not  one 
individual,  in  anv  age,  who  has  so  thorouo-hlv,  so 
exhaustively  gone  over  the  whole  of  the  external 
proofs,  as  to  be  able  to  say  with  truth,  "  There  is 
not  a  corner,  which  I  have  not  explored,  not  a  spot, 
in  which  some  seemingly  decisive  fact  against  the 
authority  of  Scripture  might  lie,  which  I  have  not 
narrowly  scanned.  The  thing  is  literally,  physi- 
cally impossible. 

It  is  no  calumny  against  professional  men,  to  say 
that  few  of  them  cither  have,  or  can  have  exhaus- 
tivelv  searched  into  more  than  one  or  two  of  the 
leadincc  and  better-known  branches  of  external  evi- 
dence.  Many,  very  many,  have  not,  cannot  have 
done  even  this.  AVhat,  then,  of  non-professional 
persons,  of  the  vast  laity,  especially  the  vast  com- 
monalty of  Christianity  ?  Talk  of  Hebrew,  Greek, 
Chaldaic,  Syriac,  and  other  languages  of  ancient 
codices,  ancient  versions,  of  historical,  scientific, 
philological,  critical,  hermeneutical  researches  and 
studies,  of  prophecies  and  miracles  and  inspiration, 
and  the  kinds  of  investigation  belonging  to  them  ! 
What  do,  what  can,  the  myriads  of  good  Christian 
people  know  about  any  of  these  things  ?  Nothing, 
absolutely  nothing.  And  have  they,  then,  no  posi- 
tive, reliable  evidence,  on  which  their  faith  rests  ? 
Has  the  Great  Being  left  them  without  the  possi- 
hility  of  any  positive,  reliable  evidence  ?     For  in 


EVIDENCES    OF    REVELATION,  193 

their  case,  such  faith,  as  Mr.  Mansell  desiderates, 
is  literally,  absolutely  impossible.  With  patent, 
outcrvinijj,  innumerable  facts  around  us,  we  cannot 
hesitate  to  judge  that  the  Bampton  lecturer  must 
be  wrong,  altogether  wrong,  in  this  conclusion. 
The  evidence  which  alone  he  counts  positive  and 
reliable  is  that  which  untold  myriads  cannot  reach 
by  any  possibility.  The  evidence  which  he  counts 
merely  negative,  is  that  on  which  their  faith  rests, 
on  which  it  must  rest,  for  they  have  no  other. 
The  question  gives  its  own  reply — a  triumphant 
reply.  Must  not  this  evidence,  and  7iot  the  other j 
be  the  highest,  the  soundest,  the  strongest  ?  It 
would  be  an  impeachment  of  the  Almighty  to  think 
anything  else,  it  would  betray,  on  his  part,  a  mani- 
fest disregard  of  the  pressing  wants  and  the  ■clearest 
interests  of  his  creatures. 

There  is  more.  On  the  face  of  it,  external  evi- 
dence can  bring  only  to  this  conclusion,  that  a  cer- 
tain book  comes  from  God,  and  is  invested  with 
his  authority  ;  but  it  does  not  suppose  either 
knowledge  of  its  contents  or  adoption  of  them. 
The  rational  believer,  when  he  has  rationally  be- 
lieved, has,  after  all,  a  real  faith  to  seek,  a  faith 
that  shall  be  good  for  anything,  here  or  hereafter. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  other  side,  and  imagine 
a  man  who  is  no  rational  believer,  but  has  only  a 
dim  idea  that  the  Bible  may  be  divine  ;  or  even  a 
fixed  conviction  that  it  is  not  divine,  but  merely 


194    CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

human.     He  opens  and  reads^  and  as  he  reads,  he 
is  brought  to  a  sudden  pause,  and  is  iiTesistibly 
impelled  to  think— "  God  is  here  and  I  knew  it 
not/'     (I  speak  that  which  I  do  know,  I  simply 
record  that  of  which  I  have  the  highest  j^roof.)    It 
is,  as  if  the  Invisible  whispered  in  the  deepest  depth 
of  his  natm-e,  "  I  have  found  thee,  and  thou  mayst 
no  more  escape/'     A  preternatural  touch  goes  to 
the  quick  of  his  soul,  and  it  trembles.   Reason  within 
him,  and  conscience,  wake  up  to  life  and  say,  "  It 
is  true,  read  again  ;   it  is  there,  it  is  true,  it  is 
divine/'    A  voice  from  within  answers  to  the  voice 
without,  and  the  conviction  is  instant,  irresistible — 
"  this  is  God,  be  sure  of  it ;  this  is  God."     The 
Bible  meets,  w^akes  up,  answers  to  the  divine  intui- 
tions of  the  soul,  the  deep  longings,  wants,  suffer- 
ings, sins,  fears  and  hopes  of  man  !     Answers  to 
them,  and  exceeds  them  all,  reveals  wants  unfelt 
before,  creates  longings  that  never  stirred  before, 
sheds  light,  higher,  purer,  brighter,  more  ravishing, 
than  the  eye  ever  caught  a  glimpse  of  before,  finds 
and  draws  forth  intuitions  in  the   silence  of  the 
reason  and  conscience  which  had  lain  dormant  ever 
before,  and  shows  other  and  higher  points  of  vision, 
glorious  peaks,  hidden  from  the  unaided  eye,  glan- 
cing in  the  blended  radiance  of  wisdom,  purity, 
truth,  power,  and  love.     This  is  the  majesty  and 
might  of  self-attestation,  this  is  evidence,  whose 
force  falls  on  the  educated  and  uneducated,  on  him 


EVIDENCES   OF   REVELATION.  195 

who  has  searched  into  the  external  proofs,  and  on 
him  who  knows  nothing  of  them  ;  this  is  evidence 
which  it  is  pitiful  and  poor  to  call  positive  ;  it  is 
more  than  positive,  it  is  invincible,  it  is  almighty, 
and  carries  the  conviction  triumphantly  to  our 
heart  of  hearts  ;  "  This  is  from  above,  only  and 
wholly,  and  for  ever  divine." 

There  are  some  grave  difficulties  which  will  be 
instantly  suggested  in  great  force,  to  certain  minds, 
by  statements  like  these.  What  need  of  revela- 
tion, they  will  eagerly  ask,  if  reason  ah'eady  con- 
tains within  itself  all  that  is  supposed  to  be  re- 
vealed ?  But  reason  does  not  contain  all  that  is 
supposed  to  be  revealed.  This  is  not  asserted. 
Quite  the  reverse.  But  reason  contains  truth  akin 
to  that  which  is  revealed  ;  it  is  the  jj^lace,  of  such 
truth,  of  ultimate,  native  intuitions,  it  is  the  power 
through  which  we  recognize  and  take  hold  of  the 
divine,  which  revelation  makes  known.  There  is 
then,  it  may  be  urged,  no  supreme  authority,  no 
infallible  judge  such  as  we  have  been  in  the  habit 
of  supposing  the  inspired  Scriptures  to  be.  Rea- 
son would  seem  to  be  exalted  above  revelation,  at 
all  events  placed  on  a  level  with  it.  Every  man 
becomes  on  these  principles,  his  own  highest  au- 
thority, and  accepts  or  rejects  what  he  pleases, 
according  to  the  dictates  of  his  reason,  and  con- 
science, and  that,  'practically ^  must  amount  to  his 


/ 


196  CONCERNING  WRITTEN   REVELATION. 

own  whim  and  caprice,  at  different  times,  and  in 
different  states  of  mind. 

There  is  danger,  always,  and  in  everything  how- 
ever apparently  safe.  The  soundest  principles,  the 
surest  truths,  are  not  secure  against  danger.  There 
is  great  danger  from  the  pride  of  reason,  from  the 
vanitv,  the  stiff  doormatism,  the  stubborn  selfhood 
of  men,  from  fanaticism,  from  superstition,  and 
from  the  tendency  to  a  false  mysticism  in  superior 
minds.  Let  the  danger  be  guarded  against,  with 
the  most  jealous  and  untiring  care.  But  it  is  not 
inevitable.  Surely,  there  may  be  a  cautious,  a 
wise,  a  humble,  a  self-distrusting,  a  reverent,  a 
godly  use  of  the  powers,  with  which,  for  the  no- 
blest ends,  our  Maker  has  endowed  us. 

As  it  is,  we  must  not  overlook,  either  the  exist- 
ing fact  of  a  diversity  of  Christian  opinions,  al- 
most endless,  or  the  humiliating  lessons  which  it 
teaches.  The  immense  number  of  Protestant  and 
of  Romish  sects,  reveal  what  must  ever  be  the  in- 
evitable result,  so  long  as  the  sphere  is  open  tp  dif- 
ferent minds.  Nothing  can  be  more  decisive  than 
the  motto  of  all  the  evangelical  churches,  "  the 
scriptures  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments,  the 
only  infallible  rule  of  faith  and  manners.''  But 
free-will  and  necessity,  resistible  and  irresistible 
grace,  election  and  non-election,  universal  atone- 
ment and  limited  atonement,  salvation  of  infants 
and  perdition,  eternity  and  non-eternity  of  evil — 


EVIDENCES    OF    REVELATION.  197 

not  to  name  points  far  more  widely  apart  stiU — 
are  all  based  on  the  one  infallible  authority. 

The  question  is  quite  apart,  how  does  revelation, 
viewed  differently,  as  it  inevitably  must  be,  by 
different  minds,  best  authenticate  its  origin  ?  I 
have  sought  to  answer  the  question  on  the  ground 
of  facts,  patent,  outcrying,  innumerable  facts, 
which  seem  to  admit  of  no  interpretation  but 
one.  The  entire  mass  of  the  Christian  laity,  es- 
pecially the  Christian  commonalty,  know,  and  can 
know  next  to  nothing  of  external  proofs,  they  have 
and  can  have  nothing,  but  the  internal,  self-attest- 
ing evidence.  I  maintain  that  this  is  enough  ; 
tliey  have  found  it  abundantly  enough,  rationally 
indestructible.  And  every  real  accepter  of  revela- 
tion, though  he  have  first  inquired  into  the  exter- 
nal seals  of  its  divine  origin,  must  come  to  thiSj 
also,  at  last,  and  can  rest  only  here. 

We  say,  and  rightly  say,  that  so  much  letter- 
press within  two  boards,  contains  the  message  from 
heaven.  But  practically,  and  in  effect,  each  man's 
bible  is  so  much  as  he  has  found  and  put  within 
him,  and  no  more.  He  may  find,  he  ought  to 
find,  ever  more  and  more,  but  that  only  which  he 
has  found,  is  the  revelation  to  him.  The  rest  is 
a  bible  only  in  name.  A  mine  is  opened  before 
us  ;  it  is  filled  with  treasure,  and  is  inexhaustible. 
But  my  wealth  consists  only  of  so  much  genuine 
metal  as  I  find  and  make  my  own  and  carry  with 


198  CONCERNING   WRITTEN    REVELATION. 

me,  and  put  to  use.  Others  find  what  I  do  not, 
and  I  may  find  what  thev  have  missed.  It  is  open 
to  all,  it  belongs  to  all  alike,  but  each  is  rich  only 
in  that  which  he  gets  possession  of.  The  best  test 
of  a  gold  mine  is  the  actual  finding  of  gold  in  it. 
Geologists,  mineralogists,  and  practical  workmen 
may  survey  a  district  and  may  predict  that  gold 
must  be  found  there.  But  to  dig  and  find  gold,  to 
dig  still,  and  find  more  gold,  settles  all  questions, 
and  makes  doubt  impossible.  Finding  the  Divine 
puts  the  stoutest  unbelief  to  flight,  and  the  Divine 
which  we  find  is  our  Bible,  no  more.  The  self- 
attestinor  divinitv  of  revelation,  its  inherent  life 
and  force,  form  its  best  evidence.  Valuable,  indis- 
pensable as  the  external  proof  is,  in  its  own  place, 
this  is  it  which  has  made  Christianity  omnipotent, 
has  secured  its  noblest  triumphs,  and  spread  its 
sweeping  conquests.  It  is  power.  It  touches  the 
soul,  comes  home  to  the  deepest  thoughts  and  feel- 
ings, and  far  transcends  them  and  inspires  the  con- 
viction of  its  own  assured  divinitv. 

And  shall  we  then  suspect  and  distrust  reason 
and  conscience ;  that  higher  nature  within  us, 
throucrh  which,  throuo^h  which  alone,  we  have 
come  near  to  the  Invisible  indwelling  spirit  of  Re- 
velation, and  which  is  even  specially  constituted  to 
recognize  this  Holy  Presence  ?  Shall  we  suspect 
and  distrust  it,  as  if  it  were  the  foe  and  not  the 
ally  of  scripture  ?      If  ice  do,  the  Great  Being 


ETIDEyCES    OF    REVELATION.  199 

does  not.      Are   we  wiser,  more  thouorlitfal,  more 

'  0  7 

prudent  than  he  /  Low  and  feeble,  as  our  nature, 
confessedly  is,  and  often  fallacious,  He  has  trusted 
it,  most  maixellouslv.  Throuorli  this  and  only 
this,  it  has  been  shown  already,  anterior  to  re- 
velation. He  summons  us,  to  rise  to  the  idea  of 
Himself ;  through  this  and  only  this,  He  has  left 
us  to  reach  the  conception  of  His  intelligent,  free, 
moral  beino^.  Bv  the  aid  of  this,  and  onlv  this, 
we  are  first  of  all  in  a  condition  to  look  into  what 
claims  to  be  a  revelation  from  him,  and  when  the 
revelation  is  in  our  hands,  it  is  this  chiefly,  though 
not  alone,  which  the  revelation  addresses.  As  for 
the  claim  of  divinitv.  made  bv  revelation,  we  have 
no  means — the  world,  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
among  the  privileged,  educated  classes — has  no 
possible  means  of  testing  it,  save  through  this  and 
only  this.  It  is  this,  this  alone  which  linds  the 
Invisible  in  the  message,  and  summons  us  to  adore 
and  believe. 

We  MIGHT  afford  to  dispense  with  aU  the  exter- 
nal evidences,  on  which  Mr.  Mansell  relies  so  much. 
But  the  internal,  self-attestins:  divinitv,  we  could 
not  afford  to  lose.  Were  this  to  cro,  all  would  s:o. 
There  would  then  be  no  God  to  us  ;  we  could  not 
recognize  him,  could  not  answer  to  his  voice,  his 
touch.  There  would  then  remain  to  us.  onlv  dark- 
ness  and  death — death  to  aU  that  is  most  real 
within  us  and  above  us ! 


CHAPTER    III. 

REVELATION  AND   GOD. 

Is  Grod  Eevealed  ? — As  He  is  ? — ^As  He  is  not  ? — Presented,  Re- 
presented ? — Representation,  Revelation  ? — True  or  False  ? — 
Types,  Images? — Their  Meaning  and  Use — Fearful,  if  very  G-od 
not  revealed. 

I  THINK,  I  am  not  wrong  in  asserting,  that  the 
Bampton  Lecture  is  the  first  and  only  book,  in  any 
language,  which  maintaining  the  doctrine  of  a  reve- 
lation from  Heaven,  at  the  same  time^  denies  that 
the  revelation  reveals  God.  That  it  actually  does 
sOj  it  will  be  possible  to  make  exceedingly  plain. 
I  am  not  conscious  of  anything,  but  an  act  of 
pei'fect  fairness  and  justice,  when  the  lecturer  is 
represented  as  maintaining,  that  something  is  re- 
vealed in  the  scriptures^  but  it  is  not  God,  not 
God  as  He  is,  and  when  it  is  concluded  that  if  so, 
we  are  shut  up  to  the  alternative  that  it  is  God  as 
He  is  not  ;  for  God,  somehow,  it  certainly  is.  The 
thing  of  all  things,  which  is  unrevealed  and  incap- 
able of  being  revealed,  is  God,  that  is,  very  God. 
Whatever  be  the  purpose  of  the  Old  and  New  Testa- 
ments, to  reveal  Grod,  the  true,  very  God,  to  bring 
him  forth  to  his  creatures^  as  He  really  is  and  as 


EEVELATIOX    AND    GOD.  201 

he  alone  can  be  truly  conceived,  is  not  included  in 
ttiat  purpose.  Perhaps  his  meaning  is  nowhere  ex- 
pressed so  shortly,  nakedly  and  unequivocally,  as 
in  a  note  in  his  second  lecture  (p.  305),  where  he 
refers  to  ^^  the  admission,  which  is  ultimately  forced 
on  us,  that  our  human  conception  of  the  Infinite  is 
NOT  the  TRUE  one.''  The  Infinite  is  God,  or  it  is 
nothing.  The  Infinite,  with  the  lecturer,  is  God, 
and  God  is  the  Infinite.  What  is  true  of  the  one, 
he  holds  to  be  true  of  the  other — rightly  or  wrongly 
is  not  the  question.  The  Infinite  is  simply  and 
only  a  synonym  for  God,  and  the  sentence  quoted 
is  virtually  this,  ^'  our  human  conception  of  God  is 
not  the  true  one.'' 

Altogether,  a  preliminary  remark  is  needed  in 
reference  to  such  phrases  as  Infinite,  Absolute  na- 
ture, the  Absolute  God,  God  in  his  absolute  es- 
sence, and  so  forth.  Already  notice  has  been  taken 
of  this  phraseology.  But  the  notice  must  be  re- 
peated. "  The  Absolute  God,"  most  persons  would 
conceive  to  mean  the  true  God,  very  God,  and  so 
understood,  its  use  would  be  quite  harmless.  But 
the  philosophical  sense  is  perfectly  different ;  it  is 
the  absolved  God,  God  loosed  from  all  relation, 
The  Unconditioned.  It  has  been  shown,  that  there 
is  no  unconditioned,  Absolute  God,  no  absolute 
essence,  and  there  never  was  to  any  rational  crea- 
ture. The  God  of  consciousness,  the  true  God,  is 
a  voluntarily  conditioned  being,  standing  in  direct 


202  CONCERNING   WRITTEN    REVELATION. 

relation  to  his  creatures.  The  Absolute,  therefore, 
applied  to  God,  is  not  simply  unmeaning,  it  is  pos- 
itively false.  The  entire  phraseology,  borrowed 
from  a  philosophy,  which  is  wholly  idealistic,  is  to 
be  utterly  condemned  and  discarded.  In  like  man- 
ner, it  has  been  shown,  that  the  term  Infinite,  ap- 
plies strictly  to  the  eternal  duration  of  God.  That 
is  Infinite.  But  beyond  this,  men  have  no  right  to 
apply  terms  of  their  own  coining  to  the  Great  Be- 
ing. In  all  aspects  of  his  nature.  He  is  incapable 
of  limit,  past  finding  out,  above  the  highest  con- 
ceptions of  his  highest  creatures.  But  this  is  the 
utmost  that  any  are  entitled  to  assert.  The  Bamp- 
ton  lecturer,  however,  maintains  a  perfectly  oppo- 
site view.  To  him  God  is  the  Absolute,  the  Infinite, 
His  essence  is  the  absolute  essence.  Kightly  or 
wrongly  is  not  the  question  here.  But  this  is  the 
fact — he  applies  these  phrases  to  God,  he  uses 
them  as  synonymous  with  God,  and  what  he  asserts 
in  reference  to  them,  he  is  to  be  understood  as  as- 
sertino;  in  reference  to  God,  the  livinsj  God — other- 
wise  his  whole  reasoning  is  purposeless.  I  under- 
stand this,  and  shall  act  entirely  on  this  under- 
standing. No  one  can  legitimately  understand 
anything  else. 

In  order  that  the  amplest  justice  may  be  done  and 
a  perfectly  faithful  impression  made,  in  reference 
to  the  jDoint  before  us,  I  shall  first  of  all  quote  en 
masse,  the  whole  of  the  passages,  of  which  after- 


REVELATION    AND    GOD.  203 

\^ards  I  shall  have  to  make  separate  use.  He 
siDcaks  of  ^'  the  morbid  horror  of  anthropomor- 
phism, which  poisons  the  speculations  of  so  many 
modern  philosophers,  when  they  attempt  to  be 
wise  above  what  is  written,  and  seek  for  a  meta- 
physical  exposition  of  God's  nature  and  attributes. 
They  may  ^oi,  forsooth,  think  of  the  unchangeable 
God,  as  if  He  were  their  felloio-man,  influenced  by 
human  motives  and  moved  hj  human  supplications. 
They  want  a  truer,  juster  idea  of  the  Deity  as  He 
is,  than  that  under  which  He  has  been  pleased  to 
reveal  Himself,  and  they  call  on  their  reason  to 
furnish  it.  Fools,  to  dream  that  man  can  escape 
from  himself,  that  human  reason  can  draw  aught 
but  a  human  portrait  of  God  .  .  .  .  do  we 
ascribe  to  Him  a  fixed  23urpose  ?  Our  conception 
of  a  purpose  is  human.  Do  we  speak  of  Him  as 
continuing  unchanged  ?  Our  conception  of  con- 
tinuance is  human.  Do  we  conceive  Him  as  know- 
ing and  determining  ?  What  are  knowledge  and 
determination  but  modes  of  human  conscious- 
ness V  (pp.  17-18.)  "  Revelation  can  make  known 
the  Infinite  Being,  only  in  one  of  two  ways,  by 
presenting  Him  as  He  is,  or  by  rep)rese7iting  Him 
under  symbols  more  or  less  adequate.''  (p.  27.) 
"  Revelation  represents  the  Infinite  God,  under 
finite  symbols,  in  condescension  to  the  finite  capac- 
ity of  man  ....  rationalism  claims  to  be- 
hold God  as  He  is  nom;  it  finds  a  common  object 


204  CONCERNING    WRITTEN    REVELATION. 

for  religion  and  philosojDhy,  in  the  explanation  of 
God."  (p.  31.)  ''  We  feel  that  though  God  is  in- 
deedy  in  his  incomprehensible  essence,  absolute  and 
infinite  :  it  is  not  as  the  absolute  and  infinite,  that 
He  appeals  to  the  love^  and  the  fear,  and  the  rev- 
erence of  his  creatures.  We  feel  that  the  life  of 
religion  lies  in  the  human  relations  in  which  God 
reveals  Himself  to  man,  not  in  the  divijie  perfec- 
tions, which  those  relations  veil  and  modify, 
though  without  wholly  concealing.  We  feel  that 
the  God  to  whom  we  pray  and  in  whom  we  trust, 
is  not  so  much  the  God  eternal  and  infinite,  with- 
out body,  parts,  or  passions  (though  we  acknowl- 
edge He  is  all  these),  as  the  God  who  is  gracious 
and  merciful,  etc.''  (pp.  64-65.)  ''  To  have  suf- 
ficient grounds  for  believing  in  God  is  a  very  dif- 
ferent thing  from  having  sufficient  grounds  for 
reasoning  about  Him ;  ....  the  natural 
senses,  it  may  be,  are  diverted  and  colored  by  the 
medium  through  which  they  pass,  to  reach  the  in- 
tellect, and  present  to  us,  not  things  in  themselves, 
but  things  as  they  appear  to  us.  And  this  is 
manifestly  the  case  with  the  7^eligious  conscious- 
ness, which  can  only  represent  the  Infinite  God, 
through  finite  forms.  But  we  are  compelled  to 
believe,  on  the  evidence  of  our  senses,  that  a  mate- 
rial world  exists,  even  while  we  listen  to  the  argu- 
ments of  the  idealist,  who  reduces  it  to  an  idea  or 
a  nonentity,  and  we  are  comjpelled  by  our  religious 


REVELATION    AND    GOD.  205 

consciousness  to  believe  in  the  existence  of  a  per- 
sonal God,  though  the  reasonings  of  the  rationalist 
logically  followed  out,  may  i^educe  us  to  Fantheism 
or  Atheism/'  (p.  122.)  ''  The  first  mode  aims  at  a 
speculative  knowledge  of  God  as  He  is  ;  .  .  .  . 
the  second,  abandoning  the  speculative  knowledge 
of  the  Infinite,  ....  is  content  with  tliose 
regulative  ideas  of  the  Deity,  which  are  sufficient 
to  guide  our  practice,  but  not  to  satisfy  our  intel- 
lect, which  tell  us  not  tvJiat  God  is  Himself,  but 
how  He  wills  that  we  should  think  of  Him. 
.  .  .  .  He  knows  that  human  worship  is  not 
incompatible  with  infinite  wisdom  and  goodness, 
though  it  is  not  as  the  Infinite  that  God  reveals 
Himself  in  his  moral  government,  nor  is  it  as 
the  Infinite  that  He  promises  to  answer  prayer." 
(p]3.  126-8.)  '■'■  In  this  manifestation  of  God  to 
man,  alike  in  consciousness  as  in  Scripture,  under 
Unite  forms  io  finite  minds,  as  a  person  to  a  person, 
we  see  the  root  and  foundation  of  that  religious 
service,  without  which  belief  is  a  speculation  and 
worship  a  delusion.''  (p.  128.)  ''  It  is,  then, 
strictly  in  analogy  with  the  method  of  God's  pro- 
vidence, if  we  believe  He  has  given  us  truths,  in- 
tended not  to  satisfy  our  reason,  but  to  guide  our 
practice  ;  7iot  to  tell  us  what  God  is  in  his  absolute 
nature,  but  hoiu  He  luills  that  ive  shoidd  think  of 
Him  in  our  present  state."  (p.  143.)  '^  It  is  to 
be  expected  that  our  knowledge  of  God,  though 


206  CONCERNING   WRITTEN    REVELATION. 

revealed  by  Himself,  is  revealed  m  relation  to  hu- 
man faculties,  and  subject  to  the  limitations  and 
2?7zperfectionSj  inseparable  from  the  constitution  of 
the  human  mind."  (p.  144.)  ^'  We  may  believe 
and  ought  to  believe  that  the  conceptions  which 
we  are  comjpelled  to  adopt  as  the  guides  of  our 
thoughts  and  actions  now,  may,  indeed,  in  the 
sight  of  a  higher  intelligence,  be  but  partial  truth, 
but  cannot  be  total  falsehood."  (p.  145.)  ''  We 
must  remain  content  with  the  belief,  that  we  have 
that  knoioledge  of  God  which  is  best  adapted  to 
our  wants  and  training.  How  far  that  knowledge 
represents  God,  as  He  is,  we  know  not  and  have 
no  need  to  know."  (p.  146.)  "  TAe  ti^ue  concep- 
tio7i  of  the  Divine  nature,  so  far  as  loe  are  able  to 
receive  it,  is  to  be  found  in  those  regulative  repre- 
sentations which  exhibit  God  under  limitations, 
accommodated  to  the  constitution  of  man,  not  in 
the  unmeaning  abstractions,  which,  aiming  at  a 
higher  knowledge,  distort  rather  than  exhibit  the 
Absolute  and  the  Infinite."  (p.  150.)  ^'  W^e  can- 
not help  observing,  how  the  Almighty,  in  com- 
municating with  his  people,  condescends  to  place 
Himself  on  what,  humanly  speaking,  may  be 
called  a  loiuer  level  than  that  on  which  the  natural 
reason  of  man  would  be  inclined  to  exhibit  Him." 
(p.  152.)  ^'  The  Father  has  revealed  Himself  to 
mankind,  under  human  types  and  images,  that  He 
may  appeal  more  earnestly  and  effectually  to  man's 


REVELATION    AND    GOD.  207 

consciousness  of  the  human  spirit  within  him, 
Tue  Son  has  done  more  than  this.  He  became, 
for  our  sakeSj  very  man  ;  .  .  .  .  being  both 
God  and  man.  Herein  is  our  justification,  if  we 
refuse  to  aspire  beyond  those  limits  of  human 
thought  in  which  He  phiced  us.  Here  is  our  an- 
swer, if  any  man  would  spoil  us  through  philoso- 
phy and  vain  deceit.  Is  it  rational  to  contemplate 
God,  under  symbols  drawn  from  the  human  con- 
sciousness .^  Christ  is  our  pattern,  for  in  Him 
dwelleth  all  the  fulness  of  the  Godhead  bodily." 
(p.  154.) 

It  would  be  difficult  to  find  an  instance  of  any- 
thing more  fatuitous  in  reasoning  than  is  supplied 
by  the  last  of  these  quotations.  The  very  words, 
^'  in  him  dwelt  all  the  fulness  of  the  godhead 
bodilv,"  contain  the  instant  answer  to  the  fallacious 
inferences  of  the  lecturer.  Who  ever  thought,  or 
said,  that  it  was  '^  irrational  to  contemplate  God 
under  symbols  drawn  from  the  human  conscious- 
ness ?"  Whence,  else,  could  they  be  drawn  ?  But 
the  question  is,  whether  symbols  drawn  from  the 
human  consciousness,  or  elsewhere,  do  truly,  or 
only  fallaciously,  represent  God,  whether  they 
bring  us  down  to  themselves,  or  prompt  us,  and 
help  us  to  rise  above  themselves.  The  Redeemer 
of  men  was  man  ;  are  we  therefore,  taught  to 
think  of  the  Almighty  as  man,  are  we  not,  on  the 
contrary,  impelled,  from  man,   through  man,  by 


208    CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

the  aid  of  man,  to  rise  to  God.  The  Kedeemer  of 
men  was  man  ;  but  his  humanity  suggested,  ut- 
tered, imaged  more  than  the  human,  because  it 
included  more  than  the  human,  because  it  was 
the  temple  of  the  indwelling  Deity.  Had  the 
purpose  been  to  keep  us  down  to  the  human,  a 
common  humanity  had  sufficed.  But  a  common 
humanity  did  not  suffice.  A  superhuman  hu- 
manity was  set  before  the  world  ;  a  divine  hu- 
manity, one  in  which  dwelt  the  fulness  of  Godhead 
— -just  that  we  might  be  saved  from  abiding  with 
the  notion  of  mere  human  attributes  and  modes,  and 
might  be  compelled,  in  thought,  to  ascend  to  divine 
excellences.  Jesus  spake  as  man  never  spake,  acted 
as  man  never  acted,  lived  as  man  never  lived,  and 
died  as  man  never  died.  A  mysterious  sovereignty, 
not  human,  rested  upon  him,  a  purity,  a  wisdom, 
a  forgivingness,  a  gentleness,  a  power  of  endurance 
and  of  self-sacrifice,  a  patience,  a  meekness,  and  a 
love,  which  were  not  only  symbols  of  the  divine, 
but  were  themselves  verily  divine.  Anthropomor- 
phism is  harmless  when  it  guides  the  human  to 
transcend  itself,  when  it  lifts  it  up  to  the  idea  of  a 
su]3erhuman  perfection.  It  is  dangerous  and  blas- 
phemous when  it  seeks  to  bring  down  God  to  the 
level  of  his  creatures,  and  conceives  their  weak- 
nesses and  limitations  as  also  His. 

This  levelling  of  the  Divine,  in  my  humble  judg- 
ment, is  the  intent  and  drift  of  the  Bampton  lee- 


REVELATION    AND    GOD.  209 

ture  ;  it  distinctly  aims  to  justify  anthropomor- 
phism,  on  philosophical  grounds.  How  else,  shall 
we  account  for  the  bitter  contempt  with  which,  in 
one  of  the  passages  already  quoted,  the  lecturer 
speaks  of  "  the  morbid  horror  of  anthropomorphism" 
— as  if  it  were  not  at  all  a  thing  to  be  afraid  of — 
"  which  poisons  the  speculations  of  so  many  modern 
philosophers  when  they  attempt  to  be  wise  above 
what  is  written,  and  seek  for  a  metaphysical  expo- 
sition of  the  nature  and  attributes  of  God."  By 
the  way,  only  by  the  way,  it  is  possible  to  seek  a 
knowledge  of  God's  nature  and  attributes,  without 
desiring  that  it  be  metaphysical,  far  less  that  it 
shall  consist  of  what,  in  another  passage,  the  lec- 
turer calls,  "  unmeaning  abstractions,  which  distort 
rather  than  exhibit  God."  The  two  things  are 
quite  apart,  and  not  without  great  injustice  are 
they  here  conjoined.  A  knowledge,  a  true,  not  a 
fallacious,  knowledge  of  God  is  what  we  seek.  The 
lecturer  continues,  "■  they" — those  who  have  a  hor- 
ror of  anthropomorphism — "  may  not,  forsooth , 
think  of  the  unchangeable  God,  as  if  he  were  their 
fellow  man,  influenced  b}^  human  motives,  and 
moved  by  human  supplications."  This  piece  of 
not  well-timed  irony  can  only  mean  that  what  thes© 
men  think  they  may  not  do,  the  lecturer  thinks 
they  may  and  ought  to  do — ^it  is  their  fault  that 
they  do  not.  It  must  mean,  that  we  ought  to  con- 
ceive of  God^  as  if  he  were  om'  fellow  man,  influ- 


210  CONCERNING   WRITTEN    REVELATION. 

enced  and  moved  as  human  beings  are  influenced 
and  moved.  He  continues—^'  Fools,  to  dream  that 
man  can  escape  from  himself,  that  human  reason 
can  draw  aught  but  a  human  portrait  of  God." 

What  man  does,  or  thinks,  is  human,  must  be 
human,  never  can  be  anything  but  human.  But 
whether  a  man's  thought  can  carry  a  man  above 
man's  self,  is  not  touched.  Man  is  always  man  ; 
what  he  does  is  man's  doing,  what  he  thinks  is 
man's  thinking,  is  human.  In  this  sense  he  can 
never  transcend  himself  Is  this  what  the  lecturer 
means  ?  If  so,  there  is  some  room  for  an  honest 
indignation  against  what  is  surely  not  fit  treat- 
ment of  a  solemn  and  great  subject.  Has  any  one, 
in  his  right  mind,  thought  or  said  that  man  could 
be  not  man  ?  I  must  call  this  worse  than  trifling. 
The  lecturer  continues — '^do  we  ascribe  to  God  a 
fixed  purpose,  our  conception  of  a  purpose  is  hu- 
man— do  we  speak  of  Him  as  continuing  unchanged, 
our  conception  of  continuance  is  human — do  we 
conceive  him  as  knowing  and  determining,  what 
are  knowledge  and  determination  but  modes  of  hu- 
man conscii.usness." 

I  am  quite  unable  to  make  anything  else  of  these 
questions  and  answers  than  this,  that  they  are  a 
very  philosophical,  very  learned  mode  of  stating  a 
very  plain  fact,  namely,  that  man  is  always  man, 
that  when  he  speaks  about  God,  or  anything  else, 
he  uses  human  words,  because  he  has  none  other  to 


REVELATION    AND    GOD.  211 

use  ;  and  when  he  conceives  anything,  his  concep- 
tion is  a  human  conception,  simply  because  he  is  a 
man,  and  not  an  angel ;  and  when  he  thinks,  his 
thouo-ht  is  a  human  thousrht,  that  is  to  say,  it  is 

O  O  7  V    7 

formed  by  a  human  mind,  and  according  to  those 
laws  that  guide  and  govern  human  thinking.  But 
the  question  is  not  touched  at  all,  whether  the  human 
thought  may  be  a  correct  thought  or  no,  whether 
it  may  answer  truly,  to  that  with  which  it  is  occu- 
pied. Schelling  alone,  in  the  philosophic  circle, 
with  whom  the  mystics  of  earlier  and  of  later  times 
are  substantially  at  one,  asserts  the  possibility  of 
transcending  consciousness.  But  were  he  silenced, 
as  on  this  point  he  easily  can  be,  the  question  w^ould 
be  as  far  as  ever  from  being  determined,  whether 
within  the  limits  of  consciousness,  and  according  to 
the  formal  laws  of  thought,  it  be  possible  for  the 
human  mind  to  rise  to  that  which  is  superhuman, 
to  think  of  it,  and  to  think  accurately  and  truly. 
This  question,  the  only  one  at  issue,  is  not  touched 
by  the  lecturer.  I  maintain  that  the  laws  of 
thought  and  of  consciousness,  the  spiritual  consti- 
tution of  man,  established  by  the  Great  Maker,  are 
such,  as  to  show  a  divine  intention  that  man  should 
be  able  to  escape  from  himself,  that  human  reason 
should  be  able  to  draw  more  than  a  human  portrait, 
aye,  many  a  portrait  of  siqjerliuman  excellence  and 
greatness,  and  that  the  human  mind  should  be  able 
to  rise  to  that  which  is  far  above  itself.    I  maintain 


212  CONCERNING    WRITTEN   REVELATION. 

it,  on  the  ground  of  experience  and  of  fact.  The 
lecturer  may  taunt  those  whom  he  calls  dreaming 
fools,  and  may  lash  them  with  his  bitterest  irony. 
But,  perhaps,  they  have  no  cause  to  be  much 
moved.  It  is  more  than  an  adequate  compensation 
to  them,  that  they  are  able,  and  know  and  feel  that 
they  are  able,  to  conceive  power,  and  wisdom,  and 
rectitude,  and  perfection,  which  it  would  be  con- 
tradictory to  attach  to  any  mere  humanity.  It  is 
no  question  with  them.  They  are  conscious  of 
power  to  conceive  a  superhuman  spiritual  nature, 
in  which  superhuman  attributes  and  excellences 
reside.  Man  can  escape  from  himself,  can  trans- 
cend himself,  he  is  constituted  to  transcend  him- 
self, far  and  farther  and  yet  farther  still,  to  rise 
above  himself,  and  nearer  and  nearer  to  the  Great 
Being. 

We  meet  in  the  Bampton  Lecturer,  constant 
reference  to  "  the  finite  forms,  finite  symbols,  and 
human  types  and  images  of  Holy  Scripture,  and  to 
the  condescension  to  finite  capacities,  and  the  ac- 
commodation to  the  limitations  and  imperfections, 
inseparable  from  the  constitution  of  the  human 
mind.''  One  is  tempted  to  ask,  Who  ever  heard 
or  dreamt  of  infinite  forms,  or  infinite  symbols,  or 
types,  or  images,  who  ever  heard  of  infinite  words, 
who  ever  dreamt  of  such  ?  The  constant  repetition 
is  startling.  Without  any  such  intention,  on  the 
part  of  the  writer,  it  goes  to  create  an  impression, 


REVELATION    AND    GOD.  213 

quite  apart  from  argument.  Mani-s  a  finite  being, 
in  the  midst  of  finite  beings  and  things.  But  the 
constant  and  utterly  useless  repetition  and  reitera- 
tion of  the  word  finite  is  apt,  in  certain  minds,  to  . 
nourish  a  prejudice,  a  pre-judgment,  of  the  ques- 
tion, '^  Whether,  through  the  finite,  man  can  as- 
cend to  that  which  is  far  above  the  finite,  to  the 
conception  of  the  living  God,  of  whom  infinity  is 
one  of  the  distino-uishino^  attiibutes.''  Of  course, 
in  speaking  of  this  Great  Being,  revelation  employs, 
the  only  materials  which  are  possible,  finite  words, 
forms,  types,  and  images,  and  at  last  a  finite  human 
nature,  the  man  Christ  Jesus,  who  was  God  as  well 
as  man.  But  the  use  of  all  these  is,  not  that  we 
should  rest  in  them,  but  that  we  should  conceive 
that  whicli  is  immeasurably  above  them,  that  which 
they  are  intended  to  suggest  and  strike  out. 

On  the  whole,  there  seems  to  be  an  entire  mis- 
apprehension, pervading  this  portion  of  the  Bamp- 
ton  Lecture,  with  respect  to  the  proper  meaning 
and  use  of  an  image  or  symbol.  For  illustration,  let 
us  take  a  very  frequent  phrase — ^'  mental  growth." 
The  words  are  figurative,  typical.  The  question 
is,  is  it  intended  that  I  am  to  bind  my  thought 
down  to  the  actual  symbol,  or  am  I  to  use  it  as 
a  ladder  for  ascending  to  what  is  above  it  ? 
Here,  in  the  literal  image,  we  have  first  ;  ground 
properly  prepared  and  manured,  then  a  seed  de- 
deposited  in  it,  the  seed  is  saturated  with  mois- 


214    CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

ture  and  warmed  by  the  sun^  it  softens,  fer- 
ments, decays,  perishes,  a  green  sprout  gradually 
breaks  out,  it  elongates,  thickens,  strikes  up  and 
up,  grows  stronger  and  stronger.  Have  I  to  keep 
my  thought  down  to  these  and  such  things  ?  Or, 
on  the  contrary,  forgetting  them  all,  in  themselves, 
have  I  only  to  use  them,  as  helps  for  suggesting 
something  totally  different  in  Mnd^  where  there  is  no 
soil,  no  manure,  no  rain,  no  moisture,  no  sun,  no  fer- 
mentation, no  sprouting.  I  must  rise,  if  I  would 
understand  and  make  intelligent  use  of  the  figure, 
1  must  rise  to  a  purely  spiritual  nature,  the  idea  of 
the  gradual  increase  of  knowledge,  the  gradual  fill- 
ing and  furnishing  the  mind,  the  gradual  awakening 
and  exercising,  and  invigoration  of  the  powers,  the 
implantation  and  strengthening  and  progress  of  in- 
ward principles.  The  types  and  images  of  scrip- 
ture are  only  degraded  (any  types  and  images 
would  be  only  degraded  and  perverted)  if  we  bind 
our  thought  down  to  the  actual  form.  The  entire 
end  of  the  most  sacred  symbols  is  destroyed,  if  we 
put  tliera  in  the  place  of  that,  which  they  are  to 
signify  and  suggest.  True,  they  are  human,  finite, 
in  condescension  to  our  capacity,  in  accommoda- 
tion to  our  limited  nature.  True,  most  true,  as 
the  lecturer  says,  "  The  Father  has  revealed  him- 
self to  mankind  under  human  types  and  images, 
that  he  may  appeal  more  earnestly  and  effectually, 
to  man's  consciousness  of  the  human  spirit  within 


REVELATION   AND   GOD.  215 

him/'  Is  there  any  other  than  a  human  spirit 
within  him,  to  which  an  appeal  could  be  made  ; 
why  have  we  this  labored,  repetitious,  pleonastic 
ringing  out  of  the  terms,  human,  finite,  as  if  we 
were  in  danger  of  forgetting  that  man  is  man. 
The  Merciful  Father  does  indeed  seek  to  touch,  in 
the  nearest,  closest,  tenderest  possible  way,  the 
consciousness  of  his  creatures,  by  means  of  images 
which  thev  can  at  once  understand  and  feel.  But 
is  it,  that  they  should  only  keep  to  these  images, 
is  it  not,  rather,  that  they  should  rise  above  them? 
That  is  the  question.  The  human  type  has  a  su- 
perhuman reality,  to  which  it  answers,  which  it  is 
meant  to  suggest  to  us.  It  is  used,  not  for  its  own 
sake.  We  abuse,  we  pervert,  we  destroy  it,  if  we 
put  it  in  the  place  of  the  higher  reality.  Its  whole 
intention  is  to  lift  us  up  to  what  is  above  it.  An 
image  is  an  image  of  something,  and  the  some- 
thing above  it  which  it  images  and  not  itself,  is 
the  end  of  its  use. 

"  We  cannot  help  observing,''  says  the  lecturer, 
^^how  the  Almighty  in  communicating  with  his 
creatures,  condescends  to  place  himself  in  what 
humanly  speaking,  may  be  called  a  lower  level, 
than  that  on  which  the  natural  reason  of  man 
would  be  inclined  to  exhibit  him."  In  the  name 
of  the  natural  reason  and  its  almighty  inspirer, 
this  is  utterly  denied.  The  words  are  denied,  but 
much  more  the  spirit  they  breathe.     If  there  be 


216    CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

any  one  thing  in  the  bible,  more  than  another,  to 
which  the  natural  reason  of  man  clings,  it  is  its 
simple,  human,  touching  imagery.  And  why  ? 
Because,  of  all  things,  the  soul  finds  this  to  be 
mightily  helj^ful,  in  inspiring  the  truest,  loftiest, 
divinest  thoughts  of  the  Great  Being.  Were  we 
to  rest  in  the  imagery  itself,  instead  of  allowing  it 
to  lift  us,  as  it  is  intended  it  should  lift  us,  to  what 
is  far  above  it,  then,  indeed,  the  Almighty  would 
he  placed,  on  a  lower  level.  And  this,  it  has  been 
shown,  this  is  what  the  lecturer  does  and  counsels 
all  to  do. 

Respecting  the  nature  of  revelation,  the  views 
expressed  by  Mr.  Mansell  are  strangely  unfixed, 
apparently  unpremeditated.  ^'  Revelation,  it  is 
said,  can  make  known  the  Infinite  Being,  only  in 
one  of  two  ways,  by  'presenting  Him  as  He  is,  or 
by  representing  him  under  symbols  more  or  less 
adequate."  This  sounds  acute  and  elegant,  but  it 
is  without  foundation.  Present  God  ?  Present, 
in  distinction  from  repi^esent  ?  We  present  a  liv- 
ing being,  in  person  and  in  no  other  way  that  I 
know  of.  We  represent  him  in  words  or  by  signs 
of  one  kind  or  other.  Revelation  cannot  p>resent 
God  at  all,  the  idea  is  preposterous  and  absurd  ; 
and  I  am  by  no  means  sure,  that  this  is  the  only 
instance  in  which  sense  has  been  sacrificed  to  sound. 
Revelation  can  do  nothing  but  represent  God.  The 
representation  is  thought  to  be,  it  calls  itself,  a  re- 


REVELATION    AND    GOD.  217 

velation,  an  unveiling.  At  all  events,  it  is  a  repre- 
sentation of  God,  in  words  and  by  images  and 
types.  Is  the  representation  truej  or  false  ?  That 
is  a  great  question  !  The  verdict  of  the  lecturer 
upon  it  is  hardly  doubtful.  He  does,  indeed,  seem 
to  say — in  fact,  he  does  say — that  God  reveals  him- 
self, but  he  verily  means  conceals,  not  reveals — 
"  The  life  of  religion  lies  in  the  human  relations  in 
which  God  reveals  himself  to  man,  not  in  the  di- 
vine perfections,  w^hich  those  relations  veil  and 
modify,  though  without  wholly  concealing.''  How 
God  reveals — /.  e.,  2<?iveils — Himself,  in  relations 
which  veil  His  divine  perfections,  few  could  pre- 
tend to  understand.  To  the  same  effect  is  the  pas- 
sage relating  to  the  evidence  of  the  senses  : — "  The 
natural  senses,  it  may  be,  are  diverted  and  colored 
by  the  medium  through  which  they  pass  to  reach 
the  intellect  and  present  to  us  not  things  in  them- 
selves, but  things  as  they  appear  to  us.  And  this 
is  manifestly  the  case  with  the  religious  conscious- 
ness," &c.  If  this  does  not  mean  that  our  exter- 
nal senses  are  partly  fallacious  and  deceptive,  and 
that,  like  them,  our  religious  consciousness  is  also 
■^dixilj  fallacious  and  deceptive,  what  can  it  mean  ? 
Kevelation  represents  God  to  mankind,  and  there 
are  manifestly  only  two  senses  in  which  it  can  do 
so — either  truly  or  untruly.  Truly  or  untruly  ? 
— that  is  the  great  question.  The  Bampton  lec- 
turer, not  once,  but  times  without  number,  vehe- 


218    CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

mently  resists  the  idea  that  God  is  or  can  be  re- 
presented as  He  is.    Can  there  be  an  alternative  but 
this,  that  He  must  then  be  represented  as  He  is 
not  ?  Quite  in  consistency  with  this  alternative,  we 
read  of  "  those  regulative  ideas  of  the  Deity,  which 
are  sufficient  to  guide  our  practice,  but  not  to 
satisfy  our  intellect  ;    of  truths  intended  not  to 
satisfy  our  reason,  but  to  guide  our  practice/'    The 
scriptures  "tell  us,  not  what  God  ism  Himself, 
but  lioio  He  ivills  that  we  should  think  of  Him  ; 
they  are  intended  to  tell  us  not  what  God  is  in  his 
absolute  nature,  but  lioiv  He  luills  that  we  should 
think  of  Him  in  our  present  state."    On  the  whole, 
it  is  as  i^lain  as  very  intelligible  words  can  make  it, 
that  for  oursakes  God  is  represented  not  as  He  is, 
but  as  He  is  not.    The  knowledge  communicated  to 
us  is  not  the  true  knowledge,  but  only  "  that  which 
is  best  adapted  to  our  wants  and  our  training." 
The  deliberate  judgTuent  of  the  lecturer  is  expressed 
in  the  following  decisive   sentences  : — "  How  far 
that  knowledge  (given  in  the  scriptures)  represents 
God  as  He  is — in   other  words,  t^^uly  represents 
God — we  knoiv  not.''     "Our  conceptions  of  God, 
the  conceptions  we  are  compelled  to  adopt,  may, 
indeed,  be  but  partial  truth,  but  they  cannot  be 
total  falsehood.''     "  Our  human  conception  of  the 
Infinite,"  of  God  who  alone  is  the  Infinite,   "  is 
not  the  true  one."    This  is  the  verdict  on  the  awful 
question— "  Not  True,"  yet   "Not  Total  False- 


REVELATION   AND   GOD.  219 

liood ;"  How  far  true^  or  How  far  false,  "  we 
know  not."  I  end  as  I  began  ;  something  is  re- 
vealed, but  it  is  7iot  God.  The  thing  of  all  things, 
which  is  unrevealed  and  incapable  of  being  re- 
vealed, is  God. 

It  is  a  lamentable  result  !  The  worship  of  all 
Christian  churches  and  congregations,  the  prayers 
of  all  good  Christian  people,  are  offered  up  to  the 
unknown  Being.  We  cannot  trust  our  religious 
consciousness,  for,  like  our  bodily  senses,  it  is  a 
coloring,  if  not  distorting  medium,  through  which 
objects  cannot  be  presented  as  they  are  in  them- 
selves. We  cannot  trust  divine  revelation,  for  its 
representations  are  intentionally  not  true,  though 
not  total  falsehood  ;  they  teach  us,  indeed,  the 
mode  in  which  God  wills  that  ive  should  think  of 
Him,  but  we  know  that  that  mode  is  not  true, 
though  how  far  it  is  from  the  truth  we  know  not. 
The  deep  moan  of  a  troubled  human  heart  is 
wafted  across  the  dark  expanse  of  three  thousand 
years — "  0  that  I  knew  where  I  might  find  Him, 
that  I  might  come  even  to  His  seat  \"  And  in  the 
long  interval  many  and  many  a  spirit  in  like  trouble 
has  lifted  up  the  same  burdened  cry.  There  is  no 
answer  to  it,  on  the  principles  with  which  we  have 
been  contending  ;  no  answer,  save  one,  which  it 
were  merciful  to  withhold.  "You  cannot  find 
Him;   you  cannot  know  Him.     Something  you 


220    CONCERNING  WRITTEN  REVELATION. 

may  know,  something  you  may  find,  but  7iof,  never, 
the  true,  the  real  God." 

But  there  is  an  answer  to  the  question,  of  a  very 
different  character,  and  from  a  very  different  quar- 
ter. "  We  know  that  the  Son  of  God  has  come 
and  hath  given  us  an  understanding  to  know  Him 
that  is  true."  "This  is  life  eternal,  that  they 
might  hioiv  thee,  the  only  true  God  and  Jesus 
Christ,  whom  thou  hast  sent."  "  Every  one  that 
loveth  is  born  of  God  and  hioiveth  God.  He  that 
loveth  not  knoweth  not  God,  for  God  is  love." 

An  ideal  counteiyai^t,  in  us,  compressing  Infinity 
within  the  limits  of  our  minds,  is  impossible.  It 
is  admitted  in  the  fullest  extent.  But  has  the 
Great  Being  no  godlike  ways,  thoughts,  utterances 
that  proclaim  him  at  once,  that  bring  him  truly 
before  our  thoughts,  far  more  truly  than  if  we  had 
a  visible  representation  before  our  eyes  ?  It  is  dis- 
tressing, profoundly  distressing,  in  my  humble 
judgment,  if  our  experience  compels  us,  for  our- 
selves, to  answer,  No.  Yet  more  distressing,  if  to 
others,  in  reply  to  their  eager  questioning,  we  are 
compelled  to  answer.  No. 

There  was  one  who  could,  and  did,  proclaim, 
"  He  that  hath  seen  me  hath  seen  the  Father" — 
the  invisible  through  the  visible.  Many  a  time, 
the  Divinity  broke  through  his  humanity ;  as 
when  he  spoke  to  the  guilty  woman — "  Daughter, 
doth  no  man  condemn  thee  ?  neither  do  I  condemn 


REVELATION   AND   GOD.  221 

thee  ;  go,  and  sin  no  more ;"  or,  when  on  the  cross 
he  prayed,  "  Forgive  them,  for  they  know  not 
what  they  do  ;"  or,  when  on  the  mountain  side,  he 
taught  the  multitudes,  "  Blessed  are  the  poor  in 
spirit,  for  theirs  is  the  kingdom  of  heaven ;'' 
"  blessed  are  the  pure  in  heart,  for  they  shall  see 
God."  Never  man  spake  so.  God  was  in  such 
words,  and  breathes  out  of  them,  at  this  moment, 
on  the  world,  with  the  glow  of  unutterable  wis- 
dom and  love.  "I  thank  thee,  oh  Father,  that 
hast  revealed  to  babes  the  things  hidden  from  the 
wise  and  prudent." 


SECTION    FIFTH. 


CONCERNING  MORALITY  AND  A  MORAL  SENSE, 


Chaptee 

I. — The  Relative  and  the  Real. 
II. — Human  Modifications  of  Mokality. 
III. — I:^imutable  Right  and  Wrong. 


CHAPTEE    I. 

THE   EELATIYE  A2TD  THE  EEAL. 

Relation  to  Faculties  of  Knower — Phenomena — Also  Noumena — 
Ground  to  Believe  this — Consciousness  not  Fallacious — Knowing 
Faculty  not  Fallacious — Minds  generically  the  same — Limited, 
not  therefore  Unreal. 

The  question  as  to  the  relativity  or  reality  of  all 
our  knowledge,  lies  very  near  to  that  which  touches 
specially  our  connection  with  the  Great  Being. 
There  are  strong  peculiarities  attaching  to  the  lat- 
ter, which  render  it,  in  some  degree,  independent 
of  otlier  questions.  But  the  scepticism — I  can  call 
it  by  no  other  name — which  denies  that  we  can 
know  Grod  as  he  is,  belongs  to  that  wider  scepticism 
which  denies  that  we  can  know  anything  as  it  is. 
Sorrowfully  it  must  be  confessed,  that  Jiere,  not 
only  Kant  but  Hamilton  is  at  one  with  the  Bamp- 
ton  lecturer.  And  the  position  which  they  in  com- 
mon maintain,  it  must  be  granted,  seems  to  be 
logically  unassailable.  Yet  I  hope  to  be  able  to 
make  out  that,  in  effect  and  in  fact,  it  is  not  sound, 
and  that  all  which  is  ascertainable  by  logic  is  not 
all  which  is  ascertainable  by  other  means. 

Here  are  some  of  the  modes  in  which  formal 


226  MORALITY    AND    A    MORAL   SENSE. 

science  puts  its  unwelcome  result  : — "  We  can 
know  only  as  we  have  faculties  for  knowing/' 
"  Not  that  which  is,  can  we  reach,  but  only  that 
which  is  in  some  way  relative,  analogous  to  our 
powers,  and  only  so  far  as  it  is  relative  to  our 
powers/'  "  Quicquid  recipitur,  recipitur  ad  mo- 
dum  recipientis."  "  Things  as  they  appear  to  us, 
but  not  things  as  they  are  in  themselves — pheno- 
mena, not  noumena,  are  for  us/'  "  Of  existence 
absolutely  and  in  itself  we  know  nothing/' 

Perhaps  it  is  not  much  to  say,  that  all  this  is 
strongly  opposed  to  the  ordinary  convictions  of 
mankind.  Most  men  would  be  disposed  to  assert 
with  confidence.  We  must,  we  do,  we  certamly  do 
know,  at  least,  some  things  in  themselves  ;  we 
know  them  really,  not  simply  as  they  appear  to  us, 
but  as  they  m^ust  aj)pear  to  all  intelligent  beings, 
and  that  is,  as  they  really  are  in  themselves.  There 
may  not  be  much  in  this  fact,  but  in  the  event  of 
independent  presumptive  reasons  being  discovered, 
tending  in  the  same  direction,  it  is  something  to 
have  this  strong  background  of  general  conviction 
on  which  to  lean. 

One  thing  is  quite  certain,  we  can  know  only  so 
much  and  so  far  as  we  have  faculties  for  knowing. 
Were  our  faculties  strengthened,  were  they  more 
numerous,  as  we  can  well  imagine  them  to  be,  the 
sphere  of  our  knowledge  would  be  indefinitely  en- 
larged.    That  is  to  say,  our  knowledge,  at  present^ 


THE  RELATIVE  AND  THE  REAL.      227 

is  certainly  limited.  But  who  denies  that  it  is  ? 
It  is  undeniable.  Of  any  subject,  in  any  direction, 
we  know  only  so  much.  With  no  great  stretch  of 
fancy  we  can  imagine  our  knowledge,  in  every 
direction,  to  be  immensely  increased.  But  limited 
knowledge,  so  far  as  it  goes,  need  not  be  therefore 
untrustworthy,  it  may  be  perfectly  reliable  and 
real.  We  can  know  only  what  appears  to  us,  and 
what  is  relative  to  our  faculties.  But  because  a 
thing  appears  to  us  and  is  related  to  our  faculties, 
is  it  just  therefore  not  real  and  actual,  in  itself  ? 
Who  has  demonstrated  this  ?  It  has  never  been, 
it  cannot  be  demonstrated.  Here,  it  would  ap- 
pear, lies  the  fallacy,  at  all  events  the  defect,  in 
the  theory  which  maintains  the  relativity,  not  in 
distinction  from,  but  as  opposed  to  the  reality,  of 
all  our  knowledge.  It  takes  for  gi'anted  that  phe- 
nomena, just  because  they  are  phenomena,  are 
therefore  not  noumena.  But  this  is  not  proved, 
cannot  be  proved.  Phenomena  may  not  be,  also, 
noumena  ;  the  two  are  quite  apart.  Granted.  But 
there  is  nothing  to  hinder  that  they  he,  also,  nou- 
mena. This  has  never  been  disproved,  cannot  be 
disproved.  When  it  is  asserted,  "  W^e  can  know 
07ily  phenomena,"  even  logically,  the  position  is  not 
strictly  defensible.  We  do  know  phenomena — 
what  we  know  are  phenomena — that  is  certain  ; 
logic  is  entitled  to  affirm  it.  But  logic  cannot  le- 
gitimately add  a  single  word.     That  we  know  only 


228  MORALITY   AND   A   MORAL   SENSE. 

phenomena^  in  other  words,  that  the  phenomena 
are  only  phenomena,  is  a  gratuitous  assumption. 
Certain  things,  in  reference  to  matter,  and  in  refer- 
ence to  mind,  appear,  of  which  we  can  and  do  take 
hold.  But  may  not  the  things  which  aj^pear  he 
the  things  themselves.  I  maintain  that  there  is  no 
reason  to  think  anything  else,  and  very  strong  pre- 
sumptive reasons  to  lead  us  to  think  this.  Knowl- 
edge, though  limited,  may,  so  far  as  it  goes,  be 
perfectly  reliable.  It  is  of  phenomena,  but  it  need 
not  therefore  be  of  mere  phenomena,  in  distinction 
from  realities.  The  actual  things  themselves  may 
ajDpear  to  us — why  not  ?  and  thus  be  both  pheno- 
mena and  noumena. 

Let  us  turn  for  illustration  to  the  power  of  con- 
sciousness. This  is  the  one  essential  condition  of 
all  intellectual  activity.  I  know,  only  as  I  know 
that  I  know  ;  I  feel,  only  as  I  know  that  I  feel  ;  I 
desire  and  will,  only  as  I  know  that  I  desire  and 
will.  This  is  the  light  of  all  our  seeing,  the  light, 
in  which  all  our  mental  states  and  acts  are  visible 
to  the  eye  of  the  soul.  With  what  is  my  thought 
occupied  at  this  moment  ?  what  emotion  is  23assing 
through  me  ?  what  desire,  or  volition,  is  forming  ? 
This,  and  this,  and  this  :  I  know  it,  I  am  conscious 
of  it,  it  admits  of  no  doubt.  We  cannot  go  higher. 
The  testimony  of  consciousness  is  accejDted,  as  in- 
dubitable. It  is  the  ultimate  autlioritv,  from  which 
there  is  no  appeal.     Kant,  Hamilton,  and  Mansell, 


THE  RELATIVE  AND  THE  REAL.      229 

bow  to  it.  It  is  the  one,  only,  foundation  of  phil- 
osophy. The  testimony  of  consciousness,  as  a  rev- 
elation of  the  facts  of  our  inward  being,  must  be 
accepted,  unconditionally,  else  philosophy  is  no 
longer  possible.  It  is  accepted.  But  why,  on  what 
ground  ?  Simply  because  we  cannot  believe,  and 
have  no  ground  to  believe,  quite  otherwise,  that 
our  nature  is  a  lie.  But  this  is  to  fall  back,  not  so 
much  on  ourselves,  as  on  our  Creator.  In  consti- 
tuting and  constructing  our  nature,  he  cannot  have 
meant  us  to  believe  a  falsehood,  cannot  have  erected 
within  us  a  lying  witness. 

We  are  entitled,  I  think,  to  apply  the  same  mode 
of  reasoning  in  other  special  cases.  Here,  for  exam- 
ple, my  faculty  of  knowing  belongs  to  the  structure 
of  my  nature,  quite  as  much  as  my  consciousness 
does.  If  I  accept  the  latter  as  no  deception,  no  false- 
hood palmed  uj)on  me,  why  should  I  any  more  dis- 
trust the  former.  True,  I  know  only  what  appears 
to  my  faculty  of  knowing,  what  it  is  formed  to  take 
hold  of.  If  it  did  not  appear ,  and  were  wholly 
unrelated  to  my  mind,  it  would  be  to  me  nothing. 
But  because  it  aj)]Dears,  does  it,  therefore,  become 
notlimg,  and  is  it  to  be  counted  by  me  for  no  re- 
ality ?  I  think  the  highest  reason  is  at  one  with 
the  strong  natural  convictions  of  mankind  gener- 
ally, in  the  conclusion  that  our  knowledge  is  real, 
though  it  be  relative  ;  real,  though  it  be  phenome- 


230  MORALITY   AND    A   MORAL    SENSE. 

nal ;  not  merely  phenomenal,  but  also  noumenal — 
the  two  being  perfectly  consistent. 

Logic  is  a  stern  authority,  and  logic  asserts, 
"  what  you  know  are  phenomena,"  and  logic  can- 
not make  out  that  phenomena,  in  any  case,  are  also 
realities.  But  there  may  be  strong  ground,  never- 
theless, to  believe  it,  and  to  believe  it  confidently. 
Here  is  a  book  before  me — I  perceive  it,  I  am  con- 
scious of  perceiving,  of  knowing  it.  It  aj^pears  to 
me  ;  .if  it  did  not,  I  could  know  nothing  about  it. 
It  ^'s  a  phenomenon,  but  I  know  that  it  is  more, 
my  knowing  faculty  declares  it  to  be  a  real,  sub- 
stantial existence,  a  fact  in  God's  universe.  It  is 
not  mere  j)henomenon.  It  is  a  veritable  something, 
and  I  know  it  to  be  a  veritable  something,  that  is, 
if  I  give  credit  to  my  power  of  knowing.  I  do 
know  it  as  it  is,  not  ]3erfectly,  not  all  comprehen- 
sively. But  what  I  do  know  is  actually  true  of  it. 
If  I  had  ten  senses,  instead  of  five,  or  a  hundred 
instead  of  ten,  I  should  discover  properties  that  are 
now  hidden  ;  but  those  which  I  had  already  dis- 
covered, would  not  thereby  be  falsified,  else  my 
whole  nature  would  be  falsified  along  with  them, 
my  mental  constitution  would  then  be  an  organ- 
ized deception. 

We  must  know  things,  really,  as  they  are  in 
themselves,  must  know  them  as  other  intelligent 
beings  know  them.  They  may  know  far  more, 
and  other  properties,  than  we  do ;  but  what  we 


THE    RELATIVE    AND    THE    REAL.  231 

know  must  abide  true  also,  and  enter  into  the  con- 
ception of  the  reality.  I  do  know  myself,  my  real, 
very  self.  I  do  know  myself  truly,  so  far  as  my 
knowledge  goes.  Self  is  a  phenomenon  of  con- 
sciousness, but  it  is  a  reality  beyond  it,  at  the  same 
time,  which  I  certainly  know.  What  I  am  to  my 
own  consciousness,  that,  also,  I  must  be  to  other 
intelligences  who  look  upon  me.  They  may  know 
more,  but  they  cannot  know  contrary  to  what  I  do. 
Perfect,  universal  knowledge  of  self,  or  of  anything 
else,  I  have  not,  but  a  knowledge  real,  positive, 
and  reliable,  I  have.  I  do,  I  must  know  my  ac- 
tual thoughts,  my  principles,  my  tendencies,  my 
motives,  my  aims,  my  character,  that  which  makes 
me  what  I  am,  and  distinguishes  me  from  others. 
In  the  same  way,  there  must  be  a  knowledge  real, 
though  limited,  of  other  living  beings,  as  well  as 
of  self — a  knowledge  of  their  actual  character,  of 
their  place  in  the  scale  of  intellectual  and  moral 
worth.  Beyond  this,  a  real  external  universe  is 
before  us,  real  mountains,  seas,  forests,  and  skies, 
not  projected  from  within,  not  created  by  our 
minds,  or  by  any  laws  that  guide  our  perception 
and  our  thinkings,  but  out  from  them,  actual  sub- 
stantial  facts — phenomenal,  it  is  true,  appearing 
to  us,  else  we  could  know  nothing  of  them,  rela- 
tive to  our  faculties,  but  not  the  less  real  in  them- 
selves. Beyond  this  still  there  is  real  truth  for 
the  inward  eye,  as  well  as  a  real  universe  for  the 


232  MORALITY   AND   A   MORAL    SENSE. 

outward  eye.  There  are  real  truths,  standing  quite 
out  from  our  faculties,  independent  of  them,  ap- 
2:)earing  to  us,  indeed,  but  themselves  solid  veri- 
ties.    There  is  a  real  living  God,  over  all. 

Mr.  Mansell  interposes  a  difficulty  in  the  way  of 
real  knowledge,  as  distinguished  from  relative,  for 
which  not  many  are  likely  to  be  prepared.  When 
we  speak  of  knowing  things  in  themselves,  know- 
ing them  as  they  are,  we  mean  that  our  knowledge 
of  them  is  not  owing  merely  to  the  instrument 
with  which  we  think,  but  much  more  to  what  is 
in  them,  themselves,  to  what  is  outward  and  ac- 
tual in  them,  of  which  we,  with  our  minds,  take 
hold.  In  other  words,  we  mean,  that  we  know 
them,  in  some  degree,  as  any  other  mind,  any- 
where, must  know^  them.  An  outer,  independent 
reality  must  be  virtually  the  same  to  all  intelligen- 
ces. But  the  Bamj^ton  lecturer  finds  and  asserts 
that  "  I  can  imagine  other  minds,  only  by  first  as- 
suming their  likeness  to  my  own.''  (p.  203.)  This 
assumption,  it  is  contended,  I  have  no  right  to  make. 
As  a  matter  of  jDure  reason,  we  know  nothing  of 
any  created  minds,  save  human  minds.  We  may 
conjecture,  may  imagine,  on  various  presumptive 
grounds,  such  other  existence,  but  we  cannot 
know  it,  as  a  fact.  Eevelation  makes  known  finite 
intelligences,  not  human,  vast  in  number,  perhaps 
of  different,  separate  orders,  and  higher  in  the  scale 
of  creation  than  mankind.     We   accept  the  fact. 


THE  RELATIVE  AND  THE  REAL.      233 

but  why,  the  lecturer  will  ask,  should  "human 
intelligence  be  made  the  representative  of  all  in- 
telligence ?"  Perhaps  this  is  a  case  in  which 
one  question  may  best  be  answered  by  another, 
and  we  ask  in  reply,  why  not  ?  If  it  be  legiti- 
mate to  rise  from  our  own  spiritual  nature,  to 
the  Supreme,  the  Divine  spiritual  nature — and 
our  Maker  has  left  us  no  means  but  this  of  reach- 
ing the  conception  of  Himself — it  can  scarcely 
be  derogatory  to  other  creatures,  if  we  conceive 
of  them  through  ourselves.  It  seems  not  unphil- 
osophical,  but  on  the  contrary  most  congenial 
and  congruous,  to  conceive  of  all  created  minds, 
as  brothers,  elder  born  and  younger  born,  perhaps  ; 
endowed  with  varying  powers,  but  generically  i\Q 
same.  It  is  impossible  for  us  to  conceive  of  Mind, 
anywhere,  of  any  order  or  grade,  except  as  a  power 
of  knowing,  feeling,  and  desiring,  or  willing.  Dif- 
ferences in  degree  may  be  endless,  but  generic  dif- 
ference is  inconceivable,  without  a  destruction  of 
our  whole  notion  of  mind.  Can  we  imagine  any 
created  intelligence,  thinking  that  two  and  two  are 
six,  that  the  sun  moves  round  the  earth,  that  the 
monarchy  of  Britain  is  a  republic,  that  a  man  is 
not  essentially  the  same  identical  person  at  fifty  as 
he  was  at  thirty,  that  responsibility  does  not  mean 
that  we  are  answerable  to  a  superior  authority  ? 
We  cannot.  These  are  things  not  only  true  to  us, 
but  true  in  themselves,  which  all  minds  must  look 


234  MORALITY    AND   A    MORAL   SENSE. 

upon,  essentially,  in  the  same  light.  A  higher  in- 
telligence might  have  a  deeper  insight  into  the 
science  of  numbers,  the  laws  of  the  material  uni- 
verse, the  theory  of  government,  the  doctrine  of 
personal  identity,  and  into  the  relation  subsisting 
between  man  and  his  Creator  than  we  have,  but 
that  which  we  know  are  true,  could  not  be  false  to 
him  ;  it  would  be  true  to  him  also.  Much  more 
might  be  true,  but  this  at  least  would  abide  true. 
Our  knowledge  is  not  complete,  not  perfect,  but  it 
is  of  actual,  positive  verities,  without  us,  and  in- 
dependent of  us,  and  of  all  ;  it  is  of  things  as 
they  are,  and  are  seen  by  all  intelligences.  The 
phenomena  of  consciousness  are  not  fallacies,  our 
powers  are  not  meant  to  deceive  us,  but  to  guide 
us  in  their  measure  to  truth  and  reality.  Things 
a][>]^eaT  to  us,  but  if  they  were  merely  appearances 
they  would  be  implicit  untruths.  We  are  invol- 
untarily bound  by  certain  laws,  in  obedience  to 
which  thoughts  are  formed.  But  our  nature  be- 
comes a  falsehood,  and  our  Maker  a  deceiver,  if 
these  laws  be  not  intended,  not  to  keep  us  back 
from  reality,  but  to  help  us  more  surely  to  reach 
it.  Had  we  higher  faculties,  we  might  know  more, 
but  this  ought  not  rationally  to  create  the  slightest 
suspicion  that  the  acquaintance  with  things  which 
we  do  possess  is  not  valid.  Our  knowledge  is  re- 
lative, it  must  be  relative  to  our  faculties — all 
knowledge  is  necessarily  relative  to  the  faculties  of 


THE    RELATIVE    AND    THE    REAL.  235 

the  being  who  possesses  it — but  it  is  not,  therefore, 
nDt  real.  -It  is  phenomenal,  but  phenomena  are 
phenomena  of  something  actual  behind  them, 
which  they  phenomenize,  and  thereby  reveal.  It 
is  limited — so  is  all  created  knowledge,  the  knowl- 
edge of  the  highest  created  intelligence  that  exists, 
or  can  be  conceived  to  exist — but  so  far  as  it  goes, 
it  is  reliable  and  genuine. 


CHAPTEE  II. 

HUMAN  MODIFICATIONS  OF  MORALITY. 

Kant — Practical  and  pure  Reason — Logically  wrong,  morally  right 
— Thought-Forms — Time,  Space,  Personahty — No  new  Limita- 
tions— Moral  Ideas— Xot  Modified  by  Laws  of  Thought— Mind 
Reflects  Truly — Xot  Cramped  hy  its  own  Forms. 

From  wliat  has  been  advanced,  it  is  sufficiently 
apparent — the  fact,  indeed,  is  admitted  on  all 
sides — that  logic  is  not  an  instrument  for  the 
discovery  of  new  truth.  Its  proper  and  only 
office  is  to  eliminate  what  is  and  what  is  not 
involved  in  certain  assumed  data.  Existing  truth, 
truth  already  contained  in  the  premises,  it  can 
detect  and  expose.  But  with  this  its  function 
ceases.  If  the  premises  be  true,  the  strictly  logi- 
cal inferences  and  deductions  from  them  cannot  be 
assailed.  But  even  when  the  premises  are  strictly 
true,  that  may  be  also  true  which  goes  far  beyond 
them.  For  example,  in  the  brief  discussion  with 
which  we  were  last  occupied,  the  phenomena  of  con- 
sciousness constitute  the  entire  sphere  of  our  knowl- 
edge, and  logic,  therefore  justly  concludes  that  all 
our  knowledge  is  phenomenal ;  or,  again,  on  the 
ground  that  we  can  know  only  so  far  as  we  have 


HUMAN   MODIFICATIONS   OF   MORALITY.       237 

faculties  for  knowing,  logic  justly  concludes  that 
all  our  knowledge  is  relative  to  our  faculties.  This 
is  clearly  involved,  and  it  is  all  that  is  involved  in 
the  premises.  But  logic  does  not  and  cannot  assert 
that,  because  tliis  is  true,  it  is  also  the  whole  truth 
that  can  be  ascertained  on  the  subject.  So  far  from 
this  we  have  found  that  what  are  truly  the  ])lieno- 
mena  of  consciousness  are  also  more  than  pheno- 
mena, are  the  things  themselves,  which,  indeed, 
appear  to  us,  since,  unless  they  did,  they  would  be 
to  us  nothing.  We  have  found,  besides,  that  that 
which  is  truly  relative  to  our  faculties,  is  so  not 
because  of  some  special  peculiarity  in  our  mental 
structure  which  gives  its  own  form  to  all  that 
reaches  it,  but  because  of  generic  characteristics 
which  must  be  common  to  all  intelligent  beings. 
Our  knowledge  is  phenomenal,  and  it  is  relative  ; 
but,  on  other  grounds,  we  are  able  to  conclude  that 
it  is  perfectly  reliable  at  the  same  time,  so  far  as  it 
goes. 

There  is  one  region,  above  all  others,  where  the 
nature  of  our  knowledge  is  a  matter  of  supreme 
imjjortance.  It  is  the  region  of  moral  truth.  If 
our  ideas  of  right  and  wrong  be  not,  in  their  meas- 
ure, real ;  if  they  be  owing  to  a  molding  and  shaj)- 
ing  power  in  us,  and  not  to  the  things  themselves  ; 
if  they  do  not  answer  truly,  in  their  measure,  to 
very  realities,  there  is  nothing  stable  for  us  ever- 
more.    In  my  humble  judgment,  had  that  portion 


238  MORALITY   AND    A   MORAL    SENSE. 

of  the  Bampton  Lecture  relating  to  conscience  and 
to  the  nature  of  morality,  stood  alone,  and  had  all 
the  other  portions  been  faultless,  tliis  would  have 
rendered  the  work  dangerous,  in  a  degree  hardly  to 
be  estimated  ;  and  all  the  more,  as  it  comes  from 
a  professed  and  sincere  advocate  of  Christian- 
ity, whose  sentiments,  therefore,  are  likely  to  be 
adopted,  without  suspicion  and  without  examina- 
tion, by  great  multitudes.  These  sentiments,  as  I 
humbly  judge,  tend  to  saj)  the  foundations  of  the 
highest  truth  and  of  all  rational  faith. 

It  would  be  vain  to  think  of  a  full  discussion 
here,  of  the  nature  of  virtue  and  of  the  theory  of 
our  moral  sentiments.  Yet  both  of  these  high 
questions  are  intimately  related  to  the  subject  which 
is  to  occupy  us.  Is  there  such  a  thing  as  right  and 
wrong,  a  distinct  quality  of  our  mental  and  of  our 
outward  acts,  separate  from  wisdom,  from  utility, 
from  beauty,  from  aesthetic  fitness,  not  opposite  to 
these  properties,  even  congenial  with  them  all,  but 
perfectly  distinct  from  them,  above  them,  suj)er- 
added  to  them  ?  And  is  there  a  part  or  power  of 
our  nature  which  takes  hold  of  this  distinct  quality, 
perceives  it,  makes  us  at  once  conscious  of  it — a 
power,  besides,  which  asserts  a  supreme  authority 
from  which  there  is  no  appeal,  and  imjjeratively 
commands  and  forbids  ?  To  these  questions  I  find 
both  an  affirmative  and  a  negative  answer  in  the 
Bampton    Lecture — aflirmative,    inasmuch    as    it 


HUMAN   MODIFICATIONS   OF   MORALITY.       239 

seems  to  consent  to  the  conclusions  of  Bntler ;  neg- 
ative, inasmuch  as  the  whole  of  the  reasonings  are 
in  the  face  of  these  conclusions.  The  lecturer  will 
be  found  to  deny  what  Butler  distinctly  held  : 
firstj  immutable  right  and  wrong,  apprehensible  by 
man  ;  and,  secondly,  conscience  as  the  inward  wit- 
ness and  revealer  of  immutable  right  and  wrong. 
The  opening  reference  to  Kant,  in  the  beginning  of 
the  seventh  lecture,  is  almost  decisive  of  this  point. 
Not  many  could  have  dealt  with  his  magnificent 
thoughts  as  the  lecturer  has  done.  I  quote  the 
passage  entire,  as  translated  by  Hamilton  (Lect.  i. 
39),  with  only  a  few  unimportant  changes.  It  is 
from  the  concluding  portion  of  the  treatise  on  the 
practical  reason. 

"Two  things  there  are  which  the  oftener  and  the 
more  steadfastly  we  contemplate,  fill  the  mind  with 
an  ever  new  and  ever  rising  admiration  and  rever- 
ence— the  staiTy  heaven  above  me,  the  moral  law 
within  me.  After  neither,  as  if  it  were  hidden  in 
darkness  or  in  the  immensity  beyond  the  sphere  of 
my  vision,  do  I  need  to  search  and  merely  conjec- 
ture. Both  I  contemplate  lying  clear  before  me,  and 
both  I  connect  immediately  with  my  consciousness 
of  existence.  The  one  departs  from  the  place  I 
occupy  in  the  outer  world  of  sense,  expands  beyond 
the  bonds  of  imagination  this  connection  of  my 
body  with  worlds  rising  beyond  worlds,  and  sys- 
tems blending  into  systems,  and  protends  it  also 


240  MORALITY   AND   A   MORAL   SENSE. 

into  the  illimitable  times  of  their  periodic  move- 
ments, to  its  commencement  and  perpetuity.  The 
other  departs  from  my  invisible  self,  from  my  per- 
sonality, and  represents  me  in  a  world  truly  infinite 
indeed,  but  whose  infinity  can  be  tracked  out  only 
by  the  intellect,  with  which  also  my  connection, 
unlike  the  fortuitous  relation  I  stand  in  to  all  worlds 
of  sense,  I  am  compelled  to  recognize  as  universal 
and  necessary.  In  the  former,  the  first  view  of  a 
countless  multitude  of  worlds  annihilates,  as  it 
were,  my  imj^ortance  as  an  animal  product,  which, 
after  a  brief — and  that  incomjDrehensible — endow- 
ment with  the  powers  of  life,  is  compelled  to  re- 
fund its  constituent  matter  to  the  planet  on  which 
it  grew,  itself  an  atom  in  the  universe.  The  other, 
on  the  contrary,  elevates  my  worth  as  an  intelli- 
gence, even  without  limit,  and  this  through  my 
personality,  in  which  the  moral  law  reveals  a  faculty 
of  life,  independent  of  my  animal  nature — nay,  of 
the  whole  material  world  ;  at  least,  if  it  be  per- 
mitted to  infer  as  much  from  the  regulation  of  my 
being  which  a  conformity  with  that  law  exacts ; 
proposing,  as  it  does,  my  moral  worth  for  the  abso- 
lute end  of  my  activity,  conceding  no  compromise 
of  its  imperative  to  the  necessitation  of  nature,  and 
spurning,  in  its  infinity,  the  conditions  and  boun- 
daries of  my  j)resent  transitory  life." 

Sir  William  Hamilton  is  all  admh'ing,  genial 
sympathy  with  the  German  sage.     He  quotes  the 


HUMAN   MODIFICATIONS   OF    MORALITY.         241 

foregoing  passage  "  for  the  soundness  of  its  doctrine 
and  for  the  natural  and  unsouglit-for  sublimity  of 
the  expression."     He,  with  Kant,  was  a  believer  in 
conscience  and  in  immutable  morality.     But  the 
Bampton  lecturer  only  objects  and  censures,  only 
wonders  at  the  inconsistency,  which  first  proves  all 
our  knowledge  to  be  relative,  and  then  a  portion  of 
it  to  be  real.     The  inconsistency  is  palpable,  and 
has  been  marked  by  a  thousand  eyes.     The  practi- 
cal is  separated  from  the  pure  reason  by  an  essential 
distinction,   apparently  without  sufficient   ground 
and  in  defiance  of  logic.     But  it  is  a  glorious  in- 
consistency, it  is  a  noble  blunder — perhaps  no  blun- 
der, but  a  magnificent  truth,  only  reached  not  soon 
enough.     True,  majestically  true,  is  the  grand  dis- 
covery, where  he  finds  it  :  but  it  is  true,  also,  where 
he  found  it  not.     In  the  pure  reason,  as  well  as  in 
the  practical  reason,  lie  divine  intuitions,  eternal, 
necessary  truths.    But  as  to  the  latter,  at  all  events, 
the  practical  reason,  conscience,  as  we  should  say, 
Kant,  yielding  to  the  force  of  his  own  conscious- 
ness, upheld  the  indwelling  in  man  of  immovable 
moral  convictions  and  of  a  supreme  moral  authority. 
But   the    Bampton    lectm^er   only   pertinaciously 
stands  by  the  fact  of  Kant's  logical  inconsistency. 
And  it  is  quite  true,  as  he  asserts,  that  "  the  result 
of  the  critical  philosophy  (in  the  hands  of  Kant)  as 
applied  to  the  speculative  side  of  human  reason, 
was  to  jorove  the  existence  of  certain  necessary  forms 


242  MORALITY    AND    A    MORAL   SENSE, 

and  laws  of  intuition  and  of  thought,  which  impart 
a  corres20O7iding  character  to  all  the  objects  of 
which  consciousness,  intuitive  or  reflective,  can 
take  cognizance/'  (p.  200.)  But  according  to  the 
same  philosophy,  certain  moral  ideas,  he  insists, 
are  not  merely  "  facts  of  human  consciousness,  con- 
ceived under  the  laivs  of  human  thought,  but  abso- 
lute, transcendent  7'eal {ties,  implied  in  the  concep- 
tion of  all  reasonable  beings,  as  such,  and  therefore 
independent  of  the  law  of  time,  and  binding  not  on 
man  as  man,  but  on  all  possible  intelligent  beings, 
created  and  uncreated.  The  moral  reason  is  thus 
a  source  of  absolute  and  unchangeable  recdities, 
while  the  speculative  reason  is  concerned  only  with 
phenomena,  or  things  modified  by  the  constitution 
of  the  human  mind/'  (p.   201.) 

It  is  not  my  business  to  defend  Kant.  Let  it 
be  granted,  that  so  far  as  he  is  concerned  the  criti- 
cisms now  quoted  are  just.  But  these  criticisms 
throw  additional  light  on  the  jDrinciples,  undoubt- 
edly maintained  by  the  lecturer.  The  distinction 
which  is  here  made,  is  broad  and  impassable,  be- 
tween realities  and  phenomena,  or,  as  he  varies  the 
expression,  things  modified  by  our  minds,  between 
realities  and  facts  of  human  consciousness,  reali- 
ties and  things  conceived  under  the  laws  of  human 
thought,  between  truth  and  right  for  man  and 
truth  and  right  for  other  intellige7it  beings.  He 
insists  that  the  forms  and  laws  of  thought  impose 


HUMAN   MODIFICATIONS   OF   MORALITY.        243 

a  character  of  their  oicn  on  whatever  is  the  object 
of  consciousness,  quite  other  than  the  thing  itself. 
It  brings  back  repulsively  the  hard  image  of  "  a 
mind  cramped  by  its  own  laws  and  bewildered  in 
the  contemplation  of  its  own  forms/'  The  fixed 
idea  seems  to  be,  that  the  laws  of  thought  are  so 
many  rigid  moulds,  so  many  contracted  grooves, 
into  which  thought,  like  fused  metal,  is  run,  and 
from  which  it  receives  a  peculiar  form,  unlike 
everything  else  ;  at  least  whether  like  or  unlike 
anything  else,  or  how  far  like  and  how  far  unlike, 
we  can  never  know.  Perhaps  it  would  be  more 
philosophical,  more  generous,  certainly  more  hon- 
orable to  the  Creator,  to  conceive  of  the  forms  of 
thought,  as  mirrors,  so  constructed  and  so  set  that 
by  their  mould  and  their  position,  they  may,  in 
their  measure,  reflect  on  us  a  truthful  image  of  the 
realities  that  fall  on  their  surface.  On  the  lectur- 
er's supposition,  our  minds  must  for  ever  present 
to  us  self-originated  illusions,  necessarily  more  or 
less  artificial,  must  actually,  largely  create  for  us, 
what  we  imagine  to  be  realities  beyond  them  and 
independent  of  them.  On  the  supposition,  which  I 
have  ventured  to  suggest,  our  minds  are,  within 
the  limits  of  their  capacity,  faithful  and  truthful 
media,  through  which  is  honestly  conveyed  to  us 
what  is  presented  to  them. 

Perhaps  the  question  ought  to  have  been  sooner 
distinctly  put   and   answered,   '^  What   are   these 


244  MORALITY    AND    A    MORAL   SENSE. 

mysterious,  essential  thought-forms,  these  neces- 
sary mental  laws,  which  are  supposed  not  to  re- 
port to  us  what  is  communicated  to  them,  but  ac- 
tually to  modify  all  our  knowledge  and  to  make  it 
specially  liuman^  quite  different  from  knowledge, 
possessed  by  other  intelligent  beings,  at  all  events, 
whether  different  or  the  same,  or  how  far  different 
and  how  far  the  same,  we  can  never  know.  What 
are  they.^  Chiefly  these  three — Time,  Space,  Per- 
sonality. 

I.  The  first,  the  law  of  Time,  is  tlie  univeral, 
the  only  strict  universal  thought-form,  necessarily 
affecting  all  the  acts  of  consciousness,  without  ex- 
ception. In  thinking  of  anything,  we  think  of  it, 
must  think  of  it,  as,  in  time,  occuj)ying  a  definite 
period,  preceded  by  something,  followed  by  some- 
thing else.  Duration  and  succesl^ion  are  the  two 
necessary  ideas.  We  are  not  taught  by  experience, 
thus  to  think  :  it  is  not  owing  to  a  purpose  or 
choice  of  ours.  It  is  involuntary,  inevitable,  uni- 
versal, wholly  a  priori.  But  is  there  anything 
here,  any  new  thing,  not  already  involved  in  our 
nature,  to  cramp,  to  fetter,  to  narrow,  to  modify, 
to  alter  our  ideas,  to  make  them  other,  than,  in 
an}^  case,  they  must  have  been  ?  I  maintain 
there  is  not.  The  bearing  of  this  thought-form, 
on  the  doctrine  of  the  Infinite,  is  manifest,  and 
the  lecturer  has  made  legitimate  use  of  it  in  this  re- 
lation.    Within  time  we  cannot  condense  eternitv. 


HUMAN    MODIFICATIONS    OF    MORALITY.        245 

Within  limits,  we  cannot  compress  that  which  has 
no  limits.  Under  the  mental  law  of  time,  Infinity 
is  in-con-ceivable,  in-com-prehensible.  But  I  ask 
is  this,  any  neio  thing,  any  additional  chain,  forged 
for  us,  by  this  peculiar  thought-form  ?  It  is  sim- 
ply to  say,  that  we  are  created  and  not  uncreated, 
that  we  are  finite,  not  infinite.  It  is  no  new  thing, 
but  neither  more  nor  less,  than  simply  identical 
with  the  earlier  fact  involved  in  our  creation.  The 
finite  cannot  contain,  com-prehend  the  Infinite. 
The  a  priori  law  of  time  is  not  a  new,  cramping, 
naiTowing,  modifying  influence.  It  is  simply  the 
necessary  concomitant  of  our  created  nature,  and 
no  addition  to  it.  Above  all,  it  is  no  peculiar  lim- 
itation, belonging  only  to  man,  making  his  thoughts 
and  his  knowledge  peculiarly  human,  but  belonging 
necessarily  to  all  created  minds,  be  their  order  what 
it  may. 

II.  In  like  manner,  of  the  thought-form  of  per- 
sonality. We  think  of  mental  attributes,  must 
think  of  them,  can  only  think  of  them,  as  in  an 
individual  mind.  It  is  possible  to  abstract  the 
general  quality,  say,  of  wisdom,  and  to  reason  re- 
specting it,  and  to  set  it  before  our  minds,  as  a 
separate  idea.  But  in  the  same  moment,  in  the 
same  mental  act,  we  necessarily  localize  it  in  a  wise 
being.  The  law  of  personality  conditions  our 
thinking,  in  this  sphere.  Supreme  intelligence, 
moral  attributes,  volitions,  we   are  compelled   to 


246  MORALITY   AND    A    MORAL    SENSE. 

attach  to  a  Supreme  Personality.  But  do  we  not, 
at  the  same  time,  most  surely  believe  that  this  is 
the  very  actual  fact .?  Why,  and  on  what  invinci- 
ble ground,  shall  any  one  assert  that  it  is  not  ? 
Our  own  personality  is  the  image  and  the  proph- 
ecy, if  not  the  proof  of  the  Supreme  personahty. 
Unless  our  nature  be  an  elaborate  deception,  we 
are  compelled  to  accept  this  as  the  very  truth,  in- 
volving no  inconsistency,  though  profound  mys- 
tery, which  we  may  never  be  able  to  solve.  At 
all  events,  this  can  be  no  peculiarly  human  limita- 
tion. Kising,  necessarily,  out  of  the  very  fact  of 
personality,  it  must  bear  alike  on  all  created 
minds,  human  and  superhuman. 

III.  The  law  of  Space  need  not  be  noticed.  It 
belongs  only  to  one  sphere,  that  of  extended  matter 
and  of  our  external  perceptions,  and  in  no  import- 
ant sense  can  it  be  conceived  to  create  any  new 
limit  for  our  knowledge. 

The  entire  idea  of  our  being  cramped  and  fet- 
tered, by  the  necessary  laws  of  thought,  is  un- 
founded and  untrue.  We  are  creatures,  finite, 
limited  bein^^s,  and  all  our  knowledo'e  and  our 
powers  are  limited.  But  our  Creator  has  not 
aggravated  this  necessary  limitation,  by  new 
chains,  under  the  name  of  essential  thouoiit-forms. 
The  conception  is  both  more  natural  and  more 
philosophical,  that  these,  belonging  to  us,  not 
peculiarly  as  human,  but  in  common  with  all  finite 


HUMAN    MODIFICATIONS    OF    MORALITY.        247 

beings,  are  designed  to  help  us  in  reaching,  to  the 
utmost  extent  of  which  our  nature  is  capable,  the 
very  reality  of  things.  It  is  not  true  that  the  laws 
of  thought  ^^  impart  a  corresponding  character  to 
all  the  objects  of  consciousness,"  that  is,  impose  on 
them  an  additional  limitation  of  their  own.  It  is 
not  true  that  the  "  facts  of  human  consciousness" 
are  not  also  faithful  representatives  of  facts  in 
themselves.  It  is  not  true  that  '^  what  is  conceived 
under  the  laws  of  human  thought"  is  not  also  ac- 
tual reality.  It  is  not  true  that  right  and  wrong 
for  man  is  not  also  right  and  wrong  for  all  other 
intelligent  beings. 


CHAPTEK    III. 

IMMUTABLE  RIGHT  AND  WKONG. 

iQcapable  of  Judging  of  Divine  ? — Infinite  Morality  ? — Absolute 
Morality  ? — Contradictory — Bolingbroke — Regulations — Eternal 
Principles — No  Modification — "Varied  AppJieations — Conscience 
— Supreme  Authority. 

The  work  we  are  examining^  deals  with  the  hu- 
man, only  with  the  human  ;  and  the  human,  it 
professes  to  show,  is  something  quite  by  itself, 
peculiarly  constructed  and  conditioned,  under  pe- 
culiar restrictive  laws,  which  make  all  human 
knowledge  and  all  human  experience  totally  differ- 
ent from  knowledge  and  experience,  among  other 
intelligent  beings.  Above  all,,  it  aims  to  separate 
these  utterly  and  for  ever,  from  all  relation  to  the 
Divine  Mind. 

"  As  a  corollary  to  this  theory"  (that  of  Kant, 
already  referred  to),  "  it  follows  that  the  law  of 
human  morality  must  be  regarded  as  the  measure 
and  adequate  representation  of  the  moral  nature 
of  God  ;  in  fact,  that  our  knowledge  of  the  Divine 
Being  is  identical  with  that  of  our  own  moral 
duties."  (p.  202.)  The  lecturer  speaks  of  Kant's 
theory  as  virtually  maintaining  "  that  man  may 


IMMUTABLE    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  249 

becomo  the  measure  of  the  Absolute  nature  of 
God/'  (p.  208.)  Again,  with  reference  to  the 
Moral  Eeason,  he  says,  ^'  We  must  refuse  to  exalt 
it  to  the  measure  and  standard  of  the  Absolute 
and  Infinite  goodness  of  God."     (p.  229.) 

Perhaps  it  might  be  asked,  where,  even  in  Kant, 
there  is  just  ground  for  this  sort  of  inference. 
But,  at  all  events,  it  is  surely  possible  to  maintain 
the  authority  of  conscience,  and  the  validity  and 
reality  of  our  moral  intuitions,  without  exalting 
man  to  the  level  of  his  Creator,  and,  above  all,  with- 
out constituting  him  the  measure  and  standard  of 
his  Creator's  attributes.  There  are  some  things 
which  even  the  lecturer  must  allow  to  be  common 
to  man,  with  the  Highest  Intelligence.  A  whole 
is  greater  than  its  part,  parallel  lines,  cannot  meet ; 
in  another  region  the  principle  of  gravitation  reigns 
in  the  material  universe,  and  in  another  region 
still,  wisdom  is  better  than  folly.  We  might  even 
venture  so  far  as  to  make  these,  and  such  facts  or 
principles,  tests  of  any  communication  professing 
to  come  from  above.  If  thev  were  contradicted  or 
denied,  we  might  venture  to  conclude  that  the 
communication  could  not  be  divine.  But  should 
we,  therefore,  be  chargeable  with  exalting  our 
knowledge  to  the  level  of  the  Divine,  above  all, 
with  constituting  our  knowledge  the  measure  and 
standard  of  the  Divine.  The  idea  is  preposterous, 
and  as  a  charge,  is  scarcely  candid  or  fair.     But 


250  MORALITY    AND    A    MORAL    SENSE. 

the  whole  drift  of  the  lecturer  is  to  show  that  hu- 
man morality  is  one  thing,  divine  morality  (though 
I  intensely  dislike  the  j)hrase)  quite  another  thing. 
"  Human  morality,  even  in  its  highest  elevation,  is 
not  identical  with,  nor  adequate  to  measm'e  the 
absolute  morality  of  Grod.''     (p.  206.) 

Taking  the  word  absolute,  in  its  strict  philoso- 
phical meaning,  the  meaning  belonging  to  it,  in  the 
earlier  discussions  relating  to  the  Absolute  and  In- 
finite, that  phrase,  absolute  morality  is  simply  not 
sense,  indeed,  is  a  pure  contradiction.  Absolute, 
absolved,  loosed  from  relation,  connection,  depend- 
ence, etc.  Morality  is  a  single  quality,  out  of 
many,  related  necessarily  to  other  qualities,  sup- 
posing their  existence,  essentially  dependent  on 
them  ;  on  intelligence,  for  example,  on  perception, 
on  volition.  If  it  be  said  it  is  absolute,  inasmuch 
as  it  is  "  in  and  bv  itself,"  this  arises  from  a  mis- 
conception.  The  Being  in  whom  it  resides  is  in 
and  of  Himself — that  is.  He  is  underived,  self-sus- 
tained, and  everlastingly  self-sustaining.  But  His 
attributes  are  in  Him,  not  in  and  of  themselves. 
If  the  word  be  employed  po23ularly,  to  mean  pure, 
unmixed,  genuine,  very  morality,  in  its  highest 
possible  form,  the  sense  is  most  true ;  but  the  w^ord, 
already  preoccupied,  is  none  the  less  objectionable. 
At  all  events,  let  us  not  be  terrified  by  the  grand- 
eur of  the  word  absolute,  for  here  the  only  thing  it 
can  mean  is  pure,  real,  very. 


IMMUTABLE    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  251 

It  may  be"  convenient,  at  the  same  time,  to  notice 
a  cognate   phrase,   which  is  also   repeatedly  em- 
ployed, infinite  morality.     I  do  not  know  what  it 
means,  or  by  what  authority  it  is  used.     I  can 
attach  no  idea  to  the  word  infinite,  in  this  connec- 
tion.    Kectitude,  purity,  veracity,  benevolence,  in- 
capable of  limit,  in  the  uncreated  nature  ;   moral 
excellence,  the  highest  that  can  possibly  exist,  be- 
yond which  nothing  is  conceivable  !     To  any  other 
or  more  than  this,  I  am  unable  to  attach  any  idea, 
any  meaning  whatever.     Infinite,  in  the  strict  phi- 
losophical   sense,    does    convey   more    than    this, 
something  positive  and  a2:)prehensible,  though  not 
comprehensible.     The  Being  in  whom  spiritual  ex- 
cellence resides  is  strictlv  Infinite,  because  He  is 
Eternal,    unbeginning,    unending,    underived,    un- 
changeable.     All    his    perfections,    physical,    and 
moral,  are  in  this  sense  strictly  infinite,  that  they 
ever  have  been  and  ever  shall  be.     But  in  them- 
selves, to  call  them  infinite,  may  be  true,  or  it  may 
be  false  ;  but  to  me  it  is  wholly  unintelligible.    One 
thing  is  quite  clear,  moral  attributes  in  the  Great 
Being  may  be  in  exercise,  or  they  may  not  be  in 
exercise  ;  they  may  be  put  forth  in  varying  forms 
and  in  varying  degrees.     To  my  mind  it  is  contra- 
dictory to  predicate  infinity  of  that,  which  admits 
of  degrees.    On  the  whole,  these  awful  words  Abso- 
lute morality.  Infinite  morality,  must  not  be  suf- 
fered  to  impose   on  us.      Both   are   at   the   best 


252  MORALITY   AND   A   MOEAL   SEN'S!:, 

unmeaDingy  and,  at  least,  one  is  a  pure  contra- 
diction. 

I  am  not  quite  sure,  that  even  the  design,  un- 
consciously, of  the  use  of  the  terms  we  have  criti- 
cized, was  not  to  deter  us  from  attempting  to  think 
of  the   moral   attributes   of  the   Creator,   and   to 
make  us  feel  that  the  subject  does  not  belong  to 
us   at  all.      The   undoubted  aim  of   the  lecturer 
throughout,  is  to  prove  that  moral  excellence  in  the 
highest  nature  is  altogether  beyond  our  knowledge. 
Thus  he  says — ^'  He  from  whom  all  holy  desires^ 
all  good  counsels,  and  all  just  works  do  proceed, 
must  himself  be  more  holy,  more  just,  more  good, 
than  these.     But  when  we  try  to  realize  in  thought, 
this  sure  conviction  of  our  faith,  we  find  that  here, 
as  everywhere,  the  finite  cannot  fathom  the  infinite, 
that  while  in  our  hearts  we  believe,  yet  our  thoughts 
are  at  times  sore  troubled.''     (p.   230.)     "  That 
there  is  an  absolute  morality,  based  upon,  or  rather 
identical  with  the  eternal  nature  of  God  is  indeed 
a  conviction,  forced  upon  us  by  the  same  evidence, 
as  that  on  which  we  believe  that  God  exists  at  all. 
But  what  that  absolute  morality  is,  we  are  as  un- 
able to  fix  in  any  human  conception,  as  we  are  to 
define  the  other  attributes  of  the  same  divine  na- 
ture.''    (p.  206.)     ''  We  do  not  certainly  know  the 
exact  nature  and  operation  of  the  moral  attributes 
of  God  :  we  can  but  infer   and   conjecture   from 
'what  we  know  of  the  moral  attributes  of  man,  and 


IMMUTABLE    RIGHT   AND   WRONG.  253 

the  analogy  between  the  finite  and  the  infinite,  can 
never  be  so  perfect,  as  to  prechide  all  possibility 
of  error  in  the  process/'     (p.  240.) 

There  is  one  writer  of  the  last  century,  Lord 
Bolingbroke,  who  expresses  sentiments  precisely 
identical  with  those  now  quoted.  In  him  they 
were  consistent  enough  ;  for  he  employed  them  in 
order  to  overthrow  the  argument  for  a  future  state. 
'•^  The  Divine  attributes,''  says  Bolingbroke,  '^  are 
exercised  in  such  innumerable  relations,  absolutely 
unknown  to  us,  that  though  we  are  sure  the  ex- 
ercise of  them,  in  the  immensity  of  the  universe, 
is  always  directed  by  the  all-perfect  Being,  to  that 
which  is  fittest  on  the  whole  ;  yet,  the  notions  of 
created  beings  like  us,  who  see  them  in  one  rela- 
tion alone,  cannot  be  ajDplied  to  them,  with  any 
propriety  nor  with  any  certainty  sufiicient  to  make 
them  objects  of  ■  our  imitation."  (Bol.  Works, 
Lon.  1754,  iii.  412.)  Again,  '•'•  as  little  can  we  rise 
from  our  moral  obligations  to  God's  supposed 
moral  attributes.  I  call  them  supposed,  because 
after  all  that  has  been  said,  to  prove  a  necessary 
connection  between  his  physical,  and  his  moral  at- 
tributes, the  latter  may  all  be  absorbed  in  his  wis- 
dom." (iv.  18.)  "  God  is  in  their  (theologians') 
notion  of  him,  nothing  more  than  an  Infinite  man. 
He  knows  as  we  know,  is  wdse  as  we  are  wise,  and 
moral  as  we  are  moral."  (iv.  296.)  "  Clarke's 
whole  chain  of  reasoning,  from  the  moral  attri- 


254  MORALITY    AND    A    MORAL    SENSE. 

butes  downwards,  is  nothing  more  than  one  con- 
tinued application  of  human  moral  ideas  to  the 
design  and  conduct  of  God."  (v.  5.)  "  It  re- 
quired no  such  metaphysical  apparatus,  as  he  (Sam. 
Clarke)  employed,  somewhat  tediously,  to  prove 
that  all  perfections,  physical  and  moral,  must  be 
attributes  of  the  self-existent,  all-perfect  author 
of  all  being  ;  but  he  does  not  prove  what  he  as- 
serts, and  on  the  proof  of  wdiich  his  whole  argu- 
ment turns,  that  these  attributes  are  the  same  in 
God,  as  they  are  in  our  ideas."     (iv.  249.) 

These  sound  to  me  like  extracts  from  the  Bamp- 
ton  Lecture  ;  they  contain  the  very  ideas  put  forth 
in  it ;  but  they  are  the  words  of  Lord  Bolingbroke. 
None  could  be  more  earnest  than  he  was,  in  his 
day,  to  prove  that  the  moral  attributes  of  the 
Great  Being  are  unknown,  and  unknow^able  by 
man. 

There  is  one  distinction  between  the  Divine  and 
the  human,  in  which  a  source  of  difficulty  is  found, 
wdiich  it  is  not  easy  to  appreciate.  "To  human 
conception,  it  seems  impossible  that  absolute  mo- 
rality should  be  manifested  in  the  form  of  a  law 
of  obligation,  for  such  a  law  implies  relation  and 
subjection  to  the  authority  of  a  lawgiver.  All 
human  morality  is  manifested  in  this  form."  (p. 
206.)  I  humbly  conceive,  that  all  the  difficulty 
here  represented,  vanishes  with  a  simple  statement 
of  the  accepted  facts.     There  is  a  law  within  the 


IMMUTABLE    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  255 

human  mind,  commandmg  right,  forbidding  wrong. 
There  is  also  an  inward  sense  of  obligation  to  obey 
that  law.  It  is  in  this  way  that  human  morality 
is  manifested.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Supreme 
always  is  and  does  that  which  is  immutably  right. 
It  is  his  essential  nature,  to  be  and  do  that  which 
is  immutably  right.  He  would  not  be  God,  He 
would  cease  to  be,  were  it  otherwise.  There  are 
no  lawgiver  and  no  law  to  Him,  no  obedience,  no 
sense  of  obligation  ;  but  only  the  silent  evolution 
of  an  eternal  fact,  the  serene  energy  of  a  changeless 
nature.  What  is  law  to  us,  is  life  to  the  Supreme  ; 
what  is  obligation  to  us,  is  mere  being  to  Him. 
And  what  then  ?     Where  is  the  difficulty  ? 

The  real  question  at  issue  is  not  touched  at  all — 
"  Is  there,  or  is  there  not,  that  which  is  immutably 
right,  that  which  is  immutably  wrong — the  same 
to  all  created  minds,  and  to  the  uncreated  ?  Have 
we,  or  have  we  not,  the  power  of  distinguishing 
that  which  is  immutably  right  and  that  which  is 
immutably  wrong  ?  Is  rectitude  rectitude,  up- 
rightness uprightness,  dishonesty  dishonesty,  gen- 
erosity generosity,  malignity  malignity,  deceit  de- 
ceit, to  us  and  to  all  beings,  and  to  the  Great 
God  ?"  The  question  is  intelligible,  direct,  sim- 
ple. I  put  it  in  the  shortest  form,  Is  a  lie  a  lie, 
all  the  universe  over,  in  all  places  and  at  all  times, 
and  amongst  all  rational  and  moral  beings  ?  There 
may  be  doubt  whether  a  thing  be  true  or  false,  or 


256  MORALITY   AND    A    MORAL    SENSE, 

how  far  it  is  the  one  or  the  other.  There  may  be 
doubt  whether  the  utterer  or  the  doer  of  it  were 
aware  of  its  falsity,  or  how  far  he  was  aware  of  it. 
But  suppose  the  thing  to  be  a  palpable,  naked 
falsehood,  is  it,  or  is  it  not,  a  falsehood  all  the  uni- 
verse over  ;  is  it,  or  is  it  not,  eternally,  immutably 
wrong,  a  thing  to  be  only  scouted,  scorned,  hated, 
reprobated  ?  Can  we  conceive  a  single  sane  mind, 
of  God's  creating,  of  any  order,  in  any  part  of 
space,  thinking  it  other  than  eternally,  immutably 
wrong  ?  Phenomenon  of  consciousness  ?  It  is 
phenomenon.  But  there  is  reality  behind  it,  and 
it  is  this,  of  which  we  take  hold,  and  know  that 
we  take  hold.  It  is  such  a  phenomenon,  so  actual, 
so  real,  that  it  scorches,  and  scars,  and  damns  the 
mind  in  which  it  is  begotten.  It  is,  and  we  know 
that  it  iSj  an  actual,  execrable,  burning  abomina- 
tion, in  Grod's  universe.  We  do,  in  our  measure, 
know  some  things,  this  among  others,  in  them- 
selves, as  they  really  are,  and  as  they  are  judged  by 
all  creatures,  and  by  the  Creator  ! 

Our  impressions  of  evil,  as  of  everything  else, 
depend  on  our  mental  capacity,  and  on  the  amount 
of  our  intelligence.  A  powerful,  instructed,  disci- 
plined mind,  will  see  falsehood  as  another  cannot. 
But  to  both,  with  stronger  or  feebler  impressions, 
it  is  essentially  the  same — a  thing,  only  and  immu- 
tably wrong. 

The  Bampton  lecturer,  if  I  rightly  understand 


IMMUTABLE    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  257 

him,  would  have  us  abandon  all  investigation  into 
fixed  moral  principles,  and  would  substitute  for 
them  certain  ascertained  rules  of  life.  As  in  the 
intellectual,  so  here  also  in  the  moral  region,  his 
conviction  seems  to  be  that  the  moment  we  pass 
from  the  world  of  the  senses  to  the  world  of 
thought,  from  practical  to  speculative  truth,  we 
insm'e  nothing  but  perplexity.  Take,  as  an  exam- 
ple, the  following  on  the  subject  of  principles — 
"  To  maintain  the  immutability  of  moral  princi- 
ples in  the  abstract,  is  a  very  different  thing  from 
maintaining  the  immutability  of  the  particular  acts 
by  which  those  principles  are  manifested  in  prac- 
tice. That  duty  ought,  in  all  cases,  to  be  fol- 
lowed, in  preference  to  inclination,  is  as  certain  a 
truth  as  that  two  straight  lines  cannot  inclose  a 
space.  In  their  concrete  application,  both  princi- 
ples are  equally  liable  to  error It  is 

in  their  concrete  form  that  moral  principles  are 
adopted  as  guides  of  conduct  and  canons  of  judg- 
ment, and  in  this  form  they  admit  of  various  de- 
grees of  uncertainty  or  of  positive  error."  (p.  207.) 
Poor  guides  they  must  be  1  useless  canons  1  one 
would  think,  if  this  be  true.  There  are  cases  of 
casuistry,  Protestant  as  well  as  Roman  Catholic, 
which  fill  many  goodly  volumes.  And  if  the  great 
principles  of  morality  depended,  as  the  lecturer 
seems  to  think  thev  do,  on  the  solution  of  such 
cases,  we  may  as  well,  at  once,  throw  ourselves  at 


258  MORALITY    AND    A    MORAL    SENSE. 

the  feet  of  di vines,  of  either  school,  or  both  ;  for 
no  training  of  ordinary  men  could  possibly  fit 
them  for  such  a  task.  But  what  shall  we  think 
of  the  elevation  to  the  dignity  of  a  moral  princi- 
ple, of  the  statement,  ^^  that  duty  ought  always  to 
be  followed  in  preference  to  inclination.^'  Moral 
principle  ?  it  is  no  moral  principle.  It  is  a  sound 
maxim,  a  judgment  which  most  men  have  arrived 
at.  But  moral  principles  are  given  in  a  shorter, 
simpler,  terser,  sterner  form.  Be  just,  be  truth- 
ful, be  upright  and  sincere,  be  loving  and  gener- 
ous !  Duty  !  the  word  is  short  enough,  but  it  is 
made,  in  experience,  endlessly  complex  and  com- 
plicated. There  are  many  real  and  many  more 
unreal  difficulties,  connected  with  the  determina- 
tion of  what  in  modern  phrases  is  called  duty.  It 
touches  a  thousand  things,  more  or  less  related  or 
conflicting,  which  are  made  to  encumber  the  sim- 
ple moral  imperative,  the  ought  and  ought  not. 
We  think  of  interests,  immediately  persona!  or 
relative,  of  social  obligations  and  influences,  of  ac- 
tual surrounding  conditions,  of  results  and  effects, 
of  public  opinion,  of  23leasure  or  pain,  to  others  of 
inclination  or  bias,  for  or  against.  But  the  question 
is  far  shorter,  easier,  simpler,  "  shall  I  utter  or  act 
a  falsehood  ?  shall  I  be  guilty  of  clear  injustice  ? 
shall  I  practise  a  deception  ?  shall  I  perpetrate  a 
cruelty  .?"    These  are  questions  which  in  999  cases 


IMMUTABLE    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  259 

out  of  every  1,000,  even  a  child  knows  to  answer, 
in  a  moment. 

The  lecturer  keeps  far  away  from  the  great,  im- 
mutable principles  of  right  or  wrong.  Apparently, 
human  morality  is  to  him  something  doubtful,  fluc- 
tuating, and  changeable.  He,  in  fact,  speaks  of 
"  moral  obligation,  conceived  as  a  law  binding  on 
man,  to  be  regarded  as  immutable,  so  long  as  magi's 
nature  remains  unchanged."  (p.  204.)  Again,  of 
"morality  in  its  human  character,  depending  on 
conditions  not  co-eternal  with  God.'^  (p.  210.)  It 
would  not  be  equitable,  were  I  to  omit  to  say,  that 
in  these,  and  such  cases,  he  has  reference  to  what 
are  called  positive  commands  of  God  touching 
things  indifferent  in  themselves,  but  binding,  be- 
cause they  are  commanded.  As  most  forcibly  illus- 
trating the  principle  involved,  I  take  the  fact  that 
the  Jews,  by  command  of  God,  gave  a  tenth  of 
their  property  to  their  religion,  that  a  particular 
tribe  were  priests  by  birth,  wore  certain  robes,  and 
performed  certain  ceremonies  at  certain  times,  and 
in  a  prescribed  mode.  These  things  were  neither 
ridit  nor  wrons^  in  themselves,  human  conscience 
had  nothing  to  do  with  them,  save  in  one  point ; 
they  were  to  the  Jews  express  commands  of  their 
God.  And  reason  and  conscience  witness  to  this 
as  a  first  principle,  "  God  is  to  be  obeyed  unreserv- 
edly." We  may  be  right  or  we  may  be  wrong  in 
construing  his  voice,  but  that  voice  recognized,  obe- 


260  MORALITY    AND    A    MORAL    SENSE. 

dience  is  imperative.  Here  is  tlie  one  moral  prin- 
ci2:)le,  in  all  that  can  be  regarded  as  circumstantial 
and  positive,  in  human  duty — implicit  obedience 
to  God.  But  this  has  nothing  circumstantial, 
local,  temporary,  fluctuating  in  it ;  it  is  eternal, 
immutable,  universal,  a  law  not  to  man  only,  but 
to  all  created  natures.  This  stands  on  the  same 
basis  with  eternal  justice,  veracity,  sincerity,  and 
benevolence. 

But  the  aim  of  the  lecturer  is  not  to  identify 
human  morality  with  everlasting  principles,  but  to 
reduce  it  to  what  is  merely  positive  and  locally  or 
temporarily  regulative.  He  speaks  of  the  great 
principles  of  all  that  is  holy  and  righteous  existing 
in  God,  before  they  assumed  theii^  finite  form  in 
the  heart  of  man.''  (p.  210.)  What  is  the  finite  in 
distinction  from  any  other  form  of  rectitude,  vera- 
city, U23rightness  and  benevolence  ?  I  do  not 
know.  Again,  "  God  did  not  create  absolute  mo- 
rality, it  is  co-eternal  with  himself,  and  it  were 
blasphemy  to  say  that  there  ever  was  a  time  when 
God  was  and  Goodness  was  not.  But  God  did 
create  the  human  manifestation  of  morality,"  (p. 
208),  that  is  to  say,  he  did  create  a  human  mani- 
festation of  that  which  was  in  Himself  and  was 
uncreated.  We  must  understand  this,  as  the  un- 
doubted import  of  the  structure  of  the  sentence. 
The  eternal  principles  of  right  and  wrong  are  un- 
created, but  a  human  manifestation  of  them  loas 


IMMUTABLE    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  261 

created.  That  must  mean,  I  imagine,  a  human 
medium  for  manifesting  tliem  was  created.  The 
lecturer  adds,  God  did  create  this  manifestation, 
"  when  he  created  the  moral  constitution  of  man/' 
Of  course  he  did.  The  moral  constitution  of  man 
was  the  new  medium,  through  which  eternal  moral 
principles  were  manifested.  No,  by  no  means,  this 
is  not  what  the  lecturer  would  say,  for  he  adds, 
Grod  did  create  the  human  manifestation  of  moral- 
ity, "  when  he  placed  man  in  those  circumstances, 
by  which  the  eternal  principles  of  right  and  wrong 
are  modified  in  relation  to  this  present  life."  This 
is  not  manifestation,  it  is  not  the  mere  application 
of  principles  to  certain  new  circumstances,  but 
modification. 

To  modify,  is  to  alter,  so  as  to  suit  circum- 
stances. We  modify  a  statement,  when  we  find, 
either  that  it  contained  too  much  or  did  not  con- 
tain enough,  to  be  strictly  true.  We  modify  a 
scheme,  when,  finding  either  that  it  will  not  work, 
or  not  so  efficiently  as  we  anticipated,  we  correct 
its  provisions,  or  introduce  new  ones.  We  modify 
a  principle,  when  experience  has  taught  us  that  in 
one  direction  and  another,  it  is  not  really  sound,  or 
is  defective.  To  modify  is  to  alter.  And  the 
eternal  principles  of  right  and  wrong  are  not 
merely  applied  to  this  present  life,  but  altered.^ 
how  far  we  know  not,  but  they  are  so  far  altered 
that  from  human  morality,  we  cannot  judge  lohat 


262  MORALITY    AND    A    MORAL    SENSE. 

real,  essential  morality  is,  or  may  be.  If  this  be 
not  to  shake  the  everlasting  foundations  of  the 
moral  universe,  what  can  be  ?  No  wonder  then 
the  lecturer  should  say,  "  while  in  our  hearts 
we  believe,  yet  our  thoughts  at  times  are  sore 
troubled."'  No  wonder  then  he  should  find 
"  many  things,  impossible  to  understand  and  diffi- 
cult to  believe."  And  his  hitherto  strong  refuge, 
Butler,  whose  chief  glory,  it  appears  to  me,  no 
one  has  labored  more  effectually — though  without 
such  an  intention — than  he,  to  cast  in  the  dust  ; 
his  chosen  refuge  cannot  avail  him  here.  True 
enough,  ^'  the  very  philosopher  whose  writings 
have  most  contributed  to  establish  the  supreme 
authority  of  conscience  in  man,  is  also  the  one, 
who  has  pointed  out  most  clearly  the  existence  of 
analogous  moral  difficulties  in  nature  and  in  re- 
ligion, and  the  true  answer  to  both,  namely  the  ad- 
mission, that  Grod's  government,  natural  as  well  as 
spiritual,  is  a  scheme,  impeyfectly  comprehended." 
(p.  229.) 

All  or  nearly  all  will  admit  that  God's  govern- 
ment is  imperfectly  comprehended.  But  what  of 
the  modification,  the  alteration  of  the  eternal  prin- 
ciples of  right  and  wrong,  in  relation  to  this  lyres- 
ent  life  ?  What  of  human  morality  as  a  different 
thing  from  real,  genuine,  essential  morality  ? 
This  is  no  imperfect  comprehension  of  Grod's 
government,  it  is  comprehending,  only  too  clearly, 


IMMUTABLE    RIGHT   AND   WRONG.  263 

the  unstable  and  flexible  character  of  moral  law. 
Butler  maintains  nothing  like  this,  he  does  not,  in 
the  most  indirect  way,  hint  at  such  a  thing.  The 
very  contrary.  Butler  upholds  the  doctrine  of 
conscience  as  a  power  in  the  soul,  percipient  of 
immutable  right  and  wrong,  an  authority  com- 
manding the  one,  forbidding  the  other.  Referring 
to  disputed  commands  in  the  Old  Testament,  he 
says,  ^'  none  of  these  precepts,''  (in  the  very  pas- 
sage quoted  by  Mr.  Mansell,  p.  243,)  "are  contrary 
to  immutable  morality."  Immutable  morality ! 
He  holds  that  we  can  know  it  and  judge  what  is 
and  what  is  not  contrary  to  it.  The  Bampton 
lecturer  could  not  have  employed  the  phrase,  for 
he  distinctly  maintains  that  we  cannot  know  it. — 
There  is,  he  might  have  said,  an  immutable  mo- 
rality, but  what  it  is,  we  are  wholly  unable  to  fix 
in  any  human  conception.  Not  so,  Butler.  So 
clear,  and  sure,  and  fixed  is  our  conception  of  it, 
in  his  opinion,  that  he  puts  it  against  a  conceived, 
not  actual,  statement  in  the  scriptures,  and  asserts 
its  supremacy.  '^i/*it  were  commanded,"  he  says, 
"  to  cultivate  the  principles  and  to  act  in  the 
spirit  of  treachery,  ingi'atitude,  cruelty,  the  com- 
mand,''— in  the  bible  he  means — even  a  command 
in  the  bible — ''  would  not  alter  the  nature  of  the 
case  or  of  the  action,  in  any  of  these  instances. 
But  it  is  quite  otherwise  in  precepts  which  require 
only   the   doing   an   external   action."     (p.   243.) 


264  MORALITY    AND    A   MORAL    SENSE. 

There  can  be  no  interpretation,  but  one,  of  this 
passage.  Conscience,  in  the  sphere  of  the  highest 
moral  principles,  is  the  ultimate  authorit}^,  from 
which  there  is  no  appeal.  Everywhere,  for  all 
beings,  and  for  ever  and  ever,  these  principles  are 
immoveable.  The  law  of  the  inward  judge  is 
paramount.  Nothing  can  compete  with  it.  But- 
ler shall  tell  us,  that  not  even  a  command  in  the 
\)i\)[Q — were  such  a  thing  possible — not  even  a  com- 
mand in  the  bible,  however  seemingly  express  and 
plain,  could  alter  the  case.  There  is  nothing  here, 
of  the  modification  of  eternal  right  and  wrong  ; 
nothing  here  of  distinguishing  human  morality, 
from  eternal,  essential  morality. 

To  those  who,  with  myself,  bow  to  the  authority 
of  the  holy  scriptures,  there  may  be  a  nobler  and 
fuller  revelation  of  moral  life,  than  can  be  reached, 
in  the  absence  of  such  divine  aid,  and  a  clearer 
and  more  extended  interpretation  of  moral  law. 
But  where  there  are  no  scriptures,  thank  God  ! 
there  is  a  conscience,  a  voice  from  above,  within 
man,  testifying  to  the  highest  and  grandest  truth. 
Take  this  away  !  as  in  effect  and  in  fact,  the 
Bampton  lecturer  does,  and  the  divinest  light  that 
yet  lingers  in  the  human  soul  is  put  out.  Reduce 
morals  to  a  calculation  of  probabilities,  a  science 
of  ecclesiastical  casuistry,  let  virtue  depend  on  a 
w-eighing  and  balancing  of  advantages,  personal 
and  relative,  on  a  measuring  of  effects,  near  and 


IMMUTABLE    RIGHT    AND    WRONG.  265 

remote,  on  each  man's  sagacity  and  honesty  and 
temper  in  judging,  let  there  be  no  innate  sense  ol 
right  and  wrong,  no  ultimate  authoritative  judge,  let 
eternal  justice,  veracity  and  ujDrightness,  witnessed 
bv  conscience,  be  banished  from  lano;ua2:e,  as  ami- 
able  but  imbecile  mistakes,  and  the  very  founda- 
tions of  the  moral  universe  are  upturned  and  the 
reign  of  a  hopeless,  eternal,  moral  anarchy  is  in- 
augurated. 

The  imperfections  and  even  perversions  of  nat- 
ural conscience  are  undeniable.  Like  the  bodily 
senses  and  the  powers  of  the  mind,  this,  also  ad- 
mits of  behig  improved  and  impaired.  But  it  re- 
mains notwithstanding,  as  they  also  do  ;  it  remains 
an  imperishable  part  of  our  constitution,  precious 
above  all  others,  as  the  source  of  immutable,  moral 
intuitions.  '^  It  is  not,''  says  Dr.  Chalmers,  meet- 
ing the  case  of  contradictory,  ethical  conclusions  in 
different  countries  and  ages,  ^^  it  is  not  that  Justice, 
Humanitv,  and  Gratitude  are  not  the  canonized 
virtues  of  every  region,  or  that  Falsehood,  Cruelty, 
and  Fraud  would  not,  in  their  abstract  and  unas- 
sociated  nakedness,  be  viewed  as  the  objects  of 
moral  antipathy  and  rebuke.  ...  In  spite  of 
all  the  topical  moralities,  to  which  various  causes 
have  given  birth,  there  is  an  unquestioned  univer- 
sal morality  notwithstanding.  And  in  every  case, 
where  the  moral  sense  is  unfettered  by  these  asso- 
ciations and  the  judgment  is  uncramped  either  by 

12 


266  MORALITY   AND    A   MORAL   SENSE. 

the  partialities  of  interest  or  by  the  inveteracy  of 
national  customSj  which  habit  and  antiquity  have 
rendered  sacred,  .  .  .  conscience  is  found  to 
sjDcak  the  same  language  ;  nor  to  the  remotest  ends 
of  the  worldj  is  there  a  country  or  an  island  where 
the  same  uniform  and  consistent  voice  is  not  heard 
from  her." — Moral  and  Intellectual  Constitution 
of  Man,  I.  89-91. 

If  the  conclusions  which  have  been  successively 
arrived  at,  in  the  progi'ess  of  this  criticism,  be  valid, 
the  following  is  something  like  the  result  : — The 
BamjDton  lecturer  has  dethroned  human  reason, 
has  reduced  all  truth  to  a  mode  of  our  conceptions, 
has  put  out  the  lamp  of  revelation,  denying  that 
the  true  God,  as  He  is,  is  to  be  found  there,  and 
has  thus  left  the  outer  temple  void  and  dark.  But 
in  his  reasonings  on  our  moral  nature,  he  has  done 
something  yet  more  to  be  lamented.  He  has  put 
forth  his  hand  to  the  very  altar  of  the  innermost 
sanctuary  of  our  being,  has  extinguished  the  sacred 
fire  on  that  altar,  and  has  written  on  the  whole 
structure — Ichabod,  the  glory  is  departed  !  I  ven- 
ture to  lift  a  humble,  feeble  voice  against  this  sac- 
rilege. For  one,  I  must  stand,  at  all  hazards,  by 
what  I  regard  as  among  the  clearest  and  surest  ut- 
terances of  consciousness,  the  existence  of  a  moral 
sense  !  For  one,  I  must  abide,  as  on  the  very  es- 
sential ground  of  the  moral  universe,  by  immutable 
morality,  revealed  by  conscience  and  common  to  all 


IMMUTABLE    RIGHT    AND   WRONG.  267 

intelligent  beings.  So  much  the  more  absolutely 
must  I  cling  to  these,  because,  on  the  principles  of 
the  Bampton  lecturer,  I  can  see  nothing  for  man 
but  darkness  —  darkness  above,  below,  around, 
everywhere  ;  darkness  in  this  world,  darkness  here- 
after, darkness  for  ever  and  ever  ;  dreary,  hopeless, 
overwhelming  darkness ;  an  eternal,  intolerable 
agony  of  darkness  ! 

Only  in  a  passing  sentence  or  two,  shall  I  notice 
the  peculiar  method  in  which  the  lecturer  defends 
the  mysteries  of  Christianity,  the  doctrines  of  the 
Triniiy,  the  Incarnation,  the  Atonement.  It  is 
well  known  that  objectors  against  these  doctrines 
have  been  wont  to  assert  that  they  are  not  only 
incomprehensible,  but  directly  contradictory.  The 
answer  of  the  lecturer  amounts  to  a  free  ad- 
mission of  all  the  alleged  contradictions.  It  is 
even  so,  he  would  say,  but  the  objection  has  no 
validity  as  a2)plied  to  the  Christian  revelation, 
for  it  is  only  common  to  it,  with  all  philos- 
,  ophy  and  with  all  the  efforts  of  reason,  when 
directed  to  the  nature  of  God,  or  to  his  pro- 
cedure with  his  creatures,  or  to  his  purposes  and 
methods.  We  cannot  reason  upon  them  without 
being  plunged  into  contradictions  without  end. 
We  have  no  right  to  reason  upon  them  all.  They 
belong  to  the  region  of  faith — they  are  to  be 
accepted   unconditionally.     The   Infinite  and   all 


268  MORALITY   AND   A   MORAL   SENSE, 

that  relates  to  the  Infinite  is  not  an  object  of 
human  thought.  We  have  no  business  to  think, 
we  are  utterly  incapable  of  conceiving  anything  at 
all  on  the  subject. 

It  occurs  to  me,  that  there  are  others  besides 
Christians  who  might  make  very  admirable  use  of 
this  mode  of  silencing  objections.  There  is  a  doc- 
trine, very  venerable  by  antiquity,  and  as  having 
been  devoutly  held,  as  being  held  at  this  moment 
by  myriads  of  the  human  race — the  doctrine  of 
The  All — no  individual,  personal  God,  but  The 
All — one  immanent  life,  for  ever  and  ever  develop- 
ing itself  and  absorbing  back  into  itself  what  it 
gives  forth,  an  everlasting  egress  and  regress,  out- 
coming  and  resumption.  All  alleged  contradic- 
tions, its  adherents  might  maintain,  have  no  valid- 
ity. The  subject  does  not  belong  to  the  sphere  of 
human  thought  at  all.  It  is  inconceivable,  and 
therefore  the  moment  reason  approaches  it,  it  can 
find  in  it  nothing  but  contradictions.  This  high, 
transcendental  method  of  dismissing  objections 
would  lead,  logically,  to  some  curious  results.  No 
Protestant,  for  example,  could  utter  a  word  against 
such  a  dogma  as  transubstantiation,  to  name  no 
other.  The  ultra  Calvinists,  also,  to  whom  the 
lecturer  seems  to  bear  little  love,  and  their  doctrine 
of  eternal  justification  and  eternal  reprobation, 
would  be  perfectly  safe.     They  have  only  to  utter 


IMMUTABLE    P.IGHT    AND    WRONG.  269 

the  magical  words — "  The  Infinite  is  not  an  object 
of  human  thought  at  all — this  belongs  to  the  region 
of  the  unconditioned,  into  which  vou  have  no  nojht 
to  enter/'  With  these  words,  all  difficulty  van- 
ishes and  victory  is  complete. 

It  is  little  likely,  that  accomplished  and  earnest 
theologians,  in  our  own  or  any  other  country,  will 
be  found  wilHng  to  accept  of  this  kind  of  shelter 
for  doctrines,  which  they  hold  dear.     Time  was, 
when  the  battle  of  the  faith  was  fought  on  other 
and  far  nobler  ground,  and  erudite  and  able  men 
contended,    triumphantly    contended,    that    that 
which  they  admitted   to  be  altogether  incompre- 
hensible, could  not  be  shown  to  be  contradictory. 
Tliat  time,  one  may  piously  hope,  is  not  yet  past. 
Meanwhile,  so  far  as  the  Bampton  lecturer  is  con- 
cerned, those  who  have  separated  themselves  from 
Christianity,  are  completely  triumphant,  and  have 
had  conceded  to  them  all  that  they  ever  contended 
for.     They  have  always  alleged,  they  do  now  allege, 
that  Chiistianity  has  no  foundation  in  reason,  can- 
not stand  on  the  ground  of  reason.     The  lecturer 
simply  acknowledges  the  fact.     In  his  view,  Chris- 
tianity is  as  full  of  as  insoluble  contradictions,  as 
he  imagines  philosophy  to  be.     But  it  does  not 
seem  to  occur  to  him,  that  in  such  a  case,  wisdom 
would  teach  us,  not  to  adopt  the  one,  because  it  is 
no  v>'orse  than  the  other,  but  to  reject  both,  for  the 
same  reason. 


270  MORALITY    AND    A    MORAL    SENSE. 

I  see  an  alternative,  one,  only  one — either  to 
yield  unconditionally  to  authority  and  throw  our- 
selves into  the  arms  of  an  infallible  church,  or  in 
blank  despair,  to  enshroud  and  entomb  ourselves 
amidst  all  the  horrors  of  a  universal  scepticism. 


SECTION      SIXTH. 

CONCERNING   REASON   AND    FAITH. 


COXCERM^G  REASON  AXD  FAITH. 

Faith,  as  Act  of  the  Understanding — Knowledge,  Basis  and  Mea- 
sure of — Its  Distinctions — Consciousness — Intuitions  of  Sense  ; 
of  Reason — Spliere  of  Responsibility — Character  of  Faith  deter- 
mined by  its  G-rounds — Fact  of  Consciousness  enough — Its  own 
Ground — Mere  Act  of  Faith  Nothing — Primary  Beliefs — Man- 
sell's  Statements — Hamilton's — Ground  of  Faith  Always  Under- 
standing, Higher  Reason,  or  both — Revelation — God  Trustworthy 
— Understanding,  Reason,  Conscience,  Proclaim  it — Harmony 
of  these  Powers — Xo  Discord — Spirit  of  Faith — The  Piercmg 
Eye — Perfect  Light. 

There  are  two  wordsj  Eeason  and  Faith,  occur- 
ring, especially  the  first  of  the  two,  I  know  not 
how  often,  in  the  Bampton  Lecture.  Neither  of 
them  is  once  defined,  or,  in  any  precise  manner, 
explained.  I  have  attempted  to  show  that  the 
lecturer,  in  his  use  of  the  term,  reason,  means  sim- 
ply the  understanding,  the  faculty  of  judgment, 
the  power  which  discriminates,  reasons,  infers,  de- 
duces and  judges.  The  doctrine  of  Leibnitz,  Kant, 
thouo-h  as  announced  bv  him,  there  is  much  confu- 
fusion  and  inaccuracy.  Cousin,  Coleridge,  Hamil- 
ton, and  the  modern  philosophy  of  Europe,  with 
the  exception  of  one  or  two  eminent  English 
names,  is  that  there  exists  a  higher  reason  in  man 
— intellect  proper,  the  source  of  intuitive  a  priori 


274  CONCERNING   REASON    AND    FAITH. 

truths.  Farther  still,  there  is  a  moral  sense,  what 
Kant  desigates,  the  j^i'^'^ctical  reason — the  source 
of  moral  intuitions.  Our  English  name  is  con- 
science, a  power  percipient  of  right  and  wrong,  an 
authority  commanding  the  one,  forbidding  the 
other.  These  three — omitting  the  popular  use 
of  the  word  as  S3monymous  with  general,  human 
intelligence — the  understanding,  the  intellect,  the 
conscience,  include  all  the  strictly  legitimate  ap- 
plications of  the  term,  reason. 

Faith,  so  far  as  it  belongs  to  philosophy,  has  two 
distinct,  but  closely  rela^ted  senses,  into  one  or 
other  of  which  all  its  applications  may  be  resolved. 
First  of  all,  it  is  simply  equivalent  to  belief,  hold- 
ino-  for  true  and  real.  Secondlv,  it  is  used  to  mean 
confidence,  trust  in  a  statement,  a  principle,  a  per- 
son, in  anything.  The  second  of  these  senses,  neces- 
sarily, includes  the  first,  but  the  first  may  exist 
without  the  second.  We  may  firmly  believe  a 
thing  to  be  true,  in  which  there  may  be  no  need, 
not  even  a  possibility,  for  the  exercise  of  trust  or 
confidence.  But  that  in  which  we  confide,  we 
must,  first  of  all,  necessarily,  hold  to  be  true. 
Confidence  is  often  only  belief  intensified,  the 
same  thing  but  in  a  more  emphatic  form.  At 
the  same  time,  there  is  a  real,  generic  difference 
between  the  two.  Simple  belief  is  purely  intellec- 
tual, confidence  is  always  partly  moral,  an  act  not 
of  the  understanding  merely,  but  still  more  of  the 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  275 

heart,  perhaps  also  of  the  conscience.  The  inward 
nature  takes  hold  of  that  which  it  believeSj  com- 
mits itself  to  itj  as  true,  and  rests  in  it. 

But  whether  in  the  sense  of  trust,  or  in  that  of 
simple  belief,  the  question  is,  what  is  the  exact 
relation  between  faith  and  reason — the  lower,  the 
hio-her  or  the  moral  reason  .^  Within  certain  lim- 
its,  the  answer  to  this  question  can  create  no  diffi- 
culty. Belief,  in  the  usual  meaning  of  the  word, 
belief  grounded  in  the  conclusions  of  the  under- 
standing, is  perfectly  intelligible  and  explicable. 
Through  the  ordinary  mental  processes,  we  in- 
quire, examine  and  make  ourselves  acquainted 
with  the  subject,  thoroughly  understand  it,  and 
admit  and  adopt  what  commends  itself  to  our 
minds,  as  true.  In  the  same  way,  we  receive  from 
others  a  statement  of  facts,  the  testimony  appears 
to  us  sufiS-cient,  and  satisfactory,  and  we  credit  it. 
In  all  this  we  act  clearly  and  solely  on  the  ground 
of  the  understanding — the  measure  of  our  knowl- 
edo-e  is  the  measure  of  our  faith. 

It  is  quite  true,  that  so  soon  as  a  thing  com- 
mends itself  to  our  minds,  so  soon  as  we  thoroughly 
understand  it  and  find  its  evidence  sufficient,  we 
must  believe  it.  It  may  be  distasteful.  We  may 
loisli  not  to  believe  it,  we  may  assert  that  we  do 
not  believe  it,  but  we  must,  nevertheless  ;  we  do, 
in  point  of  fact.  Seeing  a  thing  to  be  true,  and 
believing  it  are  identical.     But  it  is  sufficiently 


276  CONCERNING   REASON   AND    FAITH. 

palpable,  that  the  apparent  necessity  in  this  case  is 
owing,  in  great  part,  to  ourselves,  is  self-created. 
It  is  wtj  who  according  to  our  inclination,  look  or 
refuse  to  look  at  truth,  loe  who  examine  or  refuse 
to  examine  evidence,  ive  who  suffer  prejudice,  in 
one  direction  or  another,  to  sway  our  minds  or  who 
resist  the  force  of  prejudice.  At  last,  belief  is  our 
deliberate  act^  grounded  in  the  perceptions  and  con- 
clusions of  our  understanding.  Knowledge  is  the 
basis  and  the  measure  of  the  act.  We  believe,  be- 
cause we  understand,  and  so  far  as  we  understand 
and  no  farther. 

All  the  difficulty  in  determining  the  exact  rela- 
tion between  reason  and  faith,  lies  in  quite  another 
region.  Before  touching  this,  however,  I  must 
notice  some  distinctions,  often  overlooked,  but 
which  have  a  very  essential  bearing  on  the  subject. 

The  act  of  consciousness  is  altogether  involun- 
tary and  necessary.  I  cannot  avoid  being  con- 
scious of  what  is  passing  in  my  mind.  It  does  not 
dej)end  on  my  will.  I  arn  conscious,  whether  I 
will  or  no.  For  this  reason,  consciousness  is  its 
own  ground,  and  needs  and  can  have  no  other.  I 
hnow,  that  I  know,  that  I  feel,  that  I  will,  that 
this  thought  is  in  my  mind  at  this  moment.  I 
knoiv  it.  You  cannot  go  beyond  this.  You  can 
get  no  proof  whatever  of  the  fact  from  any  other 
quarter,  nothing,  except  this  immediate  necessary 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND   FAITH.  277 

knowledge.     Consciousness  wants  no  proof,  it  has 
no  gi'ound  beyond  itself.     It  is  its  own  ground. 

External  perception  also  is  necessary  and  invol- 
untaiy.  With,  my  eyes  open,  I  cannot  avoid  per- 
ceiving, whether  I  will  or  no.  I  see  that  tree,  that 
hook,  that  flower.  It  cannot  be  proved  by  any 
other  evidence.  I  see  it,  that  is  all,  I  know  that  I 
see  it.  You  cannot  go  farther,  it  is  its  own  ground. 
The  intuitions  of  the  higher  reason  and  of  the  con- 
science, belong  to  the  same  category.  "  The  soul, 
God,  immortality,  immutable  right  and  wrong — 
these  and  other  such  are  data  of  reason  and  con- 
science. The  understanding  may  consent  to  them 
as  true,  may  be  able  to  find  strong  confirmations 
of  their  truth.  But  they  are  not  discovered  by  the 
understanding,  they  are  not  arrived  at  by  reason- 
ing, and  they  may  not  be  capable  of  being  logically 
demonstrated.  They  are  first  of  all  given  in  con- 
sciousness, they  are  utterances  of  the  soul  from 
within  to  itself,  internal  readings,  intellections,  an- 
nouncements by  the  reason  and  conscience,  and  in 
common  with  the  intuitions  of  sense,  and  with  all 
the  acts  of  consciousness,  they  are  simply  their  own 
ground. 

Faith,  whether  in  the  sense  of  belief,  or  in  that 
of  confidence,  belongs  to  quite  another  order  of 
powers.  It  is  essentially  secondary,  that  is,  it  sup- 
poses something  prior  to  itself,  on  which  it  rests. 
Unlike  consciousness,  perception,  and  reason,  it  is 


278     CONCERNING  REASON  AND  FAITH. 

Dot  necessary  but  dependent,  generally  all  but  uni- 
versally dependent,  on  our  will.  It  does  not  arise 
out  of  our  mental  constitution,  whether  we  will  or 
no,  but  is  a  capacity,  which  we  may  or  may  not 
exercise,  according  to  our  inclination  or  our  pur- 
pose. Hence  it  is  essentially  connected  with  re- 
sponsibility— it  is  a  virtue,  and  its  opposite  may  be 
a  crime.  Consciousness,  perception,  and  the  intui- 
tions of  reason,  are  neither  right  nor  wrong,  on  our 
part,  neither  wise  nor  unwise.  To  be  conscious,  is 
no  merit  and  no  fault,  neither  to  be  praised  nor  to 
be  blamed.  It  is  the  mere  necessary  act  of  our 
nature,  with  which  we  have  nothing  to  do,  except 
to  acknowledge  it.  But  is  faith,  thus  indifferent, 
either  intellectually  or  morally  ?  On  the  contrary, 
it  cannot  be  doubted  for  a  moment,  that  faith  may 
be,  must  be,  always,  either  right  or  wrong,  wise  or 
unwise.  Its  character  is  determined  by  the  grounds 
on  which  it  is  based. 

One  additional  distinction  remains,  belief  or  faith 
is  in  no  respect  creative,  not  even  percejDtive,  but 
only  and  wholly  re-ceptive.  It  is  not  an  organ  for 
discovering  truth,  or  even  for  ^9er-ceiving  truth  that 
had  otherwise  been  unseen.  It  supposes  something 
presented  to  it,  something  already  discovered  and 
perceived  by  another  organ,  and  its  entire  office  is 
to  hold  it  for  true,  and  to  admit  and  adopt  it.  It 
does  not  suj^ply  its  own  materials,  but  simply  acts 
on  materials  presented  to  it.     We  believe.     The 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  279 

first  question  is,  in  what  ? — something  presented 
to  uSj  through  another  medium.  The  second  ques- 
tion is,  on  what  grounds  ?  and  are  the  grounds 
valid  or  invalid  ?  These  questions — questions  be- 
lono'ins:  altoG;'ether  to  the  understandino- — can  be 
determined  in  no  other  way  than  every  other  act  of 
our  rational  nature  is  determined.  The  mere  fact 
of  consciousness,  without  asking  a  single  question, 
is  sufficient,  we  are  entitled  to  take  our  stand  uj)on 
it,  itself  alone.  If  I  am  conscious  of  a  certain 
thought,  feeling,  state  of  mind,  at  this  moment,  it 
cannot  be  gainsaid.  Nothing  can  be  surer.  But 
the  mere  act  of  faith  is  of  no  value  at  all.  It  de- 
pends entirely  on  the  grounds  on  which  it  is  based 
— whether  they  be  wise  and  valid,  or  the  contrary. 
It  would  be  pure  fanaticism,  utter  irrationality, 
capable  of  every  sort  of  abuse,  to  say,  "  I  believe 
this  or  that,  I  can  give  no  ground  for  it,  but  I  firmly 
believe  it.''  In  no  respect,  can  the  mere  act  of  faith 
be  either  its  own  evidence  or  its  own  ground.  In- 
variably, the  question  must  abide — a  question,  al- 
together, of  the  understanding — believe  in  what  ? 
on  what  grounds  ? 

The  great  difficulty — real  or  imagined — is  in  the 
application  of  the  principles  now  laid  down  to  what 
are  called  "  primary  beliefs,"  the  reality  of  which  I, 
for  one,  most  fully  and  cordially  recognize.  There 
are,  it  is  maintained,  beliefs  or  trusts,  native  to  the 
soul,  immediate,  irresistible,  ultimate  facts,  beyond 


280  CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH. 

wliicli  we  cannot  go.  In  loose,  current  phrase 
there  are  intuitions  of  sense  and  intuitions  of  rea- 
son, including  both  our  j^urely  intellectual  and  our 
moral  intuitions.  I  am  fully  prepared  to  gi'ant,  in 
opposition  to  the  idealist,  that  we  do  put  faith,  and 
are  justified  in  putting  faith,  in  our  sense-percep- 
tions ;  and  in  opjDOsition  to  a  mere  sensational,  ma- 
terialistic^ positive  philosophy,  that  we  do  put  faith, 
and  are  justified  in  putting  faith,  in  the  intuitions 
of  reason  and  conscience  and  in  consciousness,  in 
which  alone,  both  the  higher  and  the  lower  intu- 
itions are  given.  I  hold  that  we  are  so  constituted, 
as  to  entertain  these  primary  beliefs,  and  that  in  spite 
of  seeming  excej)tions,  they  are  immediate,  and  all 
but  irresistible.  But  I  deny  altogether,  that  either 
the  character  or  the  law  of  faith  is  herebj^,  in  any 
respect,  altered.  It  is  still  secondary,  dependent  and 
purely  receptive.  Instead  of  being  its  own  gi'ound, 
it  is  grounded — as  the  mere  statement  of  the  psycho- 
logical facts  shows — in  perception,  or  in  reason,  or  in 
conscience,  and  throughout  in  consciousness.  In- 
stead of  being  arbitrary  and  unaccountable,  instead 
of  being  opj^osed  to  the  higher  reason,  instead  of 
being  even  independent  of  it,  faith,  as  it  respects 
our  j^rimary  beliefs,  is  consciously  sanctioned,  nay 
demanded  by  the  reason,  as  a  necessary  act  of  obe- 
dience. Faith,  in  the  cases  alluded  to,  true  faith, 
is  itself  the  highest  reason,  is  simply  obedience  to 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  2S1 

the  highest  reason  —  the  consummation  and  the 
crowu  of  our  intellectual  activity. 

There  is  even  more.  Our  primary  beliefsj  in  the 
farthest  analysis,  are  capable  of  being  resolved  into 
an  indestructible  conclusion  of  the  understanding. 
The  deep,  inward  ultimate  ground,  understood  and 
felt  by  multitudes  who  cannot  express  it,  in  defi- 
nite words,  is  no  other  than  this — our  perceptions, 
our  intuitions,  our  consciousnesses  must  be  true,  he- 
cause  otherwise  our  nature  is  a  falsehood  and  our 
Creator  a  deceiver.  This  is  the  last  stronoc  refu2:e 
of  faith  in  these  primary  convictions.  AYe  could 
believe  nothing,  if  they  were  not  to  be  believed. 
All  within  us  and  all  around  us,  everywhere,  would 
be  only  delusion  and  mockery.  And  thus  the 
highest  faith  is  resolved  into  a  simple  judgement, 
an  act  of  the  calm,  sober  understandino-. 

But  some  of  the  truths  of  intuition  are  alto- 
gether incomprehensible,  and,  at  least,  this  seems 
not  consistent  with  the  law  of  faith  as  already 
expounded.  The  Unbeginning,  Unending,  Un- 
changing One  is  incomprehensible.  Infinite  dura- 
tion is  incomprehensible,  utterly  incomprehensible. 
But,  it  must  be  remembered  that  all  these  are  data 
of  the  higher  reason,  or  rather,  as  I  venture  to 
think,  inferences  of  the  understanding  from  data 
of  the  reason.  Faith  has  thus  not  onlv  reason  to 
sustain  it,  but  a  double  ground  in  the  understand- 
ing: and   the  reason,   and.    therefore,    legitimately 


282  CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH. 

takes  hold  of,  aj^preliends  that  which  nevertheless 
cannot  be  com-prehended  in  thought.  Even  the 
Bampton  lecturerj  in  luorcls,  sustains  this  issue. 
^'  Keason  itself/'  he  says,  "  rightly  interpreted, 
teaches  the  existence  of  truths  that  are  above  rea- 
son"— that  is,  which  are  imcomprehensible.  And 
again,  "It  is  a  duty  enjoined  by  reason  itself  to 
believe  in  that  which  we  are  unable  to  compre- 
hend." Quite  so  :  ,and,  therefore,  faith  is  mani- 
festly based  on  reason.  We  may  judge  wdth  what 
consistency,  and  in  connection  with  the  words  now 
quoted,  the  lecturer  can  assert,  "  We  thus  learn 
that  the  provinces  of  reason  and  faith  are  not  co- 
extensive." (p.  96.)  But  if,  as  he  had  just  main- 
tained, reason  enjoins  what  faith  obeys,  and  as  in 
the  first  quotation,  if  reason  teaches  what  faith 
adopts,  it  is  showm,  so  far  at  least,  that  their  pro- 
vinces are  co-extensive. 

I  turn  to  the  language  of  Sir  William  Hamilton 
on  this  point,  beautifully  exact  and  true  to  the 
letter.  '^  We  are  thus  taught,"  he  says,  ''  the  salu- 
tary lesson,  that  the  capacity  of  thought  is  not  to 
be  constituted  into  the  measure  of  existencCy  and 
are  warned  from  recognizing  the  domain  of  our 
knowledge  (that  is  our  com-prehension)  as  neces- 
sarily co-extensive  with  the  horizon  of  our  faith." 
He  never  opposes  reason  to  faith,  never  opposes 
even  knowledge  to  faith  ;  but  only  maintains  that 
the  one  extends  beyond  the  other.     The  Bampton 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  283 

lecturer,  on  the  contrary,  speaks  of  ''  The  conflict- 
ing claims  of  reason  and  faith." 

After  describing  the  contradictions  that  arise  out 
of  the  idea  of  the  Infinite  or  Absolute,  he  adds, 
"  This  tells  with  equal  force  against  all  belief  and 
all  unbelief,  and  therefore,  necessitates  the  conclu- 
sion that  belief  cannot  be  determined  solely  by 
reason/'  (p.  59.)  Belief  is  not  always  determined 
by  reasoning,  not  always  by  Icnoioledge  i.  e.  com- 
pre-hen-sion  ;  sometimes  it  has  its  ground  in  in- 
tuition. But  I  have  tried  to  show  that  in  all  cases 
it  must  be  determined,  either  by  the  higher  or  by 
the  lower  reason,  or  by  both.  By  what  else  can  it 
be  determined  ?  There  is  no  single  power  within 
us  and  no  combination  of  powers  apart  from  the 
understanding  and  the  intellect,  through  which 
belief  can  be  produced.  Again,  ''  In  this  impotence 
of  reason,  we  are  compelled  to  take  refuge  in  faith, 
and  to  believe  that  an  Infinite  Being  exists,  though 
we  know  not  how."     (p.  120.) 

It  is  reason  which  impels  or  compels  us  to  be- 
lieve that  an  Infinite  Being  exists.  Instead  of 
fleeing  from  the  one  to  take  refuge  in  the  other,  it 
is  reason  which  in  this  case  teaches  what  faith 
adopts — reason  which  enjoins  what  faith  obeys. 
Instead  of  being  uncongenial  and  irreconcilable, 
the  two  are  in  perfect  harmony,  faith  all  the  while 
leaning  on  reason  for  support.  One  other  passage 
will  sufiice.     "  In  thus  believing  we  desert  the  evi- 


284  CONCERNING   REASON    AND   FAITH. 

dence  of  reason  to  rest  on  that  of  faith  and  of  the 
pnnci2)les  on   which   reason   itself  depends,   it   is 
obviously  impossible  to   have  any  other  guaran- 
tee."— (p.  146.)    We  may,  in  many  instances,  have- 
to  transcend  the  evidence  furnished  by  the  under- 
standing merely.     That  may  be  insufficient.     But 
to  desert  even  this  for  the  evidence  of  faith,  is  to 
abandon  that  which  is  something,  however  inade- 
quate, for  that  which  is  literally  nothing.     By  no 
possibility  can  our  mere  faith  in  anything  furnish 
the  least  evidence  that  the  thing  is  true  and  real  ; 
and  as  for  being  a  guarantee,  and  the  only  guaran- 
tee^ of  the  principles  on   which  reason  itself  de- 
pends, if  there  be  force  in  what  has  been  already 
advanced,  this  must  at  once  be  seen  to  be  the  very 
/       opposite  of  the  truth. 

Graphically  and  beautifully,  faith  is  said  by  an 
inspired  penman,  to  substantiate  things  hoped  for ; 
that  is,  by  its  all-absorbing  force,  to  give  them,  to 
our  sensibilities,  the  solidity  of  a  real  presence. 
Graphically  and  beautifully,  it  is  said,  to  e-vidence 
things  not  seen, — that  is,  to  bring  them  out  into 
clear  light,  and  to  present  them  before  our  eyes. 
But  evidence,  meaning  ^^roo/*  of  its  objects,  in  any 
possible,  intelligible  sense,  it  can  furnish  none. 
The  mere  act  of  believing  or  confiding  in  anything, 
in  itself,  is  of  no  value  at  all.  All  the  value  that 
can  belong  to  it  depends  entirely  on  the  grounds 
on  which  it  is  based.     Faith  merely  takes  hold  of 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  285 

that  which  has  been  seen  to  be  true,  which,  pre- 
viously and  on  other  grounds  has  been  seen  to  be 
true.  It  is  supposed  that,  first  of  all,  we  find  a 
thing  to  be  true  and  trustworthy  ;  whether  it  be 
so  or  not,  actually,  is  still  a  question,  but  the  evi- 
dence, at  least,  has  satisfied  us,  and  on  the  ground 
of  this  we  put  faith  in  it.  Indisputably,  the  faith 
cannot  be  the  proof  of  its  truth. 

It  must  be  acknowledged  that  Hamilton,  in  his 
notes  on  Reid,  employs  language  which  goes  far, 
too  far,  to  support  that  of  the  Bampton  Lecture. 
Two  things,  however,  are  to  be  noted  :  first,  that 
he  does  not  refer  to  faith  in  its  usual  and  general 
meaning,  but  only  to  a  certain  limited  class  of 
beliefs,  those  called  primary,  native,  intuitive  ; 
secondly,  even  these  primary  beliefs  he  does  not 
place  in  opposition  to  reason,  but  only  holds  that 
their  ground,  and  the  ground  of  reason  itself,  lie  in 
something  which  he  conceives  to  be  beyond  reason. 

'^  Reason  itself,"  says  he,  '^  must  rest  at  last 
upon  authority,  for  the  original  data  of  reason  do 
not  rest  on  reason;  but  are  necessarily  accepted  by 
reason,  on  the  authority  of  what  is  beyond  itself."' 
— {Hamilton's  Beid,  p.  760.)  What  authority,  we 
may  ask,  esj^ecially  ask  Hamilton,  is  there  or  can 
there  be  lulthin  us,  superior  to  the  higher  reason  ? 
None.  There  is  no  power  in  our  nature  superior 
or  even  equal  to  this.  And  if  the  authority  re- 
ferred to  be  an  authority,  ah  extra,  that,  first,  can 


286  CONCERNING   REASON   AND    FAITH. 

only  be  reached  by  us  ;  secondly,  can  only  reach, 
us  through  our  reason,  intellectual  or  moral — as  a 
datum  of  this  highest  power  ;  so  that  reason,  even 
in  such  a  case,  is  and  must  be  the  ultimate  ground 
on  which  faith  rests.     And,  besides,  who  is  enti- 
tled to  assert  that  the  data  of  reason  cannot  rest 
on  reason  ?     Do  not  the  data  of  consciousness  rest 
on  consciousness,  on  consciousness  alone  ?     I  am 
conscious   of  this   or  that  thought  in  my  mind. 
Where  is  the  proof  ?     I  know  it.     I  can  have  no 
other  j)roof ;  I  want  no  other.    I  know  it  as  a  fact 
within  me  ;  it  is  enough.    So,  also,  I  am  distinctly 
aware  of  this  or  that  intuition.     I  see  it,  I  read  it, 
as  written  and  laid  up  in  the  locus  2^Ti7icipia7^u7n ; 
my  hio'her  reason  announces  it  as  true.     If  it  be 
suggested,   as  it  may  legitimately  be   suggested, 
that  in  both  of  these  instances  we  can,  in  addition 
to  their  own  proper  ground,  and  do  fall  back  on 
our  nature  and  on  the  great  Being  who  created  it. 
It  is  granted.     The  authority  of  our  Creator  is 
paramount.     He  is   to  be  implicitly  believed  and 
trusted.     But  there  is  a  reason  for  this.     It  is  be- 
cause  even    the   understanding   teaches    that   we 
could  believe  nothing,  unless  we  believed  this.     In 
other  words,  we  come  back  to  the  very  ground  of 
rationality.     The  principle  which  we  adopt  in  this 
case  is  one  which  the  understanding  and  the  intel- 
lect not  only  sanction  but  demand.     This  faith  is 
faith  altogether  grounded  in  reason. 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  287 

"  In  the  last  resort/'  Hamilton  adds,  "  we  must, 
perforce,  philosophically  admit  that  belief  is  the 
primary  condition  of  reason,  not  reason  the  ulti- 
mate gTound  of  belief"  (p.  760.)  By  no  means  ; 
for,  when  we  accept  the  data  of  reason,  it  is  be- 
cause we  have  ground  in  our  nature  and  in  Him 
who  created  it  for  believing  that  these  data  are 
true,  because  we  are  satisfied  that  the  reason  which 
furnishes  these  data  legitimately  deserves  our  faith. 
Again,  Hamilton  adds  :  "  We  are  compelled  to 
surrender  the  proud  intellige  ut  credas  of  Abelard, 
to  content  ourselves  with  the  humble  crede  ut  in- 
telligas  of  Anselm."  (p.  760.)  But  why  may  not 
both  maxims  be  profoundly  and  equally  true  ?  I 
hold  that  they  are.  We  should  err  egregiously  by 
adopting  the  first  alone,  but  not  less  egregiously 
should  we  err  by  adopting  the  second  alone.  Both 
togiether  must  be  taken  in  order  to  reach  the  whole 
truth.  Examine,  search  j)atiently,  get  to  under- 
stand and  know,  in  order  that  you  may  enlighten- 
edly  adopt.  On  the  other  hand,  accept  what  the 
higher  reason  announces,  in  order  that  you  may  pon- 
der it,  penetrate  it,  and  understand  it  as  far  as  it 
can  be  understood.  It  is  even  j)ossible  to  put  An- 
selm's  maxim  in  a  higher  and  more  modest  form 
still,  than  he  gave  it,  crede,  etiamsi  non  intelligas — 
etiamsi  mmquam  intellecturus  sis.  Some  of  the 
data  of  reason  are  incomprehensible  by  the  under- 
standing.    But  they  are  true  ;  the  ground  of  the 


288  CONCEKNING   REASON    AND   FAITH. 

reason  whereon  they  stand  is  sufficient  basis  for 
theui  to  rest  upon,  though  to  their  full  and  grand 
compass  of  meaning  we  shall  never  be  able  to 
reach. 

The  general  results  at  which  we  have  arrived  are 
these.  First  of  all,  we  put  faith  in  the  conclusions 
of  the  understanding  ;  and  these,  of  course,  may 
be  right  or  they  may  be  wrong.  But  we  believe 
that  which  we  think  we  understand  and  because 
we  understand  it,  and  only  so  far  as  we  understand 
it,  our  knowledge  being  both  the  basis  and  the 
measure  of  our  faith.  Secondly,  we  put  faith  in 
the  intuitions,  first,  of  sense,  and  second  of  reason, 
intellectual  and  moral.  And  lastly,  we  put  faith 
in  consciousness,  the  witness  alike  of  our  intui- 
tions and  of  all  our  acts  of  knowledge.  Throuo;h- 
out,  in  all  cases,  the  ground  of  faith  is  either  the 
understanding,  or  the  higher  reason,  or  both.  Our 
mere  faith  itself  determines  nothing,  j)roves  noth- 
ing. Its  worth  or  w^orthlessness  depends  entirely 
on  the  character  of  its  grounds.  Universally,  the 
question  must  be  put,  Are  these  grounds  wise, 
right,  sufficient  .^  in  one  word,  are  they  rational. 

There  remains  one  possible  source,  wdiich  the 
Bampton  lecturer  seems  to  have  had  chiefly  in  his 
thought,  whence  the  materials  of  belief  or  faith 
may  be  de-riv-ed.  That  source  is  written  revela- 
tion. With  many  of  the  questions  here  arising, 
most  of   which  belong  exclusively  to  the  under- 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  289 

standing,  the  logical  understanding,  the  faculty  of 
judgment,  we  have  nothing  to  do.  For  example, 
by  what  external  marks,  seals  and  proofs,  that 
w^hich  claims  to  be  from  heaven,  evinces  itself  in- 
dis2)utably  to  be  so,  is  not  a  question  for  us.  So 
also,  by  v>'hat  canons  of  criticism,  what  principles 
and  modes  of  interpretation,  w^e  are  to  be  guided 
in  dealing  with  what  is  written,  so  as  most  surely 
to  reach  its  true  meaning  and  to  determine  the  sense 
of  disputed  texts,  are  not  questions  for  us.  By  the 
way,  only  by  the  way,  there  is  one  canon,  to  which, 
inasmuch  as  it  is  perfectly  general  and  has  a  pe- 
culiar recommendation,  I  may  give  prominence. 
If  we  attach  weight  to  the  authority  of  Butler, 
we  shall  ponder  his  deliberately  expressed  verdict, 
already  quoted  :  ''None  of  these  precepts'' — dis- 
puted precepts  in  the  Old  Testament — "  are  con- 
traiy  to  immutable  morality.  If  it  were  com- 
manded to  cultivate  the  principles  and  act  in 
the  sp)irit  of  treachery,  ingratitude,  cruelty,  the 
command  would  not  alter  the  nature  of  the 
case  or  of  the  action,  in  any  of  these  instances.'' 
I  say,  we  shall  ponder  his  words  and  shall  learn 
from  him  to  lay  it  dow^n  as  one  of  the  fixed  laws 
of  interpretation,  that  that  cannot  be  divine,  which 
is  in  the  face  of  the  immutable  principles  of  reason 
and  conscience.  Should  any  sacred  text  seem  to 
contradict  these  principles,  we  may  doubt  our  in- 
terpretation of  the  text,  we  may,  we  must  dismiss 


290  CO^'CERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH. 

that  interpretation  as  certainly  false,  but  we  may 
not,  must  not  for  a  moment  suffer  the  faintest  sus- 
picion of  these  principles  to  darken  our  minds. 
Revelation  may  make  known  that  which  neither 
unaided  reason  nor  conscience  has  ever  uttered. 
Revelation  may  announce  that  which  is  far  beyond 
and  above  all  intimations  from  within,  may  an- 
nounce even  that  which  transcends  the  comprehen- 
sion of  the  finite  mind.  But  w^hat  is  in  manifest 
contradiction  to  the  immutable  princijDles  of  moral- 
ity, revelation  never  can  promulgate,  for  this  would 
be  to  make  the  Great  Being  contradict  himself 
All  this,  by  the  way.  Such  matters  do  not  fall 
within  our  proper  sphere. 

What  we  have  to  suppose  is  this,  the  conviction 
lodged  in  a  human  mind  that  certain  words  express 
a  real  message  from  the  Almighty,  and  that  the 
message  conveys  such  or  such  a  distinct  meaning  ; 
the  result  is  a  firm  belief  in  this  meaning,  as  the 
very  thought  of  the  Supreme.  What  is  the  nature 
of  this  belief  or  faith  and  on  what  is  it  grounded  ? 
In  reference  to  the  preliminary  stages  which  lead 
to  this  final  result,  there  is  no  room  for  difference 
of  opinion.  For  example,  manifestly,  it  may  be 
true  or  it  may  be  false,  that  there  is  a  divine  voice 
in  certain  words.  We  may  have  come  to  a  right 
or  to  a  wrong  conclusion  on  this  point.  It  is  cer- 
tainly one  which  can  be  ascertained  only  through 
the  processes  of  the  understanding,  or  through  the 


CONCERNING   REASON   AND   FAITH.  291 

intuitions  of  reason,  or  through  both.  In  like 
manner  it  may  be  true  or  it  may  be  false,  that  the 
meaning  which  tue  have  attached  to  the  Divine 
voice  is  the  correct  one.  We  may  have  come  to  a 
right  or  to  a  wrong  conclusion  on  this  point.  It 
is  certainly  one  which  can  be  ascertained  only  in 
the  exercise  of  the  common  faculty  of  judgment. 
Thus  far  the  act  of  our  minds  is  manifestly 
grounded  in  reason.  But  does  the  faith  which  we 
repose  in  the  ideas  which  we  have  thus  reached, 
demand  quite  a  new  exposition.  It  is  faith  no 
longer  in  man,  no  longer  in  ourselves,  no  longer  in 
reason,  but  in  the  immediate  word  of  the  Supreme. 
Be  it  so.  Certainly,  the  mental  act  does  terminate 
in  the  G-reat  Being,  as  its  object,  and  there  reposes 
with  confidence.  But  why  ?  Unaccountably  ? 
arbitrarily  ?  in  a  way  of  which  no  explanation  can 
be  given  ?  No.  But  because,  simply  and  only 
because  the  understanding,  the  intellect  and  the 
conscience  unite  in  announcing  it  as  their  impera- 
tive demand,  that,  of  all  things.  He  is  to  be  be- 
lieved. Here  and  everywhere,  true  faith  is 
grounded  in  reason.  It  can  be  grounded  in 
nothing  else. 

It  is  possible,  legitimately  to  extend  the  idea  of 
supernatural  communication,  beyond  the  limits  of 
the  sacred  text.  Philosophy  at  least  has  nothino- 
to  object  against  this  extension.  The  daemon  of 
Socrates   contains   the   germ   of   an   imperishable 


292  CONCERNING   REASON    AND    FAITH. 

truth.  There  is  a  widely  extended  belief  in  the 
direct  intercourse — altogether  mysterious  and  in- 
comprehensible as  it  is — of  the  Infinite  with  the 
finite  mind.  The  idea  is  inexpressibly  healing  and 
strengthening,  that  the  great  speaker,  unheard  by 
the  outward  ear  ;  and  the  great  worker,  unseen  by 
the  outward  eye — the  speaker  to  minds,  the  worker 
in  minds — ceaseless,  universal,  impartial  in  his  in- 
fluence, is  the  Creator  and  Father  of  men.  Where 
a  human  mind  is  found,  His  secret  voice  is  never 
silent.  His  invisible  energy  is  never  at  rest.  It 
ajDpears  to  be  in  harmony  with  the  soundest  phi- 
losophy to  believe  that  the  unspoken  word  of  the 
Eternal  is  heard — might  be  heard  far  oftener  than 
it  is — within  the  individual  soul. 

But  does  not  this  give  scope  to  unlimited  delu- 
sion ?  Certainly,  in  some  aspects  it  seems  to  do 
so.  Our  own  mere  notions,  our  morbid,  super- 
stitious feelings,  the  wild  dreams  of  our  imagina- 
tions, may  be  taken  for  intimations  from  heaven. 
But  I  may  venture  to  suggest  that  the  evil  is  by 
no  means  peculiar.  It  is  only  precisely  of  the  same 
kind,  with  that  which  befalls  the  outward  written 
revelation.  Men  put  their  own  fanciful  capricious, 
prejudiced  interpretations  on  it ;  and  difierent  in- 
dividuals in  difierent  conditions  of  mind,  bring  out 
the  most  o^^posite  senses  from  it.  In  either  case, 
whether  from  without,  or  from  within,  it  is  only 
by   the  reverent,  the  reflecting,   the  modest  soul, 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  293 

that  the  Divine  voice  is  rightly  interpreted.  Be  it 
ever  remembered  that,  whether  there  be  a  Divine 
voice  at  all,  and  what  its  true  meaning  is,  are  ques- 
tions to  be  determined  only  by  the  judgment,  ques- 
tions, therefore,  to  which  in  all  cases  we  may  give 
a  right  or  a  wrong  reply.  But  supposing  them  an- 
swered satisfactorily,  faith  terminates  in  this  case 
as  in  the  former,  in  the  Great  Being  himself,  as  its 
object,  and  there  reposes  with  confidence.  But 
w4iy  ?  Not  unaccountably,  not  arbitrarily.  No  ! 
but  because,  sim23ly  and  only  because,  the  under- 
standing, the  intellect  and  the  conscience  unite  in 
announcing  it  to  us  as  their  imperative  demand, 
that  of  all  things,  He  is  to  be  believed.  Here  and 
everywhere,  true  faith  is  grounded  in  reason.  It 
can  be  grounded  in  nothing  else.* 

*  I  am  glad  to  be  able  to  confirm  the  general  issue  at  which  we 
have  arrived,  by  the  authority  of  a  recent  work  which  forms  a  most 
valuable  contribution  to  sound  philosophy,  Dr.  McCosh's  Intuiiions 
of  the  Mind.  "  All  allowable  faith  has  thus  ever  the  sanction  of 
reason,  and  in  some  cases,  it  is  the  issue  of  a  consequential  reason- 
ing. Faith  is  thus  liable  to  be  tested,  even  as  reason  Ls ;  nor  are 
we  at  liberty  to  lay  reason  aside  on  the  pretence  of  following  a  faith 
which  will  not  allow  itself  to  be  examined."  (p.  422.)  "We  should 
not  place  ourselves  for  one  hour,  under  the  guidance  of  a  faith 
which  has  no  evidence  to  furnish.  There  cannot  be  a  more  peril- 
ous advice  than  that  which  has  been  given  by  certain  parties  to 
the  doubting  and  inquiring,  when  they  exhort  them  to  force  them- 
selves to  believe,  though  as  yet  they  feel  that  they  have  no  con- 
vincing evidence,  or  to  profess  a  creed,  in  order  to  get  one,  as  they 
fall  in  with  evidence  in  advancing.  It  will  be  seen  at  once,  where- 
in this  case  differs  from  the  other  previously  put.  In  the  one,  we 
walk  with  reason,  from   the   beginning,   though  we  do  not  know 


294      CONCERNING  REASON  AND  FAITH. 

It  is  a  disastrous  blunder  to  cast  suspicion  and  dis- 
honor on  any  of  the  powers  with  which  our  nature 
is  endowed,  and  to  set  them  one  against  the  other,  as 
natural  enemies.  It  amounts  to  an  indirect  impeach- 
ment of  the  Creator.  True,  there  are  foolish  and 
proud  worshippers  of  human  intelligence,  as  if  it 
were  almost  independent  of  the  Being  who  inspired 
it  ;  conceited,  petulant,  shallow  and  empty  praters, 
who  will  own  no  authority  higher  than  their  own 
judgment,  and  who,  in  effect,  make  their  knowl- 
edge the  measure  of  everything  visible  and  invisi- 
ble, human  and  Divine.  All  the  greatest  thinkers 
of  the  world  exclaim  with  one  voice  against  such 
rationalism  as  this,  and  denounce  it,  as  of  all  things 
the  most  irrational.  Sir  William  Hamilton  pro- 
duces a  marvellous  host  of  confessors,  not  to  knowl- 
edge, but  to  ignorance,  to  their  own  ignorance  and 
the  ignorance  of  their  race  ;  confessors  selected  from 
all  ages,  countries,  and  schools.  Our  highest 
knowledge  only  deepens  the  conviction  that  we 
know  nothing  jyerfecthj^  nothing  in  all  its  ramifi- 
cations and  relatio7is.  But  we  do  know  neverthe- 
less, and  this  is  the  fact  which  is  injuriously,  fatally 
overlooked  on  the  other  side.  We  do  know,  and 
are  sure  that  we  are  able  to  know,  and  shall  know 

whither  it  may  lead  us ;  in  the  other,  we  are  without  reason,  from 
the  beginning  and  cannot  expect  reason  to  aid  us  in  our  difficulties. 
In  the  one,  we  set  out  with  light  and  wait  for  more ;  in  the  other, 
we  set  out  without  light,  and  necessarily  at  random,  and  if  we  fall 
in  with  light,  it  must  be  by  the  purest  accident."  (p.  425.) 


OOXCERNIXG    REASON    AND    FAITH.  295 

raore  and  yet  morej  ever  and  ever  more  ;  and  our 
knowledge,  though  always  limited,  is  real  and  reli- 
able, so  far  as  it  reaches. 

It  is  neither  right  nor  wise,  to  decry  the  under- 
standing on  all  occasions,  and  by  all  possible  means. 
The  habit  grows  by  indulgence,  and  degenerates  at 
last  into  a  most  offensive  species  of  cant,  the  cant 
of  reverence  and  humilitv.  "  The  human  mind  is 
feeble  and  erring,  never  to  be  relied  upon,  always 
and  only  to  be  distrusted."  Such  is  the  kind  of 
language  which  many  are  wont  to  use.  What  piety 
there  may  be  in  this  mood  of  mind,  I  shall  not 
take  it  upon  me  to  judge  ;  but  unquestionably  the 
quality  of  wisdom  is  greatly  lacking  in  it.  That 
very  conclusion  which,  with  such  solemnity  and 
sadness,  is  affirmed  by  those  who  take  a  pleasure  in 
defaming  themselves,  is  nothing  more  than  the 
verdict  of  theii'  understanding.  It  appears  that 
even  they  can  place  some  confidence  in  this  power 
after  all.  Distrusting  it  in  all  other  cases,  they 
entirely  trust  it  in  this  case,  when  it  judges  that  it 
is  not  to  be  trusted. 

Our  nature  is  limited,  all  our  faculties  are  lim- 
ited, just  as  certainly  as  they  are  created.  The  one 
condition  is  only  the  other,  in  a  different  phrase. 
On  all  sides,  in  relation  to  every  subject  of  thought, 
that  which  we  know,  stretches  onward  to  that 
which  we  cannot  know,  wdiich  is  illimitable  and 
incomprehensible.    Our  powder  of  judgment  is  finite 


296     CONCERNING  REASON  AND  FAITH. 

and  demands  constant  caution  in  its  exercise,  lest 
we  adopt  that  which  is  eiToneous.  But  true  rever- 
ence and  true  humility  would  teach  us  to  connect 
this  fact,  with  a  high  and  sacred  responsibility.  Be 
it  as  it  may,  the  undei'^tanding  is  our  Creator's  gift 
to  us.  It  is  the  instrument  with  "which  he  has 
furnished  us,  the  only  instrument  wdth  w^hich  he 
has  furnished  us  for  forming  a  judgment  at  all,  and 
for  reaching  a  conclusion  wdth  respect  to  anything. 
By  all  means  let  its  exercise  be  guarded  by  perpet- 
ual caution,  and  by  a  modest  diffidence  ;  but  let 
the  power  itself  be  reverenced  and  trusted  for  its 
Great  Author's  sake,  and  from  a  faith  in  his  benig- 
nant and  wise  design. 

The  great  fault,  the  vice  of  our  age,  it  appears 
to  me  does  not  lie  on  the  side  of  over- valuing  the 
2)0wers  of  the  human  mind,  though  that  has  its 
dangers,  formidable  both  in  character  and  in  num- 
ber. It  lies,  I  venture  to  judge,  in  exactly  the  op- 
posite direction  ;  it  consists  in  the  wdde  neglect  of 
the  free  exercise  of  the  understanding,  especially  in 
the  most  sacred  sphere  of  thought.  This  power  is 
often  described,  as  if  it  were  only  or  chiefly  a  temp- 
tation and  a  snare.  Manifold  evils  are  traced  back 
to  it  as  their  dark  fountain,  and  the  most  dispar- 
aging epithets  are  used  to  destroy  all  reverence  for 
it.  In  utter  contempt,  but  very  ignorantly,  it  is 
taunted  as  the  logical  understanding  and  the  mean- 
ing is,  that  it  is  useless-at  the  best,  save  for  split- 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  297 

ting  of  hairs,  subtle,  finical,  hard,  and  cold.  Faith,  \ 
on  the  other  hand,  is  exalted  as  a  lofty  virtue,  inde- 
pendent of  the  understanding,  and  even  opposed  to 
it.  It  is  hardly  an  exaggeration  to  affiim,  that  if 
men  were  to  think  of  the  organ  of  outward  vision, 
as  many  certainly  do  think  of  their  mental  faculty 
of  perception,  we  should  meet  them  with  their  eyes 
fast  closed  or  protected  by  some  opaque  covering  to 
save  them  from  the  danger  of  seeing. 

Multitudes  of  intelligent  persons  reach  their  re- 
ligious creed,  scarcely  at  all,  through  inquiring  and 
judging.  They  have  been  born  to  it ;  or,  in  a 
period  of  inward  disturbance  and  fear,  they  have 
rushed  to  it  for  shelter.  And  all,  or  nearly  all, 
with  whom  they  mingle,  have  accepted  the  same 
formulae.  They  themselves,  besides,  have  read  on 
the  subject,  and  are  not  destitute  of  considerable 
information  respecting  it.  That  is  virtually  the 
whole  matter.  Nothing  more.  And  what  they,  in 
this  manner,  reach,  they  continue  to  keep,  through 
the  same  means.  Some  conflicting  thoughts,  some 
unpleasant  misgivings,  they  are  occasionally  con- 
scious of,  but  these  are  never  fairly  met  and  im- 
partially dealt  with.  They  are  simply  set  aside. 
The  fear  is,  that  by  another  course,  their  adopted 
creed  would  be  endangered.  But,  wherefore,  should 
it  ?  After  the  closest  examination,  impartially 
conducted,  a  true  faith  must  remain  essentially 
unchanged.     But  with  or  without  change  in  the 

13 


298  CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH. 

articles  of  a  creed,  this  noble  effect  would  follow — 
we  should  be  stronger  and  freer  by  honest  investi- 
gation, and  should  be  impelled  to  illimitable  pro- 
gress in  the  path  of  reverent  obedience  to  the  laws 
of  our  nature,  and  to  Him  who  established  them. 
Is  this  effect  rare  ?     It  is  so,  simply  because  the 
only  method  of  reaching  it  is  so  widely  neglected. 
Free,  independent  inquiry,   a  disposition  to  look 
impartially  on  all  sides,  and  a  resolute  purpose  to 
adopt  only  that  which  in  all  honesty  we  judge  to  be 
true,  vast  multitudes,  undeniably,  know  nothing  of 
this,  and  never  have  known  it.     In  the  sphere  of 
religion,  as  well  as  in  other  spheres,  perhaps  more 
than  in  any  other  sphere,  men   think  in  masses, 
think  with  their  party.     That  simply  means  that 
they  do  not  think  at  all.     It  is  an  affair  of  imita- 
tion, of  social  influence,  of  outward  circumstances. 
The  old  saying  has  gTown  out  of  use,  and  would 
hardly  be  endorsed  in  these  days,  ^'  He  who  hath 
never  doubted,  hath  never  truly  believed."     Free 
thinking  has  become  synonymous  with  infidelity, 
as  if  thinking,  which  was  not  perfectly  free,  could 
justly  be  of  the  smallest  value  in  the  sight  of  man 
or  God. 

The  wav  in  which  truth  reaches  the  mind  is 
hardly  less  im^^ortant  than  the  truth  itself  which 
is  accepted.  The  very  process  of  honestly  exerting 
the  powers  of  our  rational  nature,  of  inquiring  and 
judging  impartially,  the  very  process  is  vitalizing, 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  299 

invigorating  and  healing.  That  which  is  true, 
greatly  true,  may  settle  on  the  surface  of  the 
mind  as  a  foreign  deposit,  successive  depositions 
may  gather  above  the  first  stratum,  and  the  whole 
may  form  a  mere  inert  accretion,  never  piercing 
down  at  all  into  the  spiritual  nature,  to  arouse  and 
quicken  it,  and  to  work  within  it,  as  a  vital  force. 
We  are  afraid  of  error,  and  with  just  cause.  But 
there  is  something  else  of  which  we  have  quite  as 
just  cause  to  be  afraid.  The  design  of  our  mental 
structure  is  unmistakable.  We  are  constituted  to 
inquire,  to  examine,  and  to  search  out  truth  for 
ourselves.  In  our  very  structure,  our  Maker  an- 
nounces his  will,  that  we  should  faithfully  exercise 
the  power  of  judgment  with  which  he  has  endowed 
us,  on  everything  which  appeals  to  us,  and  that 
without  fear  or  favor,  shaking  off  all  thought  of 
consequence,  and  every  influence  that  might  either 
deter  or  ensnare,  we  should  determine  for  ourselves, 
according  to  our  best  ability,  what  is  true,  and 
how  far  it  is  true.  But,  independent  thinking,  in 
the  sphere  of  religion,  at  all  events,  the  habit  of 
independent  thinking  is  little  known,  so  little,  that 
where,  in  any  instance,  it  rises  into  prominence,  it 
is  viewed  with  suspicion  and  fear,  as  a  thing  which 
can  conduct  only  to  evil.  Error  may  be,  it  often 
is,  crime.  But  there  is  one  thing  which  always, 
and  certainly  is,  crime,  to  pour  habitual  contempt 
on  our  Maker,  by  refusing  to  put  forth  the  powers 


300  CONCERNING    REASON    AND   FAITH. 

with  which  he  has  endowed  us,  on  the  highest  and 
grandest  subjects,  which  can  occupy  them. 

It  is  altogether  a  mistake,  to  imagine  that  we 
endanger  faith  by  doing  simple  justice  to  the  un- 
derstanding. The  marvellous,  almost  mysterious 
power  ever  maintains  its  lofty  place  in  our  spirit- 
ual being.  As  an  inscrutable,  internal  force — a 
force  for  action  and  for  suffering — it  has  enkin- 
dled, when  depicted  by  a  genial  soul,  more  than 
human  eloquence,  it  has  breathed  a  deeper  glow 
into  the  fire  of  insj^iration  itself.  Verily,  faith 
hath  removed  mountains.  It  hath  sublimated, 
glorified,  almost  deified  humanity.  Men  have 
done  and  endured  things  nearly  incredible  through 
this  wondrous  power.  But  the  startling  fact  must 
not  be  overlooked,  that  these  incredible  things 
have  often  been  irrespective  of  the  rightness  or  the 
wrongness  of  the  principles  which  were  held  and 
trusted  in,  by  the  doers  of  them.  A  false  as  well  as 
D.  true  creed  has  had  its  conquering  heroes  and  its 
self-sacrificing  martyrs.  Truth  and  error  are  not 
ascertained  by  succcessful  daring  and  by  heroic 
suffering.  The  grounds  of  faith  are  ever  perfectly 
distinct  from  its  effects  in  this  relation,  and  its 
grounds  alone  determine  its  cliaracter,  as  wise  or 
unwise,  right  or  wrong.  But  faith  itself,  grounded 
in  whatsoever  it  may,  the  principle  is  strength. 
It  is  not  an  eye  to  see  ;  it  may  be  bhnd,  or  the 
light  it  follows  may  be  a  false  light.     But  it  is  a 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  301 

a  hand  to  grasp.  And  even  if  the  grasp  inclose 
nothing  or  a  lie,  the  grctsp  is  mighty.  It  may  be 
such  tremendous  tension  and  fixture  of  the  whole 
frame,  such  vice-like,  prodigious  compression,  such 
superhuman  excitement  and  concentration  of  all 
the  physical  and  all  the  mental  energies,  that  it 
shall  do  the  work  of  a  minor  Omnipotence. 

The  spirit  of  faith,  however,  we  may  estimate 
the  relative  worth  of  the  faculty  ;  the  disposition 
to  believe  and  trust  is  always  a  beautiful  sign  of 
moral  health.  The  unsuspicious,  ingenuous,  gener- 
ous, open  soul  is  in  the  normal  state  of  nature. 
We  are  formed  to  believe  and  confide.  The  first 
years  of  rational  life  on  earth  are  marked  by  un- 
limited dependence  on  the  one  hand,  and  unlimited 
trust  on  the  other  hand.  We  believe  and  confide 
in  our  own  powers,  in  other  living  beings  with 
whom  we  come  in  contact,  and  in  the  great,  mute 
symbols  of  nature  around  us.  It  belongs  to  our 
structure.  We  are  so  made  and  constituted.  The 
chief  and  most  beautiful  characteristic  of  childhood 
is  immense,  almost  unreserved  receptivity  and 
trustfulness.  Suspicion  in  a  child  is  an  unnatural 
vice.  But  what  would  be  vice  in  this  period  be- 
comes a  virtue  in  one  more  mature,  becomes  a  ne- 
cessity. There  are  powers  within  us,  slowly  devel- 
oped, whose  very  office  it  is  to  guard,  to  direct,  and 
to  govern  faith,  to  forbid  or  to  command  its  exer- 
cise.    That  which  was  at  first  a  mere  tendency, 


302  CONCERNING   REASON    AND    FAITH. 

a  spontaneouSj  almost  involuntary  disposition,  is 
meant  to  become  a  regulated  principle,  filling  its 
own  place  in  the  liarmony  and  order  of  our  inward 
beins:,  in  obedience  to  the  laws  which  have  been 
established  to  guide  its  action.  As  we  advance  to- 
wards maturity  of  intelligence  and  of  moral  worth, 
every  exercise  of  faith  becomes  more  consciously 
dependent  on  the  higher,  controlling  powers  of  the 
soul.  But  it  is  just,  therefore,  only  the  stronger, 
the  more  secure,  and  often  the  more  rapturous. 

There  is  no  discord  between  the  understanding 
and  even  the  loftiest  movements  of  a  legitimate 
faith.  The  mere  judging  faculty  sanctions,  even 
enjoins  consent  to  that  which  itself  could  never 
have  reached,  and  can  never  comprehend.  It  recog- 
nizes the  trustworthiness  of  the  Supreme,  and  com- 
mands unqualified  reception  of  whatever  issues  from 
his  authority.  It  recognizes,  besides,  even  in  man, 
a  power  far  above  itself,  whose  data  it  must  simply 
accept  and  dare  not  question.  Between  a  true 
faith  and  the  higher  reason^  intellectual  and  moral, 
the  harmony  is  entire.  Whatever  in  written  in- 
spiration, whatever  in  external  nature,  whatever  in 
spiritual  providence,  whatever  in  the  depths  of  the 
soul  itself  is  distinctively  from  above,  appeals,  of 
right,  to  the  reason  and  the  conscience,  and  appeals 
not  in  vain.  This  is  it,  in  our  nature,  which  is 
constituted  to  take  hold  of  the  Divine,  which  is  the 
special  organ  of  the  Divine,  through  which  we  as- 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  303 

cend  to  the  Great  Being,  and  his  thoughts  and  the 
sense  of  his  presence  descend  to  enter  us.  To  con- 
temn the  understanding,  and  neglect  its  free  exer- 
cise, is  crime  ;  but  to  dishonor  the  higher  reason, 
the  Divine  faculty,  the  only  organ  through  which 
our  Maker  can  speak  with  us,  and  we  can  reach  our 
Maker,  is  crime,  more  flagrant  still. 

"  Read — within  V  is  the  audible  command  of 
his  own  mind,  to  every  human  being — "  Read — 
ivithin  !''  Go  down  to  the  deep  place  of  intuitions, 
which  own  no  earthly  fountain  !  Search,  Look, 
Gaze,  Try  to  detect  and  decipher  the  mysterious 
writing  on  the  primitive  tablets  of  the  soul,  Avhich 
no  created  hand  has  traced  !  Listen,  also  !  in  that 
profoundest,  sacredest  adytum — away  from  all 
outer  sounds,  which  derange  and  dull  the  organ  of 
hearing,  wait  for  the  faintest  whisperings  of  the 
holy  oracle  ?  Look  and  Listen,  Wait  and  Gaze, 
long,  patiently,  painfully  !  The  oracle  luill  utter 
itself,  the  hidden,  holy  writing  loill  shine  out,  and 
some  divine  letters,  words,  sentences  will  become 
legible  to  the  eye  !  Nor  can  this  do  other  than 
prompt  and  help  the  study,  not  less,  but  more 
eager,  and  humble,  and  reverent,  of  the  pages  of 
the  outward  inspiration.  That,  like  another  mys- 
tic Shekinah,  will  illumine  the  deep  adytum  and 
suftuse  it  with  a  diviner  glory.  But  whether  in 
the  first,  more  dim,  mysterious  light,  or  in  the 
later,  brighter  efi'ulgence,  Reason  is  the  eye  of  the 


304  CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH. 

.soul,  wliich  Faith  BiibTiiiKsivcly  .'ind  joyously  fol- 
lowH.  What  the  one  deHcrics,  the  other  accepts. 
The  two  arc  one ;  at  least  a  harmony,  if  not  a 
unity. 

Calm,  eager,  piercing  is  ihv.  gaze  of  llcason.  Jt 
is  the  eye  of  profound,  abstracted  contem])lation, 
now  turned  downward  to  tlu^  dee})est  depths  of  tlio 
being  and  again  lii'ted  up  to  the  S])here  of  the  Eter- 
nal, that  it  may  Jiiid  what  is  writt(ui  in  the  one, 
inter[)reted  juid  coniirmed  by  the  other.  There  are 
select  moments  in  the  mental  history,  sacred  to  the 
higher  reason,  when  it  is  not  so  much  exerted  by  us, 
as  visited,  indepeiKh^ntly  of  eifort  on  our  ])art,  with 
wondrous  illumination.  It  is  not  an  ehiborative,  but 
a  luiicly  receptive,  at  the  most,  a  contemplative 
faculty.  'J'here  are  select  moments,  when  its  receji- 
tivc  ])()wer  and  the  positive  impartations  made  to  it 
and  the  openings  into  the  unknown,  through  which 
it  may  gaze,  all  are  extraordinary.  It  may  be  with 
the  volume  of  inspiration  before  us  and  its  holy 
teachings  lifting  up  our  minds — it  may  be,  in  the 
secret  cluunber,  wlicn  avc  are  upon  our  knees,  be- 
fore tlu^  ''All-seeing" — it  may  boon  the  lone  moun- 
tain or  ill  the  deep  forest  wild — it  ma,y  be,  in  th(^ 
silence  and  outspread  darkness  of  midnight — ak)ne, 
iar  from  human  lellowshii)  !  The  eye  of  Iveason 
sweei)S  the  horizon  all  around,  and  the  whole  ex- 
])anse  of  ih('  concave,  overhead.  Like  as  some 
absorbcnl    worshi})per   of   science,    in   his   solitary 


CONCERNING    REASON    AND    FAITH.  305 

tower  of  obsorvation,  while  all  the  world  is  asleep, 
directs  his  telescope,  now  to  one  qnarter  of  the 
heavens  and  a<;ain  to  another  ;  the  eye  of  the 
s])iritual  seer,  the  spiritual  seeker,  gazes  forth  and 
upward.  Thus  it  may  have  gazed,  often  and  long, 
but  in  vain.  At  lenirtli,  the  inoniont  comes  when 
a  single,  brilliant,  glittering,  spark-point,  like  a 
precious  star,  a  solitary  jewel  on  the  brow  of  night, 
is  described.  Perhaps  another  glints  out  and  per- 
haps even  another  still.  It  is  rapture,  worth  all 
the  gazing,  and  w\aiting,  and  watching,  and  dis- 
appointment, and  frequent  sickness  of  heart  ! 

Wait  on  !  Brave  soul — seeker  after  imperish- 
able eternal  truth  !  Light  is  worth  waiting  for. 
It  shall  spring  up.  More  and  yet  more  shall  break 
forth,  to  the  upward,  eager  eye.  But  the  realm 
of  the  darkness  is  vast,  the  points  of  light  are  few. 
We  anticipate,  we  long  for  another  state  of  being. 
(Shall  there  ever  be  to  us  an  atmosphere  without 
clouds,  a  day  to  which  there  is  no  light  ?  ^'  In 
T/nj  Light— 'Thou  Eternal  Fount'— we  shall  see 
Light  !" 


THE   END. 


